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Every author will claim that his or her book will cast light on aspects of the
chosen topic not previously illuminated by his (or her—to be understood
throughout) precursors. Where then are the dark unexplored recesses of the
underground world that justify the promised light at the end of the tunnel of
this present account?
The immediate spur to writing this book is that the author has lived and
worked through a period of revolutionary change in tunnelling, with several
components:
 
• change from traditional craft to technological art;
• spectacular advances in site investigation techniques and in geotechnical
analysis;
• great strides in technological development in all aspects of tunnel
construction;
• emphasis on the teachable elements of science applied to tunnelling;
• recognition of the interplay of opposites: opportunity and risk, in the
development of tunnelling strategies;
• institutional recognition of tunnelling as a specific branch of engineering.
 
But costly mistakes—possibly costing more than the original estimate of
the project—are now more common occurrences, usually of a foreseeable
and preventable nature. Overall, therefore, the industry is nowhere near
optimum potential, to the frustration of those who work in it, the
wasting of personal effort, the thwarting of the objectives of the
promoters of projects who, in the most egregious failures, have
themselves through lack of understanding established conditions
unconducive to success. Where lawyers earn far more from the failure of
projects than do the most skilled engineers from success, clearly there are
fundamental systemic faults.
From the surface, no single explanation for this contradictory situation is
apparent but deeper digging indicates a common set of system failures. A
primary purpose of this book is therefore to see tunnelling as a system and to
develop principles for success based on effective understanding and
operation of the system of interplay of specific tunnelling skills.
The views expressed in this book are the author’s own but he
acknowledges his debt to his many immediate colleagues in Halcrow and to
so many tunnellers and others around the world for several of the thoughts
which have prompted the book. The author accepts full responsibility for
any misunderstanding. The account may be criticised as unduly orientated
towards the British and European examples. This is justified by selecting
examples for which the circumstances are generally familiar; lessons learned
may well have more universal application. The Channel Tunnel, for
example, provides many examples of meritorious engineering with less
meritorious management. An exemplary account of its engineering geology





Against each symbol is a brief definition and a reference to the most
appropriate Section or Appendix of the book for further explanation.
a major semi-diameter of ellipse 9.3
a tunnel radius App. 5A
A cross-sectional area of tunnel 5.3
b minor semi-diameter of ellipse 9.3
c cohesion 5.1.1
ca concentration of gas in air 8.3
cu undrained shear strength of soil 5.1.1
cv coefficient of consolidation 5.1.1
cw concentration of gas dissolved in water 8.3
C construction hazard 6.1.3
C circumference 9.3
Cp velocity of compressive wave 4.1.2
Cs velocity of shear wave 4.1.2
d10 size of tenth smallest fraction 6.3
D design of project hazard 6.1.3
E Young’s modulus for lining App. 5A
Ec Young’s modulus for ground App. 5A
F flux rate for transfer of gas between air and water 8.3
h depth of tunnel axis App. 5G
h depth of compensation grouting 5.3
H height of column of rock supported by tunnel App. 5D
H head difference App. 5G
H geological hazard 6.1.3
H Henry’s constant 8.3
i distance of point of inflexion from axis 5.3
I second moment of area App. 5A
k hydraulic permeability App. 5G
kh hydraulic permeability (horizontal) App. 5G
kv hydraulic permeability (vertical) App. 5G
x Noteation
K0 earth pressure coefficient at rest 5.1.1
Kp coefficient of passive pressure 5.2.1
Kp´ coefficient of effective passive pressure App. 5B
m radial spacing of rock bolts at rock face App. 5D
mv coefficient of volume compressibility 5.1.1
M bending moment in lining per unit length of tunnel App. 5A
Mmaxmaximum value of M App. 5A
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n period of years 3.2
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Ns stability ratio 5.1.1
p Vs/A 5.3
p probability 2.7
pi internal support pressure 5.1.1
q surface surcharge pressure 5.1.1
q flow per unit area App. 5G
qu unconfined compressive strength 5.1.1
Q weight of explosive charge 6.3
Q0 inflow (outflow) per unit length of tunnel App. 5D
Qp inflow per unit length of probe-hole App. 5G
r rate of interest 3.2
r radial coordinate App. 5A
r0 radius of tunnel App. 5A
R geological risk 6.1.3
Ra radius of curvature of ellipse on major axis 9.3
Rb radius of curvature of ellipse on minor axis 9.3
Rc competence ratio (qu/σ0) 5.1.1
Rs compressibility factor App. 5A
T tension in rock-bolt App. 5D
u radial convergence 5.1.1
ua radial convergence at radius a 5.1.1
u* shear velocity App. 5G
û maximum value of u App. 5A
Vs area of surface settlement trough 5.3
Vt ground loss into tunnel per unit length 5.3
w surface settlement 5.3
wmax maximum value of surface settlement 5.3
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z vertical coordinate 5.3
z0 depth from surface to tunnel axis 5.1.1
∆r change in radius, r 9.3
∆C change in circumference, C 9.3
γ unit weight of soil 5.1.1
Noteation xi
γw unit weight of water App. 5A
ε strain App. 5B
εr radial strain App. 5B
εy axial strain App. 5B
εθ circumferential strain App. 5B
θ angular coordinate App. 5B
λ radial stress parameter 5.1.1
λ coefficient of ground reaction App. 5A
v Poisson’s ratio App. 5A
ρ density 4.1.2
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σn normal stress 5.1.1
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σv vertical stress 5.1.1
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φ angle of friction 5.1.1
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Introduction
Tunnelling, along with much civil engineering in Britain, particularly of
projects of high potential risk, has suffered during the late 1980s and 1990s
from the unsuccessful experiment—doubtless influenced by the prevailing
politics of the time—to apply crude free market principles to the
procurement of projects in fragmented elements, each element at least cost,
centrally administered but not integrated. To many, the paradox has not
been lost that a commercially motivated doctrine applied in an inappropriate
manner to an essentially professional field reserved its hardest blows for the
commercial interests themselves, as ‘management’ and ‘engineering’ were
condemned to part company.
The jargon of ‘systems’ is unfamiliar to tunnelling. In consequence, in this
book, a familiar term ‘design’, usually used in construction in far too narrow
a sense, is used in the broad sense in which it is applied, for example, in
manufacturing engineering (Chaplin 1989). Where the term ‘design’ is used
in this comprehensive sense, as defined in Chapter 2, it is printed throughout
as ‘design’ to avoid confusion with the narrow sense of ‘scheme design’ and
‘element design’ traditional to tunnelling. One particular objective of this
book is the emphasis on the essential interaction between product design (the
design of the finished project and of its operation) and process design (the
design of construction and its means) for success. The dominant role of
design in this broad sense is discussed in Chapter 2.
The book is thus largely concerned with the features of operation of the
design process to allow the development and execution of the optimal
scheme by the interactions, often iterative, between the several contributors.
Along the way, examples, many within personal experience, illustrate
success and failure, and underscore the benefits of design to all concerned,
not least the ‘clients’ and their financial supporters. There are those who
maintain that design equates to engineering and that there is merit in
emphasising this correspondence. The author has much sympathy with this
view but ‘engineering’ already has too many connotations. The main virtue
in design is that the engineer will be working with other disciplines who will
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be able to apply the same term design for their combined, and for their
separate, activities. The term will therefore bond and not divide the team.
What is so special about tunnelling? Each particular property is shared to
some degree with other forms of construction; many of the principles
discussed have far wider application. Tunnelling may however be
characterised by these features:
 
• extreme dependence on the ground, the interpretation of its
characteristics in terms of risk;
• high degree of interdependence between planning and project design,
arising from provisions for containing the ground and excluding ground-
water;
• domination of the methods of construction on the design of the project;
• effect of restrictions of access on logistics, particularly in dealing with
construction problems;
• interdependence of a long chain of control between the intention and its
execution.
 
To use current jargon, the broad claim is the attempt to provide the first
holistic account of tunnelling. Much has been written on design—conceived
as analysis in determining the geometry and constituent elements of the
finished tunnel, somewhat less on techniques of construction. There are also
many accounts of underground planning from the last 20 years, a few
monographs on site investigation for tunnels and briefer accounts of the
elements of the overall process. Many Papers and Conference Proceedings
describe specific case histories but few attempt to trace misfortunes to their
fundamental causes and fewer yet attempt to provide analysis of the
explanations for success or to provide clues as to how to avoid unfortunate
repetition in the future. A certain amount has been written by tunnellers on
the contractual and management aspects for success but this seems largely to
have passed by those who set standards from the top-down style of much
that passes for engineering management.
Successful tunnelling requires the blending of many skills, the
acquisition of experience and judgement, and the transmission of the
benefit of this experience to newcomers into the underworld. Much benefit
results from encouragement to exchange views and to compare
experiences. This is achieved at several levels, including the learned society
activities of professional and technical bodies, at an international level by
the activities—and with the encouragement of—the International
Tunnelling Association (ITA), the International Society for Rock
Mechanics (ISRM), the International Society for Soil Mechanics and
Geotechnical Engineering (ISSMGE) and their specialist groups, also the
Technical Committee on Tunnelling of PIARC (Permanent International
Association of Road Congresses). The most valuable contributions
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demonstrate the degree to which expectations based on analysis and
experiment correspond to experience in projects, particularly where the
account includes statements as to what has been learned. Certain classes of
engineer appear to avoid exposing their approaches to their work,
preferring instead to spread a deliberate air of mystery around their work
as an esoteric art confined to initiates of a particular doctrine. This is
nonsense and their own degree of success suffers in consequence. It is
noticeable, for example, that sprayed concrete lining (SCL) tunnelling in
soft ground (see Chapter 1) has profited immeasurably from the recent
open comparison between theory and practice arising from many
participants of its application to British clays.
The principal players in a tunnelling project may be imagined to be
assigned as the members of an orchestra. Each needs to be able to master his
own instrument, each needs to have a good ear for the contributions of
others in order to be able to engage in the counterpoint of dialogue. The
conductor, the leader of the project, needs to understand how to blend the
contributions by the players, requiring an appreciation of the range of pitch
and tonalities—the specific element—of each instrument. Too often, the
tunnelling players are each following unrelated scores, with the conductor
confined to the role of the orchestral administrator, without insight into the
essence of the enterprise, the manager without understanding of what is
managed. No wonder if the result is too frequently cacophonous.
This book is directed towards the interests and needs of each member of
the tunnelling orchestra and of its impresarios, the Owners, to assist each in
playing his own part and to become better attuned to the contributions of
others. The objective is to help not only those engaged in the direct functions
of achieving the underground project but also those in associated functions
such as physical planning and transport economics, particularly those
concerned in financing and management from a distance, who play vital
parts in achieving the optimal project. Furthermore, the key messages on the
management of tunnelling projects should have a wider audience, not only
because of common features of different types of major project but also to
influence the ‘decision makers’ who far too often have made the wrong
decisions of policy, incapable of retrospective correction, through failure to
understand the criteria for success. These may include the Development
Banks, Government Ministers, Local Government officials, and both public
and private owners of Utilities. The hope is that there may be some influence
towards steering an initial course so that those who come to put policy into
action do not need to expend unnecessary energies on attempts partially to
mitigate consequences of original misdirection. The fundamental criteria for
success have a broad application to any project with a significant element of
natural risk.
At the central point of initial decision-making, the ‘conductor’ is familiar
with tunnel design and construction, also with the operational and financial
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objectives. During the early stages, particularly before commitment to the
nature of the project, or even whether a tunnelled option may be preferred,
the functions of the ‘conductor’ may be undertaken in whole or in part by a
‘surrogate client’ or ‘surrogate operator’ who brings the requisite
understanding and who represents the client (Owner, promoter or operator)
in commissioning whatever studies and investigations may be expedient to
reach a preliminary view on the options and to advise on the formation of
the team who will have the duty to carry forward in an orderly process the
project design. Too often, the first professional recourse by the client is to a
lawyer who sets out to erect the barricades for protection against contractual
conflict, casting other participants as antagonists to be attached to
contractual chains and to be exposed to legal minefields. This is the worst
possible starting point for a project which, for success, essentially demands
much cooperation from the contributing Parties.
Many skills need to be harnessed for the successful tunnelling project.
Whether or not the appropriate skills are recruited depends on the
management of the project. Here we encounter the first set of problems.
All civil engineering projects have a purpose beyond civil engineering.
Tunnelling is no exception but occupies a rather esoteric position in that the
ultimate objective is not, as a general rule, directly associated with an
underground solution. The extension of a metro system or certain forms of
hydropower are exceptions to this general rule. Those who commission
projects of these latter types may be expected to have greater familiarity with
the criteria for success of underground projects than those, for example, who
operate main-line railways or water supply who only venture deep below the
surface once in a generation. Whatever the purpose, the total management of
the project will determine whether the potential for success survives the
initial phase.
Much, possibly too much, has recently been written on project
management. The engineer concerned with underground projects must be
familiar with the elements of good management, of special concern to his
type of project, including the available tools based on information
technology or IT, and will find it advantageous, but not necessarily for clear
thinking, to be familiar with the jargon and the acronyms—but at all costs
must avoid the dangers of lapsing into management-speak. The essentials of
project management start from an understanding of the qualities of
leadership, and the criteria for overall project optimisation. Management by
remote direction is fatal for tunnelling; some of the fatalities are described in
this book. Tunnelling, as with any complex activity in a previously
unexplored environment, contains elements of uncertainty that need to be
understood and controlled. Optimisation in consequence entails the control
of risk and the counterpart of exploiting opportunities for innovation. A
primary essential of the manager is therefore to understand the features of
the tunnelling process, to influence the overall strategy from the moment of
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first recognition of the possibility of a tunnelling solution through to the
operation of the finished project. Chapter 7 describes the most essential
functions of the manager and, for those contemplating the commissioning of
a possible tunnel, this may be the point of entry, leading into Chapter 3
which describes the process of project definition, from the outset, when the
project is no more than a gleam in the eye or a hypothetical solution to a
previously unsolved problem. Chapter 5 follows the evolution of the project,
identifying the principal features which should influence decisions at each
stage, to avoid later untoward consequences.
The scheme of project management has no unique structure. The
principles need to be respected within the evident requirement for
compatibility with the organisation of the Owner (or Commissioner) of the
Project. Good project management may readily accommodate the several
forms of Private and Public Finance of Projects. It is nevertheless recognised
that the rigidity of the rules of certain Public—and some Private—bodies
needs to be relaxed. The fragmentation of projects by the separate
commissioning of different aspects of the work must also be abandoned since
such practices inhibit the essential interactive features of design. Can the
Owner afford to engage people at the initial stages with operational
knowledge and the appropriate skills to interact with those who are to define
the tunnelling option? If not, then he cannot afford to consider a tunnelled
option.
Those who continue to visualise tunnels as examples of linear procedures
may find a certain logic in the ordering of Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, titled
respectively: Planning; Studies and Investigations; Design of the Tunnel
Project; Design of Construction. This is partly an illusion, however. Constant
reminders are provided of the fact that this arrangement is little more than a
convenience for reference; the important feature is that these apparent
phases should be viewed as continuous processes with many cross-
connecting functions, the essence of the holistic approach. Following
another line of thought, the different types of tunnel for different purposes
might have been developed coherently through planning to operation. Traces
of this cross-dimension will be found in elements of each chapter.
The interlinkage of activities may be illustrated by consideration of risk,
defined in Chaper 2. The principal technical elements of uncertainty of a
tunnelling project derive from the ground. The initial route planning may
introduce more or less features of uncertainty, which will need investigation
or control or at least strict definition in relation to possibilities of
construction. Tunnel design is dominated by the ground; so too is
construction. Different forms of construction will be vulnerable to different
aspects of uncertainty. Hence optimisation is a continuing activity, taking
account of all such considerations. While the perception and anticipation of
risk is fundamental to successful design, it should be understood that risk in
tunnelling seldom lends itself to statistical calculation but is more of a
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pragmatic Bayesian nature (whereby assessments of future risk may be
constantly updated from data compiled from immediate past experience),
for several reasons.
Firstly, geological variability is so wide that the degree of uncertainty of
the ground can usually only be expressed between limits, progressively
narrowed as the project develops. For example, the precise nature of possible
water inflows and the positions of important ground interfaces may be
sufficiently unpredictable to demand a form of observational approach (see
Chapter 2).
Secondly, the risks are consequences of interactions of a site- and project-
specific nature. Even, therefore, if averaged statistics existed of incidents
with particular combinations of the several factors, their application to a
specific project would have little significance. The most significant factor
will be the degree of awareness of the possible consequences of the particular
combination of circumstances and their anticipation.
Thirdly, as every tunneller will know, there is a prevailing ethos of every
project, partially derived from the degree of shared interests in the
definitions for success between the parties concerned. This ethos may
profoundly influence the attitude to risk and the appropriate preparedness.
This is the social dimension of tunnelling, a source of light or of darkness.
A structure for systematically listing the factors contributing to risk
should nevertheless be devised. How to circumscribe risk and how to
apportion responsibility for control and management feature throughout
this book. Risk as a main cause of increased cost and delay is cultivated by
absence of continuity of purpose in project development, the associated
fragmentation of responsibility, the failure early in the life of a project to
address risk and its attempted evasion by transmission to other parties
further down the line, involved with only a part of the project, who have
remote prospects of definition, investigation or control. This book is
concerned in developing the culture for enhancing opportunities, for the
encouragement of good practices to permit the potential for successful
projects and for the full realisation of satisfying project experiences.
While certain aspects of the relationships between the parties to a
tunnelling project need to respect commercial criteria, in essence success
depends upon the mutual recognition of the professional standards of the
participants. The nature of design emphasises that these are paramount,
between promoter, engineer, contractor and specialist. Recognition of this
mutual respect is more highly cultivated in European countries other than
Britain than in Britain and the USA, where the engineers have less control
over the practices in procuring the contributory elements of tunnelling
projects. The consequent loss is shared by all parties, with greater risk of loss
and less innovation in practice. There are solutions to this sub-optimal
culture, whose exposure and amelioration are the principal purposes of this
book.
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All of these aspects have a bearing upon the education and training of
engineers. Tunnelling provides an excellent example of the need to combine
depths—the understanding and expertise in several quite different
disciplines—with breadth, the ability to fit all these elements together. Some
suggest that technical design in the ‘sharp’ parts of engineering is quite a
different activity from managing construction. This is a dangerous myth
which promotes the separation between the two activities of design and
management. The import of this book is that the two activities merge
imperceptively and that it is the ability to achieve this merger which is a




If we can think of one bit of time which cannot be sub-divided into even
the smallest instantaneous moments, that alone is what we can call the
‘present’. And this time flies so quickly from the future to the past that it
is an interval with no duration.
St Augustine, Confessions XI.xv (20), tr. H.Chadwick.
1.1 Introduction
The reader will find here no attempt to provide a comprehensive history of
tunnelling. The objectives are more modest and more targeted, namely, to set
the scene from the earliest known tunnelling, to review developments which
have contributed to present-day understanding of the criteria for success,
with references to exemplary projects.
On the negative side, the objective is to attempt to explain historical
factors contributing to the current lack of general appreciation for these
same criteria for success. In so doing, it is necessary to understand how
circumstances have changed with time and with the increased complexity of
the tunnelling operation. The many contributory factors include the
increasingly specific technical requirements to satisfy the objectives of an
underground project, developments in the techniques and the means of
tunnelling, also in the associated improved capability to explore the ground,
to measure and model its characteristics.
This account is in consequence deliberately selective, using particular
examples, from the several periods of development of tunnelling, as
landmarks, generally to emphasise the varying degrees of intuition, craft-
skill and technology which have characterised the several periods into which
this chapter is divided. There is no clearly defined boundary between
tunnelling history and current developments. The most important features of
current practice rest upon concepts which have been developing over many
years. The sub-division between past and present is therefore one of
convenience in telling a reasonably continuous tale.
A broad survey of tunnelling rapidly reveals how tunnelling has
progressively been challenged to penetrate ground of increasing degrees of
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inherent difficulty. With time, in consequence, the relationship between the
main parties concerned with each tunnel has assumed greater importance. A
contrary more recent development, during a period in which inappropriate
contract relationships have been increasingly imposed, adds to a mismatch
between what these relationships should be and what in fact they have been.
A pervading objective of this book is to help to guide towards good practice
for the future, in the management aspects of engineering as much as the
technology, the two being indivisible in good practice. A historical
perspective provides a guide, with the view that knowledge of the point of
departure is necessary in order to chart the course to our destination. For
general accounts of the history of tunnelling, the reader may turn to
Sandström (1963), Széchy (1970) and Harding (1981) although it will be
found that more recent information causes the account below to make some
modification to these texts. Background reading into earlier times may start
from Singer et al. (1954).
1.2 Tunnelling in antiquity
Since tunnelling, especially tunnelling for mining minerals and for water
supply, precedes recorded history, we can only conjecture as to the thought
processes of those in the earliest times who discovered that tunnelling
provided the solution to perceived requirements. We need to respect the
intelligence of these early tunnellers of 3000 years ago and more for the
magnitude of their achievements, whose art depended entirely on trial-and-
error (heuristics) to learn what could be done and how best to achieve
results, with neither the benefit of underlying technology nor with access to
specialised tools. All ancient civilisations have left behind examples of
tunnelling at varying scales.
The earliest tunnels would have been modelled on natural caves, selecting
rock types capable of penetration with crude tools, and having innate
strength and tight joint structure conducive to a natural stable form without
need for artificial support. Much of the tunnelling for mining was initially of
this nature following lodes with near-surface exposures. Early tunnels reflect
the change of social priorities with time. Whereas at the present day a tunnel
has one or more special purposes as conveyor of people or substance, storage
or protected housing, many of the most spectacular tunnels were for
ceremonial and religious purposes. It is remarkable that the first known sub-
aqueous tunnel was built in about 2000 BC to connect the royal palace of
Queen Semiramis to the Temple of Jove (or his equivalent) beneath the River
Euphrates. The tunnel was about 1 km long, had a section of 3.6 m×4.5 m,
and was lined in brickwork with a vaulted arch set in bituminous mortar.
The river was diverted to permit cut-and-cover construction. While this may
not constitute tunnelling in the purest sense, nevertheless the sophistication
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of the techniques point to a preexisting skill and assurance in undertaking
such works.
It also deserves record that, for city drainage systems during the Akkadian
supremacy (BC 2800–2200) of Mesopotamia, vaulted sewers were built in
baked brick, with inspection chambers and rodding eyes, lined in bitumen.
To wander a little further from our scene, there were bath-rooms paved in
bitumen-faced brick, also closets with raised pedestals with the occasional
refinement of a shaped bitumen seat (Singer et al. 1954). Rings of brickwork
in vaults for wide spans were inclined to avoid the need for centring.
Tombs and temples provide other examples of tunnelling. The Royal
Tombs at Thebes in Egypt and at Ur in Mesopotamia date from around 2500
BC; Abu Simbel in Egypt dating from around 1250 BC is another such
example. These tunnels were in limestone, requiring high standards of
craftsmanship in their form but presenting no problems of stability. Another
later example, mentioned by Sandström (1963) among many examples in
India, concerns the caves of Ellora, near Bombay, excavated between 200
and 600 AD, tunnels aggregating to a length of more than 9 km, cut by chisel
in fine-grained igneous rock.
A celebrated, but by no means unique, water supply tunnel of the ancient
world is the Siloam tunnel (also known as Hezekiah’s tunnel), mentioned at
2 Kings 20:20, at 2 Chronicles 32:30 and elsewhere in the Old and New
Testament of the Bible. The oldest part of the city of Jerusalem, dating from
2000 BC or earlier had a source of water from the Gihon spring on the Ophel
ridge to the east of the city. The name Gihon in Hebrew (and its Arabic form,
Umm al-Darah) relates to its gushing siphonic nature, with high flows for a
duration of 30 minutes or more at intervals of 4–10 h (depending on the
season and the source of information). As early as about 1800 BC, a short
length of tunnel connected the spring to a well shaft nearly 30 m deep within
the city wall. In around 950 BC Solomon connected the spring by an open
channel outside the city wall to the pool of Siloam within the wall. Under
threat of siege by the Assyrians under Sennacherib, King Hezekiah secured
the water supply by resiting the pool of Siloam and feeding it through a
tunnel 533 m long, following a sinuous route about 60% longer than the
direct length from spring to outlet portal. The tunnel is roughly 1 m wide and
2 m high, increasing to a considerably greater height near the portal,
presumably as a result of correcting an error in level. The reasons for the
devious course of the tunnel have long been the cause of speculation. Most
probably the explanation includes geological influences (natural fissures in
the rock) combined with the avoidance of areas of royal tombs. The tunnel
was advanced from both ends and a sharp Z-bend near mid-length probably
marks the point of break-through. A stone memorial tablet found in 1880
provides, in one of the oldest example of cursive Hebrew script, a brief
account of the tunnel and the occasion of break-through, which reads in
translation: ‘While the hewers yielded the axe, each man towards his fellow,
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and while there were still three cubits to be hewn, there was heard a man’s
voice calling to his fellow, for there was a crack in the rock on the right and
on the left.’
The qanats of the Middle East, an art which survived over the centuries
with little change, required a greater degree of understanding of the need for
an internal lining to provide support and a watertight invert. Joseph
Needham (1971) finds evidence of similar tunnels in China as early as 280
BC and conjectures as to whether the art may have passed from China to the
Middle East or vice versa. The qanats demanded a degree of conceptual
thinking since, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, water was intercepted from
springs beneath the surface of the ground, derived from the face of a range of
hills, the tunnels serving as conduits to wells, or to surface discharge as
ground levels permitted, to satisfy requirements for irrigation. The qanats
were constructed from generally vertical shafts at centres of about 150 feet
(45 m), their courses marked by rings of spoil around each shaft.
Intermediate access for water could be by way of stepped inclined shafts. The
water supply to several cities of Asia Minor used ancient canals, partially
tunnelled, of considerable length. Arbil in North Iraq, for example,
continues to rely upon such a canal of Sennacherib, 20 km long with a tunnel
whose ashlar entrance portal is 2.7 m wide, with floor and walls faced in
stone slabs.
Figure 1.1 Qanat.
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The Greeks and Romans were familiar with the use of tunnelling to
undermine (‘sap’) the walls of defended cities, and in the appropriate
countermeasures. Many tunnels were also constructed as part of the
aqueducts supplying water to cities, such as that for Athens, remaining in use
to the present day.
The Greek water supply tunnel on the island of Samos (Plichon 1974)
highly regarded by Herodotas, merits a brief description. The tunnel,
conceived by Eupalinos and constructed in 525 BC, provided water from a
spring to the town of Samos. The tunnel has the form of an approximately
square heading 1.8 m×1.8 m, the roof generally provided by a stratum of
competent rock. In order to maintain a continuous gradient for the water
conduit, formed in tiles, a 0.8 m wide trench was sunk from the heading to
depths between 1.5 m and 8 m, a series of stone slabs above the conduit
supporting backfill in the trench of spoil from the tunnel.
The Romans have left such fine examples of masonry vaulting that it is no
surprise that, for ground capable of standing unsupported over short lengths
for a short time, they have demonstrated a capability for building arched
tunnels of appreciable span. Their permanent stability depends in the same
manner on transmission of load around the arch approximately transverse to
the joints between voussoirs. Drainage tunnels mentioned by Livy include
the 2210 m (1500 Roman passi) long tunnel to drain Lake Albanus. The
tunnel, about 1.5 m wide by 2.5 m high, was constructed in hard volcanic
rock in the year 359 BC, using working shafts at intervals of about 45 m. The
most notorious Roman drainage project is that of the Lake Fucinus (now
Celano) Emissarium, about 5500 m long, 2.5 m wide and 5 m high, which
was driven from working shafts at intervals of about 35 m (a Roman actus),
vertical and inclined, with ashlar used for lining in unstable ground, built
between 41–51 AD. Suetonius describes the first unsuccessful opening
ceremony after which the tunnel had to be regraded, the deferred ceremony
leading to flooding of the celebratory banquet alongside the tail-race canal.
Road tunnels through spurs of the Apennines around the Bay of Naples
were constructed at Cumae and at Puteoli, by Octavian (later Augustus)
respectively about 1000 m and 700 m long, 3 m wide and 3.2 m high. Several
tunnels of the ancient world are mentioned by Livy, Pliny the elder,
Herodotus, Suetonius and Vitruvius, with many of the references given by
Humphrey et al. (1998).
1.3 Development of rationale
The breakdown in urban society with the collapse of the Roman empire
caused the general absence of demand for tunnelling in Europe for several
hundred years, although small-scale mining continued, using the traditional
methods described by Agricola (Georg Bauer) in 1556. Széchy (1970)
mentions a 5.6 km long drainage tunnel of the Biber mine in Hungary,
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started around 1400 as an outstanding example of the time. Techniques of
timbered support and the methods of excavation were largely derived from
mining practice. The construction of the Col di Tenda tunnel on the road
between Nice and Genoa was started by Anne of Lusignan in 1450 but later
abandoned (Harding 1981) then restarted in 1782 and once again
abandoned in 1794 at a length of 2500 m.
Leonardo da Vinci made numerous proposals, which came to nothing, for
navigation canals, including a connection between the rivers Garonne and
Aude, subsequently constructed as the Languedoc canal by Pierre-Paul
Riquet (Sandström 1963), including the Malpas tunnel (157 m×6.7 m
high×8.2 m wide) completed in 1681, using gunpowder to blast the rock, but
only lined some years later. The celebrated French engineer, Vauban, was
also associated with this project.
Sandström contrasts the subsequent practices in canal building in Britain
and in Europe, the former by privately financed canal companies at least
cost, the latter, financed by the state, having more substantial dimensions.
The first English canal tunnel was that of James Brindley on the Bridgewater
canal directly entering Worsley coal mine, opened in 1761 and subsequently
extended. This marked the beginning of the canal age, with numerous
tunnels on the extending canal network. Brindley’s next achievement was the
Harecastle tunnel, 2630 m long, 4.3 m high and 2.7 m wide, on the summit
of the Grand Trunk (later the Trent and Mersey) Canal, damaged by mining
subsidence and replaced by a parallel tunnel constructed by Telford. The
canal tunnels constructed by Outram, Jessop, Rennie, Telford and others set
traditional standards for tunnel construction in rock and in weaker ground,
using the English method described below.
By the seventeenth century, designers of the earliest canal tunnels in
France were beginning to apply principles of graphical statics to the criteria
for constructing stable arches. The design of timber support was also being
developed from the experience in mines. Salt mines at Wielicka near Cracow
in Poland, for example, contain massive timbering from the seventeenth
century, protected by the saline atmosphere and providing evidence of a
well-developed art.
Temporary timber support for tunnelling evolved in different parts of
Europe, principally for canal and the early railway tunnels, attracting
regional designations and having characteristics adapted to the particular
conditions of the locality. Some of the better known systems, illustrated for
example by Sandström (1963) and Harding (1981), had particular
characteristics.
The German system provided a series of box headings within which the
successive sections of the side walls of the tunnel were built from the footings
upwards, thus a forerunner of the system of multiple drifts. The method
depends on the central dumpling being able to resist without excessive
movement pressure transmitted from the side walls, in providing support to
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the top ‘key’ heading prior to completion of the arch and to ensuring stability
while the invert arch is extended in sections.
The Belgian system started from the construction of a top heading,
propped approximately to the level of the springing of the arch for a
horseshoe tunnel. This heading was then extended to each side to permit
construction of the upper part of the arch, which was extended by
underpinning, working from side headings. The system was only practicable
where rock loads were not heavy.
The English system also started from a central top heading which allowed
two timber crown bars to be hoisted into place, the rear ends supported on a
completed length of lining, the forward ends propped within the central
heading. Development of the heading then allowed additional bars to be
erected around the perimeter of the face with boards between each pair to
exclude the ground. The system is economical in timber, permits
construction of the arch of the tunnel in full-face excavation, and is tolerant
of a wide variety of ground conditions, but depends on relatively low ground
pressures.
The Austrian system required a strongly constructed central bottom
heading upon which a crown heading was constructed. The timbering for
full-face excavation was then heavily braced against the central headings,
with longitudinal poling boards built on timber bars carried on each frame of
timbering. As the lining advanced, so was the timbering propped against
each length to maintain stability. The method was capable of withstanding
high ground pressures but was particularly extravagant in the demand for
timber.
In the absence of other than primitive means for foreseeing the nature
of the ground ahead of the advancing tunnel, there were frequent
surprises. Linings were in masonry or brickwork depending on local
availability of supply. Some of the early railroad tunnels in North
America were lined in timber, with long, shaped voussoirs supported on
vertical side members.
The first sizeable tunnel in soft ground is recorded by Sandström (1963)
as the Tronquoy tunnel on the St Quentin canal in France in 1803, where the
method of construction, based on the use of successive headings to construct
sections of the arch starting from the footing, was a forerunner to the
German system described above.
1.4 New methods, tools and techniques
Rock tunnelling was revolutionised by the first use of explosives for mining
in Germany in the seventeenth century (Sandström 1963) and by the use of
compressed air for pneumatic drills in 1861. Previously, the methods had
been laborious and slow, scarcely improving on principles used by the
Egyptians and later the Romans who understood how to use plugs and
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feathers, also the expansive effects of wetted wooden plugs driven into drill-
holes.
The Fréjus Tunnel (also known in Britain as the Mont Cenis Tunnel), the
first Alpine tunnel, constructed between 1857 and 1870, first used
compressed-air drills—drilling prior to this time a laborious operation by
hand-operated drills (using ‘jumpers’ and hammers). A steam-driven rock
drill, invented by a British engineer, T.Bartlett, was successfully adapted for
compressed air in 1855 but was not developed commercially. Several
features of other proposals, including that of Joseph Fowle of the United
States, were incorporated in the rotary-impact drills with automatic feed
used by G.Sommeiller for the formidable task of driving the 12 224 metres
long Fréjus Tunnel. The first compressor installation of 1861 used falling
water with entrained air, separated under a pressure of 700 kPa, but
excessive dynamic stresses caused unreliable operation and a waterwheel
was substituted to power the compressors. The first drilling carriage
(‘jumbo’) was also used for this tunnel, mounting four to nine drills. Fréjus is
also notable for the consideration given by Sommeiller for the
accommodation, medical and school services provided for the work force.
Soft ground tunnelling was liberated from its constricted use by the
invention of the shield by M.I. (Sir Isambard) Brunel, who, at the same time,
introduced other expedients which later became widely adopted (spiles
[renamed by some in the 1980s as soil-nailing], methods of face support),
demonstrating a clear, although yet largely qualitative, understanding of the
interaction between the ground and its support, also the means for
controlling entry of water. His contribution to tunnelling was so remarkable
that it merits more than a brief mention in this chapter.
Brunel’s Patent Application of 1818 (Brunel 1818) depicts two types of
circular shield, one advanced by propelling rams bearing against a reaction
frame, itself blocked against the most recently completed length of the tunnel
lining. The other type of shield comprises a central rotating drum while the
lining is advanced as a series of segments built in a helix (Muir Wood 1994a).
Brunel was thinking ahead of the current practicability of incorporating
hydraulic machinery into a moving shield.
The first shield-driven tunnel, the Thames Tunnel, initially designed
predominantly for horse-drawn traffic serving the docks under construction
on the south bank of the River Thames, was however rectangular. Muir
Wood (1994a) describes the shield in considerable detail. Essentially, it
comprised 11 (later 12) vertical cast-iron frames each containing three cells,
each about 2 m high×0.8 m wide, one above the other. At the head, and to
each side of the shield, a series of ‘staves’ with sliding and pivoted support
from the frames, had cutting edges at their leading end, and were extended
by wrought-iron skirts at the rear to permit the brickwork lining to be built
within their protection. The frames and the staves could be independently
propelled forward by screw-jacks bearing against the last completed section
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of brickwork. Initially the section of the excavated tunnel was 10.83 m (35 ft
6 in) wide by 6.25 m (20 ft 6 in) high, increased to 11.44 m (37 ft 6 in) wide
by 6.71 m (22 ft) high for the second part of the tunnel.
The face was supported by elm poling boards held against the face by
screw-jacks. Excavation was achieved by the removal of one or more
poling boards in each cell. Ultimately successful, after an ordeal which
would have daunted a lesser engineer—arising mainly from unexpected
features of the ground, from consequent irruptions by the river and the
great difficulty in the essential coordination of all the activities concerned
with the advance of the shield in appalling conditions and poor light—
tunnelling started in 1825, and was completed in 1841. By this time the
nature of the requirement had changed so that the tunnel was initially
opened for pedestrians in 1843 and for the East London Railway (now part
of London Underground) in 1869.
The quality of bricks and the design of the Roman cement mortar used by
Brunel were designed to limit to a minimum inflow of water. In order to
drain any water seeping through the brickwork, Brunel provided a system of
circumferential slots cut or otherwise formed at the intrados of the
brickwork, at intervals of about 0.2 m, with the internal lining provided by
tiles and a plaster rendering, illustrated by Roach (1998) who describes work
undertaken to provide an internal concrete lining in 1996 as a replacement to
the original internal lining. The main principle of conservation was assured
at this time by causing minimal change to the stress regime of the original
brickwork, predominantly caused by water loading, by means of adequate
and readily maintainable drainage between brickwork and reinforced
concrete lining (which may well itself require repair during the future period
of expectation of life of Brunel’s tunnel).
The first circular shield, on the basis of a patent by P.W.Barlow, was used
in 1869 for the Tower Hill subway tunnel beneath the River Thames, for
which J.H.Greathead, assistant to Barlow, designed a simpler version
propelled by screw-jacks. The tunnel was first to be lined in cast-iron
segments adopting the illustration of such a lining in Brunel’s 1818 patent.
The tunnel, 1340 ft (408 m) long, had an internal diameter of 2 m with a
lining flange depth of 75 mm. The lining was erected within the skirt of the
shield and grout was injected to fill the annulus behind the lining by syringe.
The first use of hydraulic jacks was for the shield built by A.E.Beach for a
tunnel in 1869 under Broadway, NY, otherwise based on Barlow’s patent.
Greathead continued to develop many ideas for exploiting the
potential of the shield, including the closed-face shield with the ground
broken up by jets and the spoil removed as a slurry, the forerunner of the
slurry shield, first used at New Cross in London in 1971. He also
proposed the trapped shield, for use in unstable ground enabling, in the
event of a face collapse, stability to be restored through pressure
balancing on a horizontal surface between the two partitions forming the
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trap. Greathead also designed the grout-pan for continuous mixing and
injection of grout, a device in use to the present day. The City and South
London Railway of 1886 (from City to Stockwell—now part of the
Northern Line of London’s Underground) provided the first opportunity
for Greathead (Greathead 1896) to demonstrate the potential of
improved shield tunnelling. These twin 10 ft 2 in (3.1 m) diameter
tunnels, each 3.5 miles (5.6 km) long, used electric locomotives for
traction and compressed air where required by the ground. The use of
compressed air for balancing water pressure, including the use of
horizontal air locks had been proposed by Lord Cochrane’s Patent 6015
of 1830. Compressed air had been widely used for diving bells and for
caissons, e.g. for bridge piers, where the balance was achieved through a
horizontal water surface, a tunnel presenting the more complex problem
of a varying pressure over the vertical height of the face. A.M.Hersent
successfully constructed a small cast-iron heading, 5 ft (1.5 m) high by 4
ft (1.2 m) wide, in compressed air in Antwerp in 1879.
Compressed air was used for the Hudson River Tunnel by D.C.Haslin in
1879. This pair of railway tunnels was to be lined in cast-iron segments with
internal brickwork to give a finished diameter of 18 ft (5.5 m). The tunnel
was entirely in silt which stood at a stable slope of about 45 degrees in the air
pressure, cut in benches, without other face support or protection. The first
disaster occurred when attempting to link the two tunnels by a heading close
to the main working shaft. The work was recovered, an improved system
devised with a short length of pilot tunnel, but the whole abandoned in 1882
when the money ran out. The tunnel was subsequently advanced with the
use of a shield with hydraulic segment erector, by Sir William Arroll advised
by Sir Benjamin Baker. Financial problems, however, prevented completion
until 1899 (Jacobs 1910).
Greathead shields were also used for two subsequent road tunnels
beneath the River Thames, at Blackwall (1892–97) (Hay and Fitzmaurice
1897) and Rotherhithe (1904–8) (Tabor 1908).
The technique of tunnelling in open ground continued to require a
closely timbered heading ahead of the shield, no great advance on the
technique used by Brunel. In 1896 Sir Harley Dalrymple-Hay developed
the hooded shield with clay-pocketing, the packing of a puddled clay into a
series of adjacent holes forming an annulus ahead of the cutting edge of the
shield (Dalrymple-Hay 1899). Struts supporting the face timbering
allowed the shield to be advanced into the clay annulus while face support
remained undisturbed. A similar technique, using steel shutters supported
by screw jacks (once again recalling Brunel), was used for the Blackwall
Tunnel, for which air-locks built into the shield, never in fact used, would
have allowed differential pressures for the upper and lower sections of the
face, evidently requiring a substantial seal at the intermediate working
platform.
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For the main drainage system for London of Bazalgette (Bazalgette 1865)
sub-drains were widely used to draw down ground-water which would
otherwise have caused slumping of the face of a tunnel in waterbearing
ground. A comparable technique was used for the Mersey rail tunnel (1881–
6), the low-level drainage tunnel in sandstone excavated by a machine
designed by Beaumont.
The developing interest in the Channel Tunnel inspired many proposals
for mechanical excavation (Lemoine 1991). The first trials of a machine of
J.D.Brunton, using disc-cutters in 1882, achieved 12–17 m/day but its
design presented unsolved maintenance problems. Colonel Frederick
Beaumont invented his machine, a rotary machine with picks, in 1875. The
design was improved by Colonel Thomas English and tested for the
Channel Tunnel in 1880. By Spring 1882 this 2.1 m diameter machine had
bored a tunnel 800 m long at Abbotscliff and a tunnel 1100 m long under
the sea from a shaft at Shakespeare colliery (later to form part of the main
working site for the Channel Tunnel). An improved and more powerful
machine, built in 1882 by Batignolles, excavated about 1700 m of the total
length of 1840 m of the French tunnel at Sangatte, achieving a maximum
rate of advance of 24.8 m/day. In 1883 T.R.Crampton proposed a machine,
hydraulically driven by water from the sea, which would also be used to
evacuate spoil as a slurry. A heading 150 m long was driven at Folkestone
Warren in 1922 by a machine designed by Douglas Whitaker, lightly built
by present standards. The further development of tunnelling machines had
then to await the 1950s.
Copperthwaite (1906) and Simms (1944) provide contemporary
accounts of practical developments seen from a British viewpoint. For a
brief account of the major developments in Britain since 1875, see Muir
Wood (1976).
The first of the generation of mechanical shields used the Price Digger of
1897, with chisel picks attached to arms rotated by electric motor, which
was followed by numerous comparable designs. Table 1.1 indicates the
approximate rates of progress achieved over the years for driving running
tunnels in London. Rotary shields in clay with expanded linings have
permitted rates of advance for sewer and water-supply tunnels in London
clay and Gault clay well in excess of 1000 m/month. For tunnels of relatively
short length, the use of road-headers within simple shields have achieved
rates in excess of 350 m/month (Jobling and Lyons 1976).
The process of placing concrete in situ was incompatible with timber
supports. In consequence, the first uses of concrete were for tunnels in
good rock and it was only with the introduction of steel supports that
the use of concrete became the norm for a tunnel lining material. An
early use of concrete in tunnel lining was for the East Boston Tunnel of 1892,
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where the tunnel was lined in stages, a crown shield supported on the
concrete side-walls. In the early years of the twentieth century, concrete
began to be used more generally for tunnel lining, the concrete placed behind
timber formwork supported on steel arches, taking advantage of in situ
concrete to mould itself to the shape of the rock extrados. Steel arches had
largely superseded the use of timber in rock tunnels and, later, rock bolts
were introduced from mining.
Cast iron for internally flanged linings, particularly of circular tunnels in
soft ground, often constructed in shield, became widely used, using the
material in such a manner to take advantage of its strength in compression
and weakness in tension. As cast-iron linings increased in cost, so were
alternative materials sought. Linings of rings of bolted, flanged, reinforced
concrete segments were introduced in 1936 (Groves 1943), used to the
present day for hand-constructed shafts and tunnels and for primary linings.
The next major development had to await expanded linings, described in
Section 1.5 below.
1.5 Towards the present day
Until the 1950s tunnelling continued to be seen as largely a traditional
craft-based operation, undertaken by skilled miners and timbermen largely
educated from experience. Design methods, developed in the nineteenth
century, were being extended but not essentially modified by Kommerell
(Figure 1.2), Terzaghi and others. The time was ripe for the application of
the rapid developments in the understanding of the behaviour of soils and
later, and more partially, of the behaviour of rocks. It had long been
understood that the ground, if allowed to deform slightly, was capable of
contributing to its own support. With the general replacement of timber by
steel supports, it was now becoming possible to quantify this effect and to
design the construction and timing of support correspondingly. Apart
from the positive influence from the advances of the supporting
technologies, demand for tunnels suddenly increased as the world began
to recover from the material shortages and economic constraints following
Table 1.1 Approximate rates of advance of running
tunnels for London’s underground railways
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the Second World War, for road/rail (including Metro) transport,
telecommunications, water and sewage conveyance, oil and gas storage,
hydroelectric and defence purposes, recognising the increased penetrating
power of missiles.
Ground exploration techniques (see Chapter 4), partly derived from oil
exploration, developing from the 1930s, allowed recovery of (relatively)
complete and undisturbed samples of soil and cores of rock. Soil mechanics
as a recognised technological specialism began to permit the principal
properties of the ground in terms of strength and deformability to be applied
to the design of tunnel excavation and support. Some years later—the delay
a consequence of rock types spanning a wide range of varieties of behaviour
as a continuum/discontinuum—rock mechanics was applied to the design of
arch support (Terzaghi 1961) and subsequently by Lang (1961), Rabcewicz
(1964) and many others to the use of rock bolts, sprayed concrete and allied
means of initial support. In view of the complexities of rock as a material,
advances were largely dependent on bold experiment, often at full scale,
followed by a degree of conceptualisation and analysis, supplemented by
laboratory experiment. This is a far more typical manner of advance in civil
engineering than the traditional notion that the order runs: theory;
experiment; development, application; trial and demonstration, as in some
Figure 1.2 Rock loading on a tunnel (after Kommerell 1940).
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branches of science. Civil engineering is in this respect akin to medicine.
Jaeger (1955) summarises the experiences in pressure tunnels, including
successes and failures.
A fundamental development for tunnels in soft ground was the
appreciation that generally, and this could be readily if only approximately
estimated, the strength of the ground was adequate, with some degree of
radial support from the lining, to resist (elliptical) deformation of a circular
tunnel, as a result of differences between vertical and horizontal ground
loading. From this feature follows the conclusion that the ideal lining is
capable of adequate strength to develop circumferential force while having
minimum stiffness in bending in the plane of the ring (Muir Wood 1975a),
characteristics which could be achieved, for example, by means of the use of
segments with shaped, initially convex/convex longitudinal joints (see Figure
5.14), care being taken in the design to avoid the risk of high local bursting
stresses. Jacked linings or linings with soft packings in the joints could also,
subject to the practicalities of construction, serve to match the convergence
of the ground to reduce the load in the ring. While initially such concepts
were applied to linearly elastic ground and linings, subsequent availability of
computer power with the ability to introduce full constitutive relationships
of the ground, based on the concepts of critical state, have permitted much
refinement of these early approaches. Current applications are described in
Chapter 5.
Traditionally, segmental linings had often been used in conjunction with a
tunnelling shield, the segments being erected and bolted together to form a
ring within the protection of the skirt of the shield, the resulting annular
space being filled with cement (earlier, lime) grout. For tunnels in clay
capable of standing unsupported briefly over the width of a ring, the use of
linings built directly against the ground simplified the process and allowed
greater rates of progress to be achieved. Where the ground could be cut to a
smooth cylindrical surface by the shield, the lining could be erected in rings
and expanded against the ground, thereby minimising inward ground
movement. For this purpose, the most satisfactory method for small
diameter tunnels entailed the use of tapered segments so that the ring was
expanded by driving such segments into the ring by the use of the propelling
jacks of the shield. The Don-Seg lining (Figure 1.3) was first used for the Lee
Valley-Hampton water tunnels following their successful use in an
experimental tunnel in 1951 (Scott 1952, Cuthbert and Wood 1962). The
improved rates of construction achieved by the several innovations are
illustrated by Table 1.1. Donovan (1969) describes developments in
segmental linings from British experience.
For large diameter tunnels, where a high rate of progress was not a
primary aim, the lining was expanded by means of jacks inserted in the ring
between segments (Figure 1.4), with the jacks replaced by dry concrete
rammed in place in a sequential manner, a practice with the potential of
Figure 1.3 Don-Seg expanded concrete lining.
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preloading the lining sufficiently to reduce settlement. The Potters Bar
railway tunnels provided in 1955 (Terris and Morgan 1961) an opportunity
to design an expanded lining for a tunnel of 26 ft 6 in (8.1 m) internal
diameter. The tunnel was to be used by steam locomotives so a sulphate
resisting cement, Sealithor, was adopted for the precast segments. Provision
needed to be made for frequent refuges and for the throats of smoke shafts,
also for uncertain and weathered ground at each portal of the three tunnels.
A lining of constant thickness was used, adequate to provide for each of
these special circumstances (Figure 1.4). Each ring comprised a massive
invert segment, with 19 ‘morticed and tenoned’ voussoirs to complete the
ring, 18 in (0.45 m) wide, 27 in (90.68 m) thick. At each side, at axis level,
pockets were provided for hydraulic jacks, used to expand the ring
immediately after erection, designed to occur as soon as the shield completed
a forward shove. At refuges, openings were formed by this procedure, an
adaptation of tradition:
 
1. above and below the refuge, voussoirs cast with semi-cylindrical radial
pockets at adjacent faces were built into the lining such that 150 mm
cylindrical holes were provided through the full thickness of the lining;
2. earth-dry fine concrete was compacted into the cylindrical cavities to
provide shear keys between rings;
3. temporary segments were withdrawn in the position of the refuge which
was completed by further hand excavation and provision of an arched
brickwork rear wall.  
Figure 1.4 Potters Bar tunnel lining.
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For the smoke shaft throats, each the width of four rings, i.e. 6 ft (1.8 m), a
more complex procedure was required, adopting (1) and (2) above
supplemented by the threading of longitudinal Lee-McCall prestressing
bars to avoid risk of spreading of the ‘lintel’ and ‘sill’ above and beneath
the opening.
Several means of expanding the ring were tested in an experimental
tunnel for the Victoria Line of London’s Underground in 1960–61 (Dunton
et al. 1965), including the use of internal jacks with the insertion of folding
wedges and the use of a wedge segment in the crown. For the Victoria Line
(Follenfant et al. 1969, Clark et al. 1969), jacks were used at ‘knee joints’
with precast blocks inserted in the space.
London Heathrow Airport’s Cargo Tunnel (Muir Wood and Gibb
1971), a two-lane road tunnel, passes beneath Runways 5 and 6. Great
economy could nevertheless be achieved by designing a tunnel for low
cover (C/D<0.78). An expanded lining was adopted for this 33 ft 9 in (10.3
m) internal diameter tunnel, illustrated by Figure 5.14, using segments 12
in (300 mm) thick and 24 in (600 mm) wide, the ring being prestressed by
jacks at axis level. As for the Potters Bar tunnels, after full expansion dry
concrete was packed to each side of the jacking space, the jack
subsequently removed and the concrete packing completed.
The Potters Bar lining had been deliberately made stiff, i.e. with
bearing across virtually the full width of each longitudinal joint. The
benefits of articulation were achieved elsewhere by shaping the
longitudinal joint, generally as convex-convex arcs to permit rolling
without the risk of one segment ‘hanging up’ on another away from the
centroid of the section. High precision in casting ensured the benefits of
the design without risk of local excessive stress, tolerances of 0.1–0.2 mm
being demanded and achieved, together with complex angular tolerances,
using specially designed jigs. By the time of the Channel Tunnel, high
precision 3-D metrometers were available, undertaking the computation
to establish that dimensional limits were being achieved (Eves and Curtis
1992).
For tunnel linings through ground imposing uneven loading, secondary
bending stresses need to be accepted. Grey cast iron, traditionally used for
tunnel segments, has limited tensile strength. In consequence, for such
situations, spheroidal graphite (s.g.) iron, with tensile strength
approaching that of steel, has been widely used as a bolted segmental
lining, for several Metro tunnels and for parts of the Channel Tunnel (Eves
and Curtis 1992). Steel segmental linings have also been used for special
circumstances of abnormal loading (Craig and Muir Wood 1978) where
casting procedures would be uneconomic. The evolution of the design of
tunnel junctions has developed from cast-iron frameworks (the so-called
‘picture-frame’ opening) to many forms of the use of steel and concrete for
the purpose.
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For many of the early examples of expanded linings, the segments were
designed of such dimensions as to permit handling, placing and stressing
without the need for reinforcement, for reasons of economy, to assist in
achieving dense high quality concrete and to avoid long-term problems of
corrosion. As such linings have encouraged high-speed tunnelling, so has the
use of wider rings (1–1.25 m) developed, with the consequent need for
reinforcement and for additional protection, by particularly dense concrete,
careful control of depth of cover to reinforcement, the use of cathodic
protection or epoxy coating of reinforcement, particularly where the lining is
exposed to saline or polluted water.
Rock tunnelling evolved, following the Second World War, from a
traditional craft using familiar materials in a familiar manner, into a
technology-based art. Ground description was developing towards
quantification (Talobre 1976) permitting emerging attempts at analysis, an
increasing choice of means of support and an appreciation of the influence
on the behaviour of the ground of the procedures in working. The sheer
complexity and variability of rock impeded a rational approach; on the
other hand, it was becoming evident that any rationale would need to be
expressed in simple terms or variability would require continuous
reassessment. Here it is worth reflecting that, in many circumstances, a
length of tunnel benefits from the contribution of the third dimension since
a local failure mode must cause work to be done, as ‘membrane failure’ of
the tunnel lining and by contributions of the ground, a mechanism not
reflected in a 2-D analysis.
Several engineers through the nineteenth century, such as R•iha
(Kastner 1971) were pointing to the benefit of early support for jointed
rock to anticipate high loading caused by rock loosening as a
consequence of excavation. Only later, however, as Kovári (1999)
describes, Wiesmann in 1912 established, in a qualitative manner from
experience of the Simplon Tunnel, the beneficial consequences of
allowing deformation of squeezing rock. The corollary was therefore to
relate the properties of the support to the stress/strain behaviour of the
rock around the advancing tunnel in order to provide an economic and
stable solution. This concept is now accepted as fundamental to tunnel
design, with great consequent economies in tunnel support. There is also
a hidden benefit in that the risk of sudden brittle failure is thereby
reduced. The approach towards this end has seen a considerable variety.
From one viewpoint, the engineering geologist (Talobre 1976) has seen
an understanding of the geological structure as the key to success. From
another viewpoint, the theoreticians (e.g. Kastner 1971, Ladanyi 1974)
have endeavoured to express the loadings as closedform solutions as a
basis for the geometrical design of the tunnel, providing that reliable
ranges of values may be given to the variables. In between, observation in
tunnels using innovative forms of support, assisted by understanding the
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geology and using analytical techniques in simplified form, allow
pragmatic rules to be developed for comparable circumstances. The
authors of Rock Mass Classification systems have endeavoured to
provide simplified keys to the generalisation of such observations.
Present and possible future developments of convergence between these
approaches is discussed in Chapter 5.
For jointed rock, Engesser in 1882 (Széchy 1970), followed in 1912 by
Kommerell (1940) had provided a simplified rational basis for estimating the
rock load to be supported by an arched tunnel (Figure 1.2). Terzaghi (1961)
developed this approach for steel arch supports with suggested values for the
rock strength parameters. The main problem in design of steel arches was
that of discontinuity of contact pressure between rock and arch, traditionally
achieved by timber packing, with consequent indeterminacy in calculating
collapse load for failure by torsion and lateral buckling. The expedient of a
porous bag filled with weak mortar between rock and flange of arch (Muir
Wood 1987) much reduced the uncertainty and increased the load-carrying
capacity (Figure 5.13).
More generally, appreciation of the merits of light support with properties
of deformability to suit the ground have long been a feature of the approach
of many engineers, by some as a reaction to the experiences of the massive
masonry linings, rigid and slow in construction, of the early trans-Alpine
tunnels, where the permanent structure might have occupied as much as
40% of the excavated profile (Müller 1978, Fechtig and Kovári 1996). The
common objective has been to enable the ground to be self-supporting
around the periphery of the tunnel to the greatest degree. Mining practice
provided much of the incentive for liberation from tunnelling tradition,
mining being relatively unconcerned about questions of loss of ground,
hence capable of exploiting the natural properties of coherent ground,
making use of rock-bolts, sprayed concrete and roadheaders for excavation.
The first two provided components for rapid, light, yielding support, the
latter a form of mechanised excavation adaptable to wide variation in
geometry. Dubious claims are made that as early as 1944, Rabcewicz
(Rabcewicz 1944) foresaw the benefits of tunnelling practice based on such
features. In fact, there is a long history of the perception, application only
becoming practical with the later development of tunnelling techniques, in
response to demand.
Here again the major steps forward in tunnelling occurred in the 1950s
with the principles coupled with growing understanding of the behaviour of
jointed rock, the availability of new techniques in rock-bolting, the use of
rock anchors and the application of sprayed concrete (Shotcrete being a
trade name) and, most importantly, the opportunity to test out new ideas
with growing confidence in practical tunnelling. Two noteworthy early
developments were in Switzerland, 1951–55, using Shotcrete for the
Lodano-Losagno Tunnel for the Maggia hydroelectric project and the Snowy
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Mountains Hydroelectric Project in New South Wales, Australia from 1952
(Lang 1961, Andrews et al. 1964, Dann et al. 1964, Moye 1965). Many
others in many other countries have grasped the essence of the principles and
applied it with success.
Rabcewicz coined the title ‘New Austrian Tunnelling Method’ (NATM) in
1962 (Rabcewicz 1964) with an explanation:
‘…the author carried out during the (1939–45) war a new method
called the “auxiliary arch” which consisted of applying a relatively thin
concrete lining [a conventional in-situ lining of the time would be an
unlikely candidate for the “observational method” then described] to
the rock face as soon as possible, closed by an invert and intended to
yield to the action of the protective zone [the name given by Rabcewicz
to the rock adjacent to the tunnel]. Deformation of the auxiliary arch
was measured continuously as a function of time. As soon as the
observation showed a stabilising trend of the time/deformation curve,
another lining called the “inside lining” was constructed inside. The
method can be considered as a real predecessor of NATM as it
comprises all the integral factors with the exception of modern means
of surface stabilisation.’
If the approach (it is not a method) had retained comparable simplicity of
principle, the term NATM would be more generally accepted at the
present day as defining a valuable step in furnishing the tunnel engineer’s
tool-kit (Müller 1978, Müller and Fecker 1978). But the succeeding
generation of Austrian tunnelling engineering could not forbear to invest
the principles in an impenetrable shroud of complexity—and downright
nonsense—possibly with an aim of combining market penetration with
apparent academic respectability. Examples include the extraordinary
variety of definitions of ‘ground rings’ (the ‘protective zone’ of
Rabcewicz), i.e. the zones of rock naturally stressed by excavating the
tunnel, which girdle—or in some exigesises appear only partially to
girdle—the tunnel. In reality, any opening in the ground causes a degree
of ground support to be conferred by circumferential stress of the ground.
The official definition of NATM, issued by the Austrian Society of
Engineers and Architects reads:
The New Austrian Tunnelling Method constitutes a method where the
surrounding rock or soil formations of a tunnel are integrated into an
overall ring-like support structure. Thus the formations will themselves
be part of this supporting structure.
This, as Kovári (1993) explains, is a universal consequence of tunnelling.
Another curiosity concerns the notion of a minimum point of the Fenner-
Pacher ground response curve relating convergence to the degree of support
28 Background to modern tunnelling
required (see, for example, Brown 1981)—the forerunner of the
confinement-convergence curves. (Rabcewicz 1969, Rabcewicz and Golser
1973)—which has become established in NATM lore, contrary to common-
sense. The correct timing of the provision of support is said to be a
fundamental principle of NATM but without a minimum point for support
need this criterion does not exist. Much more important becomes the need to
secure the ground before the rate of convergence becomes excessive, a
feature omitted from the Fenner-Pacher concept (apart from an
extraordinary multi-dimensional version proposed by Sauer (1986) which
appears to be devoid of theoretical basis). The consequence has been, quite
predictably, much confusion as to a definition of NATM as a result of
banality of the philosophical attributes which are claimed for it (Kovári
1993). A rational approach to systems of Informal Support is discussed
further in Chapter 5.
Practically, for the ‘brave’ new alpine tunnels, light support capable of
tolerating a high degree of inward convergence of highly stressed rock to
establish equilibrium, has achieved great economies by comparison with
traditional methods. This was achieved for the Arlberg and Tauern tunnels
(John 1980) by the use of yielding Toussaint-Heinzmann arches (see
Section 5.2.1) since the degree of convergence would be excessive for a
loadbearing Shotcrete lining. Additionally, in weaker ground, the
techniques of building a side- or crown-heading directly into the full
tunnelled section draws upon earlier traditional practices with steel arch
supports, in other than squeezing ground (Kovári 1998). For a rock tunnel
under high ground loading, the principal objective will be to establish
stability while limiting the extent of the loading to be transferred to the
support or to any subsequent lining. For an urban tunnel in soft ground,
the principal objective is different, namely to provide support so
expeditiously as to secure the ground and to limit ground movements
which may otherwise be expensive to compensate or cause damage to other
structures and services. Reduced loading on the support in soft ground is
natural and adventitious as a result of the deformation of the ground ahead
of the installation of support (Panet and Guenot 1982).
It is a universal principle of good tunnelling to adapt the support to the
expected behaviour of the ground. On the one hand, NATM has been used
to cover a variety of different approaches to tunnelling and, on the other,
many engineers approach tunnel design in a rational manner which does
not wish to wear impenetrable philosophical baggage. In this book, the
term ‘Informal Support based on Monitoring’ is the general description,
contracted to Informal Support, emphasising that this title includes all
forms of tunnelling which entail the provision of support intermediate
between excavation and a final formal lining (which might itself be in
sprayed concrete). Support may include the use of bolts, spiles, dowels,
arches and sprayed concrete. Here ‘Informal’ implies a variability and
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capability to respond to needs as these may vary between tunnels and
between zones of a single tunnel. For the practice of tunnelling in yielding
ground with light support, the description of Sprayed Concrete Lining
(SCL) is used, following the lead of others (Institution of Civil Engineers
1997), with these features:
 
• initial support designed on the basis of the composite behaviour of the
ground and the support;
• a reliance on observation (including the use of appropriate instruments)
as a basis for establishing adequacy of support (or, for circumstances
where time allows, the need for supplementary support);
• unified management of the design/construction stages of excavation,
initial support, monitoring and final lining.
 
There are engineers at the present day who understand SCL to exclude
reliance solely on rock-bolting, which seems reasonable in a logical sense.
Informal Support is a description of universal application, however. Early
examples of SCL were based on simple analysis of a tunnel in ground of
uniform initial stress, considering the ground as a linear elastic material up to
yield and as a material of uniform plastic strength thereafter, as described by
Kastner (1971) and others. Subsequently, the effects of anisotropy and of the
strength reducing to a residual value have been considered. For yielding
rock, the approach remains largely empirical, comparing one rock against
another, initially by ‘scoping’ and then by considering experiences with
similar rocks elsewhere before calibrating behaviour in direct trials as
tunnelling begins (Kidd 1976). Analysis may be kept simple so long as the
rock is of one type and there are no hidden hazards of the site, such as
confined aquifers, which might prevent timely undertaking of remedial
work.
There have been many developments in different forms of rock-bolt,
spiles and dowels to suit different circumstances, the current choice being
described in Chapter 6. Problems of ‘shadowing’ of sprayed concrete by
traditional steel arches encouraged increasing use of lattice arches formed of
bar and mesh. The techniques of sprayed concrete have been developed to
include robotic application and the inclusion of steel fibre reinforcement,
while the debate of the merits of dry and wet application continues, as
described in Chapter 6.
An alternative scheme of providing immediate ground support prior to
excavation, developed in France, Bridge, creates a slot in the ground
around the projected extrados of the tunnel, the slot being filled with
sprayed concrete which develops enough strength to support the periphery
of the ground prior to the main excavation (Bougard 1988). Lunardi et al.
(1997) describe recent use of the method for a 21.5 m span of a Metro
station roof.
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The earliest rotary tunnelling machines date from the 1880s, including
the machine attributed to Beaumont and used for the lengths of pilot
tunnel advanced for the Channel Tunnel from the coasts of France and
England. Mechanical shields for soft ground were largely developed for
working in the London clay (Stack 1995) with the consequent
improvements in performance illustrated by Table 1.1. Further
developments were slow until the spur of demand in the 1950s, when large
rotary rock boring machines and ‘closed face’ mechanical shields started to
be developed, the latter relying on the use of a thixotropic medium, initially
bentonite, in the front of the machine to stabilise the face of the ground
(Bartlett et al. 1973). The simple differentiation between mechanical
shields for soft ground and rock tunnelling machines for rock began to
break down, the term Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) becoming a generic
descriptive term for all species of machine with full-face rotary cutter, the
sub-species being represented as:
 
• open TBM for rock tunnels, i.e. having no cylindrical shield to support
the periphery of the ground;
• shielded TBM for weak rock (or jointed rock with low cover) and soil,
the shield providing an intermediate ground support between the face
and the support provided behind the TBM;
• TBM with closed face, supporting the ground by means of slurry filling in
the front cell, created from the excavated ground mixed with bentonite,
polymer or a foaming compound;
• earth pressure balancing machine (EPBM), where support is by
excavated spoil contained under pressure in the front cell of the machine.
 
There are a number of different forms of the last two types with intermediate
versions. Spoil of the slurry type machine is usually removed by pumping
from the face cell, whose pressure is stabilised through an upper cell forming
a compressed air vessel. Spoil from the EPBM is removed by inclined
Archimedean screw, often in two sections to give greater control by
differential rates of rotation. See also Sections 5.1.5 and 6.3.
Where a segmental lining is constructed at the rear of the TBM, it is often
the practice to articulate the machine, with intermediate jacks between the
forward and rear sections, so that the front section may continue to advance
as the lining is being erected. This practice also helps the ability to steer the
machine.
Pipe-jacking (also known as thrust-boring) is first recorded in the USA in
1892, originally providing an iron sleeve for a service pipe, later using steel
or concrete pipes for the purpose, under a road or railway line. Subsequent
developments world-wide, but principally in the USA, Europe and Japan,
have adapted the method for long lengths of pipe and tunnel. While pipe-
jacking essentially entails application of a jacking force from the point of
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departure of the tunnel, several features have contributed to the extension of
the capability and its applications:
 
1. the design of abutting joints between pipe elements, the earlier rebated
joints being generally superseded by butt-ended joints with dowels or
sleeves to maintain alignment, while controlling loading between pipes
and excluding the ground;
2. the use of intermediate jacking stations (IJS), thus limiting the jacking
load to advance the tunnel, allowing lengths of jacked tunnel or pipe in
excess of 1000 m;
3. the use of external lubricants to reduce frictional forces opposing
forward movement;
4. the use of mechanical excavation, ranging from shields with excavators
to closed forms of TBM, at the face of the tunnel;
5. the ability to introduce curves into a pipe-jacked tunnel.
 
Since 1970, miniaturisation, mostly undertaken in Japan, has developed a
family of devices for cutting and reaming the ground, largely superseding the
earlier systems which depended on jacking a blind pipe. Recent
developments are discussed in Chapter 6.
Drill-and-blast techniques have advanced through the use of multiple,
servocontrolled hydraulic drills, the process being increasingly computerised
overall, the development of explosives and delays to suit the requirements
for the main rock-breaking and for the smooth-blasting around the
periphery, also the adoption of non-electrical forms of firing (c.f. the fuses of
the early uses of gunpowder).
Road-headers and boom-cutters of several types, powers and sizes
have been developed from their widespread usage in mining. The ability
to excavate strong rock and to limit wear of the picks depends as much
on the overall stiffness of the machine, (i.e. the combination of mass,
limited mechanical clearances between elements of the system, sturdiness
of design and support of the machine to minimise ‘chatter’) as on its
power.
Transport of spoil within the tunnel may determine the speed of advance
of the tunnel. Long extensible conveyor belts have been used for this purpose
where space and geometry allow, but more often trains of wagons, either
overturned into hoppers at working shafts or equipped with floors which
open at the transfer station. For confined spaces in small diameter tunnels, a
long rail-mounted wagon with the floor formed of armoured conveyor
(Salzgitter car) has been widely used. Where the spoil is fine or where it can
readily be treated to be pumpable, the spoil has been pumped from the TBM
to the point of disposal, this particularly for closed-face machines, requiring
recirculation of the stabilising agent. For the French section of the Channel
Tunnel, on the other hand, spoil was transported by rail-mounted wagons to
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the principal shaft where, after pulverising in a mill and mixing with water,
the spoil was pumped to disposal in a surface pond behind an earth dam
(Barthes et al. 1994).
Another area of major development has been that of treating the ground
in order to establish stability or the control of inflow of ground-water ahead
of the advancing tunnel. Such methods are here referred to collectively as
‘special expedients’.
Ground freezing by the use of brine in circulation pipes was first used for
shaft-sinking for mining through water-bearing zones of the ground in South
Wales in 1862 (Glossop 1968). More recently, the technique has been
adapted for tunnelling, using a pattern of freezing around a cylinder ahead of
the tunnel together with a plug of frozen ground at its extremity. The tunnel
is then advanced in stages to allow the next cycle of freezing to start, a
relatively slow process. An alternative method of freezing has used liquid
nitrogen as the circulating fluid, requiring less mobilisation of plant and
providing a more rapid freezing process, hence allowing higher overall rates
of advance and better able to cope with the heat transport problems of
moving ground-water. The method has usually used vertical or near-vertical
freeze pipes from the ground surface to freeze a block of ground through
which the tunnel is to pass, the excavation for the tunnel cutting through
any, previously decommissioned, freeze pipes which are intersected. The
process advances with the tunnel until the waterbearing area is passed.
Treatment of the ground by injection may be required to increase the
strength of soils, to increase the stiffness of jointed rock (Jaeger 1955) or to
make tight those joints in rock otherwise contributing to instability.
Treatment is more often used to reduce the entry of water from open-
textured soils or open-jointed rock by reducing its mass permeability.
Traditionally, cement grout has been the medium, limited in its use to soils of
coarse sand size and above. The range of available materials has increased
over recent years to include bentonite-cement, fine micro-cement, silicate
grouts and a wide range of resins with controllable setting times. Essentially,
the finer the soil (or the fissures in rock), the more elaborate the overall
grouting process and the more expensive the types of grout needed to achieve
results by penetrating the finest fissures.
Glossop (1968) recalls that grouting of a primitive nature has been
practised over very many years, that Bérigny introduced grouting with clay
and hydraulic lime in 1802 and that Hawksley used cement grouting for dam
foundations from 1867.
The cement grouts set as a result of wetting, the other grouts requiring
setting agents. The traditional silicate grouts, whose setting characteristics
depend on pressure, concentration and temperature, may tend to break
down (syneresis) prematurely and should only be relied upon over short
periods. Some of the resins (and the earlier cyanide grouts no longer in
general use) are highly toxic and demand great care in their use. Harding
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(1946) describes early uses in Britain of the Joosten process of grouting,
based on silicates with an organic reagent, resulting in a gel of higher
strength than the traditional silicate grout.
For tunnelling, while ground treatments have been applied from the
surface for shafts and for shallow tunnels, the usual expedient, where long
continuous lengths of tunnel call for treatment, is to form overlapping cones
of treated ground from a pattern of drill holes diverging at an acute angle to
the axis of the tunnel, in an aureole ahead of the advancing tunnel or from a
pilot tunnel (Kell and Ridley 1966). For drill-and-blast and hand-tunnelling
techniques, the holes for the purpose are drilled at the face. Where a TBM is
used the aureole needs to be drilled from the rear of the machine, requiring
appropriately increased length of overlap between drill holes.
The use of tubes-à-manchette for grouting has become widespread,
allowing by means of a grouting tube and an external casing (Figure 1.5), the
injection of grout of known volume into a selected zone of the ground.
As recalled above, the use of low-pressure compressed air in
tunnelling dates from 1879 for the Hudson River Tunnel, the pressure of the air
Figure 1.5 Tube-à-manchette.
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serving to reduce the entry of water and occasionally also partially to
balance the pressure of the ground to reduce settlement. On account of the
risks now known to result from working in compressed air (the ‘bends’, a
temporary discomfort caused by nitrogen coming out of solution in the
blood on emerging from a pressurised tunnel, may be controlled by
observance of rules for decompression but the incidence of bone necrosis has
been recognised as a longer-term and incapacitating disease) the use of
pressures more than 100 kPa (1 bar) above atmospheric pressure is now
avoided as far as possible. Up to 1 bar permanent effects are minimal, delays
in ‘locking-out’ are avoided and, in consequence, where the tunnel is no
more than, say, 20 m below the prevailing water-table, compressed air at
such low pressure has on occasion been combined with pumping (Morgan et
al. 1965).
Water inflows to a tunnel, possibly causing unstable ground, may be
controlled by pumping, sometimes by vacuum-pumping at the face,
accompanied by recharge where unacceptable ground movements as a result
of settlement would otherwise occur, or where other deleterious effects of
drying-out, such as the effects on elm piles or archaeological remains, need
to be prevented. While the pumping has usually been confined to the
immediate vicinity of the tunnel, the particular geology may favour the use
of more extensive pumping from a permeable bed of ground beneath
troublesome water-bearing silts or fine sands. This expedient was, for
example, used for the Clyde Tunnel (Morgan et al. 1965) and in a different
form constituted Project Moses for the Storebaelt Tunnel (Biggart and
Sternath 1996).
As hinted above, special expedients are not mutually exclusive. The
design of an optimal system, using one or more expedients, has needed to
take account of many aspects of planning, of knowledge of the ground and
of the features of construction (Kell 1963). The design of ‘special
expedients’, where these are to be used, must form an integral part of the
design process described in Chapter 2. Features affecting the present choice
of excavation, lining and spoil disposal method are discussed in Chapter 6.
1.6 The developing problems of management
In the earliest days, tunnelling adopted traditional techniques, reliant upon
the initiative of the miner to adapt to change. Each qanat for example was
constructed by a small team, self-reliant and dependent on simple provisions
by others of tools and materials. The Roman tunnels were usually built by
slaves or by prisoners of war, requiring formal procedures for the
organisation of vast bodies of men but providing little scope for initiative or
innovation.
With the demands of an incipient industrial age, the practical techniques
were developed in response to demand, with increasing understanding in a
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qualitative sense as to how to adapt methods of support, particularly of
temporary support, to match the requirements of increasingly diverse
varieties of the ground. Construction methods generally followed tradition.
M.I.Brunel was the first to recognise a more complex relationship between
design of the project and design of the means and the process of
construction. Very conscientiously, but as a result subjecting himself to great
responsibility, he took charge of the integrated process in preference to
managing a system whose several components were the responsibility of
different parties.
Then followed a period of increasing refinement in the planning of the
tunnelling projects, avoiding difficult ground so far as technology allowed
and designing the project to make best use of emerging technology and
materials. The construction process remained fairly basic, apart from the
introduction of tunnelling machines which were conceived to satisfy the
requirements of the project designer as to dimensions, the tunnel constructor
(usually the Contractor) as to performance. The Engineer, the project
promoter’s designer and contract administrator, was expected to be a
competent designer who understood enough about the needs of the
Employer and the problems of construction to be able to direct the project
and to understand where the project design might be modified to assist in
achieving objectives and in overcoming practical problems of construction.
He was also expected to learn from experience as to how to achieve future
economies. Many specialised techniques were developed in temporary works
such as timbering and in overcoming specific problems but these solutions
mostly arose from experience within the tunnel and hence communicated in
practical terms between those concerned with the project, not requiring
complexities in calculation or analysis.
As time passed, and we are now into the 1950s, there was an explosion
in techniques and in the analytical ability to understand the criteria for
success in the increasingly difficult types of ground being tunnelled. This,
on the one hand, called for more specialised knowledge among those
concerned and on the other for improved communication between those
involved which was becoming, in consequence of growing complexity,
increasingly difficult. The general increase in the amount of work was
encouraging new entrants who lacked the continuity of experience.
Tunnelling, largely for such reasons, began to be associated with
uncontrollable costs and lengthening periods of construction. The
profession of civil engineering should at this point have addressed this
mounting problem. The problem was of a general nature but expressed
most extremely in relation to tunnelling, on account of dependence on the
ground and the increasingly specific requirements from management for
success in the application of new methods and means of construction. The
profession through this period stood clear of the problems of organisation
and management, except in a remote, non-specific manner. The most
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debilitating feature was a fatal developing division between engineering
and management and the increasing incoherence in the ‘management’ of
the several elements of design. As a consequence, the initiative for action
passed into the hands of other professions, the law and those concerned
with accounting for the costs of projects. The results have been predictably
unsuccessful with poor control of costs and dissatisfaction with the degree
of achievement of the Owner’s objectives. The time is now propitious for
the civil engineering profession to recapture the initiative, impose order
and achieve results for their Clients, taking encouragement from projects
which have shown features of enlightenment in project procurement and
direction described in following chapters. This is the general theme of this
book. This Chapter is intended to set the introduction to the paradox that
the tunnelling engineer has had the benefit of an increasing range of tools
with which to address his tasks whereas the framework, in which such
tools may be used to their best advantage, has generally deteriorated with
time—with honorable exceptions. Engineering potential and management
practice have been travelling in opposite directions with the consequence
that new techniques may appear superficially and erroneously to have
added to the problems instead of adding to the solutions. Subsequent
chapters attempt to diagnose the issues more specifically. Solutions exist,
with economies achievable by applying the best capabilities in all aspects of
tunnelling and through an understanding of its successful integration,





“When I use a word”, Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less”.
Alice Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll.
 
2.1 The nature of design and its application to tunnelling
Systems engineering, central to manufacturing industry and, in its widest
sense, universal to all effective practical and political aspects of life, is a term
little understood by civil engineers and hence is not commonly applied to
tunnelling (Muir Wood 1996). It is important to understand the concept,
however, in order to appreciate its potential even if we do not immediately
start as tunnellers to use the expression ‘systems engineering’. A more
familiar term to the tunnel engineer is ‘design’ and if defined sufficiently
broadly—as used in this book—‘design’ may be treated as synonymous to
systems engineering.
Manufacturing industry differentiates between ‘product design’, i.e. the
design of the finished article, and ‘process design’, the means for achieving
the desired product. Commercial organisations with an instinct for survival
have long realised the intimate relationship between the one and the other.
As a very simple example, a chocolate cream depends on the use of an
enzyme in its manufacture to liquefy the filling after application of the
coating.
Design is the central element of the art of engineering and of architecture
but members of the two professions tend to use the term in quite different
senses. To many architects, and to many of those who designate themselves
as ‘designers’, design may be related to questions of form or style of the
artefact. Many engineers on the other hand use ‘design’ as a synonym for
calculation and analysis of a finished product, related by civil engineers
either to temporary or to permanent works. Fundamentally, however, in this
book, design may be understood to describe the continuous thread, or at
least what should be a continuous thread, of recorded processes of thought—
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with appropriate transferences to manual skills—in order that ideas may be
successfully transformed into artefacts or projects, including essentially the
processes of construction. At the heart of the design process is the
concentration on the ultimate purpose of a project, to achieve the business
objectives of the Owner, expressed in the broadest terms as including the
interest of the public and of other stakeholders.
2.1.1 Characteristics of design
The characteristics of design will first be defined in general terms, then the
process of design described, identifying particular features critical to
successful design in tunnelling. It will subsequently be demonstrated that,
once the centrality of design to successful tunnelling is accepted,
fundamental consequences follow affecting policy and practice.
The essential characteristics of the design process (Muir Wood and Duffy
1996) are that it is:
 
• Creative, demanding analysis as well as imagination, often applied in
alternating sequences. Virtually all successful engineers and scientists
operate in such a fashion; Poincaré describes the mathematician as
working in this manner.
• Holistic, so that all relevant aspects of evolving solutions are taken into
account. At the level of a total project, the aspects may be very broad,
including viability, environmental and social consequences. As the
project develops in greater detail, optimisation may well depend on
revisiting some of the non-technical aspects of design.
• Integrative. Synthesis lies at the heart of the proficiency of the engineer.
Synthesis implies the ability effectively to integrate contributions from
those studying and developing different aspects of the same feature of the
project.
• Interactive. Direct communication is necessary between members of a
design team studying different aspects of design. A problem identified by
one participant may well be viewed as an innovative opportunity by
another.
• Iterative, in recognition of the fact that, except in the simplest
circumstances, an optimal solution may evolve in interactive stages. This
may entail trial-and-refinement or, occasionally, a totally fresh approach
to a solution.
• Cross-disciplinary. It follows from the above that, for productive and
progressive communication to occur, the principal participants in the
design process need to combine a depth of knowledge in their own
specialities with an awareness of, and respect for, the contributions to be
made by other members of the team.
• Systematic, the work proceeding both in principle and in detail to a well-
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conceived and developing plan. The main skill in directing design is to
combine the discipline of the plan of action with the flexibility essential
to the design process. This procedure may be conceived as progressive
exploration of only partially mapped territory as the mapping develops.
• Ethically grounded, recognising the interests of all ‘stakeholders’ and the
need to respect social and environmental issues external and internal to
the project, with clear lines of responsibility for taking such matters into
account in reaching design conclusions.
• Hierarchical, with two-way flows between the levels of the hierarchy so
that each contributes effectively to the evolution of the project. New
issues identified at a higher level may be delegated for further study at a
more appropriate level.
 
Design leading to successful projects is characterised by:
 
• the need for clearly stated objectives, including matters of resources,
functional criteria and timing, agreed between the Client and the
controller of the design process, referred to below as the ‘conductor’;
• performance criteria, modified and refined, in consultation, or in a
tighter structure of management, with the Client as work proceeds,
execution of the project and planning of its operation being seen as
interactive aspects of the project (the term ‘Client’ being used here to
represent the party commissioning the project, the ‘Owner’, or possibly
his ‘surrogate’ representative, see Chapter 3);
• professionals engaged in a unified design team, such that discussions lead
to improved understanding of the viewpoints and perceived objectives of
other members, and hence towards most rapid convergence to the
preferred scheme, through constructive dialogue;
• recognition that an appreciation of the potential risks is a necessary
preliminary to the control of risk.
 
2.1.2 The parties to the design process
The Client owns the project and the ultimate criterion for success is that his
objectives are achieved. The design process has therefore to be able to
combine the consideration of operation and construction. By a sufficient
understanding of each aspect, the objectives may become modified in a
process of optimisation, as definition of the project develops. The
implication is that there is a need for a clear statement of objectives,
differentiating between those elements which are essential and those
preferred but negotiable. Such a statement will provide a guide to the terms
of reference for the contributions of each principal party to the achievement
of the objectives.
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The design process needs to be directed by a ‘conductor’, the term being
deliberately chosen in preference to ‘manager’ since a manager has been
too often cast in the role of undertaking a remote administrative function.
The artificial division between engineering and management, fostered
during recent years by mistaken notions of accountancy, has had a highly
corrosive effect on the success of tunnel projects. Once the pervasiveness of
design is understood, it will be realised that the function is highly pro-
active, the ‘conductor’ engaged within the design process and effectively
directing the activities of the protagonists. The design process, needing
simultaneously to satisfy multiple criteria, will pass through stages of
compromise, ‘trading-off’, towards the optimal solution. Usually the
process will be one of trial-and-refinement, but sometimes it will be
necessary or expedient to reshape the concept towards a radically different
form, a likely condition for innovation. Thus, the design process entails the
skilful aiming at moving targets, the rate of convergence upon its chosen
option reflecting largely upon the cross-disciplinary skills of the
‘conductor’ and the ‘players’.
Once the guiding principles for a specific item of the overall scheme have
been adequately defined, the design of this item may proceed, with the
‘boundary conditions’ made known to all concerned, but periodically the
several features of the scheme need to be reconsidered together to ensure that
no new interactive problems have inadvertently been introduced.
Using the terminology of the system engineer, Figure 2.1 illustrates how
design may be illustrated as a series of iterative loops, each loop entailing
communication of ideas and knowledge between participants, possibly
through the medium of computers.
Uncertainty is an issue in all engineering projects; tunnelling brings its
own special brand of uncertainty, largely on account of the geological
features, their impact on the method of construction and the impractibility
of fully characterising an element of the ground even where, rarely, it is
possible fully to explore it. Where information is contributed by any party
to the design process, such information should be classified as to its
reliability and precision. An important aspect of design will be the
consideration of the means and justification of the cost of the reduction of
uncertainty in a particular respect, where such reduction may bear upon
project cost or risk.
2.1.3 Uncertainty and risk
Consideration of risk must be at the heart of the design process. Since risk
and hazard are terms used loosely in different contexts with different
meanings, each is defined, following BS 4778, in these terms:
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• Hazard: a situation that could occur during the lifetime of a product,
system or plant that has the potential for human injury, damage to
property, damage to the environment or economic loss. (‘System’ is here
understood to include the construction phase of a project.)
• Risk: a combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a
defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the
occurrence. (Since risk is related to a certain set of prior assumptions, it
is logical that, while risk generally denotes a disagreeable outcome, it
may exceptionally denote a favourable circumstance; this is a point
made by the Institution of Civil Engineers and Faculty and Institute of
Actuaries (1998)).
 
The driving force of good design in a tunnelling project is the intention to
minimise undesirable risk (generally where the term ‘risk’ is used, this
sense is implied) and to enhance the opportunities for the most
appropriate, and often innovative, elements to the work. The features of
design as defined in Section 2.1.1 are fully adapted to the investigation
and control of risk.
Figure 2.1 The iterative nature of design.
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The principles of risk analysis and risk control have been addressed by
many authors (e.g. Royal Society 1992, Rimington 1993, Godfrey 1996).
Health and Safety Commission (1991) provide a definition for the principle
of ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical) for application to the
establishment of reasonable limits to the reduction of risk.
Risk needs to be addressed on a project-wide basis. From the viewpoint of
the Owner there may well be elements of the broader ‘business case’ for the
project that need also to be included. Such considerations may take many
forms, highly project specific, of which a few are set out below by way of
example and reminder.
 
1. Optimisation of a single project may overlook features of standardi-
sation which may bring benefits for several related projects, or which
may better fit accepted administrative practices.
2. Training for operation, and encouragement of the optimal coordination
between construction and operation, may require members of the
Owner’s team to be incorporated within the construction team during
the later stages of construction.
3. The possibility of a changing future usage of the project may justify
higher standards or more generous provisions by the project, e.g. a water
supply tunnel which may in the future be operated under higher internal
pressure.
4. Protection of a sensitive structure may justify stringent measures of
design and control of an underground project, e.g. the Jubilee Line
Extension at Westminster described in Section 5.3.
5. The terms of financing or of extracting revenue from the project may
impose constraints on progress, with, for instance, an intermediate
operating stage of partial completion.
6. It may be expedient to incorporate standards of health and safety higher
than the prevailing norms, not only for reasons of principle but also to
avoid retrospective variations as a result of new legislation during the
period of construction.
7. Aspects of project risk, in cost and timing, may reflect on other features
of the Owner’s responsibilities.
 
The principal causes of risk in tunnelling may be expressed in these
categories, summarised and developed from CIRIA Report 79 (CIRIA
1978):
 
1. The physical conditions of the work:
• features of the ground and of ground-water interacting with the
methods and means of construction;
• presence of natural or man-made noxious or flammable gases or
liquids;
Design: the ubiquitous element 43




• presence of landfill.
2. Human failings:
• changes in management structure or personnel;
• failure to identify essential features of project management;
• late access to site;
• late issue of essential information;
• examples of incompetence or inefficiency;
• defective contract documents;
• defects in design of the works, in the design of their construction or in
design of the means of construction in relation to the possible range of
conditions;
• inadequate or inappropriate designations of responsibility;
• defective workmanship.
3. Effects on other parties:
• damage or injury caused by collapse or inundation of the works;
• negligence in design or workmanship;
• effects of ground movements on structures or services;
• effects of changes to ground-water regime on structures or services;
• consequential losses;
• war or social unrest.
 
Many of these features are not specific to tunnelling but the particular
characteristics of a tunnel—problems of access, degree of dependence on the
ground, the linear process of construction as a bar to acceleration—enhance
the consequences of such factors, individually or in combination.
The overall strategy concerning risk pervades all aspects of tunnel
management but at the project design phase the elements of risk should begin
to be defined and their containment related to aspects of project strategy
driven by design considerations. The orderly control of risk may be described
in these phases:
 
1. identification of potential risks;
2. investigation of nature and magnitude of potential risks;
3. development of measures to mitigate risk;
4. assessment of residual risk;
5. allocation of responsibility for accepted risk;
6. application of measures for risk control and remediation.
 
The essence of risk management is the integration across all aspects of the
design process. Thus, for example, potential hazards revealed by site
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investigation in relation to a favoured method of construction may be
eliminated in whole or in part by contributions from the planning or the
design of the project.
The general rules for tunnelling set out first in CIRIA Report 79 (CIRIA
1979)—and subsequently in different form in many other documents as the
benefits of risk analysis and risk sharing have become more widely
appreciated—remain valid, namely that the first priority is to anticipate and
forestall controllable causes of risk. This entails meticulous attention to
procedural issues in the planning stage of a project in order to understand
external constraints. Chapter 4 discusses the strategy for site investigation in
order to identify potential hazards of the ground. Here it is appropriate once
more to emphasise that so-called geological risks in tunnelling are
represented by the product (Geological hazards)×(Susceptibility of scheme
and means of tunnelling to such hazards).
The nature of tunnelling entails a degree of uncertainty. Risks may be
foreseeable in nature but not in extent or precise occasion, and may not be
practically capable of total elimination. Mitigation is best achieved by:
 
1. describing the nature of the hazards, their probable or possible incidence
and extent in relation to different forms of tunnelling;
2. indicating the circumstances in which the hazards are likely to occur;
3. making provision for responsibility and for contingency planning should
the risk occur;
4. devising and enacting inspection procedures, free from pressures for
maximum progress or for cutting corners, to ensure that measures vital
to control of risk are respected.
 
The second rule for risks, whether these concern costs or questions of health
and safety, is that primary responsibility should be specifically allocated. The
uncertainty that arises in the absence of such specific indication of
responsibility has been the primary cause of failure to control much risk. Yet
more costly and destructive of good management, is the practice, in place of
risk identification, of the incidence of risk being simply ‘passed down the
line’, usually to a contractor. Quality Assurance (QA) (see Section 7.3) has
contributed to recent tunnel problems, where Permanent Work (the field of
the Owner’s QA) becomes divorced from Temporary Works in areas in
which the combination of the two assure the safe construction of the project
(Heathrow Express collapse [described in Chapter 9], Øresund Link, loss of
tunnel element [see Section 8.2]).
Allocation of responsibility will take into account the ability physically to
control the risk, where the immediate effects of the risk will be experienced
and the ability to institute timely countermeasures. Beyond such general
principles, the allocation of risk will be much influenced by the nature of the
contractual relationships. Risk recognises no frontiers of professional
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discipline or demarcation of duties. A well-organised project will ensure that
it is in the interest of all parties to identify and control risk, emphasising the
particular features and the most expedient means of control. This is a
practice to infuse the project, right from the outset, working from the general
towards the particular as the features of the project assume definition and as
some risks may disappear, others more precisely understood. The greatest
benefits are achieved by modifications made before expenditure on the
variation of any aspect of the project has already been incurred. A
particularly expensive feature of the Channel Tunnel was that requirements
of health and safety were evolving as the project was being designed and
entailed changes after work of manufacture and construction was already in
hand.
Statistics of past events may contribute towards estimating the risks to
health and safety associated with particular forms of tunnelling but these
should be treated with great reserve. Each project has unique features. The
‘safety culture’ of a specific project, as part of the general concern for good
working conditions, will affect many of the factors which contribute to safe
working practices. In particular, the extent to which there has been full
exchange and publication of views between the Parties engaged on the
project concerning the possibilities of particular risks will have a pronounced
effect on their control.
Uncertainty about the ground is a hazard to be understood and, so far as
possible, circumscribed. The geological model (Chapter 4) is based upon
sampling of a very small fraction of the ground, on indirect interpretation of
geophysical records and upon fitting the model into a wider geological
context. Wherever an interpretation is made, alternative interpretations of
the facts, possibly more or less favourable to different forms of tunnelling,
should be mentioned. For a project to be constructed under competitive
contract, and where there is uncertainty in one or more particular features of
the ground which may have a large effect on the contractor’s choice of
method or of cost, the use of ‘reference conditions’ (CIRIA Report 79)
indicate the assumptions to be made for the basis of the contract. The
principle is stated in para. 4.3 of this Report:
‘It is proposed that the Engineer, who will have had much greater
opportunity to direct the site investigation carried out and weigh the
results in relation to his design and the aims of the project, should
define, within limits and where appropriate, the ground deemed to be
foreseeable and so provide “reference conditions” for the ground.
These would then be accepted, unless changed or modified by the
tenderer, as the range of conditions which, in terms of Clause 12 of the
ICE Form, would be used to judge if the physical conditions and
artificial obstructions encountered…. “could not reasonably have been
foreseen by an experienced contractor”. By doing so, the Engineer will
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have established a common basis upon which all parties can at the time
of contract form an understanding of the physical conditions in which
the work is to be performed.’
As set out above, the ‘Reference Conditions’ are related to the Institution of
Civil Engineers (ICE) Conditions of Contract, up to the 6th Edition (ICE
1991) and, by analogy, to FIDIC Conditions. The principles, however, have
more general application. The selected ‘reference conditions’ should have
specific relevance to the particular project, defining features of vital
importance to the methods of construction and their costs. As stated in
CIRIA Report 79 para 4.6 ‘The ground encountered during construction
should be monitored against the Reference Conditions.’ This approach has
two main objectives: (1) to achieve economy where there is a low probability
of a major hazard (accepted by the Owner) which would, if charged to the
responsibility of the contractor, affect the optimal method of working and in
consequence the cost; (2) to provide a clear basis for measuring the extent of
variation on account of the geology, effectively in so doing ensuring that the
preparer of the contract documents has considered the nature of
uncertainties with particular bearing on construction risks.
Too often, particularly where geological risk is imposed fully on the
contractor, the Engineer claims, without justification—and in the absence of
any, or any adequate, assessment of risk—after a particular geological
problem has been encountered during construction, that he had foreseen
precisely the difficulties that would arise to the contractor. The approach
described above should assist in other constructive objectives of CIRIA
Report 79, namely: (concerning the provision of site investigation
information provided to the Contractor: para 3.4)
‘The satisfactory solution is seen in providing the tenderers with the
clearest possible description of the ground on which the tender is to be
based and to expect in return a method statement indicating a full
appreciation, based on careful examination and full understanding of
this description.’
Uncertainty is pervasive. It may be desirable for a project with a simple
purpose to define the requirements in terms of physical characteristics and
performance. For a complex, innovative project, and for one with
possibilities of interactions between different contractors, this is rarely
achievable or even, if it were, the optimal solution. The wider consequences
in contractual terms are discussed in Chapter 7.
One nearly ubiquitous hazard of urban projects concerns the presence of
pre-existing service pipes and cables, either unrecorded by the relevant
authority or misplaced sufficiently to cause embarrassment and delay in
sinking access shafts. When in any doubt, it is wise to organise a physical or
possibly a geophysical exploration to expose and then eliminate the
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problem. Boreholes are normally preceded by a trial pit for this reason. One
such borehole in an open field outside the perimeter road of Heathrow
Airport, in apparent open country and with an undisturbed agricultural air,
omitted this precaution and struck oil—the insulation for a high tension
power cable.
The nature of risk is such that care must always be taken in defining the
assumptions on which estimates of uncertainty are based. For example, a
sewerage tunnel project in England was known to face a risk of encountering
bands of Devonian rocks of strength exceeding those penetrated by the site
investigation. For the designed scheme of tunnelling by drill-and-blast, such
a contingency would have only relatively minor effect on the overall cost of
the project. An alternative scheme, offered by the Contractor and accepted
for the project, entailed excavation by road-header, a scheme offering
savings in cost of about 10% for the predicted geology but susceptible to
high increase in cost should the bands of strong rock be encountered—as
they were on account of misinterpretation of the geological structure. A
differential risk analysis would have revealed this risk before the cost was
incurred. A decision would then have been made either for supplementary
site investigation to establish whether the tunnel would be liable to traverse
the bands of strong rock in which case the excavation by road-header would
be reassessed, or to reject the excavation by roadheader at the outset. In the
event, high wear and low productivity caused the road-header to be removed
and excavation completed by drill-and-blast at an overall claimed increase of
cost of nearly 50%.
2.1.4 Qualifications for the design team
The leader of the design operation has already been referred to as the
‘conductor’. Indeed, his functions are comparable to those of the conductor
of an orchestra in that he knows how to read the full score (i.e. a broad grasp
of the design process to be undertaken, how this may be fulfilled, the pacing
of the process). He also knows what contribution to expect from each
instrument (i.e. from each key player in the design process). The ‘players’, for
their part, understand their instruments and how these blend with the
remainder of the orchestra. The overall ‘intellectual profile’ may be
illustrated in the form of a ‘wind-rose’ (Figure 2.2) for a particular project
with the several levels of capability of each participant defined as:
 
• Expertise: wide understanding in the particular area of contribution, in
relation to the needs of the project.
• Competence: general knowledge in the areas of contribution of others
adequate to allow engagement in constructive dialogue.
• Awareness: understanding adequate to respect the contributions of
others in such areas.  
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While the design process needs a ‘conductor’ throughout, the occupant of
this post may well change, particularly for a major project many years in its
evolution, in consequence of the changing characteristics of the different
phases of development of the project. Any such change must however respect
the need for continuity in conceptual thinking. This is particularly necessary
for tunnelling projects, since features of the process design, i.e. the design of
the operations of construction, need to be fully appreciated from the outset
in all aspects of planning and investigation.
2.2 Steps in the design process
Chapter 7 describes the inception of the underground project, at which
time, the design process, in the absence of adequate understanding, is
most likely to be inhibited. Where a tunnelling project has set off down a
road of fragmentation of responsibilities and control by an administrator
without understanding of the subtleties of design, radical measures are
necessary to restore the conditions for an optimised project. Figure 2.3
gives an indication of some of the principal lines of interaction between the
several activities. An overall programme needs to be developed, indicating
specific occasions for policy decisions in the course of development, for
which sound advice will be needed from those supervising the several
activities. For example, a Parliamentary Bill or authorisation by a Planning
Authority may impose constraints upon the features of the project, and
Figure 2.2 The of mix of skills needed for a water supply project.
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may itself be a necessary preliminary to the generation of financial support
for the project. For this purpose it will be necessary to describe the
approximate geometry of the project which must assume a basic knowledge
of the geology sufficient to provide guide-lines for a preferred route and
limits of deviation. There may well be other constraints to be considered at
this stage, including land ownership, protection of underground aquifers for
water supply, environmental features, urban planning, possible associated
development, which will affect such a decision.
For the Øresund link between Copenhagen and Malmo, an Illustrative
Design of the project was prepared by the Project direction team of the
Owner and Consultants, for negotiations with authorities, to establish
estimates of cost and a feasible programme and to provide guidance—but
not to usurp responsibility—to the design-and-build Contractors (Reed
1999). The discipline of so doing undoubtedly helped to prepare the Project
team to ensure that a selected Tender addressed adequately the practical
issues of the Project. Such procedures are discussed further in Chapter 7.
At the initial stage many features can only be expressed qualitatively
while, apart from the exceptional circumstance of total confidence in
knowledge of the geology, construction costs for different options can only
be expressed within margins of uncertainty whose width is highly dependent
on the particular project. At this point, and throughout the early stages of
developing the concept for a tunnel project, the ‘conductor’ should indicate
the degree of uncertainty in cost (and other attributes) with indication of the
points in the evolution of the project at which phased improvements in
precision may be expected as the result of increasing refinement in the
project definition to be expected from contributions from the design process.
This enables a strategy to be developed concerning the taking of
fundamental decisions and on the timing of financial input.
Figure 2.3 Principal interactions between participants.
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Where there are options for different forms of construction, policy
dictates the extent to which these should remain open as the project
proceeds. Figure 2.4 indicates possible effects on project optimisation at
stages in definition of the project dependent on the decision to retain two
alternatives A and B. Scheme B is indicated as less tolerant to uncertainties in
conditions of the ground than Scheme A, but offering potential savings in
cost (and possible benefits in operation including maintenance). At each
stage in defining the project, the question needs to be asked as to whether
further studies (which may also help to reduce uncertainties concerning
Scheme A) are justified in order to establish whether the potential benefits of
Scheme B may be realisable. There comes a point at which either Scheme B is
favoured as the major uncertainties have been resolved or, where the doubts
about Scheme B would entail further studies unjustifiable in time and cost,
and Scheme A will be favoured. After the point of decision, there may well be
justification for further studies to help to refine the selected option. If the
timing for decision is related to the receipt of alternative tenders for
construction, the differential value of operational benefits must have been
previously assessed (and preferably provided to Tenderers) in order to assist
in making the choice.
Figure 2.4 Decision strategy between options.
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For example in the London clay Scheme A might represent a shield-
driven tunnel with precast segmental lining, Scheme B could represent a
tunnel excavated by road-header with primary support by sprayed
concrete. Scheme A would tolerate a tighter layout than Scheme B, but a
higher radius for curves. Scheme B might require additional site
investigation to explore in greater detail the consequential effects of
ground movement and particular features affecting face stability. Estimates
of cost associated with specific risk factors at each decision point of project
definition will indicate whether potential savings, through the flexibility in
geometry offered by Scheme B, would justify additional costs of taking
forward to the next stage both Options A and B. An important question
affecting such a decision will include the expected degree of certainty in
relation to costs, as a result of incomplete information about the behaviour
of the ground.
As the design process proceeds, care should be taken to prepare and
conserve records of all activities, especially those entailing investigations
external to the project and dealings with other parties. The basis of an
elementary catechism as an aide-memoire is illustrated by Table 2.1 (based
on Anon. 1977), which may be developed in greater detail appropriate to the
specific project. Several benefits follow from such a methodical practice,
beyond the compliance with quality assessment and associated QA
procedures (which are too often over-simple in concept, unreliable in control
of risk and over-complex in administration):
 
1. The state of knowledge and expectation at a particular time is clear as the
basis of reaching a particular contingent decision. The desirability of
reviewing the decision may then be decided in the light of specific
revisions of the basis on which it was made.
2. A hiatus in the definition process of a project or the sudden transfer of
responsibility introduces, in the absence of methodical recording of
progress, a risk of subsequently duplicating work when the project
resumes or, far more serious, the omission of a particular function in
checking an essential external feature in the mistaken supposition that it
has already been undertaken and has revealed the absence of any
problem.
3. The catechism serves as a reminder that absence of information does not
permit the elimination of a particular risk without good cause.
4. In the event of subsequent criticism about a decision taken earlier in a
project (this particularly by a lawyer in the event of litigation to whom,
once the out-turn is known, correct prediction at an earlier time is
declared to be obvious, regardless of the limited data available at the
time) the rationale behind such a decision may be judged in the light of
information available at the time it was made.
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Table 2.1 Excerpt from Professional Performance Audit prepared within Halcrow
in 1977 (Anon. 1977)
3.4 During the course of design, consideration should be given by the Project
Engineer to the following specific points:
(a) Has there been any difficulty in interpretation or departure from
recommendation in Codes and Standards?
(b) Have any new criteria, evolved for particular design problems, been
scrutinised independently by an engineer experienced in the subject?
(c) Has adequate provision been made in the design and detailing for
accommodation of differential movements caused by ground settlement
and temperature changes?
(d) Have special problems of climate, pollution, aggressive soils and ground-
water been adequately considered?
(e) During construction is there any risk of imposing excessive lateral ground
loads on piled foundations or retaining walls by adjacent earthworks?
(f) Where computer aided design methods have been adopted, have the
programs been adequately justified?
(g) Are the design, construction methods and materials best suited to the
country in which they are to be used? Are the proposed standards of finish
practical and technically and aesthetically appropriate?
(h) Is the general appearance suited to the environment?
(i) Have suppliers’ claims about the properties and durability of their products
been adequately scrutinised, particularly for a new material where access
for replacement is difficult or impossible? (Such a defect could result in an
inbuilt failure mechanism.)
(j) Does any aspect of the design present difficult maintenance problems?
(k) Has the design been correctly translated on to the drawings and have they
been checked? Are the textual contract documents compatible with the
drawings? Do the documents draw attention to all special requirements
relating to controlling and accepting design criteria and monitoring
performance?
(l) Does the design comply with all statutory requirements?
(m) Have all of the interested authorities been consulted and any necessary
formal consent obtained?
(n) Are all of the wayleaves as may be necessary to give access on to the site
satisfactorily in order?
5. Such documentation, which should be concerned more with the
methodology than the precise quantitative nature of the conclusions,
much assists the appraisal of the direction of a project.
In relation to 3. above, a form of words often found in contractual
documents reads to the effect that ‘If there is reason to suspect risk of….’
without guidance as to how such a risk may be safely dismissed. The water
transfer scheme by tunnel between the Rivers Lune and Wyre suffered a
serious methane explosion at the Abbeystead valve house in 1984 causing
loss of life following completion of the scheme in 1979 (Health and Safety
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Executive 1985). It was claimed that there was no reason to suspect risk
from methane concentration. Within about 7 km of the line of the tunnel, a
borehole had been sunk in 1966, the records of which were lodged with the
British Geological Survey as ‘commercial in confidence’. A ‘commercially
confidential’ borehole in Britain is likely to be prospecting for hydrocarbons.
These circumstances are discussed in greater detail in Section 8.3.
At the early phase of project planning, a ‘sieving’ process needs to be
established in order to establish whether prima facie circumstances exist for
particular forms of geological hazard. Many may be dismissed as a result of
the first ‘coarse screening’; others may require a finer mesh, i.e. a more
detailed examination, to establish whether the study phase should attempt to
identify and quantify such residual potential hazards.
As discussed in Chapter 3, in earlier days a tunnel might be developed in a
‘linear’ manner, with the determination of the scheme of construction
allowed to follow the previous end-on functions of planning ⇒ investigation
⇒ project design. The increasing diversity of construction methods, their
greater dependence on particular characteristics of the ground, the
availability of more, and more specific, special expedients, the ability to
obtain, and to apply in a quantified manner, more detailed information
about the ground, the consequent ability to tunnel through more difficult
ground, the greater differential in cost between the favourable and
unfavourable circumstances, all tend to set the design of construction in a
more prominent—and interactive—position in the design process.
As project definition proceeds, so will the importance of the design of the
construction process become increasingly evident. Different tentative
conclusions may be reached for each stage of the design with regard to the
significance of construction design:
 
1. that the scheme entails application of familiar technology in conditions
that may with confidence be adequately defined to permit this part of the
work to be clearly specified and undertaken by competitive tender
limited to selected contractors with appropriate capability;
2. that the scheme entails innovation of a nature which requires particular
features of the construction design to be designated by the engineer,
knowledgeable in the appropriate aspects of tunnelling, responsible for
the project design;
3. that the scheme depends on development of the construction scheme in
such detail that a selected tunnelling contractor should be incorporated
within the design team. The circumstances might include one or more of
these possibilities: extending the range of previous experience; the use of
special expedients coordinated with other processes of construction; the
development of special plant; experimental work to establish feasibility;
the reliance on observational techniques to determine the scheme of
construction.
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2.3 Examples of application of the principles
While there are many examples of successful adoption of procedure (1) of
Section 2.2, using familiar methods in what are expected to be familiar
circumstances, lack of success has usually followed from failure to identify
particular hidden departures from expectation.
Heathrow Cargo Tunnel (Muir Wood and Gibb 1971) is an example of
procedure (2) where a new form of expanded lining was to be used in
circumstances which required a short shield with massive provision for face
support and a speedy reliable facility for lining erection and stressing,
described in greater detail in Section 5.2.3.
The several forms of construction by design-and-build such as BOOT
(Build, Own, Operate, Transfer) offer opportunities for full integration of
project and construction design, unconstrained by traditional practices in the
Public Works sphere, but it is remarkable that too often the two functions are
undertaken at arms length and the opportunity is lost. Many other forms of
‘partnering’ offer the chance to set construction design fully within the
design process.
Enlightenment at the top of organisations embarking upon working in a
cooperative manner with all the benefits that this should confer need to take
action to ensure that the intention pervades deeply into the operational
structure. Engineers are not by nature belligerent, but years of working in
defensive postures may have developed problems to working relationships
that need positively to be eradicated. Training needs to emphasise those
features essential to good practice and those which may well be relaxed or
modified for the overall benefit of the project.
Each tunnel has a purpose beyond the formation of a hole, or series of
holes, in the ground. There is, as it were, a light of reason at the end of the
tunnel! There is a special skill in knitting together the desired operational
features and the means for their fulfilment. For a transport tunnel built
for an existing authority with the experience of operation traffic through
tunnels, considerable knowledge and experience will be available
concerning the features needed to satisfy the objectives, but not
necessarily in the same manner as pre-existing tunnels. From the
viewpoint of construction, observation of the route for design described
in Section 2.2 should ensure that the considerations for operation will be
adequately represented within the design team, conducted by an engineer
capable of orchestrating the contributions (Figure 6.1). It is necessary to
establish adequate lines of communication, recognising that aspects of
operation run right across all aspects of project design. It is then that the
capabilities of Figure 2.3 are tested to establish that there is adequately
shared appreciation of the possible variants in the means for arriving at
the optimal scheme. Furthermore, such a degree of understanding should
help to ensure that optimisation is achieved in terms of life-cost (i.e. in
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maximising revenue [if any] less the sum of the costs of capital, operation
and maintenance [all expressed in comparable terms of Present Value])
and social benefit, and in preparation for subsequent phases of
development.
2.4 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (CDM) are set out
for the United Kingdom in a document, Designing for Health and Safety,
from the Health and Safety Commission Construction Industry Advisory
Committee (CONIAC 1994) of 31 May 1994 in response to EC Temporary
and Mobile Construction Sites Directive (92/57/EEC). Apart from
reminding the several parties to a construction contract of their duties in
relation to safety, the CDM regulations impose upon the Client the duty of
appointing a ‘Planning Supervisor’ (PS) and in designating the ‘principal
contractor’ who has duties concerning the coordination of management of
issues concerning health and safety which may affect other organisations
working at the site.
The Planning Supervisor is charged with ensuring that principles are
applied to avoid foreseeable risks, to combat risks at source and to give
priority to general safety measures. The project designer is seen to have the
greatest input to safety issues during preparation of the feasibility studies
and the concept/outline design. The designer has a responsibility at the
procurement stage in establishing the competence of the contractor but
during the construction phase the contractor is entirely responsible for health
and safety apart from design variations which need to be transmitted via the
PS. The Health and Safety Plan (P) is prepared in two stages, before and after
the appointment of the contractor. A Health and Safety File (F) is also
prepared for the benefit of those concerned with the operation and
maintenance of the project after completion.
The PS is responsible for preparing the Health and Safety Plan which, on
appointment, is passed to the principal contractor for development.
Warnings and emergency procedures for identified hazards need to be
established and the PS is to be informed of unforeseen eventualities.
The effectiveness of such a scheme depends greatly upon the competence
of the PS, including the practical understanding of tunnelling. Otherwise,
the prospect exists of the elimination of promising innovations by the PS on
account of unfamiliarity, lack of imagination or lack of willingness to
accept responsibility. The procedure may positively, with advantage and
familiarisation of all concerned, lead to a greater extent of demonstration
trials where a particular promising innovation undergoes a full-scale trial
prior to its adoption. The Victoria Line in London (Dunton et al. 1965)
provides one of many examples (Lane 1975) of the benefit of such a
practice. The penetrating observation of a previous Director General of the
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Health and Safety Executive (Rimington 1993) needs to be borne
constantly in mind: ‘to pay too much attention to avert any harm is likely
to increase harm in the long run.’ A further weakness of the functions of
the PS, which derives from the practices on which the system had to be
imposed, is the discontinuity which occurs at the time of appointment of
the Contractor. It is necessary to ensure that CDM does not inhibit the
development of linkages between the several aspects of design discussed
above, essential to its effective operation, particularly those aspects of
tunnelling which desirably entail an element of observational design
(Section 2.7).
2.5 Pitfalls in the design process
As already hinted earlier (Section 2.1), the greatest source of problems
derives from the failure to integrate management with engineering,
whereby the design process is stunted and the project potential unfulfilled.
There are many examples of the ‘management’ of major projects being
committed to management consultants who ‘manage’ by ensuring
compliance to a detailed instruction book, without regard to the features of
interaction essential to the well-being of the project. When things go
wrong, the system will ensure that the blame falls on another party, but this
has nothing to do with the optimal—or even the acceptable—standards for
a project. The management consultant keeps his ‘Teflon’ image with the
financial world.
Chapter 7 describes the essential elements of management in relation to
design, avoiding these twin, and often coexistent, defects of fragmentation
between the several elements of design, and of an artificial division between
engineering and management. When it is not integrated into the engineering,
project management equates to administration, a negative, non-productive
and non-creative function.
In the initial stages of a project, while there may be recognition of the need
for information on a variety of aspects, broadly covered under categories of
‘planning’, ‘design’ and ‘studies’, the common defect is failure to inter-relate
these functions. As indicated by Figure 2.5, there are many different aspects
of each category, with some of the interactions illustrated by Figure 2.3. In
the absence of effective management of the interactions, which may
desirably be of an iterative nature, not only can optimisation not occur but
advice on certain aspects of the project may be based on totally false
premises. This feature may be illustrated symbolically for a single step as
below.
Effectively, a, b, c,…represent the known state of each aspect at the start
of the stage of the project, with the view of each being developed to an
improved state, A, B, C,…respectively during the current stage. If we use the
code  
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A site investigation, commissioned on a predetermined basis, discloses
unexpected features. The layout has assumed a certain method of
construction, no longer viable against the new understanding of the
geological structure. Each of these studies, undertaken independently, has
in consequence arrived at irrelevant conclusions. In a comparable but less
elementary example of such an incoherent approach, the project
development proceeds in the absence of awareness of the weakness of its
geological foundations which, when known, prompts a change of route.
It is then too late to modify the investigation adequately to explore the
new route. Geological sections need to be based on conjectural
extrapolation. Each study should set out to achieve stated objectives on
the basis of stated assumptions. Interactions will be aided by the
understanding that any discovery of departure from these assumptions
will be immediately reported in order to allow assessment of the
significance of this change on the overall strategy and on the direction of
parallel studies. Part of the skill in directing such studies is to perceive
Figure 2.6 Developments of aspects of a project.
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how best to advance one such aspect in relation to the progress of others
in order to minimise repetition. Surprises are to be expected in the initial
stages of the definition of a project and studies need in consequence to be
commissioned in a sufficiently flexible manner to provide for
modification in response to events. Irrelevance or inadequacy in any
respect will otherwise cause problems and raise costs throughout the
project.
Where the project develops through well managed and inter-related
contributions, risk analysis, as discussed in Section 2.1.3, may readily be
woven into the process. Risk identification has to be undertaken
holistically since, as needs constantly to be stressed, risk is a consequence
of association between contributory factors. Where aspects of a project are
fragmented by separate uncoordinated commissioning of participants
(often in competition, providing no opportunity for injection of proposals
for improved coordination), it becomes unclear as to who, if anybody, is
responsible for risk assessment. A massive site investigation was
undertaken for a deep sewer project. For drill-and-blast tunnels with a
precast segmental lining, the principal risk might have been that of
supporting the tunnel through unstable ground associated with faults. In
fact, the tunnels were specified to be constructed by TBM with in situ
lining to follow subsequent to completion of excavation. The principal risk
then became that of limiting water inflow, affecting not only the
construction process but also threatening excessive settlement of buildings
overhead. The site investigation had been inadequately directed towards
this vital feature with the result of a thwarted contract. There was no
evidence of systematic risk assessment having been conducted as to the
adequacy of interpretation of the site investigation in relation to the
options for construction.
Elementary deficiencies in design are introduced where the ‘designer’ of
the finished tunnel fails to understand the problems and limitations of the
means of construction. One such example is that of tunnels spaced too
closely together for one or more tunnelling option. Another example arises
from the inadequate provision of space for tunnel intersections discussed in
Section 5.2.2.
Problems may arise from requirements for instrumentation within a
tunnel which pay no regard to the practicalities of construction. One simple
example arises from the wish to measure the tunnel diameter at a position
where the operation will be obstructed by an impenetrable item of plant.
Another example sets unguarded instruments exposed by projecting within
the tunnel intrados, with virtually certain risk of damage. In the first
instance, a solution will be found by precise surveying along the tunnel, by
the measurement of tunnel chords or by the use of multiple head extension
rods (MHXE) set in the ground, possibly ahead of the tunnel. In the second
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instance, the solution may be as simple as avoiding a particularly vulnerable
level along the tunnel.
Each such simple, but actual, example reveals at least two contributory
causes:
 
• lack of understanding and communication between participants;
• failure of management to provide the conditions to ensure such
communication.
 
A general failing arises from misconceptions as to the nature of design for a
design-and-build project. Thus project management calls for design
proposals and receives a description of the finished features of the tunnel
complex. Usually, the most important aspect of design will concern the
intermediate stages towards the achievement of the finished tunnel and the
means, sequence and timing whereby these are to be undertaken. In the
absence of responsibility which crosses the boundary between the several
aspects of design, failure is to be expected. In relation to the proposed use of
NATM-type tunnelling in London clay, the following observation was made
prior to the collapse of the Heathrow Express Rail link tunnels on 21
October 1994 (see also Chapter 9):
‘Conceptual design and construction [of NATM] are particularly
interdependent since the former may depend upon quite specific
features of the latter for success, with the need to ensure that these are
rigorously implemented. Present trends in commissioning tunnelling
tend to ignore a condition for good tunnelling: the overall
management of the design process. The many engineering activities
of a project are subdivided and performed sequentially or separately,
with only limited coordination. This ensures that interactions cannot




Following the collapse, the management structure was radically changed (see
Chapter 9).
2.6 The observational approach
Observation is a key attribute of the effective geotechnical and tunnel
engineer. Observation implies the ability to use the senses, mostly but not
exclusively by sight, to identify features of significance, or potential
significance, to engineering decisions. Many circumstances of the ground or
of the construction process are too complicated to describe with exactitude.
Design: the ubiquitous element 61
Observation of characteristics and comparison with similar examples
elsewhere explicitly or by personal judgment, leads to an understanding of
the potential risks and opportunities.
The engineer needs, so far as possible, to be able to measure what he
observes. The geotechnical information helps to define what is important for
the tunnelling processes. For weak ground, for example, much evidence will
be derived from samples and test results, the latter in situ for preference on
account of delicacy of soil structure and fabric. For small strains, soils may
be stiffer than for large strains, a phenomenon unlikely to be detected other
than by in-situ tests.
For strong rocks, the several Rock Mass Classification (RMC) systems,
intended by their authors as bases for tunnel support, provide initial
guidance, although different for each system (Muir Wood 1993), on what to
observe and how to record the results. Principally RMC relate to defects—or
potential defects—of the rock mass and not to the inherent properties of the
rock material. The raw data and observations of variability, coupled with
reflections on their significance and comparison against experience in similar
suites of rock, will usually provide more valuable information than the same
data entered into the algorithm of the particular RMC.
For weak rocks, the contribution from RMC is more limited since
behaviour of the rock will depend as much, or more, on the rock material
as upon the discontinuities. Attempts to base support needs for weak rocks
on RMC figures have been notably unsuccessful. The possibility of an
approach for weak rocks as simple—even if inadequate—as that for strong
rocks is illusory since the RMC systems disregard the gestalt aspects of the
properties of the ground, i.e. the characteristics dependent on the
combinative nature of the several itemised features rather than an unvaried
algebraic association of factors. A preferable approach will be to identify
the dominant factors for a particular rock type, then to map these features
in a multi-dimensional manner (Figure 2.7) based on information from
projects in similar rock types, thus identifying the bounds for satisfactory
support with acceptable safety margins. In this way, instead of an algebraic
function of rock and tunnel properties being presented in 2-D, the N
selected significant properties of a particular tunnel in a particular suite of
rocks will be presented in N dimensions. In the simplified example
illustrated, the degree of support is related to RQD and to Ns (stability
ratio), with potential ground-water problems, expressed as k×H, projected
in the third dimension.
Suppose, for example, that a tunnel in stratified mud-rocks displays initial
stability around much of the excavation except where thin stratification is
combined with bands of contrasted stiffness and where the bedding
intersects the tunnel within a certain range of angles of incidence, for which
a certain degree of support is needed. We have here four or five separate
variables whose relationships may be represented as points on an
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(imaginary) 4–5 dimensional plot. For any confined range of these
characteristics (Figure 2.7) we can observe the ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ regions on
a plot of any two selected characteristics. An approach of this nature would
assist in the planning of excavation and support procedures, always
respecting a degree of ‘fuzziness’ in the vicinity of the safe/unsafe boundary.
Engineers and geologists have traditionally, as part of their training,
developed the power of observation. Currently, much time and effort tends
to be wasted in assembling prescribed data, often painstakingly acquired at
the tunnel face, to enable calculation of a RMC algorithm which is then filed
in a geological log book but not applied to serve any further purpose.
Photographic or video records for posterity, zoning of specific characteristics
in relation to previously recognised patterns as having engineering
significance, coupled with notes on trends with the advance of the tunnel,
would be of greater value and would assist in encouraging greater alertness
on the part of the observer who will more readily appreciate the value of the
observations in relation to the practical criteria for stability. In particular, the
observer will react to unexpected features. These thoughts are further
developed in Chapter 4.
Figure 2.7 Mapping of properties of characteristics influencing support
requirements in rock.
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Observation is applied to decision-making in tunnelling in many different
forms, which may be classified as follows.
 
1. Informal: action based on observation without intermediate assessment
1.1 direct, e.g. incipient sign of face collapse.
1.2 Indirect or inferential, e.g. identification of the trend of significant
geological pattern at the advancing face associated with a potential
type of problem.
2. Formal: observation associated with assessment   
2.1 inductive method, e.g. a reasoned formal basis for 1.2 above.
2.2 design-based observation, the use of observation to improve the
design base. For example, observation of the behaviour of tunnel
support leading to improvement in design or construction
techniques, e.g. achieving improved lateral stability of tunnel arches
(see Section 5.2.1).
2.3 Observational Method or Observational Design (as defined in
Section 2.7).   
3. Syllogistic:
Application of model to syllogism: a:b::c:d where a represents analysis
applied to a laboratory or other tunnel model, b represents observed
behaviour of model, c represents analysis applied to prototype and d
represents expected behaviour of prototype tunnel.  [This is not generally
considered as a specifically observational technique (any more than other
forms of laboratory or in situ experiment) but where the model scale is
large, or where a centrifuge model has been used to overcome
dimensional factors or where the observations are based on test galleries
or shafts, it probably should be.]
 
An example of 2.1 above might be where observation indicates cyclical
variation of strata, such that the appearance of one geological member in the
face will give warning of the presence of an associated weak or water-
bearing member. Much interpretation of geophysical data is also conducted
in this manner, with a known association of signal with feature at one point
generalised towards inferring the same association elsewhere.
2.7 The Observational Method and Observational
Design
Observational techniques for geotechnical engineering were recommended
by Terzaghi and Peck (1967) under the designation of the ‘Observational
Procedure’ and later formalised by Peck as the Observational Method (Peck
1969b). He recommended the following procedural steps:
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1. Exploration sufficient to establish at least the general nature, pattern and
properties of the deposits, but not necessarily in detail.
2. Assessment of the most probable conditions and the most unfavourable
conceivable deviations from these conditions. In this assessment geology
often plays a major role.
3. Establishment of the design based on a working hypothesis of behaviour
anticipated under the most probable conditions.
4. Selection of quantities to be observed as construction proceeds and
calculation of their anticipated values on the basis of the working
hypothesis.
5. Calculation of values of the same quantities under the most unfavourable
conditions compatible with the available data concerning the subsurface
conditions.
6. Selection in advance of a course of action or modification of design for
every foreseeable significant deviation of the observational findings from
those predicted on the basis of the working hypothesis.
7. Measurement of quantities to be observed and evaluation of actual
conditions.
8. Modification of design to suit actual conditions.
 
In principle, the adequacy of the first phase of a constructional procedure
based on the Observational Method (OM) is checked by specified
observations to establish the need, if any, for further work to achieve the
desired objectives.
As set out above the procedures for the Observational Method are
unnecessarily cumbersome, and often impossible to achieve in this form, for
tunnelling. Moreover, statistical evidence of geotechnical variability for a
tunnel could rarely be presented in a significantly reliable manner to permit
the designation of ‘most probable’ (Step 3 above) condition. Tunnels may
also lend themselves to ‘zoning’ whereby, for example, (Coats et al. 1982)
expected qualities of the ground along the tunnel are characterised in
relation to expected support requirements, with the intention of so
designating each length as the tunnel advances. Where Zone 1, 2, 3…are in
descending order of rock quality and thus in ascending order of requirement
of support, the expectation is that observation will require supplementary
support to a relatively small proportion of lengths, originally classified as
Zone 1, to the standard of Zone 2, with the comparable reclassification of
some Zone 2 lengths to Zone 3. As a result of such considerations, Muir
Wood (1987) recommended a simpler set of rules to apply to tunnelling, for
a condition in which the need to modify the design might be expected to be
exceptional:
 
1. Devise conceptual model.
2. Predict expected features for observation.
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3. Observe and compare against 2.4. Are differences between 2 and 3
explained by values of parameters, inadequacy of 1 or inappropriateness
of 1?
5. Devise revised conceptual model.
6. Repeat 2, 3, 4 and 5 as appropriate.
 
Such a procedure assumes that the design of the relevant feature, usually
tunnel support, will have conformed to the conceptual model (1), with
predesigned supplementary work undertaken where the differences between
(2) and (3) so require.
In view of possible confusion, having regard to the wide acceptance of
Peck’s definition of the Observational Method (OM), simplified and varied
approaches are collectively designated in this book as Observational Design
(OD), emphasising that this is indeed a method of design. Eurocode 7 (EC7)
(BSI 1995) includes the following remarks concerning an observational
approach.
Because prediction of geotechnical behaviour is often difficult, it is
sometimes appropriate to adopt the approach known as the
‘observational method’, in which the design is reviewed during
construction. When this approach is used the following four
requirements shall all be made before construction is started:
1. The limits of behaviour which are acceptable shall be established.
2. The range of behaviour shall be assessed and it shall be shown that
there is an acceptable probability that the actual behaviour will be
within the acceptable limits.
3. A plan of monitoring shall be devised which will reveal whether the
actual behaviour lies within the acceptable limits. The monitoring
shall make this clear at a sufficiently early stage; and with
sufficiently short intervals to allow contingency actions to be
undertaken successfully. The response time of the instruments and
the procedures for analysing the results shall be sufficiently rapid in
relation to the possible evolution of the system.
4. A plan of contingency actions shall be devised which may be adopted
if the monitoring reveals behaviour outside acceptable limits.
During construction the monitoring shall be carried out as planned and
additional or replacement monitoring shall be undertaken if this
becomes necessary. The results of the monitoring shall be assessed at
appropriate stages and the planned contingency actions shall be put in
operation if this becomes necessary.
The organisational procedure for a project which entails an element of
Observational Design is illustrated by Figure 2.8. There must always
be emphasis on the time element to enable supplementary measures
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(contingency actions) to be put in place, including all administrative actions,
necessitating a rapid response system which may be a variation to normal
management procedures of reporting and decision making.
The notion of the ‘most probable conditions’ of Peck, set out above,
presents problems since it would imply that a high proportion of the work to
which the OM is to be applied would require modified design and additional
work in order to suit the actual conditions. Often, ‘most probable’ is
interpreted as ‘unlikely to be exceeded’ so that modification to the original
design becomes exceptional. In so doing, the engineer will be aware as to the
nature of a failure mechanism which may allow a degree of dependence on
mean conditions of the ground in the third dimension for a two-dimensional
Figure 2.8 Management review process for in-tunnel monitoring (after CIRIA 1997).
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approach to design (see, for example, Appendix 5E). There is a rational basis
for estimating the initial provision using OD, for greatest economy. This is
illustrated by Figure 2.9 for an over-simplified example of the support
requirement for a tunnel. Suppose that the requirement for support along a
tunnel is established on the basis of a probability curve. Thus, the total area
under the curve is unity, while the area under the curve between the origin
and a vertical line AB, set at a distance T along the abscissa, is p, indicating
that the provision of an amount of support designated as T has a probability
of p of being adequate. Where this provision is shown by OD to be
inadequate, the need for supplementary support thus carries a probability (1-
p). If we can express the costs per unit length of tunnel of the initial support
and of the supplementary support by the functions f(p) and g(p) respectively,
the mean cost per unit length is given by:
Figure 2.9 Procedure for applying Observational Design.
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Hence, by knowing the variation in unit cost of initial and supplementary
support in relation to the choice of T, the optimal value of p may be
determined. By way of a very simple example, suppose f(p)=Ap and
g(p)=kA(1-p), A and k being constants, then f’(p)=A and g’(p)=-kA. The
value of p for minimum cost is then given by eqn (2.3) as:
 
kA(1-p)-A+kA(1-p)=0, i.e. p=(1–1/2k) (2.4)
 
However approximate may be the basis for estimating the variability in the
requirement, there is, by such an approach, a more rational and economic
basis for establishing the initial requirement than that of determining the
‘most probable’ conditions of OM. The important feature is that of the ratio
k between the unit costs of supplementary and initial requirement. In
practice, of course, k and A will vary with p but it will be certain that k>1.
This simply reflects the fact that the ratio of unit costs between initial
provision of support, as part of a routine, and of subsequent modification





In consequence, the value of p that should be selected for the initial stage of




and hence, except for a very skewed relationship of the probability of
support needs, the initial provision should be greater than that
corresponding to Peck’s ‘most probable’ condition. In fact, as described
above, the need for supplementary support may, on economic or safety
grounds, be selected to be exceptional. The approach to design remains
nevertheless that of OM or OD, regardless of whether or not the supplement
is routine, occasional or quite exceptional.
Some typical applications of OD to tunnelling are described in Chapter 5.
Of course, OD has a potential breadth of application well beyond
geotechnics, including instances in which the procedures are already being
adopted without conscious awareness of the underlying principles. This
occurs for example where a feature of a project is designed to be varied in
relation to perceptions of changing demand. The system for application of
OD is illustrated by Figure 2.10. 
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Expatiate free o’er all the scene of man;
A mighty maze! but not without a plan.
An Essay on Man: Alexander Pope.
3.1 Introduction to planning
Planning needs to be undertaken in a systematic manner, implying that it is a
purpose-driven process, constantly concerned with priorities and constraints
towards achieving the identified objectives. Throughout, there needs to be
recognition of potential problems and their means of resolution, also of
innovative features that may bring benefits to the project, as a result of
identifying and resolving the problems. The project may depend on positive
support from beyond the immediate project group, the Board for a private
venture, a Committee or Local, National or International Legislature for a
project with features affecting the public interest. The planning process
needs therefore to take account of perceptions concerning the project and
how these may be influenced by exposure to positive factual data.
Misconceptions, once expressed, are often difficult to counter positively.
Planning is undertaken in an iterative manner with periodical review of the
objectives as their satisfaction becomes progressively clearer.
Economic choice may be made on the basis of sets of figures which should
be fully comparable on the grounds of ‘utility’, i.e. suitability for specific
purpose or purposes. Subjective issues will include engineering judgments as
to practicability in prevailing degrees of uncertainty. Social and
environmental features have a particular nature since each will entail a
degree of irreversibility. A major project will affect demography, possibly in
complicated fashions, for better or for worse. Direct environmental effects of
a project—and of competitor projects which would be more damaging than
the underground option—may be listed fairly objectively in the form of an
Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA). The indirect environmental effects
become more difficult to evaluate since the ecological interdependencies of
species may be only partially understood, also the degree of success of
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adaptation to a changed set of circumstances. There is plenty of scope here
for the ‘pros’ and the ‘antis’ to propose different scenarios and models for the
interpretation of data. Development is generally hostile to natural life so
that, as development in a region proceeds, so do the effects on the
environment assume greater significance. Destructive effects are usually
irreversible or only capable of being reversed by the injection of considerable
investment.
Such thoughts lead to questions concerning the definition of sustainability
(Muir Wood 1978). Sustainability is a global concept (Institution of Civil
Engineers 1996) which needs to be considered as such in environmental
terms in the way that resources are assessed for the ‘use and convenience of
man’.
Policy in relation to sustainability is not made for an individual project.
Those concerned with planning individual projects need however to
understand the features of the environment and of sustainability which may
impact on the planning process. They also need to assess public attitudes and
perceptions, which will affect the emphasis on different factors placed by
those who may influence the success of the planning process. The planning
process in Britain needs to be radically overhauled in order to be a help
rather than hindrance to the selection of projects of development which
contribute to the overall achievement of objectives in the public interest—
but this is the subject for another book!
Planning has many connotations. At the most abstract, the evolution of
types of solution to a stated problem or requirement is implied; at the most
concrete, the establishment of a project layout in 3-D, with the organisation
of resources for its achievement. Intermediately are to be found the
justification for the choice, introducing considerations of technical,
environmental, social, legal and often even political features (Figure 3.1).
Each stage of planning has no precise definition but merges into preceding
and succeeding stages. At each stage, success depends upon the ability to
interrelate the several different considerations in order to enable smooth
progress to the next stage. Planning is essentially therefore a multi-
disciplinary, progressive process. It should not need emphasis that each
aspect merits an appropriate and objective level of skill. Superficial
assessment by those unfamiliar with the ‘multi-dimensional’ form of activity
may well jeopardise a promising scheme, or occasion wasted effort in a
wholly unviable project.
Tunnelling is not essentially different in its requirements for planning
from other construction projects but underground planning does introduce a
number of features specific or predominantly associated with working
underground. These may be listed as:
 
• the liberty of choice introduced by flexibility in the third dimension;
• the extent to which cost depends on geology;  
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• the many different benefits which may flow from freeing the surface;
• legal issues concerning the sub-surface;
• the (usually positive) environmental factors.
 
The technical input to planning is described in more detail in other chapters
devoted to each specific aspect. Here, the emphasis is given to other ‘non-
technical’ elements and to the overall process of planning. Those planning
major projects, unfamiliar with work beneath the surface, tend in the early
stages to view the tunnelling element as incorrigibly costly, but not to be
subjected to informed scrutiny. A ‘systems’ approach to planning should
indicate that, on the contrary, exploration of how to minimise the cost of
tunnelling should assume a high priority in the overall planning process,
since the high elements of cost are those most likely to produce significant
reductions as a result of deepening studies of the options. Too often this logic
is ignored until too late, by which time irreversible commitment to the
overall ‘shape’ of the project prevents choice of a more satisfactory
tunnelling element with consequent detriment to the project as a whole.
Thereby the notion of unavoidably high costs of tunnelling is enhanced and
perpetuated.
3.1.1 Assessment between options
The most obvious reason for a tunnel is to traverse a physical barrier such as
a mountain range, strait, fjord or river. Rugged terrains, or areas subject to
Figure 3.1 Project planning process.
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avalanche, heavy snow falls, landslides, floods or earthquakes may also
favour a subterranean solution.
Again, tunnels may be preferred in open country for environmental
reasons for the protection of areas of special cultural value or ecological
interest. The environmental considerations in towns for traffic tunnels may
include limitations of noise, of pollution, and of visual intrusion, the
conservation of districts or even individual buildings of special merit,
avoidance of severance of a community or to enhance surface land values.
In evaluating different responses to a specific need or requirement by
surface, elevated or underground solution, the respective merits may be
considered under these categories:
 
1. Internal finance: prime cost, financing costs, maintenance and
operational costs, renewal costs, all set against revenue (if any);
2. External costed benefits: the value of the facility in terms of savings to
direct and social costs external to the project;
3. External uncostable benefits: conservation, ecology, uncostable social
benefits;
4. Enabling aspects: The project evaluated as a requisite facilitator of other
desirable developments.
 
Among the important urban benefits for holistic planning (i.e. where
adequate linkage exists between all those elements of infrastructure,
including for example education and leisure facilities, in the planning of an
urban region) but difficult to evaluate are environmental features which may
influence the competitive place of the city in attracting industry, commerce,
tourists and investment. These issues are only partially predictable, but
represent marks of good design which stamp the identity of the city. Ray
(1998) describes the part to be played by underground planning and
construction in the UN initiative of the ‘habitat’ prospect. Of course, there
are comparable considerations for tunnels in the country or to safeguard
valuable archaeological sites.
In evaluating cost/benefit, one aspect that should be more frequently
addressed concerns the separate identification of the groups who stand to
gain or to lose from a particular project. For example, a road tunnel may
provide general enhancement for the city, improvements in accessibility for
those who live outside, all at the expense of a degree of congestion in the
vicinity of the portals (Figure 3.2) and hence for such a project it is possible
to identify the areas occupied by ‘gainers’ and ‘losers’ in relation to where
they live and work. For many tunnel projects, the ‘externalities’, i.e. the
benefits less the costs external to the project, will be found to be well in
excess of the revenue.
The use of a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ referendum to canvass opinions on
a specific project is always unsatisfactory (as it is in relation to any but the
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simplest political decision). The strong opinions of those immediately
affected or of those with coherent views on policy, into which a particular
issue fits (or does not fit), are swamped by weak opinions, inspired by one-
sided media or by irrelevant prejudice against a particular ‘party’ supporting
or opposing the object of the referendum. Much success has been achieved
by more transparent discussions on projects in their early stages of planning,
in different forms of ‘Public Participation’, where the thinking behind a
project is displayed for comment and discussion. Such exercises are not only
of value in helping people to form informed views but are educative for the
engineers and others concerned in effective twoway communication and in
understanding issues which may not otherwise become apparent in the
formal process of project planning.
3.1.2 In the beginning
At one extreme, an underground project may represent an extension of an
operating underground system, e.g. for transport, water or communication.
At the other, the project may arise from the public perception of a need to
protect an existing surface facility or to provide an entirely new underground
link. In the first instance, the planning process is a familiar continuation of
what has gone before. In the second, a client needs to be identified and
unfamiliar procedures set in hand. Where politics intervene, the situation
may be likened to the Pirandello play Six Characters in Search of an Author,
Figure 3.2 Social benefits: winners and losers.
Planning 75
a production played by many different casts to many different audiences, for
example, for the Channel Tunnel over the years.
An essential element of planning for an unfamiliar project is to minimise
financial exposure consonant with adequate thoroughness of each
intermediate planning stage until the time of commitment to the project. At
each stage, a tableau should have been set which allows the assumptions,
upon which commitment is based, to be fulfilled. The planning of the
decision-making framework is therefore an essential element in tunnelling, in
view of the possible hidden traps. The planning process needs itself to be
planned by coordination with the phasing of the supporting studies and
preliminary design (Figure 3.3), which are mutually supportive.
For the de novo project, planning starts from a desk study which uses
existing and readily accessible data on the nature of the demand, the possible
types of solution and necessarily broad envelopes of the cost and time for
achievement by each type of option. Unless the project is then seen to be non-
viable on the most favourable assumptions, the scene is set for the next
phase—and so for the subsequent evolution of the several options (Figure
3.1).
The initial planning phase is beset with problems, especially for the
unwary. Options are wide open and specific experience untargeted in
consequence, alongside a frequent lack of appreciation of the importance
Figure 3.3 Integrated project planning.
76 Planning
of this initial phase. Experience in general construction management will
probably be available with temptation to the innocent to derive cost
estimates of a generalised nature—per unit area or volume, as for simple
buildings, or by historic costs—to the underground options. This will not do;
estimates of cost for each option need to be based on a rationale and applied
in association with confidence limits, which must also have a sound basis for
their expression, factors which must remain available to enable others to
accept or qualify their reliability.
The diversity of purposes for underground construction prevents
generalisation concerning the initial planning ‘ordeal’ which a particular
option must survive. Table 3.1 sets out a list of purposes, sub-divided into
categories. Even within a category, generalisation is limited, mainly in
relation to the degree of constraint. For example, the continuation of a
Metro or scheme of gravity drainage has limited options as to route and to
level; caverns for oil storage will be located predominantly in relation to
geology and access.
Another form of differentiation may be more productive, by classification
through the form of client. The term ‘client’ is defined to mean the agency
responsible for commissioning the planning of the project. There are three
criteria for classification of clients, namely experience in the objective of the
project and familiarity with tunnelling as an expedient to achieve this
objective:
 
1. The experienced client familiar with recent tunnelling. Within this
category one would expect to find the Urban Transport Authorities who
Table 3.1 Incentives for tunnelling
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already operate an extending underground railway (referred to
subsequently as a ‘Metro’), those concerned with urban services of water,
sewerage and possibly power and communication networks. Even where
there has been recent experience in administration of a tunnelling
contract, this does not however necessarily imply a familiarity with the
essentials for good practice or the freedom to engage in appropriate
methods of project procurement.
2. The experienced client without familiarity with recent tunnelling. This
category includes established public and private providers of the service
which normally adopts surface or above surface options or who have no
recent experience of tunnelling. There is a gradation here which takes
account of the degree of understanding of the opportunities and
constraints associated with the subsurface option.
3. The inexperienced client without familiarity with recent tunnelling.
Within this category will be found organisations with another principal
function or those set up to undertake specific projects. While recruits will
undoubtedly bring some experience and familiarity with tunnelling, in
the absence of special foresight these attributes are unlikely to be tapped




Each step forward in the planning process aims towards particular targets of
establishing feasibility and in refining estimates by reducing the levels of
uncertainty in relation to cost, acceptability and means of financing.
First, it is necessary to establish the factors considered a priori to influence
acceptability of an option and its cost overall. As the planning and study
process develop so may certain factors be eliminated, refined or combined by
the acquisition and processing of data. There may well be problems in the
association of factors, for example the state of the economy overall will not
only affect revenue earning but also costs of construction. Effects of inflation
need to be kept quite separate from monetary and fiscal effects of the state of
the economy. The former is neutral, except in relation to the cost of
borrowing money; the latter have far more complex consequences for
demand and for cost of construction. Each planning scenario that is
considered must eliminate incompatible features or the limits of the project’s
viability may be grossly over- or under-estimated. This may be achieved by
breaking down such factors, identifying the common element of each to be
used in each algorithm for defining a scenario. (Figure 3.4) (A scenario
represents one model among several for assessment of a project, based on a
certain set of stated facts and assumptions).
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Many factors will be represented by mean values with a judgmental
distribution which allows estimates of standard deviation. Tunnelling costs
may well start from an assumption of uniform probability of cost between
limits (Figure 3.5). As knowledge of the several factors advances, so may the
limits of uncertainty be reduced with the uncertainty of cost at any time
being represented as a curve of skewed shape as shown on Figure 3.6, whose
contributory elements may be related to individual factors or to the
combination of particular factors. One object of constructing curves of this
nature, with their individual elements of uncertainty identified, is to provide
guidance as to how best to apply resources during the planning process in
order to reduce uncertainty in cost. Certain external causes of uncertainty
may however increase with time. The compounded uncertainty curve of
construction cost may pass through several phases of adjustment, affected
principally by acquisition of geological information and the related
assessment of schemes of construction, while that of demand will depend on
the acquisition of data largely specific to the particular project. As this
process proceeds so may the superiority of particular options become
evident, comparison between options being aided by disregard of common
elements of each. There may well be surprises when, for example,
investigation reveals some previously unsuspected adverse feature of the
ground.
Coordination of planning between projects for different purposes and
serial planning in relation to succeeding projects may enter as factors for
consideration (see Section 3.5). As emphasised throughout this book, each
aspect of planning needs to be advanced in adequate association with































other elements. Consideration of one aspect may introduce new
opportunities or new problems to other aspects, with such linkages
becoming more apparent with experience. The process proceeds in effect
along the lines of American football with episodes of agreed teamwork
interspersed with a huddle to agree the strategy for the next episode.
In terms of overall strategy, the objective must always be to tackle issues
seen to have a dominant effect on viability. Interim planning reports will be
required for a major project, grafted into the process so as not to interrupt
the main elements of work. Certain aspects of the planning studies will be
inherently costly and it must be a matter of judgment as to whether a
particular aspect, e.g. of site investigation, should be taken rather beyond
what is needed for a particular phase to avoid the additional, greater, costs of
subsequent revisiting of this element. Assumptions made at the planning
stage should be declared and recorded since, as explained in Section 3.4, if
not so qualified the planning assumptions may be impaired. Table 2.1
indicates a phase in such a process.
Underground space has been used over the years for many forms of
storage (and it is no coincidence that some of the finest wines and cheese
come from regions of natural caves). More recently, the sub-surface has
been used for offices, industry and sports facilities, also for other uses
where benefit derives from an even temperature, particularly in regions
Figure 3.6 Project cost distribution.
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of severe climate, from absence of surface induced noise, dust and
vibration. Much study has been undertaken on the psychological effects
of working underground and the features to reduce any element of
claustrophobia. Some of the most innovative projects have combined
different but complementary usages, e.g. Metro stations with
underground car parks, tunnels for multiple services. The journal
Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology addresses the many
aspects of underground planning.
3.2 Financial planning
Tunnelling projects are constructed for long life, often assessed
conservatively as 100–150 years. This feature will receive little credit from
the rules of accountancy which discount future values (Institution of Civil





where £a0 represents present value, £an value in n years time at a discount
rate of r per cent.







During period 1, costs will increase to a small percentage of the value of
the project, while risk will reduce from its initial ‘speculative’ level.
During period 2, the major expenditure occurs with outstanding
construction risk gradually reduced towards zero on completion, or soon
thereafter for the consequences of construction. During period 3, costs
are recovered, in revenue or notionally. For BOT (Build, Operate and
Transfer) projects, the period for deriving revenue from operation will
terminate at the date of transfer (to state ownership). The sponsors of
privately funded projects need therefore to recognise that equity
investment raised for period 1, bearing high risk—and it is the perception
of risk to the potential investor which matters—should be on a different
basis from that for period 2. Similar curves may be constructed for
revenue of commercial projects as the planning develops. A desirable
feature in financing a tunnel project is to aim to replace the high risk, and
hence high earning, capital of the early phases with share-holding of the
completed project which reflects a more traditional commercial level of
risk.
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For infrastructure projects under PFI (Private Finance Initiative), there is a
good case for period 1 for a ‘basket’ of projects to be borne by Government,
with costs reimbursed during period 2 for those projects which proceed, with
‘novation’ of those at the centre of project planning to ensure continuity in
thinking and planning. The reasoning behind this statement may be set out
thus:
 
1. If the introduction of private finance is to be coupled with responsibility
with the viability of the project, the timing for accepting this
responsibility should not be too early or the element of risk to be borne
(Figure 3.5) will make the price to the public purse excessive.
2. There must nevertheless be confidence that the studies and planning
undertaken prior to introduction of private finance are adequate to
reduce the elements of uncertainty in relation to the specific scheme of
construction to be adopted.
3. Separate studies and planning by competitors at their cost in order to
arrive at a condition suitable for engaging private finance would be
burdensome and highly uneconomic.
4. Some potential projects may well be shown to be non-viable by the initial
planning and studies.
 
During the course of negotiation for a specific project to be built under PFI,
there may be circumstances (e.g. a project with few external benefits) in
which the cost of planning and studies up to this time should be charged to
the private participant, possibly even with an additional charge to represent
a share of the comparable preliminary work for those nonviable projects
which did not proceed.
The success of the investment plan must depend vitally on the quality of
risk assessment and mitigation throughout the project, a feature emphasised
throughout this book.
3.3 The law: facilitator or tripwire?
For any project, one of the first steps must be to establish the legal
environment in relation to the project, since the law may, and it usually does,
come to occupy the critical path and is remarkably resistant to stimuli for
acceleration. In common with other construction projects, tunnelling will
encounter legislation concerned with authorisation, through Parliamentary
procedures for major work, or local planning consents by means of
application and consent. In Britain, these procedures often involve an
Inquiry without imposed timetable. Formal submissions may be required for
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and for other consequences of the
proposal. Particular rules will normally apply in relation to the several forms
of infrastructure, with certain powers already granted to statutory providers
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of services. Where innovative arrangements between the Parties to a Project
are contemplated, departing from traditional relationships, these clearly
need to be set on a sound basis in relation to the law of the country. The
Public Finance Initiative (PFI) and any of its derivatives in terms of
management of services for the public by private organisations such as Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) fall into such a category. Additionally, dispute
resolution requires appropriate provision (Section 8.5).
Underground work is demanding on specialist skills and in their
integration. Whatever may be the legal requirement for advertising projects
for prospective tenderers, there must be safeguards to ensure that only those
with full competence and with a professional attitude appropriate to the
particular project are invited to compete or participate.
For underground works, there are additional issues for possible legal
concerns. Many centuries ago, the phrase was coined: ‘cujus est solum ejus
est usque ad coelum et ad infernos’ i.e. the ownership of the surface extends
to the sky and to the depths. Thus, while ownership upwards has been
clipped to permit free air navigation, land tenure rights below the ground
may be more murky; they may or may not include mineral rights and
usually exclude the right to extract water. Furthermore, there will be duties
to avoid causing damage to others by work undertaken below ground.
Different countries have enacted different laws concerning the right to
make use of the subsurface. A sensible present view is that the landowner
has only an interest in that part of the sub-surface that he might reasonably
develop beneficially.
An international study undertaken by the International Tunnelling
Association in 1990 (Sterling 1990) summarised the different regulations of
19 participating countries relating to the development of the sub-surface for
different applications. Generally it was found that such development was the
sole prerogative of the landowner, subject to specific conditions and to
conformity with planning regulations. In general, zoning of use of the
surface did not confine the use of the sub-surface except at points of surface
works for access or other related purpose.
The earliest Metros were sited beneath public roads to avoid the need
for obtaining special easements. When this was no longer practicable, the
right to construct underground infrastructure services was generally
acquired by negotiation or through statute, with provision for
compensation for direct loss of value or for damage, even occasionally for
nominal loss of value.
In view of the increasing perception of the planned use of the subsurface,
steps to avoid negative activities of local conflict such as the obstruction to a
future Metro by the construction of deep foundations or, positively, to
encourage multiple combined use of a tunnel, have been advocated. Many
countries now find benefit in the more coordinated use of the sub-surface
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with ability for expropriation by means of legislation. The ITA statement on
this issue (Sterling 1990) reads:
‘The sub-surface is a resource for future development similar to surface
land or recoverable minerals. Once an underground opening is created,
the sub-surface can never be restored to its original condition and the
presence of this opening can affect all future uses of the surface and the
subsurface in its vicinity. These factors require responsible planning for
all uses of the underground to ensure that the resource is not damaged
or usurped by uncoordinated first uses.
The awareness of the underground option among planners,
developers and financiers should be increased so that sub-surface
planning issues are properly addressed. Sub-surface planning should be
an integral part of the normal land use planning process.
National, regional and local policies should be prepared to provide
guidelines, criteria and classifications for assessing appropriate uses of
underground space, identifying geologic conditions, defining priority
uses and resolving potential utilization conflicts. Site reservation
policies should be established for important future uses and for
especially favourable geologic conditions.
It is recommended that every region or city establish a permanent
record-keeping system for the maintenance of detailed records of the
use of the sub-surface. This record-keeping should be coordinated by a
single agency to ensure compatible and complete records and should
include “as built” records rather than project plans. Records should
include activities, such as ground-water extraction and deep pile
foundations, which affect the potential use of the sub-surface but
which may not be classified as specific sub-surface facilities.’
 
In Minnesota and Chicago, cities with particularly favourable geology,
enabling legislation has been enacted to remove what were seen as
institutional barriers to future desirable sub-surface development. These
powers not only provide for acquisition of the underground space, with
funding and construction of development, but also the protection of the sub-
surface against damage which might inhibit subsequent planned
development. In Kansas City, where limestone mining by pillar-and-stall has
provided extensive space for commerce, offices, laboratories and storage,
building regulations have also been revised to take account of the special
conditions pertaining to activities undertaken below ground.
Apart from questions of damage caused by subsidence, matters of less
direct consequence need to be addressed, e.g. changes in water-table
affecting adjacent property, as occurred when dewatering for Amsterdam’s
Metro in the 1960s affected timber piling to buildings in the vicinity. Another
more bizarre instance is recorded [Ownership of subterranean space,
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W.A.Thomas, in Sterling (1990)] where natural gas stored by a company in
caverns escaped to a gas reservoir belonging to an adjacent landowner who
sold it. The company sued but the court dismissed the case, holding that the
escape of the gas constituted a trespass.
3.4 Competence in planning
During the planning process, issues which involve the relevant Parties in the
optimisation of the project will be encountered, particularly concerning
standards of safety, operation and maintenance, and these should be
identified and recorded, for resolution at an opportune time. For the
‘unfamiliar client’ in particular (Section 3.1.2) heed needs to be given to the
notice of policy decisions by certain times to avoid delay in the development
of planning.
A document prepared for the Permanent International Association of
Road Congresses (PIARC) (Muir Wood 1995) provides advice to ‘new
clients’ for road tunnels, much of which has more general application to
‘new clients’ for many forms of construction projects, emphasising the
nature of decisions to be made during planning, which will be affected by
intentions in operation, to allow optimised total life costs to be prepared. For
those road tunnels in particular where demand may be expected to increase
markedly with time, there may be benefit in a low-cost initial construction
designed to permit subsequent fitting of equipment and services to enhance
operational standards without the need for major reconstruction or
interruption of service. The PIARC Report referred to above (Muir Wood
1995) states that:
‘The design of a road tunnel requires the effective amalgam of expertise
between those familiar with transport planning, with construction and
with successful operation of such projects. In the absence of existing
experience of a road tunnel authority, it will be necessary to introduce
a “surrogate operator” into the planning team, an engineer with
appropriate experience who is given powers to ensure that the project
planning is undertaken in a rational and coordinated manner.’
The need for efficient communication between members of the planning
team is emphasised and discussed in Chapter 2.
Specific to a road tunnel are the questions of the degree of autonomy of
the project, the financing base and the raising of tolls which may indirectly
affect many other aspects of operation. Other particular issues include the
following:
 
1. Composition of traffic. Safety in service depends on adequacy of
provision for future demand, in terms of tunnel cross-section, gradient
and curvature. There is need for statistical predictive information on
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traffic. The tunnel should generally respect the standards of adjacent
roads (checking the ratio of user benefits to tunnel costs); where this is
impractical, variation in standard should be made well clear of the
tunnel portals.
2. Provisions for accidents. For short tunnels (say, < 1 km), any specific
provision depends on importance of the route. For medium length
tunnels (say, 1–3 km), a hard shoulder should be considered to allow
traffic to pass a stalled vehicle at low speed. For long tunnels,
emergency stopping lanes at intervals along the tunnel is an alternative
arrangement, combined with provisions for escape. In all instances, the
optimal means of respecting the safety requirements will be project-
specific, recognising the very different incidence of additional cost for
particular facilities requiring tunnel enlargements in relation to
different forms of tunnel construction. Safety requires a holistic
approach.
3. Provisions for equipment. Equipment for normal operation such as
lighting, ventilation and traffic control should be supplemented to deal
with emergencies of fire and collision.
4. Control and monitoring facilities. Such provisions depend on the nature
of the traffic and the degree of autonomy in the operation of the
project.
5. Junctions. Any feature giving rise to weaving of traffic within the
tunnel should be avoided, thus junctions should be set well clear of
tunnel portals.
6. Provisions for maintenance in service. If maintenance during
operational service is intended, provision needs to be made for access
for operatives, plant and materials. Ventilation will need to be
adjustable to meet standards appropriate for long-term exposure to
tunnel fumes.
7. Drainage. Drainage needs to include interceptor chambers and traps to
avoid risk of the spread of fire by inflammable liquid. Tunnel gradients
should respect the needs of gravity drainage.
8. Risk. The incidence of accidents in tunnels does not exceed those on
the open road but the consequences, and the problems of dealing
with accidents, may be more severe. Risk assessment should
consider the possible consequences of accidents, particularly of fire
or explosion, and their mitigation. There is also need to consider
effects on the tunnel structure and, most importantly, on the
continued operation of vital tunnel services and communications
following an accident. A rigorous consideration of possible
consequences may follow the procedure of constructing an ‘event
tree’ (Blockley 1992). Limits may be imposed on traffic allowed to
use the tunnel, in respect of risk of explosion or fire. If certain
categories of vehicle are to be excluded, it may be expedient to make
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differential risk assessments in relation to alternative routes, also to
the practicability of enforcement of rules of exclusion.
 
Comparable issues affect tunnels for other purposes.
3.5 Coordinated planning of projects
3.5.1 Multiple-purpose projects
Bridges readily serve for more than one purpose, e.g. as road and rail
combined or as road bridges carrying service pipes and cables. Tunnels
are less readily adaptable since the problems underground will include
the provision of access for inspection and repair, segregation, protection
in the case of accident or fire in the tunnel or as a result of damage to the
service pipe or cable (e.g. escape of gas or water). When a major barrier is
pierced by a tunnel for the first time, multiple usage merits consideration,
especially for ‘inert’ services such as optical cables. Multiple service ducts
are widely used at shallow depth in cities, the absence of common
terminal points often militating against such ducts being constructed at
depth. Immersed tunnels represent a partial exception to the rule, since
single tunnel units providing for multiple and separated ducted spaces for
road, rail and for services will cost less than separate units for each
purpose. In locating and protecting services, the risk and consequences of
damage by accident or fire needs proper respect. (Also see Section 3.4,
point 8).
3.5.2 Serial planning of projects
Where, as is usual for tunnelling, the horizon for planning is at a distance
beyond that adopted for identifying the least cost option by the
accountant, merit may well be found in choosing an option which is a good
fit with longer-term development, e.g. by oversizing a stage of drainage
tunnel or routeing a water tunnel to suit a subsequent stage of extraction or
supply.
As an early example of more ambitious serial planning of projects, Allport
and Von Einsiedel (1986) describe a solution to the practical problems in
planning infrastructure projects in the Philippines. This stratagem has more
general application elsewhere in circumstances in which several aspects of
infrastructural development are competing for funding, particularly in
developing countries where demand for potentially viable projects exceeds
availability of funding.
In the past, these authors state that they found that individual projects
had been allowed to proceed without a common basis for evaluation, in a
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climate in which optimistic forecasts for economic growth had encouraged
lax discipline in control. Changing money values, affected by inflation and
devaluation, with consequences to contractors’ profitability, added to
problems in forecasting disbursement needs. Thus, even those projects
authorised to proceed encountered problems in funding, causing long over-
runs. Many of the departmental agencies established to develop
programmes were following independent paths, forming new agencies with
ill-defined mandates. In such circumstances, while government made
strenuous efforts towards progress, the planning process itself was found
to be ineffectual.
One of the contributions to solving the infrastructure planning
problems in Manila, described by Allport and Von Einsiedel was the
Capital Investment Folio (CIF) process, planned to complement rather
than supersede existing systems for the allocation of resources. An
essential element of CIF concerned the establishment of investment
priorities across the public sector. The first problem to be solved was the
fact that national funding was by sector, e.g. transport, water, rather than
geographical area.
The practical solution required agreement with a new body comprising
city and national agencies, the Inter-Agency Technical Working Group
(IATWG). Initial cooperation of the existing Agencies was mixed, but in due
course a list of projects was prepared across the several sectors of
infrastructure. Next, sets of sectoral strategies were examined which allowed
development of a coherent overall strategy within a sector. Then, interaction
between the IATWG and the Agencies allowed consideration of alternative
allocations of incremental capital investment. This stage also allowed
development of linkages between the proposals of associated Agencies, e.g.
water supply, flood control, sewerage, waste disposal. Projects which might
attract private investment were also separately identified.
Where projects were already under construction, assessments were based
on the cost assumptions for completion and the consequential benefits. For
new projects, tests were made against several scenarios, favouring those
which indicated robust benefits and which were flexible in adaptation to the
uncertain unfolding scene in contrast to previous rigid planning systems.
Figure 3.7 (based on Allport and Von Einsiedel 1986) indicates the screening
and evaluation stages in the establishment of an overall Core Investment
Program (CIP).
Consideration was also given to other criteria including the matching of
projects to the capabilities of the Institutions responsible for their
direction, and the affordability of the elements of cost falling upon Local
Authorities. The process was understood to entail gradual evolution,
gaining experience, towards an improved allocation of resources,
particularly in relating investment priorities and timing of projects between
the several sectors.  
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3.6 Issues of procurement of concern to planning
Procurement and associated contractual issues are discussed at some length
in Chapter 7. During the initial planning stages, particular thought needs to
be given to such contractual aspects as:
 
1. Provision of continuity in conceptual planning if the client is to change or
if the intention is to pass responsibility for design to another Party (BOT,
for example). There is then a likely need for a degree of ‘novation’
whereby the obligations of a designer of the concept or of particular
features are taken into the new Party. A break in conceptual thinking at
this stage may well lead to inability to derive benefit from an innovative
approach that needs continuity of development into project design and
design of the construction processes.
2. The need for cost estimates to take account of the contractual
arrangements. If a partnering concept is intended, optimal means for
dealing with risk may also be devised, with optimal consequences for the
control of costs. If, at the other extreme, construction risk, including
geological risk, is to be passed to the Contractor, the costs must be
calculated against the most unfavourable foreseeable scenario of all risks
eventuating, with a margin for those unforeseeable and for possible
litigation in circumstances which may be worse yet—and generally for
tunnelling such costs may be excessive. (Figure 3.5). In the absence of
equitable risk sharing, the financial benefits of the design process as
described in Chapter 2 cannot be realised, hence the need for additional
allowance for increased cost.
Figure 3.7 CIF planning process and interlinkages (after Allport and Von Einsiedel 1986).
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3. Where legislation or custom requires that some form of open
tendering is to be operated, where Parties are to be selected on least
cost without regard for special competence, additional provisions
should be made to cover risk overall. The consequences are liable to
be so unfavourable and unpredictable that strong advice should be
given to make an exception to such a ruling on the grounds that it is
totally unsuited for work so dependent on experience, expertise and
quality as tunnelling.
 
3.7 Reliability of forecasting
Generally, experience is not good in the reliability of estimating for major
infrastructural projects, particularly where financial viability requires
estimates of revenue. There is merit in identifying what are the reasons for
this relative lack of success, what are the specific features of underground
projects in such respects and what may be done towards improvement for
the future.
For sub-surface projects, the inherent and highly site-specific nature of the
ground adds one more uncertainty to the problems of forecasting into a
future scene of unknowable political and economic circumstances. By first
identifying the main areas of uncertainty and then addressing how these may
be limited or specifically qualified in estimates, policies towards overall risk
control may be more effective. The main areas of uncertainty are described
below.
3.7.1 Political influence
Where projects have strong political concerns, there are suspicions,
supported by evidence, that figures adopted by Governments, and possibly
others, tend to involve manipulations or concealments of particular factors,
in order to appear to support a particular objective. Skamris and Flyvbjerg
(1996) provide evidence of suspicions of such activity for Danish transport
projects, and there is no reason to believe that Denmark is more prone to
economies in the truth of such a nature than other nations. In the many years
of preparation for the Channel Tunnel, Government Reports provide several
examples of:
 
• direct comparison between options of quite incomparable reliability of
basis;
• the application of contingency sums of an arbitrary nature;




3.7.2 Authorship of estimates
There are several possible causes for distortion in early estimates of projects
with contributions under these categories:
 
1. Early estimates of cost may be sought from management consultants or
economic advisors who have little understanding of technical issues,
particularly those specific to tunnelling, and frequently even less of their
own deficiencies in such respects. Preliminary estimates are therefore
based on historical costs of comparable, but by no means similar, projects
without appreciation of the great spread of costs covering the most
favourable and most unfavourable circumstances.
2. There are examples of estimates of cost being prepared by those
without great scruples for reliability but who wish to remain
associated with what may appear for them (at least until the date of
abandonment) to be a profitable assignment. Such estimates will be
well below a viable figure. One, fortunately rare, variant of this
practice is that of the Engineer (acting in this contractual capacity)
who initially undertakes to his client to fulfil a project within a certain
sum and then encounters embarrassment between Client and
Contractor when unforeseen problems emerge which would cause the
figure to be exceeded.
3. The recent practice of fragmentation of responsibilities for the elements
of project development has resulted in advice on different aspects of a
project being commissioned in separate packages from different sources.
Apart from the consequential inability to introduce optimisation, this
practice will also tend to stifle innovation and to introduce by one
fragment of the project sources of risk to the success of another without
realisation by either, since they have operated at arms length from each
other (see Section 2.5). Innovative ideas, of potential value, would
inevitably need to be tested and evaluated, across all relevant aspects, a
procedure excluded by the process of ‘design-by-fragmentation’. An
engineer, engaged for a confined element or phase of a project and hence
knowingly deprived of the opportunity to develop new ideas, would be
naturally reluctant to discuss the possibilities (there being moreover
examples of inferior unsuccessful attempts at implementing the good
ideas of others where the original authors—in a litigious age—have been
subsequently blamed for the failure).
4. Some economists have tended to extrapolate trends of demand well
beyond credible dates for acceptable percentage increase, having regard
to associated developments that would be needed elsewhere to permit
such general increase in demand. On the other hand, departments of
central and local government tend to depress estimates of figures of
demand in order to minimise capital expenditure in the short term,
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without regard to the often massive increase in costs to satisfy demand by
piecemeal construction.
 
3.7.3 Economic and political factors
Assumptions adopted in estimates need to be stated with clarity, with
evidence for calculations based on correlations between economic indicators
and costs (and revenues) for the project. The question needs to be asked as to
the risk of new legislation affecting the viability of the project.
3.7.4 Timing of completion
Estimates of cost are normally related to a particular date, indexed
backwards and forwards. There may yet remain other factors which
depend on particular timing of the project. For example, viability may be
affected by relative timing with associated projects, projects may be
timed to be available for particular events (e.g. World Olympics) which
may not only help to raise first year’s revenue but also to establish habits
of usage.
3.7.5 Development of competitors
Where there are competitor projects, technological development and
marketing strategy, the ‘game plan’ needs to be considered for each. For
example, estimates for the revenue earning capacity of the Channel
Tunnel needed always to be established against competition by the
ferries of the future, not confined to those operating at the time of the
estimate.
3.7.6 Ranges and qualifications
Too often the estimator is required to produce a single figure where
uncertainty exists. What should this figure be: the worst extreme, the most
probable, one which makes reasonable provision for uncertainty? All figures
should be qualified to discourage their misuse. It is impossible to prevent
their use out of context but this practice should then be apparent to an
auditor.
3.7.7 Attention to ‘climate of risk’
Pugsley (1966) has drawn attention to the nature of technical factors, such as
simultaneous innovations, which may, in combination, give rise to high risk.
This concept may be extended into novel areas including investment, untried
contractual provisions and the risk of political interference.
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3.7.8 Changes in requirement, including uncertainty and
vacillations
Perhaps the commonest single cause for high increases in cost of an
underground project is the late requirement for change, often as a result of
too perfunctory a planning stage. A great proportion of the expected
reduction in uncertainty of cost during the planning stage (Figure 3.5)
arises from firm decisions affecting requirements. Project financiers are
often too concerned in seeing an early return from their investment to
appreciate the merits of deliberation in the early phases of project planning
when the foundations should be laid for sound project definition. Causes of
late change may be internal to the project or external. A prominent
external cause relates to upgrading of the requirements for health and
safety. A thorough risk analysis during planning may help to avert
problems caused by subsequent hiatus when standards are reviewed too
late. For the Channel Tunnel, the effect of numerous changes to
requirement were exacerbated by the partial opacity of the Contract
Documents. For this project, the Inter-Governmental Commission,
responsible for setting safety standards through their Safety Commission,
established only after construction had begun, made many late
requirements for upgrading safety, while construction, including work
commissioned from the main sub-contractors, was already in progress.
Directly or indirectly such changes made considerable contribution to the
80% rise in estimated cost of the project. Projects of such size and
magnitude require a risk-based approach to planning and design (Section
2.1.3), which should eliminate or greatly reduce the impact of high
elements of uncertainty before these can be the cause of such major
distortions of cost. Questions of risk may extend well beyond the project
itself, including factors material to success and the actions of other parties
whose cooperation is essential to achieve the objectives of the project.
Once again it needs emphasis that not only may questions of changes in
design be involved but also delays on account of the length of lines of
communication and the complexity of particular issues once the matters
external to the project have been adequately resolved. Planning needs to
foresee and control such issues.
3.7.9 Contractual relationships
As described in greater detail in Chapter 7, the contractual relationships
have a great impact on the development of estimates as the project proceeds
through its several stages (Figure 3.5) There are three inter-related issues:
 
1. Where risk is deliberately (or by oversight) loaded on to the contractor,
tenderers are likely to take a highly pessimistic attitude as to the
eventuation of risk; thus the tender price will be expected to be high, with
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no prospect of reduction when circumstances are found to be more
favourable. On the contrary, should the contractor have underestimated,
every opportunity will be grasped for establishing a cause for being
misled by information provided by the employer. This is by definition a
‘brittle’ contract, susceptible to litigation.
2. The more the risk is placed on the contractor, the less the prospect of a
concerted risk assessment which, to minimise risk, will almost certainly
require flexibility by all parties who are in a position to contribute to
measures to reduce risk, as described in Chapter 2.
3. In the absence of equitable sharing of risk, the relationship between the
parties, at least at contractual level, will tend to be poor; problems which
otherwise, by wise anticipation, might be circumvented or readily
controlled by a cooperative approach, will tend to fester. Each side will,
perforce, become more concerned, by the nature of the contract, to
establish the fault of the other than to find an economic solution.
 
The proclivity of lawyers to inject confrontational attitudes into contract
relationships and more ubiquitously should be strongly resisted and clients
should appreciate the likely cost of bad advice in such directions.
Unfortunately, too often decisions of such elementary error are made by
those who do not understand the likely seriousness of the consequences, at so
early a stage in defining the project that no other voice is powerful enough to
counsel a wiser course.
3.7.10 Tendering processes
Tendering processes may also have the effect of preventing the favourable
outcome of a project. This feature is further developed in Chapter 7. Here it
is only necessary to state that any practice which neglects questions of skill,
technical competence and availability of adequate resources in appointing a
tunnelling contractor is likely by sowing the wind to reap a whirlwind.
Where the engineering expertise to design and possibly to supervise
construction is appointed by competition on cost, a fuse is ignited towards a
more explosive disaster.
3.7.11 Inflexible programming
Underground projects often entail interactions between separate operations
or separate contracts. These may entail ‘interleaving’ or operations being
undertaken end-on. Critical dates need to be chosen with great caution.
Programme ‘float’ may float away on account of some new constraint
which, even without overall loss of time to any contract, may lead to reversal
of the order of undertaking specific operations. Delays caused by inter-
contract conflict tend to be expensive; even more so may be the
implementation of stratagems designed to make good loss of time. It is, of
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course, right to have optimistic targets for progress which will reward efforts
for continuous improvement, but these should always be accompanied by
realistic contingencies to avoid conflict. Better by far is the objective of
maintaining flexibility between the several parties in recognition that,
without compromising obligations, adequate understanding of the essential
features of each element is a sine qua non towards finding the optimal
solution.
3.8 Practical examples of success and failure in
planning
Many of the problems encountered in tunnelling, and many of the causes
for the elimination of the tunnelling option, have arisen during the
planning—or non-planning (i.e. where planning has overlooked the
option of tunnelling)—phase. A few examples are described below and
many more of the examples of Chapters 8 and 9 stem from basic planning
errors.
A surface plan for bypassing road traffic to the South of London, termed
the Southern Box Route, was developed by the Greater London Council
during the early 1970s. This scheme encountered much opposition on
account of its land-take, effect on the environment and severance of
communities. A report was subsequently commissioned (Greater London
Council 1973) to review the opportunities for constructing roads in tunnels
under London in general and in replacing two sections of the Southern Box
Route in particular. This Report demonstrated that, whereas for one section
the tunnelled solution would cost about 80% more but would take less than
45% of the area of land, for a second section where tunnelling conditions
were more favourable, the tunnelled solution would cost very little more
than the surface scheme and would only sterilise about 23% of the area of
land. One main conclusion of the study was that if a tunnelled solution had
been considered from the outset a route might have been selected to take
better advantage of the topography to the South of London in such a fashion
as greatly to simplify access roads connecting to surface routes and to offer
greater benefits against a surface option. In the event, the Southern Box
Route project was abandoned.
For the City of Bath, a project to relieve road traffic by means of tunnels
was thwarted by dysfunction between the planning and the engineering
processes. Planning commissioned by the City Architect and Planner
concluded that a solution might be designed around a short in-city tunnel
combined with a by-pass tunnel. This conclusion was based upon
assumptions of tunnel unit costs for the two elements which were
approximately 50% and 200% of reasonable estimates respectively. One
consequence of this error was to bring the approaches to the by-pass tunnel,
in view of the over-estimate of its cost, excessively close into the centre of the
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city which was at that time already suffering the results of redevelopment too
close, in the view of many, to the core of the Regency City of Bath. The
project was abandoned and the ‘window of opportunity’ in consequence
passed by. The traffic problems continue to increase year on year, only
partially relieved by a surface bypass route using mainly existing roads to the
east of the City.
A Parliamentary Bill for the construction of the twin-bore, two-lane Clyde
road tunnel had been obtained in 1948 prior to any serious consideration of
the problems of construction. Apart from tortuous initial approaches to
connect the tunnel to existing roads along each bank of the River Clyde in
Glasgow, the curious W profile of the road surface in the tunnel represents a
not altogether successful endeavour to contain two lanes of traffic to full
height gauge within the inadequate tunnel diameter described in the
Parliamentary Bill (Morgan et al. 1965).
Second stage site investigations during the early stages of planning for the
Ahmed Hamdi road tunnel beneath the Suez canal disclosed that the original
crossing would have entailed tunnelling through water-bearing sandstones
of low strength. The location of a major fault allowed the tunnel to be resited
several kilometres further to the north in mudrocks, considerably more
favourable for tunnelling. Advantage was taken of this benefit in a
somewhat comparable manner, in tilting of the ring of the 27 km
approximately circular CERN collider path, near Geneva, and thus allowing
the tunnel to be sited predominantly in the more favourable weak sandstone
‘molasse’ and not the underlying water-bearing limestone.
Planning of the work of providing a new secondary lining to Brunel’s
Thames Tunnel proceeded on the basis of least cost without regard to the
exceptional merit of the original project, in the absence of a formal
registration of the tunnel for conservation (Roach 1998). An increase in cost
of 250% (£6.3 M to £23.2 M) was attributed to this lack of foresight
(Section 1.4). The requirements for engineering conservation, if considered
from the outset, would not have caused any increase in cost. As constructed,
respecting engineering conservation, Brunel’s lining may be expected to
remain intact and thereby ease subsequent problems of repair of the internal
concrete lining.
A project of irrigation and drainage to rehabilitate a massive farming
project to the West of the River Nile would optimally feature a drainage
tunnel to the Mediterranean through low limestone hills, constructed by a
technique of Informal Support (Chapter 5). An essential feature would be
continuity of the engineering design of the project through the construction
phase. The alternative would be based on a considerably more expensive
segmentally lined tunnel. The Client Authority was unable to accept the
condition of continuity and the tunnel option had therefore to be abandoned





If you do not know what you should be looking for in a site investigation,
you are not likely to find much of value.
1968 Rankine Lecture, Rudolph Glossop.
4.1 The methodical acquisition of data
Studies for a tunnelling project will be required on a number of different
aspects affecting construction and operation. The operational requirements
(Chapter 2) will determine the aspects in which operational studies will be
needed. For example, operational studies will provide estimates of demand
for the project, criteria to establish viability in terms of cost and revenue,
social benefits and other aspects which may be selected to be tested against
the several options—including that of ‘do nothing’.
For construction, studies will be required of all the principal features
affecting definition of the optimal project, related to the cost and time for its
execution. These studies will concern initially the interpretation of the
geology as to its engineering consequences.
4.1.1 Studies relating to operation
Studies concerning the functioning of the proposed project must be specific
to the project, to the overall purpose and to the stated objectives. Tunnelling
may well form only part of a larger scheme. To permit initial planning to be
undertaken in good time, as emphasised by Chapter 3, the initial studies
relating to the underground element may need to be undertaken a
considerable period ahead of embarking on more detailed planning, to allow
adequate flexibility in the planning of the scheme overall.
Studies on project-specific operational policy may be described under
these categories:
1. Demand, acquiring data on which time-dependent demand estimates
may be based, against a range of scenarios, expressed sufficiently
explicitly to facilitate future modification of predictions as assumptions
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may change and when trends with time become more evident. Where
appropriate, demand will be based on charges for usage in relation to
competitor projects.
2. Financing options for projects which may draw upon a measure of
private finance, in equity and borrowings, or for public funding from
different sources.
3. Quality standards in relation to performance, safety, project life and
other factors affecting overall utility.
 
It is to be noted that all such features, vital for a successful project, will
depend upon ‘soft data’, i.e. upon informed opinion and not upon
ascertainable fact. It is essential that the manner in which studies have been
undertaken be explicit and thoroughly documented, particularly in view of
the long time-scales which may be associated with the several stages in which
the studies may need to be undertaken.
Studies of this nature are common to all construction projects and
have no particular relationship to tunnelling except in so far as tunnels
present special difficulties in modification, as demands or standards may
change, subsequent to initial construction. There are however specific
features of tunnels which merit emphasis in relation to financing and
legal issues:
 
1. A tunnel project will normally need to be preceded by application to
Parliament or a comparable body for formal sanction. This will be a
protracted process and will in consequence occur early in the period of
project planning. It is necessary to ensure that the application confers
adequate flexibility to suit the adjustments that may be desirable as a
result of subsequent studies in concept, overall dimensions and in siting,
or may be necessary from considerations of safety.
2. A tunnel provides limited scope for incremental development. In
consequence, until completed it has little intrinsic value. Studies in means
for financing must therefore take account of the different degrees of
exposure to risk as the project develops, particularly in relation to risk
pre- and post-completion.
 
The viability of a privately funded traffic tunnel will be based on
estimates of demand in relation to charges in the form of tolls or credit
transfer (as part of a Private Finance initiative) for vehicle transit. The
higher the charge in relation to competing links or modes, the lower the
demand, as illustrated by Figure 4.1. In consequence, gross revenue will
take the form of an inverted-U curve, being zero for zero unit charge and
approaching towards zero when the unit charge becomes excessive. The
operating costs will have a fixed element, related to servicing capital and
undertaking essential maintenance, and a variable element dependent on
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demand. As illustrated by Figure 4.1 it is possible in consequence, on the
basis of marketing studies and estimates of costs, to find the approximate
level of unit charge to maximise net revenue. Other factors, such as
reduction in traffic congestion elsewhere on the network, may introduce
social factors to influence whether the unit charge should be pitched
somewhat above or below that predicted as commercially optimal, with
possible cross-subsidy for a privately funded project.
4.1.2 Studies relating to the execution of the project
Apart from investigation of the ground, feasibility of construction will be
concerned with such questions as:
 
• access and locations of working sites;
• availability of resources, including particular skills;
Figure 4.1 Optimisation of tolls or tariffs for profitability.
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• development of plant and techniques best suited to the project;
• environmental and social issues;
• interests of other users of the ground surface and sub-surface;
• restrictions on working, e.g. noise and vibration limits, height restrictions
near airports;
• spoil disposal;
• recent experience in comparable projects elsewhere.
 
All features concerning tunnel construction, such as access for the work
force, for plant and materials, needs for working sites, for electric power and
other services will be related to the preferred scheme of construction. Studies
of such needs will therefore become focused as the scheme of tunnelling
becomes defined. At each stage of project definition, the potential adequacy
of such features needs to be considered. For example, the power requirement
for a tunnel driven by TBM with electrically powered haulage may be in
excess of reliable available public supplies and require in consequence a
project power-plant.
Studies appropriate to a particular tunnel may relate to many aspects. For
example, basic data affecting the logistics of a tunnel project in an isolated
area will be necessary in order to establish potential problems and to provide
a data base for estimating costs. Such data should be collected and presented
in a growing statement of factual project data for general use of those
involved with the project.
Every tunnel will require the acquisition and interpretation of
information relating to the ground and to the prediction of its behaviour as
a consequence of tunnelling. Studies of research and of practical experience
related to other projects may be valuable in selecting features of the most
appropriate scheme to satisfy the demand. Thus, the major element of
studies to complement planning and design will concern the nature of the
ground and how this inter-relates with possible schemes of construction
(Figure 3.3). As a matter of definition, the term ‘site investigation’ (s.i.)
follows the example of others (e.g. West et al. 1981) in embracing the total
process of determining the nature of the ground in respects relevant to the
options for construction, while ‘ground investigation’ is defined as that
part of ‘site investigation’ which entails geological and geophysical
investigations commissioned expressly for the project. The progress of site
investigation will generally follow the sequence set out in Table 4.1. Stage I
will be essentially a desk study, Stage II entails predominantly work in the
field and the laboratory, together with interpretation of the acquired data
from Stages I and II, while Stage III will be based on observations during
construction together with further development of interpretation of all
available data.
A practice has developed in Britain (not in Northern Ireland where
borehole records are in the public domain) whereby those who have
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commissioned s.i. for construction projects establish ‘commercial—in
confidence’ rights to the results. While this may appear to have a valid
short-term commercial justification, it is contrary to the public interest,
will tend to lead to predictions about the ground being based on
suboptimal information—even by those who may be holding one part of
the data—and could well contribute to an underground accident which
might have been prevented by open access to such ‘commercial’ records
held by others. The British Health and Safety Executive might well reflect
upon the desirability of abandoning such a practice, prior to a
consequential accident.
Much has been written on the subject of relating geology to specific
engineering behaviour of the ground with the accompanying engineering
problems and opportunities, the best of these by those who have practical
experience of relating geology to the design process. See, for example, Legget
(1979), Legget and Hatheway (1988) and, for the special case of a single
major project, Engineering Geology of the Channel Tunnel (Harris et al.
1996).
Site investigation should be seen as an integral part of the design
process, of yet more vital importance to the design of the construction
process, including the design of the means of construction, as to the
design of the permanent works for the tunnel. It is only by such
recognition that the appropriate elements of site investigation may be
designed, how much determined, to what purposes and with what
specific objective indicators of achievement. Adequacy and quality of s.i.
represent an indispensable key to success of the project overall. This is
the primary justification for the s.i. to be designed and managed by those
who will be responsible for its application to the overall scheme of
construction and, as a corollary, by those who understand the
Table 4.1 Sequence of site investigation
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dependence of the construction processes on adequacy and reliability of
specific information about the properties of the ground. At all times and
for all stages of a site investigation there must be particular objectives,
particular expectations and a keen understanding of the impact of the
findings in relation to the tunnelling options. Where a departure from
expectation occurs, its significance needs to be promptly assessed. Does
this entail rethinking of the s.i. strategy or a shift in emphasis? An
anomalous result should not be dismissed as a ‘rogue’ without good
reason; it may represent the most important feature of the s.i. In other
words, progress of the s.i. affects not only the other aspects of planning
and design but also possible changes of the s.i. itself.
Features of the several stages of s.i. are described in succeeding
paragraphs. As described in Chapter 5, site investigation needs to develop in
association, by planned interactions and frequently in an iterative manner,
with the planning and conceptual design of the project: what it is to comprise
and how it is to be achieved. Thus, s.i. is vital to the preparation of tunnelling
options while the definition of these same options will contribute to the
design of the s.i.
The starting point for ground investigation must depend on the nature
and extent of pre-existing knowledge of the ground in the locality. An
undeveloped part of a country at an early stage of geological mapping
provides a very different starting point from a city much perforated by
tunnels at depths comparable to those of the proposed project. For the
former, a walk-over survey combined with the study of topographical maps
and aerial photographs will be expected to provide first evidence of surface
features and lineaments indicating faulting. Good Codes of Practice exist on
the general aspects of site investigation (e.g. BS 5930 1981) and what follows
has specific relevance to tunnelling.
Boreholes will form a central part of the investigation, their nature,
number and siting depending on the information required. The questions to
be addressed include:
 
• To what extent is geological history, structure and stratigraphy
understood?
• Will the form of tunnelling require specific information on particular
features of the ground types? If so, what specific data are required?
• How does the variability of the ground affect the extent of detail required
by the investigation?
• Is the presence of specific faults, intrusions, unconformities or other
anomalous features suspected? If so, how should this affect the design of
the investigation?
• Is water a potential problem? If so, what is required to define the nature
of the problem and potential solutions in relation to expected forms of
construction?
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• Are any hazards expected, such as the presence of methane, ground
contamination or corrosive ground-water?
• Does the nature of the ground present special problems of susceptibility
to damage of structures or services in the vicinity?
 
Boreholes for tunnelling have been used predominantly as the source of
descriptive logs, cores and samples for inspection and testing, more recently
for increased extent of in situ testing (e.g. penetrometers and vane testing for
weak soils, pressuremeters for stronger soils and weak rocks). Increasing use
has also been made of ‘down-the-hole’ testing derived from the oil
prospecting industry, for determining the physical characteristics of rocks
and of discontinuities, also of water flows. For example, for the Channel
Tunnel, since 1964 sonic and electrical logs were used to identify particular
geological horizons of the chalk (Muir Wood and Casté 1970). The
exploratory holes for the Rock Characterisation Facility for nuclear waste
disposal at Sellafield (UK Nirex 1993) represented the state-of-the-art of the
time, providing geophysical logs representing in great detail the projected
surface of the borehole and of water inflow, at a considerable cost (~£10M
for each 1000 m borehole)
Inclined boreholes are expensive but may provide the only practical
means for investigating otherwise inaccessible features. For example, the
Piora Basin (a ‘sugary’ dolomite bearing water up to 10 MPa pressure) has
been investigated in this manner (Hackel 1997) by a deflection borehole
from an exploratory tunnel for the St Gotthard Base Tunnel (Flury and
Rehbock-Sandes 1998). Steered boreholes from the shore may also be used
to explore the ground under-water without incurring the cost of drilling from
barge, jetty or platform.
Tunnels will, where the choice exists, be sited in ground favourable for the
selected form of tunnelling, using equipment designed to cope with expected
problems. Working shafts, and shafts for other purposes, may need to be
sunk through a variety of types of ground. In consequence, the scheme of site
investigation should include boreholes sited in the close proximity of
prospective shafts, to include investigation of the problems specific to the
shaft-sinking including possible effects of ground loss or water inflow. The
pattern of boreholes should respect geological features and their variability,
for urban tunnels relying on the availability of drilling sites, removing
unacceptable uncertainty on aspects of the ground which could have
significant effect on the scheme of tunnelling. Boreholes should avoid
intersection with tunnels and should be effectively back-filled with a
bentonite/cement or similar material to provide stability and prevent passage
of water across aquicludes.
The levels and mineral content of water encountered by the borehole
may provide important data, including seasonal or other variation. Study
of water flow patterns may justify pumping tests, each using several
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observation wells so that features of ground-water flow may be based on
the shape of the cone of depression, and possibly of detail of its recovery
when pumping ceases. A more popular, but less readily interpretable,
method is that of pumping-in tests between packers in a borehole. The
basis of analysis of such a test is described in Appendix 5G. Here it is
pertinent only to remark that the distance between packers may be
important where permeability variation is to be calculated for rock, also
that such packer tests measure predominantly permeability transverse to
the line of the borehole.
There is considerable choice in the type, quality and, in consequence, cost
of different forms of drilling, and of obtaining samples and cores. A decision
will be guided by the extent to which information is to be quantified and the
degree of finesse on such matters as the use of double-or triple-tube core-
barrels for example. To what extent is the precise location of the borehole
important and does this justify continuous records of inclination and
azimuth? The orientation of rock cores may provide vital information in the
interpretation of the geological structure.
Boreholes should extend to well below, say one diameter below, the
invert of the tunnel, or deeper where the base of the geological facies
chosen for the tunnel may be close to the tunnel and variable in level. If the
maximum depth of the tunnel is not known at the time of the investigation,
allowance must be made to guard against subsequent increase in depth
placing the tunnel in unknown territory. The particular circumstances of
the project will determine whether detailed sampling and testing is
required throughout the length of the borehole or predominantly in the
vicinity of the tunnel. The boreholes provide direct evidence from a minute
fraction of the ground, probably transverse to the line of the tunnel;
statistical validity of data may be improved by testing along a greater
length of the hole through the same suite of rock. It is expensive to return
to obtain more detailed information. There are many instances of tunnels
being relocated during the planning process beyond the reach of the initial
investigation.
The logging of rock cores should be undertaken as soon as practicable.
The driller should have recorded all data necessary for the determination of
the position of each core and of such matters as known loss of core, features
of water entry and of any in situ testing. The engineering geologist will
allocate the core stratigraphically and record features of engineering interest
to an appropriate level of precision, prior to any part of the core being
selected for testing (Geological Society of London 1970). Samples and cores
from boreholes may be required to be maintained in good conditions over
long periods, possibly protected from drying out or freezing. Soil or rock
properties may be inter-related so that a readily observable feature serves as
a marker for a more subtle feature of engineering significance, allowing
zoning to be based on such identification.
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The s.i. needs also to consider the consequences of tunnelling, particularly
related to ground and water movements. The calculation of settlement
(Section 5.3) may need special care for collapsing soils (e.g. loess) or for
sensitive clays (e.g. marine clays affected by base exchange) or for made
ground with high voidage (e.g. tunnelling beneath end-tipped
embankments).
For major projects, or where experimental tunnelling practices are to be
adopted, large diameter boreholes or test headings may be justified, allowing
direct examination of the ground, the taking of in situ cores, possibly
ascertaining the effectiveness of excavation or support systems. The
transference of experience from such test headings to the underground
project must make allowance for factors of size, differences in rock stress and
water pressure, possibly for local differences in geological history.
Where the tunnelling allows periodical access to the face and to exposures
of the ground along the tunnel, geological logging provides the most effective
means to record the continuity and variability of relevant geological
features. A common problem is that the mass of information recorded
becomes unwieldy to synthesise (and may merely be used to compute one or
other rock mass classification index). For the Channel Tunnel, the problem
was eased by the use of a data base permitting selective examination of
trends of particular features (Warren et al. 1996).
Geophysical methods of prospection have developed predominantly for
the oil and gas industry, where their primary purpose lies in extending
information obtained from boreholes into the second and third dimensions.
The most widely used geophysical methods of prospection are those of
seismic reflection and refraction. Each depends upon detecting the effects of
differences of sonic velocity of continuous layers in the ground. Treating the
ground as an elastic medium, the velocities of compressive and shear waves










Seismic reflection techniques are most readily undertaken on water to ensure
efficient transmission of the signal energy and are able to detect bands of
sufficient contrast in sonic impedance of a width equivalent to at least half a
wavelength. The higher the frequency, the greater the detail while the lower
the frequency, for the same pulse energy the greater the penetration. Since
the signal is not sharply focused, it is not possible to identify steeply inclined
reflectors, which includes deep local weathering. Normally, a transmitter is
attached to the survey craft which trails the receiver. Unless separate means
are provided for recording the precise relative positions of each, the runs
should be undertaken along, rather than across, any tidal current in order to
106 Studies and investigations
preserve alignment between transmitter and receiver. Tie lines are also
surveyed, preferably near slack water, so that the grid of records facilitates
the tracing of individual reflectors. As with all such techniques there are
methods for cleaning up the record, including the removal of multiple
reflections, between strong surface and internal reflectors and the sea
surface.
Seismic refraction depends on measuring the time of the return of the
signal to surface receivers, and is only operable where there is increase of
sonic velocity with depth; in a similar manner, electrical conductivity
prospection requires increasing conductivity with depth. The calibration of
such methods requires knowledge of the approximate numerical value of the
appropriate physical characteristics on which each is based.
A technique with doubtlessly unexploited potential is that of sonic
tomography, usually undertaken between boreholes, whereby the body of
the ground may be explored in two or three dimensions by the interpretation
of signals received at different depths in one borehole from transmissions
from different depths in another. Large computing power is needed for the
‘matrix inversion’ required to provide results. The method lends itself to
exploiting features of sonic velocity and of loss of signal strength.
Ground radar has been used for shallow prospecting and to investigate
anomalies locally to a tunnel. Geophysical systems with directional
capability with application to tunnelling, which make use of techniques
comparable to those of remote sensing SAR (synthetic aperture radar)
scanning from satellite, may well become available for ground prospection in
the future.
The most detailed investigation of potential hazards immediately ahead
of the tunnel is undertaken by probing. This may be of a selective nature, e.g.
for the Heathrow Cargo Tunnel (Muir Wood and Gibb 1971), see Section
2.3. More generally, the need is for exploration around and ahead of the
tunnel by means of an aureole of probe-holes inclined at an acute angle to the
line of the tunnel. The features of such probe-holes in relation to different
methods of tunnelling are described in Chapter 6.
4.1.3 Instrumentation and its interpretation
This brief account considers principles and not the characteristics of
particular types of instrument. Instrumentation techniques have developed
rapidly in recent years and may be expected to continue to develop in
reliability, precision and reducing cost. Direct measurements of value to the
engineer include:
 
1. measurements of movement of the ground and of structures, which may
be used to derive strains; also, where appropriate, associated stresses may
be calculated from strains;
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2. measurements of ground-water pressures and levels, used for establishing
effective stresses in the ground, for determining hydraulic gradients and
hence directions of flow, and, particularly, for measuring changes as a
result of tunnelling.
 
Movements along the line of a borehole may be determined by measurement
of changes of distance between indicator rings, by means of a probe or by
extensometer rods. Lateral movements in a borehole and angular tilts of
structures may be measured by inclinometer. Similar devices may be used in
probe-holes drilled from a tunnel or, alternatively, direct measurement of
relative movements of points anchored in the ground may be measured at the
tunnel face by multiple head extensometers.
Fluid-filled levels have been used to detect relative vertical movements
between points; it is then important to ensure no air in the system, no
differential effects caused by temperature or variation of density, no
prevailing atmospheric pressure gradient. The English Channel, as a
large-scale water-level, was used by Cartwright and Creese (1963) to
establish the relationships between the French and the English levelling
datums (IGN and ODN) using the electrical potential difference at the
two ends of a disused telegraph cable to record mass flow of water
through the earth’s magnetic field, with correction for Coriolis effect, for
atmospheric pressure and wind gradients, leading to a difference in mean
sea level of around 80 mm, thus a difference between IGN and ODN of
about 440 mm [subsequently corrected by GPS to about 300 mm, Varley
et al. (1992)].
Precise (invar) tapes or wires may be used to measure between pins
attached to the rock or to the lining of a tunnel. Alternatively the position of
optical targets may be determined precisely by electronic distance
measurement from a theodolite. Stress levels in a tunnel lining may be
measured directly by jacks or a form of flat jack which transmits the load.
Qualitative measurement may be made by stress cells in a concrete lining, or
strain gauges on a metallic lining. Any direct measurement must consider
effects of stiffness in compression and in shear, relative to the part of the
structure it displaces, and whether measurements will be representative.
Drying of the face of a concrete tunnel lining sets up differential shrinkage
stresses which interfere with direct measurement of stress caused by ground
loading. Stress levels between the ground and the tunnel structure are yet
more difficult to measure. The device needs not only to have correct stiffness
in compression and in shear but also to represent the surface of the structure
in position and in roughness. Records of the instrumentation for the Severn
Cable Tunnel (Haswell 1973), which appear to indicate high out-of-balance
forces, illustrate the problem. For a continuous ring, where bending
moments are derived from measurements of stress, missing data may be
estimated from the knowledge that:
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(M/EI)ds=0 (4.3)
 
The engineer is interested in deriving information from the synthesis of a
series of different sources of data. The required precision needs to be
considered at the outset. Synthesis of data of widely different accuracies
may be misleading. For the purposes of research, interpretation may be a
relatively leisurely process. The more immediate requirement will relate
to control of the work of construction. For this purpose, particularly
where measures are involved concerning not only the safety of the tunnel
but also of structures and services, there will be large quantities of data
which need to be continuously collated and collectively interpreted in
real time in such a form as to be immediately useful to decisions affecting
several simultaneous operations, with special concern for dealing with
anomalous data which do not fit prediction. This is particularly the
situation which requires complex data handling and correlation for the
control of compensation grouting as a tunnel advances, described in
Section 5.3.
Much surveying is undertaken by Global Positioning System (GPS) using
satellites with local controls to obtain maximum precision. Traditional
surveying was affected by gravity and hence a ‘level’ surface would follow
the geoid and thus be ‘correct’ in relation to surface levels of still water. The
GPS relates to geometrical coordinates of the earth and levels may therefore
need to be adjusted in relation to the geoid for projects covering a wide area,
particularly for water tunnels through mountains, affected by gravity
anomalies, also possibly, over long distances, to compensate for the
appreciable crustal movements caused by earth tides.
4.2 How not to manage the site investigation
As an aid in defining the qualities of sound s.i. for successful projects it is
useful to reflect on some of the defects currently practised in this vital area.
The ground is the principal determinant for tunnelling, its concept, the form
of the permanent works, the manner and means for achieving this form. The
site investigation and its sub-set, the ground investigation, represent a vital
resource of great value to the project overall. In consequence it should follow
that the greatest sharing of knowledge about the ground should occur
among all the key participants, those who decide on principles and details of
design and of construction. Indeed, experience of projects demonstrates that
overall success correlates well with the degree of promulgation and sharing
of data. Furthermore, in a related manner, much benefit follows from the
application of relevant overall tunnelling experience to the design of the s.i.
Otherwise, too often this becomes an exercise for demonstrating the esoteric
knowledge of specialists in specific areas of the earth sciences, who do not
understand the features, or combination of features, useful for interpretation
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in practical terms by the engineering geologist or geotechnical engineer for
application to the needs of the tunnellers.
The ground investigation involves the investment of expertise, effort, time
and expense commensurate to the size and value of the project, the nature
and complexity of the geology. The results of the site investigation require
specialist skills in interpretation which will relate the findings to knowledge
acquired from other sources and to their interpretation. While the specialist
attributes of those supervising s.i. are often emphasised, too rarely is
emphasis also given to their ability adequately to understand the nature of
the applications of the work to the tunnelling process.
It might appear axiomatic that the greatest care should be taken in
ensuring that the s.i. addresses issues most vital to the project and that the
fruits of s.i. and its interpretation, with whatever reservations about
uncertainty may be advisable, should be made readily available to all those
concerned in applying the results to the success of the project. How
extraordinary, therefore, to find as common practices:
 
1. The engineer commissioned to organise and supervise site investigations
is appointed by competition, does not need to display an understanding
of tunnelling and is not otherwise engaged in planning or design of the
project. This practice inhibits continuity or integration of project
development, with the prospect that the s.i. will not be coupled with
other features of the project planning process and will, in consequence,
not provide adequate answers to vital questions and will not allow
consideration of innovative methods of working.
2. Contractors engaged to construct the project are denied access to the
interpretation of the s.i., allowed to view only the raw results of the s.i.
which has been undertaken specifically for the project (c.f. good practice
as described in Section 2.3). These data are made available for inspection
only during a limited tender period and without guidance of
discrimination as to what may be relevant among what are often large
quantities of irrelevant data mixed with the vital information.
3. Tendering contractors are informed through the Contract Documents
that the s.i. is provided by the Owner without warranty as to its accuracy,
yet this may be the only source of information and it is usually quite
impractical to supplement the data during a limited tender period. To
deepen the inequity (and iniquity), the tenderers may be required to take
full responsibility for all ground conditions without any entitlement to
claim against unforeseeability.
 
How have these remarkable confusions of purpose and perversity of
attitude come about and with what objective? What are the intended
consequences? What are the actual consequences? We need to look no
further than the law.
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A commercial lawyer, consciously or subconsciously, imagines his client
as engaged in a series of legal jousts, potential or actual, with all with whom
he deals. The lawyer starts from the, apparently commendable, notion of
protecting his client. A simple, alas far too simple, means is to pass
responsibility for any conceivable source of risk down the line to all those
(other than the lawyer) engaged to participate in the project. This however is
totally contrary to the achievement of good engineering based on systematic
control of risk, upon which depends the attainment of the Owner’s
objectives. The consequences may be briefly described in these terms:
 
1. The s.i., divorced from those who need to apply its results to the design of
the process of construction, may neglect issues vital to the choice of the
optimal scheme of construction.
2. Whatever may be the legal basis for the disclaimers as to the validity of
s.i. data, the information provided thereby will often be the only, and
certainly the most relevant, basis for the tender. The tenderers’
interpretation may in consequence be partial and hurried. If the data are
in any way misleading, unrepresentative or erroneous, particularly if
such defects lead to apparent consequential impracticability of
performance, there must, at least in equity, be potential grounds for
claiming relief.
3. The cost of the project will be excessive for these direct reasons:
• The Contractor, unless ready to accept loss, may assume the worst
conceivable combination of geological circumstances, accentuated by
lack of opportunity to undertake a deliberate considered assessment
of all the data and thus unable to determine the optimal scheme of
construction.
• Absence of interactions between s.i. and other features of project
planning and definition (see also Chapter 3) prevent optimisation.
• Absence of adequate s.i. related to a specific means of construction
may prevent this means, possibly the most appropriate, from being
seriously considered by the Contractor.
• Where the ground departs from expectation, the Contractor can
expect no contribution from changes in the specified requirements for
the Works which may well constitute a vital part of a practical
technical solution.
4. Perhaps the most damaging feature overall is that the practice of using
s.i. as an apparent weapon to emphasise the weakness of the Contractor
in potential litigation, rather than a buttress to overall planning of the
project, establishes a point of departure for distrust liable to poison
relationships, leading towards adversarial positions, from which much
else damaging to success may spring.
5. In the event of the Contractor encountering unexpected problems, unless
readily mastered, there being no resource for compensation, there must
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always be the temptation by one side to exaggerate the problems,
possibly leading to their actual exacerbation, and by the other to pretend,
having had to make no previous declaration of commitment to specific
interpretation, that these were precisely what were to be expected (in
France pronostic rétrospectif). These are not attitudes likely to lead to
rapid economic recovery of the situation; in fact, they undermine the
professional relationships between those concerned, on which success
hinges.
 
The practices described above are particularly liable to lead to litigation,
which only rarely provides satisfaction to those outside the legal profession.
Additionally, if data available to the Owner or the Engineer or an
interpretative report not issued to tenderers point even indirectly to any
source of hidden danger, such as, for example, the possible presence of
methane below the surface, without alerting the Contractor to this
possibility, there might well be liability for concealing this potential risk if it
were to eventuate. Is the above account a fictional scenario? Unfortunately
not: each element is based on experience.
4.3 How much site investigation?
Since s.i. is accepted as being so vital to tunnelling, several attempts have
been made to express the optimal expenditure on s.i. as some numerical
relationship to the associated project, e.g. as a percentage of cost, or as a
ratio of aggregate length of borehole to length of tunnel. Thus Legget and
Hatheway (1988) suggest a range of 0.3–2.0% of total cost while West et al.
(1981) suggest Stage II s.i. (Table 4.1) as representing 0.5–3.0% for the
United Kingdom. For similar projects in similar ground there may well be
merit in making comparison (bench-marking), but it is impossible to adduce
rules of universal application for such reasons as:
 
1. Geological conditions between projects, and even within a single
project, may be highly diverse.
2. Where the nature of the ground and the geological structure may be
familiar from previous investigation—and particularly from previous
tunnelling—the percentage cost of s.i. may be expected to be less than
that for a similar project in previously unexplored ground.
3. A simple homogeneous depositional geology may generally be expected
to yield requisite information from less s.i. than complex tectonically
disturbed strata.
4. Where tunnels are set at considerable depth at expectation of saving
cost, the associated cost of each borehole for investigation will increase
exponentially (to a power well in excess of unity) with depth.
5. A s.i. campaign may lead to variation of the route of the tunnel with the
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prospect of increased cost of adequate investigation overall. Likewise,
additional costs will be incurred when different tunnel options, in form
or layout, are to be investigated.
6. A particularly economic form of tunnelling may be relatively intolerant
of variations in the properties of the ground and may thus demand more
and better quality investigation than a more tolerant or adaptable
method of tunnelling.
7. Where special expedients (see Chapter 5) may be required,
investigations of a specific nature may be needed to establish the
efficacy of such practices and hence the selection of the optimal scheme.
8. With advances in technology both in s.i. and in tunnelling, one may
expect to find historical changes in the ratios of costs.
9. Where trial shafts or tunnels are justified to help to establish optimal
schemes of tunnelling, these may or may not be classified as s.i.
10. S.i. for an underwater tunnel will cost more than for a comparable
tunnel under the land, partially compensated by the greater scope for
underwater geophysical prospection.
 
It is undoubtedly true that certain tunnels have encountered problems that
would have been eliminated by more effectively planned s.i. On the other
hand, some of the most economic tunnelling in Norway (yet more
economic by the value of aggregate obtained during excavation) through
massive granitic rocks have required virtually no advance geological
exploration on account of the general familiarity with the properties of the
ground coupled with the tolerance of the drill-and-blast method of
working, capable of variation in relation to conditions observed at the
tunnel face.
The spacing between boreholes must take account of two different but
inter-related criteria:
 
1. The extent to which the boreholes—possibly in association with
geophysical prospection—are relied upon to define the presence or
locality of particular features or of the variability in geological surfaces
or horizons vital to the scheme of tunnelling.
2. The dependence on the boreholes to acquire general information about
the qualities and variability of the rock which may contribute to a
synthesis or a statistical analysis of value to the project.
 
In essence, the frequency of the boreholes must depend initially on Stage I of
the studies (Table 4.1) amended as information begins to be assembled from
the initial phase of Stage II.
A more general problem in assessing the adequacy of s.i. arises from the
attempt to measure success of a project in terms of the percentage increment
in tunnelling cost above the value of the Tender (corrected for inflation). This
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is highly unreliable for several reasons. Firstly, the Tender total may or may
not include appropriate figures for contingencies; if it does not it does not
represent the Tender value. Secondly, ‘bench-marking’ (see Chapter 6)
between tunnel projects is notoriously difficult so there is no easy way of
determining what a particular project ought to have cost. Thirdly, attempts
to secure cost certainty for an uncertain project at the time of Tender will
frequently be associated with elevated costs (see Section 3.7). Cost certainty
at an early phase of the tunnel may well have appeal to the accountant on
account of the high standard of cost control that this may appear to
represent, but the benefit overall is illusory and the effect on cost control
overall damaging, apart from the proclivity of such an approach to
litigation. Curiously, the costs of litigation sometimes seem to escape from
the total figure stated for the cost of a project; clearly such costs should
figure in any comparison of costs overall.
Where the cost of a project has increased as a result of encountering an
unexpected feature of the ground, it is too easy to conclude that the feature
would have been revealed by a more thorough investigation. It is only by
exploring how understanding about the ground has developed during the s.i.
that it is possible to deduce whether or not supplementary s.i. might have
been targeted to reveal such a feature.
The Kelvin sewer tunnel (Sloan 1997) appears to provide a simple
example where excessive spacing between boreholes without intermediate
geophysical data failed to reveal that the ice-eroded surface of the rock
would fall below the crown of the tunnel. A more complex example is
provided by the known presence of anomalies in the London clay,
apparently associated with local erosion of the surface of the clay, fine-
grained material from beneath being forced upwards by excess water
pressure, leaving roughly cylindrical zones of unstable ground (Berry
1979). These features represent one of several aspects of periglacial
phenomena described by Hutchinson (1991), encountered by several
tunnels in the London area. In 1983, a 2.5 m diameter wedgeblock-lined
water tunnel for the Three Valleys Water Committee, constructed between
Wraysbury and Iver, to the west of London, encountered such a feature
affecting a length of about 50 m of tunnel at a depth of more than 30 m.
After unsuccessful attempts of control of the unstable ground by grouting,
adopting the technique of ‘claquage’, i.e. fracturing the ground to assist
penetration, with sodium silicate grout, freezing from the surface by the
use of liquid nitrogen was used successfully.
A major crisis in the construction of the North Bank machine hall for the
Kariba hydro-electric project depended in part upon the absence of
identification in the site investigation of bands of biotite schist in the gneiss
rocks in which excavation was undertaken (Anon 1974). Differences
between experts upon the significance of these oversights persisted as the
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original contractor was expelled (and went into liquidation as a result) and
the work completed late and at an increase in cost of around 50%.
It needs to be understood that, by failing to disclose a suspected
unwelcome feature of the ground, a borehole does not establish its absence.
This is particularly relevant for example to the deep tropical weathering of
igneous rocks. The weathered zone may be fairly narrow, following a fault
and reducing in width with depth. In consequence, the probability of it being
encountered by a series of boreholes will depend on:
 
• the spacing between boreholes in relation to the spacing between the
weathered zones;
• the orientation of the zone in relation to the inclination and azimuth of
the borehole.
 
Furthermore, where the width of the zone may be expected to reduce with
depth, the probability of an encounter by a borehole will also reduce with
depth. Thus, the series of boreholes will indicate a minimum depth of
weathering but cannot establish the maximum depth. Sonic tomography
between boreholes, or the use of steered boreholes might provide such
information for a particular feature, providing that the suspected position is
reasonably predictable from surface feature or other evidence. A statistical
analysis of the data may help to establish the relationship between depth of
the tunnel and its likelihood of encountering the feature.
From the above it should be evident that the needs of a project are highly
site- and project-specific. Once the fundamental information is obtained to
permit particular forms of construction to be considered, questions of
uncertainty and how these may be effectively reduced, must dominate the
strategy for further s.i., the criterion being that the cost of additional s.i.
must more than compensate the value of the expected reduction in cost of
construction, which of course will include the cost of uncertainty. Apart
from exploration and 3-D mapping of the ground, as the planning of the
project unfolds the supplementary s.i. may also be required to investigate the
practicability of specific techniques, including special expedients (Section
6.4). These may well entail specific trials designed for the particular
application in representative ground.
4.4 Reporting on site investigation
Reporting on s.i. needs to respect the cadence of the programme for project
planning and design (Table 4.1). Essentially, a summary is required of Stage
I, listing with care the source of each element of data. A report will be
necessary after each phase of Stage II and a specific intermediate report on
every other occasion at which new interpretation of data might lead to a
variation in the design strategy.
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Once again, emphasis is placed on the need for those in charge of s.i. to
combine an understanding of the essential features of geology with an
appreciation of the significance of the combination of the features in relation
to the problems and opportunities of tunnelling. This combination is
particularly important in enhancing the ability to draw upon the significance
of the state of knowledge of the geology at an intermediate stage of the
investigation. It is just as important to appreciate the extent of uncertainty in
a particular respect as it is to demonstrate ascertained facts and their possible
or probable inferences. For example, where figures of permeability have
been derived from packer tests in boreholes (Appendix 5G) consideration
should be given to such features as:
 
1. explaining the technique involved;
2. providing full records of measurements in tabulated figures and graphical
form;
3. interpreting figures of permeability, with indication of reliability related
to the nature of the test, the shape of the pressure/flow curves (Muir
Wood and Casté 1970) and other material factors;
4. another reminder that values of permeability are vertically skewed, i.e.
that measurements are predominantly of horizontal permeability.
 
In relation to point 4 above, for measurements of permeability of
unweathered chalk for the Channel Tunnel, where hydraulic conductivity
depends predominantly on fissure flow, permeability factors between 2 and 5
are recommended to infer vertical permeability from figures derived from
packer tests in boreholes (Sharp et al. 1996). As this book goes to press,
results are awaited of a numerical study of this feature.
The logging of cores should follow recommended procedures, in Britain
those of the Geological Society of London (1970). The commonest way of
recording the degree of jointing of rocks is by way of Rock Quality
Designation (RQD) as defined by Deere et al. (1967) as the percentage of the
total length of core recovered in solid pieces greater than 100 mm in length.
Stereoplots (Figures 4.2 and 4.3) may assist in identifying dominant trends of
jointing and critical needs for tunnel support. Study of a suite of rocks may
permit rock strength (qu) to be related to elastic modulus (E) as illustrated by
Figure 4.4 as a first guide to support needs.
There is a logic in the progression from geological description, working
from the general towards the particular for the project, through the
expression of features in quantified terms as engineering geology, thence to
geotechnical engineering and its application to the planning and design of
the project, of its elements, how they are to be built and by what means.
There is however considerable variety in application of such a ‘linear’
approach, for reasons explained in Chapter 2. Innovative approaches to
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any aspect, or incidental surprises in geological interpretation, may lead to
iteration or re-examination of an earlier phase of the work. A more
fundamental issue is that of variability of the ground and the
identification of the varying features. Optimal tunnelling in relatively
homogeneous soft ground, for instance, may be based on highly developed ‘ground
Figure 4.3 Stereo-plot for unstable rock blocks.
Figure 4.2 Stereo-plot for rock joints.
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models’ (Appendix 5F), which at the extreme may be expressed in the form
of constitutive equations for the behaviour of the ground. Rock tunnelling in
squeezing ground lends itself to a different form of analytical approach, with
variability providing limits for sensitivity analysis, i.e. the testing of a design
against its capacity for variation against possible ranges of parameters,
controlled by an observational technique. For tunnelling in jointed
competent rock, the main objective of the site investigation will be to
determine the degree of variability of the jointing pattern and of the
associated problems with inflow of water.
Informal Support will be adaptable to demand so there is less need to
establish a highly specific ground model on which to base the requirement
for support, providing that modification may be secured within the time
available, and time-based behaviour may then become an important issue to
be explored by the s.i.
Figure 4.4 Typical relationships for E and qu for weak rock (after Hobbs 1974).
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In summary, rock tunnels require:
 
• an account of the variability in support requirements, sufficiently
quantified, the data graded in respect of quality, to permit realistic
estimates of cost of different solutions;
• data necessary for the design of methods of excavation, whether by
machine or by drill-and-blast;
• prediction of specific problems to be expected, in nature and, so far as
possible, extent and expected locality.
 
The latter is frequently the most important, but overlooked, factor. The
economics of a scheme of tunnelling advancing at 100–1000 m/month may
be utterly compromised by a 6-month delay to deal with a single unforeseen,
but foreseeable, localised unstable water-bearing feature. There are many
problems along the way in identifying such a feature:
 
• the intersection of a disturbed zone by a borehole may be recorded by the
laconic ‘loss of core’;
• undue reliance on surface expression of features, particularly in a dry
climate where induration of faulted material at the surface may give a
totally misleading impression of its nature at depth;
• surface mapping may be the most positive means for locating and
orientating features of concern but local weathering may obscure such
exposures so that more subtle secondary features may need to be
identified.
 
The Canyon Project, a 100 MW, 540 m head, hydro-power project of the
Upper Kelani Valley basin of Sri Lanka was commissioned in 1982 at a time
of considerable power shortage. The original alignment of the penstock
tunnel was found to be following a band of karstic limestone
metamorphosed to marble and altered to clay with boulders, pebbles and
sand, which might have been foreseen from a surface line of swallow-holes
and boulder-filled depressions (Vitanage 1982). The tunnel was in
consequence diverted but ran close to this feature for about 80 metres and
traversed it obliquely over a further 50 m. Considerable quantities of cement
were used for cavity grouting.
On first filling the tunnel, damage was apparent, evidenced by leakage
at the rate of about 30 litres/s. On dewatering, sand and silt were found as
a deposit in the tunnel. There was evidence that a length of the crown of
the tunnel had been displaced (opening 3–10 mm, shearing 3–10 mm, but
possibly greater under pressure). The tunnel was repaired and regrouted. In
view of a prevailing power shortage, the project was recommissioned. The
question was then posed as to the temporary policy prior to undertaking
major permanent remedial work. The advice given was to avoid surges, to
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maintain vigilance for any appearance of silt at the power-house and to
sink two boreholes into the altered geological feature in the vicinity of the
tunnel. By continuous observation of water levels, sudden rise or fall would
signal a change in the local regime requiring further investigation.
Meanwhile, the plant could continue to operate. At intervals when power
was not required, the rate of leakage out of the tunnel could also be
observed.
Directional skewing occurs in the measurement of rock properties, such as
RQD, measured in boreholes. Results should always be qualified in such
respects, particularly where there are suspicions of anisotropy. Anisotropy is
a general rule rather than an exception for several reasons:
 
1. Variations in patterns of deposition, erosion and the complex effects of
periodical surface exposure will tend to cause layering of clastic strata
(e.g. seasonal varving) with consequential effects on properties as
explained in Appendix 5F.
2. Many of the causes of jointing and folding in rock will tend to cause sets
of vertical or sub-vertical joints and of jointing parallel to the bedding.
Weathering, associated with ground-water flow, may tend to follow the
jointing pattern, hence the phenomenon of deep local weathering in
igneous rocks and karsticity in dolomitic limestones. Intrusive rocks will
tend to follow pre-existing joints orthogonal to the direction of low
ground stress. Vertical boreholes are obviously ineffectual in providing
statistically reliable information on the frequency, vertical extent and
significance of vertical or sub-vertical features.
3. Schistosity will be orientated in relation to the stress regime in the ground
at the time of metamorphosis.
 
The most important feature of a borehole may concern the causes for loss of
core recovery. Down-the-hole logs and cameras may help to explain their
significance.
4.5 Identification of patterns in the ground
Site investigation will provide direct evidence of only a minute fraction of the
ground to be penetrated by the tunnel. Indirect evidence by geophysical
means may well provide valuable information of likely continuities and
discontinuities, interpreting structure in relation to specific features, with the
prospect of correlations between such features and properties of interest to
tunnelling.
Too often, results of a site investigation are then presented in the form of
a graphical plot and a statistical analysis for a particular rock type or suite of
rocks. Much may be gained by searching for patterns in the data which may
assist in predicting the nature and variability of the ground to be encountered
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by the tunnel. Patterns are of several varieties, of which the most interesting
for tunnels are:
 
1. patterns of deposition (and possibly of local erosion), including cyclical
variation and trends along an individual clast;
2. patterns of change by pressure, temperature, alteration (preferring the
French term to the more confined implication of ‘weathering’), water
flow, diagenesis;
3. patterns of effects of tectonic activity in relation to the physical
characteristics of the rock.
 
From the several phases of investigation for the Channel Tunnel a number
of these patterns became evident. Cyclical variations in the chalk marl of
the Lower Chalk were associated (Harris et al. 1996) with alternating
layers of more and less clay/carbonate ratios. The overall variation in
properties along the tunnel could be largely explained by an increasing
thickness of the clay-rich layers towards the English coast, with an
accompanying overall increase in thickness of the Chalk Marl of the Lower
Chalk (Mortimore and Pomerol 1996). There were also patterns of
decreasing permeability with depth, largely associated with increasing clay
content. A further pattern was related to the extent to which varying sea-
level through geological time subsequent to deposition had encouraged
flow paths to develop along fissures and joints. A related pattern concerned
the consequences of tectonic activity in its effects of anticlinal and synclinal
folds, with wrench faults, on the rock properties and on the development of
faulting. We may expect to be able in the future to develop improved means
for relating the effect of tectonic activity at depth to the consequences to
overlying rocks of interest to tunnelling (see, for example, Varley 1996),
which could be of considerable value in predicting variation in rock quality
along the line of a tunnel.
Episodes of interruptions in deposition may be associated with surface
weathering but more often with erosion and variation in deposits which may
be traced as part of the pattern, appreciating that one erosional episode may
lead to the partial or complete removal of the evidence of earlier episodes of
the same, or of a different, nature. This may result for example in the
presence of confined aquifers, as lenses of sand in ground of otherwise low
permeability, which may avoid detection by normal site investigation.
Intrusive igneous rocks, basalts and dolerites, may themselves be
susceptible to deep weathering. They may also give rise, on cooling, to the
development of contraction joints, providing flow routes for water and
hence increasing the local susceptibility for further weathering.
Study of the ground-water flow may establish patterns of chemical/
physical erosion and of chemical deposition, leading to the sealing of water
channels.
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Alteration at depth away from intrusive igneous rocks is most likely to be
associated with ground-water movements and hence to the pattern of
jointing and to the historical episodes causing forcing of ground-water flow.
The rate of change will be related to the temperature and chemical content of
the circulating water. It is important to understand the patterns of change of
relative sea level which may determine the levels to which major weathering
has occurred.
If patterns are expected to be identifiable in the ground to be investigated,
techniques need to be adopted for their identification and mapping. For
example, palaeontology may assist in relating a feature of a pattern to a
particular geological horizon and hence to tracing it through the ground
(Bruckshaw et al. 1961). The most positive means of identifying and
delineating patterns may be by the use of tomography. Such techniques are
usually excessively expensive for normal tunnelling but may well become the
norm for specialised application such as exploration for underground
nuclear waste disposal or for caverns for gas or oil storage.
When undertaking initial geomorphological prospection, the
identification of bands of rock resistant to weathering will often help to
explain some of the less obvious topographical features. Similarly, the spring
line at periods of raised water-table may be identified from the shape of
valley features and hence to the approximate location of the levels of
aquicludes. Many other similar associations may be developed by the
observant geomorphologist.
Ultimately, from the viewpoint of the tunneller, the objective must be to
identify patterns of grades of engineering properties of the ground and in this
way to predict rock ‘zones’ to be used for designing patterns of support, for
predicting rates of progress and possibly as a basis for payment. Such zones
depend on complex associations of rock mass properties, internal stress
patterns, ground-water patterns, tectonic activity. During site investigation,
thought needs to be given to the extent to which useful information leading
to such predictive zoning may be acquired from design and synthesis of the
recovery of data.
4.6 Specific features of site investigation
The first essential for successful site investigation for tunnelling is that of
good communication between those concerned with the performance of
the work and those concerned with its application across all aspects of the
tunnelling process. The communicators may include engineering
geologists—and their specialist advisors in particular aspects of geology
and geophysics, geotechnical engineers, and designers of the tunnelling
works with familiarity across the construction process, possibly advised by
the designers of specialist processes and plant. At the outset it will
generally not be possible to foresee which specific aspects of the properties
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of the ground will be most relevant to tunnelling. Periodical briefing
between those illustrated by Figure 2.3 should ensure that these aspects are
systematically clarified and the site investigation directed increasingly
towards the elucidation of areas of important uncertainty. There needs to
be similar two-way communication between the engineering geologist and
specialists to whom he looks for advice and for whose work he is
responsible.
The director of the investigation should always understand the current
expectations concerning the ground. As Glossop (1968) has wisely stated: ‘If
you do not know what you should be looking for in a site investigation, you
are not likely to find much of value.’ With coherent and updated briefing, the
discovery of an unexpected feature may lead immediately to question the
prevailing ‘ground model’. The term ‘ground model’ is used in two different
senses:
 
• a specific model used for analysis of tunnel stability (Appendix 5F);
• (as here) a general descriptive statement of the ground, including features
relevant to tunnelling, arising from synthesis of data currently available.
 
The planning of the site investigation depends on the second definition, the
first being derived from it to provide a simplified basis for tunnel design.
The investigation may also need to explore the interaction between the
proposed tunnel and other existing or proposed surface or buried features.
In the most demanding circumstances, the s.i. may need to be augmented
by detailed analysis or centrifuge model in order to determine safe
tunnelling procedures. Data on characteristics of the ground will then be
required in a form to feed into the constitutive equations (i.e. those
equations which relate the physical characteristics of the ground affecting
time-dependent relationships between stress and strain) needed for valid
numerical analysis. Such work needs to be conducted with great
discrimination. Much worthless numerical modelling of tunnels has been
undertaken where the circumstances do not warrant such an approach,
where the model does not adequately represent the construction process, or
where the lack of specific data renders the results unreliably precise or
positively misleading.
Traditionally, the phases of the site investigation (Table 4.1) have been
discussed in relation to the phases of the contract for construction, i.e. phases
prior to invitation to tender, possible interaction phase with tenderers
(permitting for example activities arising from direct access to test shafts and
headings), phases after award of Contract.
In this book, one objective is to insist that the development of the design
process is the significant feature to which phases in s.i. must relate. For
example, an early commitment to a particular means of tunnelling may
permit an approach to a project whereby s.i. may be specifically tailored to
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this means from an early phase. The results of s.i. are not to be treated as a
weapon of defence of a law-infested client but as a vital resource to be
applied to the benefit of the project, with areas of uncertainty requiring at all
times to be identified with as much emphasis as the areas of confident
knowledge.

1. Gjøviksports cavern for 1994 Winter Olympics in course of construction.
The main cavern has a span of 61 metres, height of 25 metres (photo
© Scan-Foto Hans Brox).
2. Cross-section of Gjøvik cavern indicating the scheme for construction.
3. Station construction of the Jubilee Line extension (photo courtesy of QA Photos Ltd).
4. Robbins 5 metre diameter TBM with back-up ready to start 17.5km drive for the
45km long Lesotho Highlands transfer tunnel (photo courtesy of QA
Photos Ltd).
5. Installation of waterproof membrane behind in-situ lining of 250 metre long×18
metre high Baixo-Chiado station cavern (photo by José Carlos Aleixo).
6. Formwork for the in-situ concrete lining for the Lesotho Highlands transfer
tunnel (part of the 82km total length of the tunnel) (photo by Bogdan
Onoszko).
7. An Atlas Copco Rocket Boomer 353 ES drilling jumbo used for the Ullbro tunnel
(photo by Shani Wallis).
8. Typical completed tunnel for the Jubilee Line extension (photo courtesy of QA
Photos/Jubilee Line Extension Project).
9. Primary shotcrete support by top heading with two benches for approximately 14
metres diameter, North Downs Tunnel, Blue Bell Hill, Kent, for Channel
Tunnel Rail Link (photo by Ros Orpin, and courtesy of Rail Link Engineering).
Chapter 5
 
Design of the tunnel project
Design—the continuous thread.
5.1 Options in tunnel design
5.1.1 The nature of the ground
Chapter 1 describes some of the developments in tunnelling which have
contributed to the options available at the present day. For any specific
project, the selection must be made against the known and suspected
features of the ground, also of other relevant aspects such as access and local
availability of tunnelling traditions and skills. The method needs to be
considered in relation to tolerance or adaptability in respect of the variability
of the ground (see Chapter 6).
Traditionally, in the days of simpler tunnelling techniques described in
Chapter 1, the ground was subdivided, for the sake of defining the approach to
be made, into ‘rock’ and ‘soft ground’. Now that it is possible to learn, where
appropriate, considerable information about the ground, not only in descriptive
terms but also in behavioural terms, e.g. features associating stress and strain in
a time dependent manner, possibly the basis of the ruling constitutive equations,
the subdivision from the viewpoint of tunnel stability is more fundamental:
 
1. Ground to be treated as a continuum, i.e. all forms of soil and
incompetent rock. Incompetent rock is defined as rock which will





 is defined below). The question of time is important since all
rocks deform with time (although rates of deformation of familiar rocks
at normal pressures and temperatures are imperceptibly slow), salt
bodies being amongst the most readily deformable.
2. Ground to be treated as a discontinuum, i.e. rock whose behaviour is
dominated, in relation to tunnel stability, by movement along joints
between discrete blocks.
Figure 5.1 Factors contributing to conceptual design.
Figure 5.2 The synthetic and analytical approaches to rock mass modelling (after
Hudson 1993).
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Occasionally, competent massive rock is so little jointed as to present
no stability problem. More taxing of ingenuity is the jointed,
relatively weak, rock whose treatment needs to consider the rock
simultaneously as a continuum and as a discontinuum. Categorisation
is affected by the relationship between tunnel size and joint spacing
(Hoek and Brown 1980).  Where choice exists, the position,
orientation, shape and direction of tunnel construction should take
account of the rock structure and in situ stress tensor. Interbedded
rocks, e.g. alternating mudrocks and siltstones, may appear to form a
continuum but the effect of changed stress patterns as a result of
tunnelling may induce cleavage along bedding planes with local
fracturing and instability. The special needs for support, or for
adaptation of tunnel profile, should be considered for such
circumstances.  Whatever may be the features of the tunnel to be
designed, the approach should include these elements:
 
1. Experience, incorporating features of empiricism based on an
understanding of ground characteristics and on successful practices in
familiar or similar ground.
2. Reason, using analytical solutions, simple or more complex as the
situation may demand, based on an acceptable ‘ground model’ (see
Appendix 5F).
3. Observation of the behaviour of the tunnel during construction,
developing into monitoring with systematic predesigned modification
where a feature of Observational Design (Section 2.7) is to be adopted.
 
This approach is illustrated by Figure 5.1, recognising that points 1, 2 and 3
are complementary, contributing to the optimal approach to the particular
circumstances rather than competitive techniques of tunnel design. However,
the mix will depend greatly upon the circumstances. For a traditional form of
tunnelling in familiar ground, reliance on experience will predominate (zone
A in Figure 5.1); the design of a tunnel in a particularly sensitive area will
depend upon a reasoned design combined with the adoption of the
techniques of Observational Design (Section 2.7) and will thus lie nearer
zone B of Figure 5.1. Hudson (1993) illustrates (Figure 5.2) an approach
towards a ‘ground model’, with the objective of striking the greatest degree
of proximity between the ‘top down’ and the ‘bottom up’ models, discussed
in Appendix 5F.
Where a specific problem of stability lends itself to analysis, resort may be
made to the Limit Theorems of the theory of plasticity (confusion may be
caused by those who use the expressions ‘upper bound’ and ‘lower bound’
more loosely to define high and low estimates of the measures needed to
ensure stability or safety):
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1. Upper Bound Theorem: If an estimate of the plastic collapse load of a
body is made by equating the internal rate of dissipation of energy to
the rate at which external forces do work in any postulated
mechanism of deformation of the body, the estimate will be either
high or correct.
2. Lower Bound Theorem: If any stress distribution throughout the
structure can be found which is everywhere in equilibrium internally
and balances certain external loads and at the same time does not
violate the yield condition, those loads will be carried safely by the
structure.
 
Davis et al. (1980) have approached the stability of the face of a tunnel in
clay, in circumstances in which the region of uncertainty between the upper
bound and the lower bound could be acceptably constrained.
Many authors make a distinction between a ‘passive’ support system, in
which the ground load gradually and naturally comes on the support, and an
‘active’ system, such as rock-bolting, in which the support is stressed on
installation against the ground. There is no sharp distinction, however, since
rock-bolts for example may be emplaced with or without initial pre-stress,
depending on the system of anchorage and on the optimisation of strain in
the rock, and may be combined with passive features such as sprayed
concrete.
For tunnels in strong rock, i.e. where the competence ratio Rc (ratio of
unconfined compressive strength of rock to initial state of stress in the
ground, see Muir Wood (1972)) may be represented as, say, Rc>4, the
structural design process is predominantly concerned with the effects of
discontinuities, generalised as jointing. As described above, the
composite geometry of joints and the conditions of joint surfaces are
therefore the major characteristics relating to the stability of the tunnel.
Scale is of the utmost importance in relating the spacing of the joints or
the sizes of potentially unstable blocks (Figure 4.3) to the cross-sectional
dimensions of the tunnel, affecting the risk of potential modes of failure.
Providing that rock joints are tight and that there is no risk of water
dissolving joint infill, rock bolts will usually suffice to secure potentially
unstable areas of strong rock or, by patterned bolting for more highly
jointed rock, in combination with steel mesh or equivalent to create a
self-supporting rock arch or ring (Appendix 5D). Where jointing may be
described as forming significant ‘sets’, i.e. preferential jointing confined
to a number of well-defined directions (Figure 4.3), the geometry of
blocks which might become detached by falling or sliding into the tunnel
may be predicted.
Where a joint of shear strength: t=c+σn tan φ (appreciably less than
the unconfined compressive strength of the unfractured parent rock
qu) occurs, potential slippage may occur for a limited range of angles of
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incidence, a, of the joint to the exposed rock face, as illustrated by Figure 5.3.
The expression for the limiting circumferential unconfined compressive rock
stress, σθ, is readily found, in terms of τ and of σr, the radial confining stress,
by way of the Mohr diagram, Figure 5.4, to be the lesser of the unconfined
strength of the intact rock and the value of σθ given by:
Figure 5.3 Failure criterion for jointed rock subjected to simple compressive loading.
136 Design of the tunnel project




Whether slippage along such a joint leads to a mechanism for failure and
hence to a displaced block depends on the geometry of the jointing system in
relation to the tunnel. Hoek (1983) describes experimental studies of the
directional strength of a number of jointed rocks.
For large caverns, the particular risk is associated with major systems of
jointing combining to define a massive potential unstable wedge or pyramid
of rock, for which major stabilisation works with anchor cables, possibly
combined with anchor blocks formed in special headings, may provide the
solution.
For tunnels in weak rock, i.e. where 1<Rc<4, or where the rock is so
heavily jointed that stability of individual blocks is generally suspect,
support will be required close to the face and this will dominate the design
approach. For support needs, the provision depends inter alia on initial
rock stress and hence on the depth of the tunnel, with special consideration
given to localities where the ground surface is steeply inclined or where the
major principal stress is not vertical. For soils, the at-rest ratio of
horizontal to vertical stress K0=σh/σv is usually considered as a constant for
any specific point, but often varying with depth. For rocks, horizontal
Figure 5.4 Mohr’s diagram for rock.
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stress may vary between minimum and maximum values orthogonal to each
other. The major principal stress may be at any azimuth or inclination,
depending on the geological history. At depth, continental trends in a
dominant direction of high horizontal stress may be an important factor in
design. Ward (1978) describes practical measurement and analysis of
support needs for weak rock, largely based on studies for the Keilder Tunnel
(Coats et al. 1982).
For soils and weak rocks stability at and near to the face will be time-
dependent, leading, for an unsupported face, to the imprecise notion of
‘stand-up time’, which may be compounded by a number of factors:
 
• equilibration of pore-pressures for cohesive soils and weak rocks;
• changing stress pattern as the distance between the face and the last
supported length of tunnel increases;
• discontinuities in the soil (e.g. slickensides, joints in clay, sand partings in
silt);
• time-dependent effects of concentrated loading between blocks (of weak
rock).
 
The effect of the equilibration of pore-pressures needs explanation. As a
tunnel advances in clay, the reduced total stress in the ground close to the
face, and the associated increase in shear stress, leads to a tendency for
dilation of the soil which causes a local reduction of pore-pressure (possibly
below zero on account of capillary forces). This reduction in turn increases
the hydraulic gradient which draws water through the ground towards the
tunnel. The reduced pressures cause a corresponding increase in effective
stress of the soil, which is then largely responsible for the stand-up time. For
an advancing tunnel, a ‘steady state’ occurs in the stress pattern relative to
the face, advancing in a Lagrangian fashion with the progress of the tunnel
(Figure 5.5). In consequence one expects stand-up time to increase as the rate
of advance increases, but this depends essentially upon the coefficient of










Here k=hydraulic permeability, mv=coefficient of volumetric compressibility,
andγw=unit weight of water. There is considerable evidence of the increased
likelihood of instability of a stalled tunnel face.
Figure 5.6 indicates diagrammatically the features of supported
pressure around a circular tunnel and of ground convergence in the
vicinity of the advancing face of the tunnel. Ahead of the face of the
tunnel, the ‘core’ (i.e. the ground within the cylinder to be excavated) will
be more or less distorted by contraction across the diameter coupled with long-
itudinal extrusion towards the face. Dominant controlling features will be
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the initial stress regime and the stress/strain characteristics of the ground.

















where u represents convergence, x a distance along the tunnel, and 8 relates
to a distance remote from the face for a (theoretically) unsupported tunnel.
In general, the greater the value of λ, the greater the convergence and the
lower the required support pressure.
In the vicinity of the face, the stress patterns may be considered as:
 
1. a dome (i.e. part of a 3-D sphere or ellipsoid) of stresses bearing on the
last effective length of ring of support or lining of the tunnel and on the
‘core’;
2. circumferential stresses around the unsupported length of the tunnel,
mainly within the ‘dome’;
3. stresses parallel to the axis of the tunnel, whose divergence will add to the
radial stressing of the ground ahead of the face and whose subsequent
convergence will aid stability between face and tunnel support.
  
Figure 5.5 Features affecting stability at the face of a tunnel in clay.
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When stability of slices transverse to the tunnel are considered, the stress
dome contributes to shear (in the plane r,θ) between slices.
This simplified concept of stress patterns indicates the contribution of the
core and of early provision of a completed ring of support to achieve initial
stability. If the ‘dome’ of ground support is viewed in a static manner, it
might be supposed that the most recently completed ring of support could
bear a disproportionately high loading. Since, however, the tunnel is
considered to be advancing steadily, the incremental load on each ring
cannot correspond to more than that due to the corresponding length of
reduced support from the advance of the face, taking account of the
contribution from increased circumferential stresses in the ground around
Figure 5.6 Radial convergence and ground stress in vicinity of tunnel face.
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the tunnel. Furthermore, the support is not provided instantaneously—there
is a time for erection and a time for the support (e.g. shotcrete) to develop a
high enough effective modulus—and the first effect of loaded support will be
a degree of radial confinement of the ground such as to enable the ground to
accept a greater share of circumferential load than it could prior to this
confinement. As a consequence, the load on the support will increase as it
recedes from the advancing face, affected by time and by the reduction in
assistance from the third dimension locally to the face.
An appreciation of the 3-D arching or ‘doming’ phenomenon is essential
to the strategy of supporting the ground. In weak (but not squeezing) rocks,
the major component of support will occur around the tunnel with the
longitudinal component of arching providing local support only. In soils, the
longitudinal component of ‘doming’ assumes greater importance in
magnitude and in the criticality of timing. Any 2-D figure of convergence-
confinement, such as Figure 5.7, should therefore be understood as a gross
over-simplification of the critical circumstances near the tunnel face where
prompt decisions need to be made. Figure 5.8 (after Kidd 1976) illustrates
application to the control of support needs for the Orange-Fish Tunnel.
For soils, it is customary to express the major factors affecting stability of
the face in terms of the stability ratio (or ‘simple overload factor’) Ns based





Figure 5.7 Ground/support interaction—conceptual diagram.
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where (see Figure 5.9) γ=unit weight of soil, q=surface surcharge pressure (if
any), pi=internal support pressure in tunnel, cu=undrained shear strength of
soil, and z0=depth to axis of tunnel. It will be noted that, for zero surcharge
and internal support, Ns=1/2Rc.
Davis et al. (1980) have related stability of an advancing tunnel without
face support to Ns for varying values of z0, tunnel radius r and l, the distance
from the face to effective support, supported by centrifuge model tests
reported by Mair (1981). For values of Ns<5, for example, a tunnel may be
constructed without great problems concerning stability providing support is
maintained close to the face. For greater values of Ns we may consider two
cases:
 
1. For z0<100 m (say), where a ‘closed face’ system of tunnelling with TBM
may be adopted or, for lesser values of z0, compressed air or face spiling
might have been considered.
2. For z0>100 m (the limit being fairly arbitrary, depending on the overall
economics of the construction of a project), where the behaviour of the
ground will be recognised as ‘squeezing’. A different technique is then
required, as described below.
Figure 5.8 Convergence guide-lines (after Kidd 1976).
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The above elementary approach to the ‘taxonomy’ of tunnelling leads to a
diagram such as Figure 5.10 where each zone corresponds to a different basic
type of tunnelling. These limits are fairly arbitrary, depending as they do on
the tunnelling technique and on the degree of variability of the ground. For
instance, the presence of high water pressure in a local confined aquifer or
affecting a plug of weak ground penetrated by the tunnel may suddenly set
up a more severe environment.
The line Rc=2 in Figure 5.10 then subdivides the continuum from the
discontinuum, recognising that, between 2<Rc<4 (say) the ground needs
to be considered as a continuum/discontinuum. The line Ns=5 establishes
the approximate boundary between ground which may be stable, if
excavated by open shield or equivalent if Ns<5, and ground which would
tend to be unstable in such circumstances, for Ns>5. Soft ground
techniques are then assumed by the figure as occurring for σz<1 MPa.
Thereafter, for Ns>5, the ground will behave increasingly as squeezing
Figure 5.9 Reference diagram for stability ratio and for settlement over a tunnel.
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rock with increasing values of z0. Such a diagram should be recognised as
qualitative; in particular the critical value of Ns depends on the unsupported
length of the tunnel.
The options for a tunnel in soil (soft ground) will be for support to be
provided close to the face or up to the limit of the ground supported by a
shield. Transatlantic practice has favoured the use of steel arches with timber
polings as primary support. Elsewhere the preference has been for the use of
segmental linings. Where the ground possesses real or apparent time-
dependent cohesion of a nature to allow immediate self-support of the
ground at and close to the face, a form of sprayed concrete lining (SCL) may
be adopted (see Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.2).
Appendix 5A considers the approximation of the circular tunnel in
linearly elastic ground, Appendix 5B and 5C derive stresses and
convergences for ideally elasto-plastic ground around an internally
supported cylinder and sphere respectively, providing data for Figure 5.11
which compares the two cases. This diagram emphasises the benefits
conferred by the third dimension.
The use of special expedients is described in Chapter 6. Here it merits
comment that, for a tunnel in water-bearing ground close to the surface,
immediate stability may be enhanced (and thus the opportunity provided
Figure 5.10 Tunnelling characteristics related to strength of ground and weight of
overburden.
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to adopt some type of informal support) by the use of low pressure
compressed air within the tunnel, at a pressure not exceeding 1 bar (100 kPa)
to avoid medical risk and time penalties. Compressed air should only be used
with full compliance with regulation.
The threat from ground-water is always a factor of fundamental
importance. Risk assessment should be applied to sparse data to establish the
range of conditions that may fit the data. The designer should then consider
the consequences. The potential rate of inflow needs to be considered in
these respects:
 
• effect on the scheme of tunnelling;
• effect on water supply or on others dependent on the ground-water;
• effect on damage arising from water abstraction;
• practicability of stemming inflow or counteracting its consequences;
• maintenance of permanent conditions of drainage or watertightness.
 
Where water is present in a tunnel which is to receive a concrete lining placed
in situ, some form of water shedding will be necessary, as described in
Chapter 6, to allow satisfactory placing of the concrete. Any system of
drainage to be relied upon over an extended period must be generously
dimensioned and provided with means for inspection and clearance of
blockages, particularly where exposed to the air, from the deposit of salts
such as calcite.
The designer of the finished tunnel must know how it is to be
constructed, hence the need for the total tunnel design process to include
Figure 5.11Comparison between stress pattern in elasto-plastic ground around a
cylinder and a sphere (φ (elastic)=30°, φ (plastic)=20°, pl=0.1σ0).
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the design of the process of construction and the means of construction,
first in conceptual terms and then developed in coordinated stages. The
choice of the form of the tunnel is then a matter of optimisation, dependent
on cost, time—expressed in terms of value for the Owner, and risk. Such a
holistic approach permits Observational Design (Section 2.7) to be used to
the best advantage.
Generally the major problems of stability arise at or close to the face of
a tunnel. Exceptions occur where the ground has swelling characteristics
(usually on account of the presence of gypsum, see Section 8.4) or where
it may be affected by extended exposure to air or water. Design for
stability must therefore be developed around possible forms or
geometries of failure, related to the proposed method and means of
construction. The different approaches to design are considered below,
with references to more extended accounts, stressing that the expected
variability of the ground qualifies the potential benefits from rigorous
design methods.
Table 5.1 summarises the several potential options in approaching the
conceptual design of a tunnel. Currently, for a strong rock tunnel, the
options are for drill-and-blast or for advance by a Tunnel Boring Machine
(TBM). The former offers flexibility in geometry, opportunity for staged
construction in headings and the possibility of additional working faces. The
latter offers the prospect of higher rates of advance (except in the strongest
rocks) and a more even rock profile, a lesser zone of disturbed rock and
reduced overbreak.
The options for a tunnel in weak rock (as defined above) are for the use of
a TBM (with or without shielding, in accordance with the nature of the
ground) or for the use of Informal Support (as defined in Section 5.1.3),
adopting a Sprayed Concrete Lined (SCL) tunnel for a tunnel in soft ground,
which may be advanced full-face or by a series of headings.  
Table 5.1 Options for tunnelling
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5.1.2 Drill-and-blast
The designer needs to take account of a number of particular features of
drill-and-blast tunnelling:
 
• tolerance of method to rock type and to quality, extent and nature of
jointing;
• tolerance to water;
• capability of providing a smooth profile;
• adaptability for variable geometry of excavation;
• extent of damage to surrounding rock;
• restrictions imposed on noise and vibration;
• risk of settlement damage.
 
These features are developed further in Chapter 6. At the project concept
stage the possible restrictions on use of the method need to be considered,
especially the question of rock damage which may control the acceptable
spacing between tunnels.
Drill-and-blast tunnels may remain unlined, may be lined with in situ
concrete or, exceptionally, with segmental linings (exceptionally in the latter
respect since the degree of overbreak adds considerably to the total cost on
account of the extent of annular grouting necessary). Where strong rock
contains weak shear zones, segmental lining may be adopted over short
lengths, possibly accompanied by a modified form of tunnel advance.
Tunnelling in strong rock is unlikely to cause unacceptable ground
movement provided major rock falls are prevented. Effects of draw-down of
the water-table need to be considered, however, as seriously as for any other
tunnelling medium (see Section 5.3 below).
5.1.3 Tunnels with Informal Support
The designer needs to take account of these special features of tunnels which
adopt a form of Informal Support:
 
• characteristics of ground, including variability, related to design of
method;
• anticipation of features which might otherwise present surprises;
• degree of tolerance to water;
• tolerance to variable geometry of excavation, including tunnel junctions;
• scheme of construction;
• time-dependence of ground behaviour;
• risk of settlement damage;
• design of intermediate stages, including special needs for face support;
• needs for observation and monitoring.
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The term ‘Informal Support’ is used generically in this book to include
systems of tunnelling which rely on primary support of the nature of bolts,
dowels, anchors, mesh, arches and sprayed concrete. The system is informal,
thus it is adaptable in components and pattern to the precise circumstances
and it may in consequence be termed an ‘informal’ scheme of support which
does not conform to a specific geometry. Sprayed concrete is a frequent (but
not invariable) component of the system. Where arches are used, these are
usually of a lattice type to avoid ‘shadows’ affecting the placing of the
sprayed concrete (Shotcrete is a trade name widely used as a synonym for
sprayed concrete). Alternatively, in squeezing ground, yielding arches may be
used (Section 5.2.2). The term NATM is not used in this book for any
specific type of support. NATM has been used by its proponents to describe
a wide variety of tunnelling conditions so the title is confusing. Moreover, it
seems advisable to avoid compromising the several forms of Informal
Support with the mythology of the claims underpinning NATM, as discussed
in Chapter 1.
Where Informal Support is applied to soil or weak rock, sprayed concrete
will invariably be used. Such support will generally require to be applied
immediately following excavation of a tunnel or of a heading to form part of
a tunnel. Applications of Observational Design will therefore take a different
form from that more generally applicable to Informal Support, in that the
time to respond to any indication of need for supplement to the support will
be limited and supplement should therefore be exceptional to the designed
scheme. This does not of course inhibit the support being applied in
successive layers (of shotcrete) or phases in areas which will subsequently be
subjected to higher stresses, e.g. at junctions or where two tunnels are to be
built close together. Support for tunnels in weak rock and soft ground is
therefore differentiated by the name Sprayed Concrete Lined (SCL) tunnels,
as a subset of Informal Support.
Where Informal Support is used for a tunnel advanced by a series of
headings, the intermediate phases of construction assume major importance
in assessing the stability of the tunnel, the face of the leading heading being
possibly several tunnel (equivalent) diameters ahead of the last completed
length of full lining. The design of individual headings for SCL tunnels needs
particularly to take account of local deformations as a result of concentrated
ground loading at sharp angles in the lining of intermediate stages (Figure
9.3) where stability will require mobilisation of local high stresses in the
ground.
A common approach by the exponents of NATM to the analysis of SCL
tunnels has been to adopt a 2-D ground model solved by using the Finite
Elements method, with the stiffness of the ground within the area of
excavation reduced in order to reproduce the observed behaviour of the
tunnel in question, advanced in a particular manner. The behaviour of the
tunnel is dominated by the three-dimensional ground movements in the
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vicinity of the face (see Figure 5.5) and hence a 2-D approach, particularly
one which entails a pragmatic choice of constants to fit measurements of
load or movements to suit one particular scheme of construction, has limited
predictive value for any variation of the particular conditions for advancing
the trial tunnel that has served for the analysis. An alternative approach is
discussed in Section 5.2.2.
A feature of SCL lies in the difficulty of providing immediate support to
the tunnel face. Several stratagems have been adopted in mitigation (see also
Section 5.1.4):
 
• use of forward-inclined arches (Figure 5.12);
• use of dowels in resin-bonded glass fibre;
• use of inclined spiles driven by use of dollies to clear the periphery of the
excavation;
• immediate doming of the face with the application of sprayed concrete;
• bench or temporary buttress (ground left undisturbed between sidewall
footings);
• use of L.P. compressed air (Section 5.1.1);
• sciage, the cutting of a slot around the tunnel periphery, immediately
filled with shotcrete (Bougard 1988).
 
A high proportion of ground loss contributing to ground movement and
surface settlement is likely to be associated with inward movement of the
face. Of the options described above, only the use of dowels will have
direct effect on such movement, which is discussed and analysed in
association with radially inward movement of the ground ahead of the face
by Lunardi (1997). Vacuum well-pointing has also been suggested for the
purpose but the practical problems of setting-up and dismantling would be
considerable. 
Figure 5.12 Examples of means of providing support close to the face (a) by use of
inclined arch support (after Muir Wood 1993), and (b) by use of short
bench.
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The tunnel invert is the most vulnerable part of the SCL tunnel lining, on
account of adhering spoil and rebound from sprayed concrete, possible
damage under construction traffic and the demanding requirements for
forming satisfactory joints in the lining where headings have preceded the
full section. Furthermore, it is often concealed from view soon after
construction. One precaution in design is to avoid the temptation prompted
by economy in excavation for too ‘flat’ an invert by maintaining a radius no
greater than, say, the mean diameter of the tunnel, the invert then being
partially backfilled with tunnel spoil (‘clay running’) to provide a surface on
which to run plant.
It is likely that bending stresses in sprayed concrete tend to be
overestimated by theoretical calculations which do not consider the plastic
behaviour of the concrete in the early hours of its life when much of the
development of load expected to contribute to bending stresses will be
occurring.
5.1.4 Squeezing ground
Squeezing ground represents a particular form of rock which can only
practically be penetrated by adherence to a stratagem which takes full
cognisance of the potential problems of excessive encroachment of the
ground into the tunnel. Kovári (1998) illustrates the problem to be solved
in that, unless supported by unacceptably heavy support, the ground will
invade much of the cross-section of the tunnel before—providing collapse
is prevented—equilibrium may be attained. To cope with this threat, a
yielding system of support is needed, possibly based on specifically
designed rock-bolts, possibly on yielding arches coupled with spiles,
capable of tolerating high local strains. Sprayed concrete will tolerate only
limited compressive strain, which may be as low as 0.2%, prior to spalling.
The Alpine tunnels have demonstrated squeezing ground at its most
intractable, where every expedient of face support, inclined spiles ‘slotted’
shotcrete and yielding arches have been successfully adopted. Kovári
(1998) illustrates how, once the ground for a pilot tunnel has been
stabilised, trimming back to the line of the full section will need to be
associated with a high level of support. Once the extent of convergence can
be estimated, an alternative approach will entail oversize excavation to the
full section with the accepted convergence respecting the dimensions of the
minimum section (see also Section 5.2.2).
5.1.5 Tunnels driven by TBM or Shield
The term ‘Tunnel Boring Machine’ (TBM) is customarily used to describe a
full-face machine used for advancing tunnels in rock, usually but not
necessarily making a circular cut. A shield implies a device to provide
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immediate support to the ground (possibly relieved by the slight projection,
the relief or bead—the latter possibly applied as a run of weld metal—of the
cutting edge) and thus that it is used in weak ground. A shield may be fitted
with a mechanical rotary cutter or it may serve as an essentially cylindrical
protection, within which excavation is undertaken by hand or by use of a
separate machine (back-actor, road-header or similar). In this book, for
simplicity, the term TBM designates a full-face shielded or unshielded
machine, while a shield is confined to a self-propelling device for providing
ground support around the excavation.
TBMs may then be classified in the following working modes:
 
• unshielded TBM, where provision is made between face and tail of the
machine to protect operatives and equipment against rock falls but where
no continuous support is provided by the machine;
• shielded TBM, where ground support is provided by the machine itself,
possibly using weak bentonite/cement grout outside the TBM for the
purpose in weak rock where steering of the machine requires some over-
cutting of the ground.
 
A shielded TBM may then be further classified as a machine with no
additional means for face support, other than the possible use of shutters
between the cutters, or as a ‘closed-face’ machine, depending on some form
of balancing of the pressure of the ground and of ground-water. Where
support is required along the TBM, a drill may operate, possibly through
slots in the skin, so that bolts may be provided close to the face. A closed-
face machine may rely on maintaining pressure at the face by means of a
compressed air reservoir, using a slurry medium from the ground itself
where suitable or by additives to the spoil as bentonite, foaming agents or
other means to permit pressure to be transmitted to the ground (rather
than to the ground-water). An alternative means is the Earth Pressure
Balancing Machine (EPBM) whereby the pressure at the face depends upon
the coordination of the advance of the machine with the ejection of spoil by
an inclined rotating Archimedes screw conveyor. Machines of these types
may be designed to operate in open or closed mode, the former allowing
more rapid progress in suitable ground.
For maximum rate of progress and to assist steering, the machine may
have an articulating peripheral joint such that the forward section with
cutter-head may advance separately from the rear to the extent permitted by
the stroke of the intermediate thrust rams.
The profile of a shield- or TBM-driven tunnel will normally be circular
(although elliptical shields have been designed and figure-of-eight shields
and even more complex configurations have been used in Japan) with the
lining following close behind or within the tail of the shield. Where the lining
is built behind the tail of the shield, broken ground may require intermediate
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support in the crown to bridge this gap, probably by trailing bars or plates
supported on the last erected ring of the lining, an expedient adopted by
Brunel for the Thames Tunnel (see Chapter 1). For a closed-face machine,
design of the seal between machine and lining, built within the tail, is a
critical feature. Rubber seals have now been generally superseded by grease-
impregnated steel wire brush seals.
Where the ground is variable, selection of the appropriate type of TBM
(see also Section 6.3) must take account of the differential efficiencies of
each type in the expected mix of ground types, having regard to the
tolerance or adaptability of each if expectation is exceeded in any respect,
and the special expedients that may be adopted for the adaptable forms of
machine.
5.2 Design of the support system 5.2.1 Steel arches
Steel arches from rolled sections continue to be used for support, mainly
where loose rock causes any ‘active’ system of support to be too difficult
to install. The design of passive support by steel arches is based on the
notion of the unstable rock wedge in the crown, or possibly
asymmetrically, to be supported, with the arch in its turn buttressed
against the rock around the remainder of the periphery of the tunnel, to
limit bending stresses.
The design of foot-blocks is vital to the success of the system of support, in
relation to the bearing capacity of the ground, reduced as it may be by local
disturbance or excavation. Where a tunnel is to be advanced by crown
heading and bench, temporary foot-blocks are needed at bench level, with
provisions for subsequent extension legs (Terzaghi 1961). The general
approach advocated by Terzaghi, similar to that advocated by Kommerell
(Figure 1.2) remains valid to the present day.
The weakness of steel arch support concerns the load at which failure
may occur by lateral buckling and torsion. Their load-bearing capacity
may be increased several-fold by providing continuous bedding against the
rock in place of the traditional timber packing. The principal of a means
for achieving this objective by the inserting between arch and rock a
bolster made in porous fabric filled with a weak sand/cement grout has
been described by Muir Wood (1987), illustrated by Figure 5.13, and an
application described by Craig (1979). Experiments commissioned by the
National Coal Board demonstrated the considerable increase in bearing
capacity by this means. Theoretically, making simplifying assumptions, the
load-bearing capacity of the bag per unit length of arch, for a non-
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where t=tensile strength of bag/unit length, with b and d as indicated on
Figure 5.13, and Kp=(1+sin f)/(1-sin φ) where φ relates to rilling material.
Toussaint-Heinzmann yielding arches have a bell-shaped section, sections
being coupled by friction clamps, as illustrated by Széchy (1970). Kovári
(1998) describes their use in squeezing ground, with thrust capacities for an
arch varying between 300 and 600 kN. The coupling needs to occur around
a part of the perimeter of constant curvature.
5.2.2 Informal Support for tunnels in weak and squeezing ground
There is something of a paradox in the fact that the most critical conditions
for the stability of the ground around a tunnel occur locally to the face. Yet,
if the ground is stable in the three-dimensional stress system which occurs in
this vicinity, installed support at first bears little load. This share increases as
the support may be loaded by convergence of the ground but principally by
advance of the face which throws the load from the ground ‘dome’ onto the
last completed section of support (Figure 5.6). A preliminary approach may
assume an elastic ground reaction, with tests for sensitivity across wide
variation, and appropriate for immediate and for long-term loading. A
simple basis for the coefficient of ground reaction proposed by Muir Wood
(1975a) is provided in Appendix 5A.
As described in Section 5.1.1, the stability of the ground in the vicinity of
the face of a tunnel depends on the formation of natural doming (the 3-D
equivalent of arching) of the ground. The time-dependent analysis of the
Figure 5.13 Reference diagram for bagged packing.
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ground in full 3-D is an elaborate approach only justified in particularly
delicate circumstances (see for example Higgins et al. 1996 concerning
tunnelling for the Jubilee Line Extension in Westminster, London near to the
tower of Big Ben). An alternative approach, which has similarities to that
proposed by Renato and Karel (1998) for squeezing ground, for more
general application is outlined below:
 
1. The physical properties of the ground are introduced as constitutive
equations in appropriate detail through CRISP or another program.
2. The heading (or tunnel) is represented as a circular cylinder of
corresponding cross-sectional area located centrally to the heading.
3. The area around the face of the representative cylinder is analysed by axi-
symmetric 3-D finite elements at times after excavation corresponding to
the rate of advance, i.e. the period over which the ground remains
unsupported for this affected length of heading.
4. For the supported section of the heading, analyses would be undertaken
in 2-D, taking account of transmitted loading from 3 above, and for the
period prior to full lining or prior to opening up of a heading.
 
Lunardi (1997) offers an alternative Lower Bound approach which takes
particular account of the stability of the core of ground ahead of the face,
the ‘advance core’, within the cylindrical projection of the tunnel. This is
an interesting approach, taking proper cognizance of the significance of
the stability of the stressed dome of ground around the face, itself
supported on the advance core, a natural feature of any form of
tunnelling, as the most vital element of the design of the interactive
support. Lunardi (1998) describes application of the ADECO-RS
(Controlled DEformation in Rocks and Soils) method to the design of
tunnels in squeezing ground on the High Speed Rail Link between
Bologna and Florence.
The debate continues between the virtues of dry-process and wet-process
shotcrete (the water for the former being added at the nozzle), the latter
claiming improved control and less rebound, the former economy in cost
(International Tunnelling Association 1991). The performance of shotcrete
may be improved by the addition of fibre reinforcement (Kasten 1997). Steel
fibre of different geometries has usually comprised fibres about 50 mm long
and 0.5 mm diameter or equivalent.
Where rock-bolts serve to create an arch of self-supporting rock around a
tunnel, a simple basis for analysis is that proposed by Lang (1961), described
in Appendix 5D. In weak rock, where convergence as the tunnel advances
may be found to cause excessive stresses so as to damage the anchorage of
the bolt, an expedient (Kidd 1976) is to tension the bolt to close joints that
may have opened with the relaxation of the excavation, then to release much
of the tension prior to further excavation.
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Water may be permitted to flow freely behind the sprayed concrete lining
and only stopped off (Section 6.3) when the secondary concrete lining is in
place which, in these circumstances, has therefore to be designed to support
the water load together with rock and any other loading relating to full or
partial failure or deterioration of the primary support. While anchor systems
may be designed to have an extended life and thus to be treated as part of the
permanent work, the elaborate methods of protection that are then
necessary entail an additional cost only acceptable for major anchorage
systems for large caverns and not normally economic for steel supports as
bolts, dowels or mesh.
5.2.3 Segmental linings
Segmental linings are loaded by the ground, through the agency of annular
grouting, by expansion of a ring against the ground or by movement of the
ground onto the lining at some distance from the tunnel face. Generally
therefore the ground loading of such linings may be assumed to occur in a
two-dimensional manner. This is often based on the fiction that the tunnel
is tightly inserted into the ground which is only then permitted to relax to
find a stable state between the perforated ground and the tunnel lining. A
simple approach is described by Muir Wood (1975a) and extended by
Curtis (1976), whereby the stresses in the lining resulting from the
combination of hoop loading and bending may be calculated in terms of
assumed linear elastic characteristics of the ground and the lining
(Appendix 5A).
The above approach, combined with a sensitivity analysis with the critical
parameters varied between limits, may well provide an adequate basis for
design of stiff or articulating linings in simple conditions of ground loading
where depth of overburden z0 (Figure 5.9) is at least 2a, where a is the
effective tunnel radius. For lower ratios of z0/a, critical failure modes should
be considered in order to provide a Lower Bound solution.
The stiffness in bending of the lining in the plane of the ring is small in
relation to that of the ground, except in very weak and readily deformable
soils such as unconsolidated silts, or where, from consideration of local
uneven loading or low depth of overburden, the lining is deliberately
stiffened. For this latter purpose, joints between adjacent rings may be
staggered, with stiffness increased by ensuring tight contact across the joints
between adjacent rings, and the longitudinal joints between segments
deliberately strengthened as described by Craig and Muir Wood (1978) for
the construction of Kings Cross Underground Station on London’s Victoria
Line.
There is great virtue in the use of unreinforced concrete for tunnel linings,
recognising the dominant influence of static loading and the avoidance
thereby of concern for long-term corrosion. Expanded linings (Figure 5.14)
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usually combine the virtue of low stiffness with practical considerations of
erection and stressing by deliberately permitting free rotation at the
longitudinal joints.
The most critical potential hazard for the Cargo Tunnel at Heathrow
Airport (Muir Wood and Gibb 1971), eliminated so far as practicable by
research of the prior use of the site and by ground investigation, was the
possible inadequacy of clay cover. Under Runways 5 and 6, the inaccessible
parts of the airport, which were of course the most vital to the operation of
aircraft, there remained the possibility of a dip in the surface of the London
clay. This might have originated from local erosion prior to the deposit of the
overlying Taplow gravels or it might have resulted from local over-
excavation by gravel dredgers into the upper surface of the London clay in
which the 10.3 m diameter tunnel was being constructed under a total cover
of less than 8 m (Figure 5.14). As a result of consideration of possible failure
modes, an acceptable criterion was for at least 1.1 m cover of London clay
above the tunnel beneath the water-bearing gravels. Any depression below
this level was to be detected by overlapping probe holes inclined upwards
ahead of the tunnel face, the contingency plan entailing a scheme for
injecting the ground to make good any deficiency in the requisite clay cover.
In the event, no such contingency was drawn upon.
Expanded linings are not only simple in construction, eliminating the need
for fixings or for grouting for structural reasons, but may contribute to
reduced ground movements by comparison with grouted linings or Informal
Support. Where the joint stiffness is less than that of the general cross-section
of the ring, the maximum bending moment that may be developed within a
segment may be approximately calculated by consideration of the relative
stiffness of the joint (see Appendix 5A).
Tunnels are normally built for long life, with a consequential need to
consider the effects of the options of abandonment and collapse. For
expanded linings, no fastenings are required between segments and the
dimensions of a segment may be chosen to provide an ‘aspect ratio’
sturdy enough to survive accidental damage during the processes of
handling and erection. Section 1.5 describes briefly the evolution of the
expanded lining. The choice of the number of segments to the ring and
the preferred width of ring affects the scheme for expanding the ring. The
simple expedient is to use tapered segments or wedges. These are replaced
by jacks where ring width is small in relation to the diameter of the tunnel
(c.f. Figures 1.3 and 5.14). The Don-Seg lining, with every segment
tapered, provided greater tolerance to slight variation in excavated
diameter than wedge-block linings with reduced numbers of wedged
segments (Clark et al. 1969).
Where segments are to be reinforced, in the presence of aggressive
ground-water or an internal source of corrosion, the several options
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consequences relating to the use of the tunnel, such as the security of railway
signalling), protective (epoxy resin) coating to the reinforcement, and high
density concrete with high resistance to percolation by water and to
diffusion of ions of H or Cl. External coating of the segments is liable to be
damaged during handling. An alternative, used particularly for expanded
linings, is the use of steel or glass fibre reinforcement, taking due account of
the brittleness and time dependence of liability to alkaline corrosion of the
latter.
Where an expanded lining is impractical, e.g. where the nature of the
ground requires the lining to be built within the tail of a shield or where
the peripheral surface of the exposed ground is too uneven to provide a
satisfactory bearing surface, the use of the tunnel largely determines the
details of the optimal bolted form of segmental lining.
Flanged segments continue to be used with connecting bolts between
longitudinal and circumferential joints, particularly for small tunnels
advanced by hand or with simple minor items of plant. The trend has
however been towards the increased adoption of reinforced concrete
segments with a flush intrados, apart from recesses for fixings, except for
those circumstances where exposed bolts also serve for other attachments or
where a secondary lining is required, for example protective brickwork for
sewer tunnels. Attachment between flush segments adopts one of several
arrangements, of which the most widely used are either bolts formed to an
arc of a circle or bolts slightly inclined in relation to the surface of the
segment which engages with a socket cast into the adjacent segment (Figure
5.15).
For the Channel Tunnel, even bedding against the chalk marl of an
expanded lining was provided by the use of pads for the initial state, with
grouting to follow (Figure 5.16), for the British section. For the French
section, where the lining was required to withstand external water pressure,
a bolted, gasketted lining was used (Figure 5.17).
While new tunnels are unlikely, except in remote areas of developing
countries, to be constructed in masonry or structural brickwork, the engineer
may well be required to analyse the adequacy of an existing lining. Codes of
Practice for brickwork tend to be unnecessarily prescriptive for the analysis
of existing tunnel linings. Too often resort is made by the inexperienced
engineer to a computer program for an elastic continuum, which will then
indicate local overstressing. The appropriate approach is to make use of the
notion of the ‘thrust line’, described in Appendix 5E. This approach may
well serve as a first check also on a concrete lining, where transverse tension
cracking in bending is acceptable for an ultimate state.
Sealing against the entry of water into a bolted lining is commonly
achieved by girdling each segment with a shaped polymeric gasket,
compressed against a twin gasket by tightening the bolts. Such seals have been
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tested against pressures up to 16 bar for the Storebaelt Tunnel (Elliott et al.
1996). Alternative methods use polymeric seals of a type which expand on
contact with water. There are also many injected sealants, usually used as a
second line of protection in association with a gasketted seal.
Annular grouting is achieved by cement grout with additives as
appropriate for control of setting time and to avoid washout by flowing
water. Provision should always be made to permit grouting close to the last
erected ring, with the process only relaxed as a result of deliberate design or
experience.
The principal features of pipe-jacking for the construction of pipelines,
headings and tunnels of a variety of shapes concern their construction, are
described in Chapter 6. Structural design has to consider loading during
construction, especially non-uniform longitudinal thrust, also uneven
loading in adjustments to direction of thrust. Following completion, loading
will correspond to that on a stiff formal tunnel lining rather than the
Marston/Spangler type formulae for pipes buried in trench (Bulson 1985).
5.2.4 Tunnel junctions and enlargements
The design of junctions in tunnels or of sudden changes in section of the
tunnel receives too little attention (Muir Wood 1970), particularly in
Figure 5.15 Typical expanded lining with bolted trapezoidal segments, (a) Ring elevation, (b)
Section A-A. (c) Longitudinal joint detail. (All dimensions in millimetres)
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relation to intermediate phases of construction. The guiding rules are that
oblique junctions, where unavoidable, should be achieved by means of an
expansion to contain the two tunnels, on the pattern of the traditional step-
plate junction for segmental linings. Square junctions should entail a minor
Figure 5.16 Typical precast concrete segment for UK section of the Channel
Tunnel (after Eves and Curtis 1992).
Figure 5.17 Typical precast concrete segment for French section of Channel
Tunnel (after Barthes et al. 1994).
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tunnel junctioned into a major (continuing) tunnel since the junctioning of
two tunnels of much the same size presents considerable problems of
temporary support during construction. The problem may be averted by
including an enlargement, costly for a shield-driven tunnel, in the continuing
tunnel in the vicinity of the junction. The objective should be to include in the
continuing tunnel special segments which may later provide the frame to the
opening for the junction, and temporary segments later removed to form the
opening. In this way, there is no major disruption to the construction of the
continuing tunnel (Figure 5.18).  
Figure 5.18 Junction of SCL tunnels of similar size.
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5.3 Ground movements and surface settlement
The anticipation of the possibility of ground movements associated with
tunnelling, leading to damage to structures or services, is a vital feature of
overall tunnel design. Ground movements may be considered in two parts:
 
1. immediate ground movements caused by loss of ground, or changes in
ground stresses, in the vicinity of the tunnel face;
2. long-term movements generally associated with ground consolidation
caused by changes in effective ground stress, which may be associated
with flow of water towards the tunnel (or possibly swelling, for a water
or sewer tunnel, as a result of leakage from the tunnel).
 
Loss of ground at a localised region in a soil at depth z0 below the ground
surface gives rise to axisymmetric strains which form a cone of
depression at ground surface. Where there is a continuous line of such
punctuated ground loss, the superimposed ‘cones’ create a settlement
trough of depression (Figure 5.9), with a shape often assumed as that of a
normal distribution curve which then permits simple relationships
between parameters of the curve. Thus, where w, the depression, attains a
maximum value wmax with points of inflexion occurring at a distance i
from the centre-line, the area of the trough Vs=2.5 i wmax. With such a
simple model, the ratio of i/z0 for a tunnel of diameter 2a with axis at
depth z0 was related by Peck (1969a) on the basis mostly of hand-driven
tunnels in the USA as i=0.2(2a+z0). For cohesive soils the trough is
certainly wider than the value given by this formula and several authors
have looked for more reliable relationships, undoubtedly affected by
many different factors that no unique relationship can express. The
formulae suggested by O’Reilly and New (1982) were based on analysis
of a number of UK tunnels:
 
i=0.43(z0-z)+1.1 m for cohesive soils
 
i=0.28(z0-z)-0.1 m for granular soils
 
within stated limitations, thus indicating the value of i at depths z above the
tunnel and up to the surface. Mair et al. (1993) suggest, on the basis of
further data, that a reasonably good fit for tunnels in clay is given by:
 
i=Kz0, where K=0.175λ+0.325 and λ=z0/(z0-z)
 
For a granular soil, the phenomenon is visualised as intergranular movement
under gravitational force. The relationship between Vt, ground loss into the
tunnel measured as m3/m and Vs will depend on the initial state of the soil: Vt/
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Vs>1 for a dense soil, Vt/Vs<1 for a loose soil. For very loose soils,
disturbance by tunnelling has on occasion caused factors well in excess of
unity. For a natural soil, this risk may be caused by base exchange since
deposition, for example, giving rise to sensitive soils (e.g. ‘quick’ clays) or by
slight cementation between loosely packed grains (collapsing soils). For
man-made deposits, the procedure of deposition may be the dominant
factor; attempts to construct a jacked heading through an end tipped chalk
railway embankment caused gross settlement as disturbance caused finer
material to flow into cavities between the large boulders at the foot of the
embankment.
For a clay, the volume per unit length of the settlement trough will be
determined in relation to stress redistribution in the vicinity of the tunnel,
with losses into the tunnel Vt causing stress relaxation.
From the development of such simple initial concepts (Attewell et al.
1986) settlement may be estimated for particular circumstances, taking
account of comparative experience elsewhere. The first consideration is that
of the ratio p(=Vs/A), where A represents cross-sectional area of the tunnel.
For a shield-driven tunnel, the contributory factors to Vt may be
subdivided as (Muir Wood 1970):
 
• loss at face;
• loss around shield;
• loss behind shield.
 
This indicates where measures may be taken to minimise ground
movement:
 
• face loss—by face support (e.g. by face rams, by GRP spiles or by earth
pressure balancing);
• losses around shield—shield alignment, minimum bead, short shield, use
of weak grout for TBM;
• loss behind shield—immediate stressing of expanded lining.
 
Particular attention was given to each of these factors for the Heathrow
Cargo Tunnel (Muir Wood and Gibb 1971), resulting in a value of p=0.3%.
Mair et al. (1993) provide a fairly coherent pattern of ‘green field’ settlement
of tunnels in London clay related to contributory factors, including the value
of Ns.
For a SCL tunnel, the face is unsupported and, while the support to the
ground is provided in a manner to permit direct loading by the ground,
settlement is greater than for a comparable well-managed, shield-driven
tunnel (Simîc and Gittoes 1996, Bowers et al. 1996), notwithstanding claims
which have been made to the contrary. A multiple drift SCL tunnel entails
much redistribution of stresses in the ground between each phase of advance,
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with further expected contributions to settlement although the procedure
should cause reduced loss of ground from an incoming face than for a full-
face tunnel with unsupported face.
Settlement calculations are essential where buildings or services exist
in the vicinity of a projected tunnel. The existence of stiff structures may
considerably modify the calculated ‘green field’ settlement trough and
this feature must be incorporated in the calculations. The extent of
modification depends on the stiffness of the structure against
compression and tension, also the stiffness in bending (Boscardin and
Cording 1989, Potts and Addenbrooke 1996). Making allowance for
such modification, it is then possible to examine the risk of causing
structural damage (Mair et al. 1996), making use of the criteria for
unacceptable damage derived by Burland and Wroth (1974). The critical
effect of settlement does not lie in its direct magnitude (apart from piled
foundations) but arises from the associated curvature and consequential
compressional and tensional soil strains. Long-term settlement,
attributable to consolidation, is often found to contribute relatively little
to structural damage since it is generally less in magnitude and extends
more widely than the immediate settlement. Piped services may tolerate a
certain degree of curvature, reflected for stiff pipes as angular deflection
at the joints, but this tolerance depends on the material of the pipe and
the nature of the design of the joint (Attewell et al. 1986, Bracegirdle et
al. 1996).
Ground movements associated with pipe-jacking follow a similar
approach to that described above, with particular modifications. First, in
very weak soils at shallow depth, there is a greater risk of heave caused by
excessive thrust. Second, as discussed in Chapter 6, drag between the tunnel
(particularly for a rectangular heading) and the overlying soil may, unless
controlled, lead to irregular ridges in the soil surface with consequences to
buried services.
Where two or more tunnels are constructed sufficiently close for
interference between the patterns of ground movement caused by each,
settlement is usually found to be greater than that estimated by direct
superimposition, doubtless as a result of non-linear effects of incremental
variations of the stress tensor.
The effects of piezometric change need to be taken into account in
calculating long-term settlements associated with consolidation (Appendix
5G). Relatively slight inflows of water into a tunnel have been the cause of
serious ground movements affecting structures as described in Chapter 8.
Rock tunnels may not be immune from causing unacceptable ground
movements where water inflow may, by way of the jointing system, cause
draw-down in overlying fine sediments See, for example, the account of the
effect from driving the Hong Kong Bank seawater tunnel (Troughton et al.
1991).
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Where ground movements would otherwise be excessive, control may be
achievable by one or other expedient. Ground movement caused by losses at
the face may be controlled by spiling or dowelling in such a manner as not to
obstruct excavation (Section 5.2.2). Some form of consolidation or jet-
grouting as an umbrella above the plug of ground in the tunnel face may
provide an alternative solution (Chapter 6). There are several means of
providing a hood above a tunnel through an unstable area of ground. Most
commonly, this procedure has been adopted to penetrate loose and
weathered ground adjacent to a tunnel portal. The ground may be
consolidated as an arch formed from a series of jet-grouted lengths of soil or
rock fragments of approximately cylindrical form. Alternatively, crown-bars
may be driven at intervals in the form of an arch; these crown-bars may be
formed from steel drill-hole casings subsequently filled with concrete. The
particular solution needs to suit the ground, the access for construction and
the available resources. If the ground is fine and water-bearing, the tubular
crown-bars may need to be closely spaced with the tubes linked by external
clutches, or a form of overlapping ‘secant’ piles may be adopted. In other
circumstances, the spacing between bars will allow arching of the soil to
occur and for the spaces to be filled or grouted as a top heading is advanced.
The form of construction will need to ensure that adequate support to the
crownbars is provided as part of the sequence of construction as the tunnel
advances, including consideration of support at the face to the leading end of
each bar.
Grouting to control ground movement may take the form of permeation
grouting, to prevent loosely packed material from collapsing or jet-
grouting to form a slab above a tunnel in weak ground. In weak clay, jet-
grouting may cause ground heave, a phenomenon experienced on a
considerable scale in Singapore for the Mass Rapid Transit System in 1985
(Marchini 1990).
Compensation grouting entails the forcing of grout into the ground
between, or ahead of, the tunnel and the structure to be protected. The
procedure is normally to sink shafts appropriately positioned in relation to
the zone of ground to be treated (Shirlaw 1996). Grout-holes are drilled
radially from the shaft, and provided with means for sleeve grouting (tubes-
à-manchette. Figure 1.5). There follows a process of preconditioning,
whereby the ground is locally consolidated and possibly fractured so that
further injection will cause immediate ground response; the compensation of
ground movement or settlement is achieved by injecting, in controlled
volumes, a bentonite-cement grout of suitable properties at controlled
pressures at locations indicated by a ‘real time’ control program which
combines records of the grouting system with movements at selected
observation points. The choice of level of the compensation grouting will be
partly dictated by the geology, partly to ensure that ground settlement
affecting buildings and services may be limited without imposing excessive
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loading on the advancing face of the incomplete tunnel. Where a tunnel of
radius a is situated at depth z0, compensation grouting at depth h may, as a
first approximation, be considered as influencing the tunnel loading by a
factor proportional to {h/[z0-(a+h)]}. The essence of the design, which must
be of an observational nature (Section 2.7), is to ensure a predesigned scheme
for correcting unexpected departures from prognosis in relation to limits of
acceptable ground movements and to loading on the tunnel, adopting a
system of triggers to indicate the need for special measures. Ideally, the
grouting needs to be synchronised with the occurrence of the potential
settlement movement to minimise the pressures required from the grouting
operation (see also Chapter 9).
5.4 Pressure tunnels
Generally, the design of a tunnel support system is dominated by the
requirement to support external ground and, often, water loading. Pressure
tunnels, where internal pressure may exceed reliable minimum ground
loading, present a special case in which the tunnel needs also to be designed
against internal pressure. For this reason, pressure tunnels often incorporate
a steel lining which may itself require, in the presence of high external water
pressure, to be anchored into the surrounding concrete (Jaeger 1955, Kastner
1971). To summarise much written on the subject: (1) the tunnel may be
designed as a concrete-lined tunnel which remains intact by virtue of the
support of the surrounding ground or (2) full internal pressure is contained
within a steel lining, or (3) where the concrete lining and the surrounding
rock, possibly stiffened by grouting, provide reliable contribution to
containment, by a composite ‘thick-walled pipe’ solution. The problem with
any intermediate solution of type (3) concerns the relative stiffness of rock
and lining which are required to be compatible in any calculation of load
sharing. Circumferentially prestressed linings (Kastner 1971) have also been
used for pressure tunnels.
Traditionally, calculations based on a concrete lining in rock have
calculated seepage forces as if the lining is cracked and has an effective
permeability no less that that of the rock. The critical failure mode considers
the dislodging of a wedge of ground from above the tunnel. This is usually a
safe assumption but Lu and Wrobel (1997) suggest that it may be
unnecessarily conservative, where the rock permeability is known and where
calculation establishes that cracking of the lining under internal pressure
results in the effective permeability of the reinforced concrete lining
remaining an order of magnitude less than that of the ground.
Where a steel lining is provided, one fundamental feature of the design
concerns the prevention of buckling as a consequence of rapid draw-down of
a slightly leaky tunnel contributing to high external water pressure. Jaeger
(1955) and Kastner (1971) describe several examples of failure of pressure
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tunnels with accompanying explanations of the deficiencies in design and
construction.
5.5 Aids to design calculation
The Appendices which follow illustrate a number of simple approaches to
different aspects of tunnel design which the Author has found useful in
practical application, and which are rarely found in juxtaposition. These
may permit simple initial estimates, frequently all that the uncertainty of
data may justify.
Appendix 5A The circular tunnel in elastic ground
‘Neither the ground nor, usually, the tunnel lining, behaves in an elastic
manner’ (Muir Wood 1975a). There remains merit nevertheless in the ability
to establish a closed form of solution for the elastic case, as a first indicator
of stresses and deformations, particularly in investigating sensitivities to
variation in the moduli of ground and lining. For an ‘elliptical’ mode of
deformation, a solution starts (Muir Wood 1975a) from the Airy stress
function in polar coordinates (Figure 5A.1):
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where slip occurs between the ground and the lining.
In a similar fashion, expressions for û and the mean circumferential
load in the lining, N, may be derived (Muir Wood 1975a). These
quantities have been plotted by Duddeck and Erdmann (1982) for the
assumptions of v=0.3Mmax and N may be derived from Figure 5A.2 for
the case of full bond between ground and lining. The maximum lining
stress may be estimated by adding mean hoop stress to the maximum
bending stress.
The direct loading in the lining may be reduced, in appropriate
circumstances, by high circumferential compressibility. The bending stiffness will
Figure 5A.1 Reference diagram for loading on a circular tunnel.
(where suffix l relates to the lining) for full bond between the ground and the
lining, or as:
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then be low and the reduction in N, ∆N, may be estimated through the
relationship:
∆N=σ0r0/(1+Rs), where the compressibility factor, Rs, may be written
as:
Rs=r0E/tEl(1+v) for a thin lining.




or, for v=0.3, λ=0.76E/r0, which may be applied as a first estimate of the
effect of small distortions of a circular or non-circular lining.
Muir Wood (1975a) discusses the effect of joints of lower stiffness than
the remainder of the lining, where the joint stiffness is designated as Ij. This is
an artificial concept since the joint has normally negligible circumferential
length. An alternative approach is to consider the rotation, θ, at the joint
when a unit bending moment is applied. For the lining between joints, the
rotation for a unit circumferential length subjected to a unit bending
moment is 1/ElIl. For a number of segments, n, in a ring, where, say, n≥8, the
effect of rotation at the joints may be approximated by reducing the value of
M to be sustained by the ring by a factor 1/(1+θElIln/2πr0), with stiffness
reduced and deflections increased correspondingly.
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Appendix 5B Cylindrical cavity with internal support
A classical problem is that of a hole in a homogeneous uniformly stressed
solid which behaves linearly elastically up to a certain state of stress and
perfectly plastically thereafter. Assume a circular tunnel with support
applying a uniform radial pressure pi.
Initially everywhere
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Figure 5B.1 Reference diagram for stresses around a cylindrical cavity.
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Closed-form solutions have been derived which are based on more specific
properties of the rock but such problems are normally solved numerically.
If the ground is supported by a thin lining, thickness t, modulus E1, in
contact at all times with the ground, circumferential force per unit length of




or, for a continuous form of lining, E replaced by E/(1-v2) in eqn (5B.23),
providing a solution for pi in terms of u0 and hence, through eqns (5B.18)
and (5.B22), a value for r1. Figure 5B.2 indicates the stress pattern around
the cavity.
If water is flowing through the ground of permeability k (see Appendix
5G) radially towards the tunnel at a rate Q, the loading on the tunnel lining
is increased in two ways: (a) by the direct water pressure against the lining;
(b) by stress transfer from water to rock as a result of radial reduction in
water pressure.
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Assume ground of hydraulic permeability k, lining permeability kl, mean
lining radius r0, lining thickness t, t«r0, water pressure w(w= ρgH).
5B.1 Direct water pressure
In ground considered as a thick cylinder, external radius r2, internal radius
r1,
Figure 5B.2 Stress pattern for a cylindrical hole in elasto-plastic medium.
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assuming zero water pressure (w0) within the tunnel. Otherwise all pressures
need to be measured relative to w0.
Hence, equating Q between eqns (5B.24), (5B.26) and (5B.27),
 
(w2-w1)k/ ln (r2/r1)=w1r0kl/t (5B.28)
 
i.e. w1=w2/[r0kl ln (r2/r1)/kt+1] (5B.29)
 
and Q may be evaluated through substitution for w1 in eqn (5B.27).
5B.2 Water pressure transmitted through ground
For the purpose of illustration of the approach, we assume the ground to be
elastic and to be unsupported at the ground/tunnel interface. This
assumption greatly simplifies the working and is readily compensated as the
calculations indicate. Equations (5B.3)–(5B.7) remain valid, with σ0=0.
From consideration of the stability of a segment, eqn (5B.8) now has an
additional term:
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Figure 5C.1 Reference diagram for stresses around a spherical cavity.
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where A and B are defined in eqn (5B.2).
Appendix 5D The reinforced rock arch
A simple means of assessing the effectiveness of rock-bolting of highly joined
rock is to consider the bolts as providing transverse prestress to the rock arch
around the cavern or around the arch of a tunnel. If the principal stresses in
the rock at failure are considered to be associated by:  
The principle relies on tight rock joints, possibly relying on the rock-bolts to
establish this condition if rock adjacent to the tunnel is loosened during
excavation.
Appendix 5E The brickwork or masonry arch
While few tunnels are currently designed in brickwork or masonry,
many such tunnels survive from previous centuries. For the sake of
simplicity, in this Appendix all such tunnels are referred to as ‘masonry
tunnels’. The engineer concerned with assessment or repair of masonry tunnels
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needs to understand the appropriate criteria for establishing the stability of
such tunnels.
The first requirement is that the structure should be in equilibrium with
external forces, but this does not take us very far. Generally, a masonry arch
may be considered as relatively flexible in relation to the ground it supports,
on account of the mortar between the elements; loading on the arch needs to
be compatible with the properties of the ground, taking account of strength
and possible swelling potential.
Arches are normally statically indeterminate. Heyman (1982) recommends
these basic procedures for assessment of the adequacy of the arch:
 
1. To check that sliding failure between blocks will not occur, i.e. that
bedding planes, potentially weak in shear, are inclined at a high angle to
the line of thrust around the arch (see, for example, Figure 5.3).
2. Tensile strength of the masonry should be neglected.
3. Compressive strength of the masonry is considered as infinite. While not
a safe assumption in principle, provided the thrust line lies well within the
width of the arch, the magnitude of thrust will not normally be a critical
feature. For tunnels at considerable depth, this feature will need to be
checked.  
Figure 5D.1 Reinforced rock arch around tunnel (developed from Lang 1961).
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Heyman then restates the lower-bound theory of plasticity for a masonry
arch thus:
 
‘If a thrust-line can be found, for the complete arch, which is in
equilibrium with the external loading (including self weight) and which
lies everywhere within the masonry of the arch ring, then the arch is
safe.’
 
The strength of the Lower Bound Theorem is that it is only necessary to
demonstrate the possibility of accommodating such a thrust-line, not that
this is necessarily the actual line of resultant thrust.
In a simple example, if an arch needs to satisfy a relationship, K0, between
horizontal and vertical ground stress, it will be necessary to establish that an
elliptical thrust line whose vertical to horizontal axes are in the ratio K0 may
be inscribed within the arch. For the simplest instances, the demonstration of
such a thrust-line may be undertaken manually. Computer programs are
available for more complex or delicate situations (Harvey 1988).
Such an approach will demonstrate the nature of potential weaknesses to
be explored for a masonry tunnel:
 
1. a horseshoe tunnel or other tunnel with a high radius to the sidewalls,
particularly where any slight deformity may present difficulties in
maintaining a thrust-line within the structure;
2. a horseshoe tunnel with invert arch will depend for stability on high
bearing loads on the footings, to allow a continuous thrust-line to be
inscribed.
 
Brunel’s Thames Tunnel (Figure 5E.1) is a good example of a robust
brickwork tunnel capable of accepting a wide variation in external loading.
An ellipse transmitting all vertical thrust through the external walls,
demonstrates a tolerance for K0=1.3, whereas a pair of ellipses, with major
axis vertical, each drawn to transmit loading through the central dividing
wall tolerates K0=0.6. Hence the tunnel would be stable for 1.3>K0>0.6. The
high quality of the brickwork and the mortar lend support to this view of
considerable robustness.
Those unfamiliar with old underground structures should learn to treat
the information on drawings, whose refinement in presentation may conceal
optimistic expectations, with scepticism, the data only being accepted
following physical confirmation. Computer analysis based upon
assumptions of elasticity of the masonry (even when the program eliminates
tensile stresses) should not be relied upon; these ignore the capability of creep
of the structure to compensate for apparent areas of high stress.
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Appendix 5F The ground model
A ground model, in the context of this Appendix, is understood to represent
a statement of the characteristics of the ground on which design for stability
of the tunnel is to be based. The model may be qualitative, e.g. a statement of
geological structure, or quantitative, e.g. a time-based constitutive model of
the behaviour of the ground—or any intermediate semi-quantitative
model—depending upon the variability of the ground and the extent to
which a more complex model may be justified by demonstrated benefit to the
project. Muir Wood (1993) discusses the taxonomy of definition of rock
support methods between these extremes.
As Duddeck (1981) rightly points out, the ground model is only one
part of the overall design model, in which he recognises two phases
(Table 5F.1).
It is the research model which explores the overall design problem
objectively, selecting the dominant factors on a sound scientific basis, not
by prejudgment. It is only by such a thorough approach that it is possible
to distill the issues that may serve for an adequate ‘technical model’.
Without this rigour, it would be possible to match a theory to represent
test results on a spurious basis. The process is further illustrated by
Duddeck, indicating on a time basis the evolution of a design which
represents the nature of expensive deviations which may be promoted either
Figure 5E.1 Brunel’s Thames Tunnel (after Law 1845).
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by the inexperienced or over-enthusiastic theorist, or as an over-reaction to
misinterpreted failure.
The first objective in selecting an appropriate ground model must be to
identify possible failure modes. Failure need not be confined to structural
failure, but may include unacceptable ground movements, problems in
selecting suitable plant for construction, or excessive entry of water into the
tunnel. These potential failure modes identify areas for study and are
themselves modified as the studies develop, as part of the overall design
process. As explained in Chapter 6, the nature of variability along the tunnel
may determine the level at which to pitch the ground model. The fuzzier the
ground model the less the benefit in attempting a good fit between the model
and reality. The sharper the model, the greater the probability of an
economic tunnelling system overall. The options may be expressed in order
of increasing precision in the simplified terms of Table 5F.2. Each numbered
factor is assumed to include all the preceding factors.
Table 5F.1 Development of the design model (after Duddeck and Erdmann 1982)
Table 5F.2 Types of ground model
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It will be observed that the Rock Mass Classification Systems of Barton,
Beniawski and others are omitted from Table 5F.2, as being inadequate to
provide reliable information on the specific failure modes discussed above.
See, for example, Moy (1995). All such systems are inappropriate for weak
rock since none considers adequately rock strength, modulus or texture.
Much effort has been applied to making statistical comparison between
different Classification Systems, much less to establishing the reliability or
economy of any one system except for a particular set of ground
characteristics. The way ahead must be to identify the important
parameters for a specific situation, and to present these in a multi-
dimensional form as discussed in Chapter 2 and illustrated by Figure 2.7.
The development of a data bank, which includes incipient and actual
failures for different features of rock and rock structure will be a valuable
aid to this approach.
Where a ground model of high precision appears to be justified by the
delicacy of the operation, it becomes increasingly important to ensure that
the manner of working and the standards of workmanship correspond to the
assumptions of the model. Limitations in dependability of such aspects may
lead to some modification of the ground model with the need for additional
countermeasures, effecting a higher factor of safety, to compensate for
suspected limitations.
Appendix 5G Ground-water flow into a tunnel
A granular medium is often assumed to have the same degree of permeability
in all directions, i.e. to be hydraulically isotropic, unless it comprises layers
of different textures or grain sizes, in which case the coefficient of hydraulic
permeability will be orthotropic. This may readily be demonstrated,
recognising that hydraulic permeability (simplified as ‘permeability’ below)
is a term which takes account of the intrinsic properties of the medium and
the properties of the fluid.
Suppose a horizontal layer of thickness p has a permeability k1 and an
adjacent layer of thickness (1-p) a permeability k2, for unit hydraulic
gradient the horizontal flow will be pk1+(1-p)k2 and hence the mean






i.e. the weighted arithmetic mean of k1 and k2.
Vertically, however, for flow q per unit area, the head loss will be pq/
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i.e. the weighted geometric mean of k1 and k2. It can readily be shown that,
where k1≠k2, kh>kv.
Traditionally, engineers are taught to estimate flow through a granular
medium by means of a flow-net of potential lines and flow-lines. Flownets
for an isotropic medium may be constructed approximately in 2-D, by
sketches to maintain orthogonal relationships between the lines of the net.
Computer programs are normally used for any but the simplest geometry, for
anisotropic ground, and for 3-D flow, where axisymmetrical flow, where
adequate, allows considerable economy in computation. The engineer
should define precisely what is sought, including possible expedients for
modifying the boundary conditions in order to establish appropriate forms
of analysis.
The simplest approach to the calculation of flow into a circular (or an
approximately circular) tunnel is to use the conformal transformation
whereby φ represents lines of equipotential and ψ lines of flow, and:
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While engineers usually express hydraulic permeability (or conductivity)
as a rate of flow through unit area under unit head gradient as a velocity
measured in metres per second, another unit is the Lugeon, expressed as flow
in litres per minute from a one metre length of a test hole between packers,
under an excess pressure of 100 m head of water. The diameter of hole is not
specified but normally considered to be NX size (diameter=76.2 mm), which
is found to correspond to about 10-7m/s. There is often a need to relate the
flow into a probe-hole for a tunnel to the expected flow into an unlined
tunnel under corresponding conditions. From eqn (5G.7), for any thickness
of permeable ground h, Q0/Qp (where the subscripts relate to tunnel and




Figure 5G.1 Reference diagram for flow into a tunnel in permeable ground.
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For a value of h=100 m, r0=2 m, rp=20 mm, the ratio is found to be about 2.
Of course, for high rates of flow into a probe-hole, the flow may be throttled
by head losses within the hole.
Where k is calculated from pumping tests from a vertical well in a
confined aquifer, the calculation of permeability is based on the loss of head
H between observation wells at radii r1 and r2:
 
Q=2πkH/ln (r2/r1) c.f. eqn (5G.7) (5G.9)
 
Thus, pumping tests from wells or results from packer tests or other forms of
tests in vertical boreholes will measure predominantly horizontal
permeability, whereas a horizontal tunnel will depend predominantly on
vertical permeability. For a packer test, the greater the test length, the less the
extent of flow dependence on vertical permeability; hence for a truly
homogeneous but orthotropic medium, the effect might be estimated by
varying the test length for repeated tests. In order to apply results from test to
prediction, it is necessary, therefore, to give some thought to the effects of




To the solid ground of nature trusts the mind that builds for aye.
Sonnets Part 1, No. 24, William Wordsworth.
6.1 The construction process
Tradition in tunnelling, as in other areas of construction, has entailed a
differentiation between what is designated as ‘engineering’ and what is
described as ‘management of construction’. For successful projects for the
future, in recognition of the increasing integration between functions, this
barrier needs to be broken down. Of course, people will continue to be
charged with specific functions to perform but the whole management
structure needs to encourage appreciation of the interdependence of
functions. Nowhere is this more necessary than for tunnelling involving
application of Observational Design (Section 2.7) or ‘Informal Support’
(Section 5.2). The tradition of separation is so strong that inertia against
change has caused design-and-build projects, potentially capable of full
integration, to remain locked into outdated roles, and hence to perform sub-
optimally. Overall success of the project is the shared goal, as against
parochial success of one faction (possibly demonstrated by some
performance indicator) at the expense of the subdivided responsibility of
another.
During the construction phase of a tunnel, there are essentially three
functions in progress affecting the physical execution of the work, as
described and defined below. The unfamiliar terminology is deliberate, to
avoid preconceptions as to the agency of each and thus to avoid assumptions
concerning traditional roles of Owner (or Employer), Engineer and
Contractor. The three functions are:
 
1. Prediction. Consideration of all the available relevant evidence should
have provided the basis for the tunnel design (Chapter 5) and the
designer as ‘Predictor’ will, in consequence, be predicting the behaviour
of the ground and the tunnel in conformity with the assumptions upon
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which the design is based. It is important that the predictions should
include the full period of the construction process and any critical
intermediate phases in the process. The predictor needs to specify clearly
the features of workmanship essential for the success of the design
assumptions made and any feature for special concern.
2. Execution. The construction needs to be planned to take account of the
predictions, having regard to overall safety and security of the works,
and economy of operation. Execution may well include: the undertaking
of progressive exploration of the ground in phase with the advance of the
tunnel; application of any special expedients required by the Predictor, in
appropriate sequence with the progress of the works.
3. Observation. The term is used here in the most general sense, embracing
inspection of the work carried out and the manner of its undertaking.
Observation may also be required to provide design data for the future
use of the Predictor, for example in permitting refinement of the initial
design.
 
As implied by Figure 6.1 the procedure between Prediction, Execution and
Observation is iterative with the constant attendance to the aims of
controlling risk and of economy overall. Direction of the total process by the
‘Conductor’ (see Section 2.1.2) ensures balance between the contributions by
the several ‘players’.  
Figure 6.1 Functions of the tunnelling process considered as a system.
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6.1.1 Prediction
Prediction will have more or less importance as a contribution depending on
the nature of the tunnelling project. Thus, where the tunnel face is generally
continuously concealed, for example by some form of pressure-balanced
full-face machine, there will only be periodical changes in prediction, based
on topography, punctuated by information from site investigation and
inferences from the information provided by the Observer. At the other
extreme, where the advance depends on interpretation of probe holes ahead
of the face in relation to the need for special expedients, there may be
frequent variation in the work plan, with constant need for reinterpretation
of the predictions in terms of a practical plan for respecting the conditions
for undertaking the work.
In such circumstances, economic construction will depend upon a plan of
work prepared to different degrees of detail for different distances (and
times) ahead, based on the progressive acquisition of knowledge, conceived
in such phases as:
 
• Phase 1. Provision of general guidance for 3–6 months ahead to
encourage planning for continuity and to ensure the availability of
special plant and equipment ahead of requirement at the face. This
period will also provide opportunity for planning of aspects of work
which might otherwise entail potential conflict between different
operations.
• Phase 2. Provision of guidance for a length (and period of several days)
ahead for which information suffices to indicate specific departures from
recent experience or of the need for special expedients. This will usually
be achieved by exploration ahead of and around the face of the
advancing tunnel by drilled probes, possibly supplemented by
geophysical means.
• Phase 3. Provision of the most specific guidance for the immediate shift
working. The exploration undertaken under Phase 2 supplemented by
more detailed investigation of zones of special concern that may have
been revealed, thereby establishing not only the delineation of such
zones but a sufficiently precise nature of the problem to design the
solution.
 
There is in consequence a phased qualitative improvement of predictive
information which marches ahead (or should march ahead) in step with the
advance of the tunnel. This process is illustrated by Figure 6.2 and needs to
be pursued systematically, modified to suit changing circumstances but
always retaining the objective of ensuring that work at the face can progress
deliberately and methodically without delay (a feature that tunnelling shares
with good military strategy and tactics), that might otherwise result from
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encountering an unexpected hazard. For example, where special plant or
expedients may be required, advance planning should have taken account of
the period needed for their commissioning, which may need to be reviewed
as work proceeds in the light of new information causing perception of
benefit from change to an initial scheme of working.
6.1.2 Execution
Tunnel construction methods may be classified in several ways. For the
present and with the object of illustrating the differing needs for advance
warning of potential problems, there may be distinctions in respect of the
degree of ‘robustness’ across variations of the ground in relation to:
 
• Tolerance: the ability to operate without major problems within a wide
range of variation of the ground;
• Adaptability: capable of modification, without appreciable cost or delay,
to meet the foreseen variations of the ground.
 
As illustrated by Figure 6.3, there will be circumstances, represented by
combined characteristics of the ground, favourable to efficient working and
a wider range of such characteristics tolerable for a small percentage of the
ground to be tunnelled. As an example, drill-and-blast will be a tolerant
method for a rock tunnel, capable of accepting a wide degree of variation in
rock characteristics and in geometry of the excavation, also in combination
Figure 6.2 Phases in progressive exploration.
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with a variety of special expedients. A shielded method of construction with
TBM, capable of operating in closed (i.e. pressure balancing) mode or in
open mode is an adaptable method, the nature of the particular degree of
adaptation being related to expected variability of the ground. Figure 6.3
assumes that each method illustrated is limited by a value of ground strength
qu adequate for stability and by upper limits of qu related to inherent strength
and to RQD. There will of course be many other factors, with the potential
of development along the lines of Figure 2.7 which relates to a different
aspect of tunnel design. Tolerance implies an immediate acceptability of a
certain range of conditions. Adaptability implies the ability to accept a
certain range of conditions provided their anticipation permits appropriate
adaptation in advance. Tolerance is thus a general attribute, adaptability one
that is premeditated and requires a modification to the general scheme of
operation. At the fringe, there is no sharp distinction between tolerance and
adaptability. Thus, a drilling jumbo for a drill-and-blast tunnel will, with
advantage, be itself adaptable for use in operations that are foreseen as being
required for ground treatment or similar ‘special expedients’. Exceeding the
Figure 6.3 Examples of tolerance of methods of tunnelling.
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limits of acceptability for highly mechanised systems of tunnelling will entail
high costs of dismantling and withdrawing machines coupled with
subsequent loss of use and time.
Much information is now available on the practical performance of
different types of TBM (Wagner and Schulter 1996). A general
comprehensive report for the Deutscher Ausschuss für unterirdisches Bauen
(DAUB 1997) provides a good starting point, indicating the several genera,
species and sub-species, with the ranges of application expressed in general
terms. Patrucco (1997) describes European Community development of
technical standards for tunnelling machines. Bruland (1998) introduces
Norwegian experience in modelling performance and cost of hard-rock
machines. Biggart and Sternath (1996) draw on Storebaelt experience in
indicating approximate ground conditions applicable to the use of slurry
machines and EPB (Earth Pressure Balance) machines.
The practical limits for operating a slurry machine in soft ground may be
related directly to the criteria for establishing face stability. Anagnostou and
Kovári (1996) show how face stability is reduced by the extent of
percolation of the slurry into the ground. If the permeability of a granular
soil may be approximated as k d10
2 where d10 represents the grain size
corresponding to the 10% smallest fraction of the soil, it is then possible to
represent effectiveness of the slurry in terms of grain size. This allows, for
any particular combination of soil type and ground water pressure, the
construction of a diagram such as Figure 6.4 where z0/a is plotted against d10.
For high values of z0/a, a degree of overpressure at the head of the slurry
machine may be tolerated and hence some increase in the acceptable value of
d10 but efficiency reduces transverse to the line of the drawn curve.
Anagnostou and Kovári also draw attention to the benefit for an EPB
machine in increasing water pressure in the head of the machine above the
pressure in the ground (or the alternative of ground-water lowering having
account to possible risks of settlement) to increase the ‘silo effect’ in the
support of the prism of ground ahead and above the face (Davis et al. 1980)
and thus affecting its stability. All types of ground are variable to some
degree and the choice between slurry or EPB machine will take account of
reducing efficiency of the former with increasing values of d10 (with an
absolute limit of d10~2 mm) and with reducing efficiency of the latter with
reducing values of d10.
For finer soils a machine operating on the principles of EPB will be
preferred, apart from soils which are fine enough to ‘stand up’ and to
have a low enough stability ratio, Ns (Section 5.1) to require no great
degree of face support, for which an open face shielded TBM will then be
preferred (Figure 6.4). Machines have been developed capable of
conversion from one mode to the other and several machines have been
used capable of operating in open or closed mode. For a specific project,
the added efficiency offered by the ability to change modes needs to be set
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against the added cost of a bi-modal (or tri-modal) machine, including the
costs of delays in making each conversion during construction, under a range
of circumstances based on geological assessment.
A great diversity of sizes, shapes and techniques of pipe- and tunnel-
jacking is now available to the subterranean engineer (Thomson 1993).
Comparable techniques for the emplacement of other structural features
such as bridge abutments have also had wide application.
With the growing use of intermediate jacking stations (IJS), the length of a
pipe-jack is only controlled by logistics and other factors of differential cost
against alternative forms of tunnelling. The maximum drive length depends
on the diameter of the pipe, say, 100 m for 300 mm diameter, 1000 m for
2000 mm diameter, with the possibility of including IJS where diameter >750
mm. It is found to be a wise precaution to introduce a new IJS before the
jacking force exceeds a certain proportion of the ultimate acceptable limit, to
allow for unexpected increase in load. Curved drives of 100 m radius have
been achieved with shaped ends to adjacent pipes and of 300 m radius using,
for example, 1.2 m lengths of 1.5 m diameter pipe with timber packings
capable of adequate distribution of load. The Unitunnel system inserts
inflatable bladders at each joint, permitting by appropriate control to snake
the tunnel, in Japan to 31 m radius for 1100 mm diameter pipes.
Figure 6.4 Choice between EPB or slurry machine.
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The different types of head adopt the features of many varieties of TBM,
or of a shield with internal excavator for the larger bores. Where the
diameter exceeds, say, 2 m, the operator may control the excavation from the
head, otherwise this is undertaken remotely from a central control station.
Compressed air may be used with pipe-jacking, observing appropriate
controls and precautions. Since pipe-jacks often occur close to the ground
surface, particularly for box-culverts, lubrication or the use of a membrane
may be necessary to avoid local disturbance as a result of periodical adhesion
of the ground to the upper surface of the box. Lubrication by bentonite may
be an automatic part of the jacking process to reduce the load on the jacks
and some form of external weak grouting may be necessary for pipe-jacks in
rock to assist steering and control settlement. Pipe-jacking is often near the
surface and may need to be able to cope with contaminated ground (Sharp
and Turner 1989).
Many types of joint have been developed with the object of minimising
damage by local overstress, maintaining alignment and preventing ingress of
ground or water. Where the pipe provides a permanent conduit, watertight
seals will be necessary at each joint.
A number of miniaturised features of pipe-jacking have been introduced
as ‘microtunnelling’, first developed in Japan in the 1970s. By definition, the
bore is less than 900 mm, the driving head remotely controlled, either using
a pilot hole reamered out, an auger or by one or other form of pressure-
balancing and excavation. When replacing existing pipes, a pipe-cruncher
may be used, fragmenting the old pipe ahead of insertion of the replacement.
6.1.3 Observation
The process of ‘observation’ includes several functions which have
traditionally become separated:
 
• Inspection. An operation which is intended to ascertain that the work is
conducted in full compliance with the specification supplemented by
other particular requirements, including those arising from ‘prediction’.
Aspects affecting risk that depend on temporary works and on
workmanship should be specifically included in inspection, thus ensuring
a safe scheme of working with, particularly for concealed work, a result
of requisite quality overall.
• Geological observation. The methodical examination and recording of
the ground (where such is practical and valuable) with special vigilance
for features that may give advance warning of the unexpected, which
may otherwise constitute an unforeseen hazard.
• Performance observation. Whether or not Observational Design
(described in detail in Chapter 2) is adopted, markers for satisfactory
performance will include obvious characteristics of defects such as
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cracking or deformation and the methodical recording by
instrumentation of movements, strains, possibly stresses and other
features such as ground-water levels and pore-water pressures. Such
observations are loosely referred to as ‘monitoring’; correctly,
monitoring implies that some remedial action may be taken if
predetermined limits are exceeded. The advantage of an Observational
Design approach is that work that may need to be undertaken as a result
of monitoring has been designed and prepared in advance.
 
Inspection will generally be concerned with regular recording of compliance
but it may have consequences requiring change, such as:
 
• concrete quality records, e.g. for strength, soundness and durability,
which may indicate need for variation in quality controls in batching and
production;
• procedures in construction which may need to be revised or specified in
greater detail to avoid problems at intermediate stages.
 
Geological observation will make direct contribution to the specific
information required for succeeding advances of the tunnel (as part of Phase
3 in Section 6.1.1), to any more radical change in approach, also in providing
explanation of geological factors relevant to any local problem experienced
(e.g. in distortion of tunnel support). Geological logs present a problem
unless prepared in a highly systematised form, allowing, for example, a 3-D
model to be prepared, and in providing readily accessible indication of
special features of interest. Like a detective novel, geological logs may reveal
clues which only later are seen to be advance indicators of the plot. For a
large project, there may be hundreds or thousands of sheets of records which
are of limited value unless capable of synthesis to indicate the wider picture
and for extraction of specific features of engineering interest. For a
creditably comprehensive account of geotechnical observations undertaken
for a major project, the reader is directed to Harris et al. (1996), particularly
to the chapter by Sharp et al. (1996).
As with all aspects of geological examination and reporting, as
emphasised in Chapter 4, the geologist must be well briefed not only in the
geological expectations—in order to react immediately to significant
departure—but also to the geological features of greatest concern to the
engineer and the uncertainties in such respects that remain from the pre-
contract studies. This concern may arise as the result of association between
two or more geological features, while one such feature on its own would
cause no particular hazard. For example, unexpected tapering of an
aquiclude, relied upon to prevent flow of water into a granular stratum, may
give advance warning of previously unsuspected problems ahead. Geological
observations recorded for the project should always be related to features
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important, or potentially important, for the project. Where geological
reports include special terms or geological jargon, care should be taken to
ensure that the language and the engineering significance are explicit. The
geologist provides expert ‘eyes’ for the project; time and effort should not be
diverted to collecting data solely for the compilation of rock quality
designation systems unless these are capable of being applied in a manner
relevant to the project.
Performance observation introduces a wide variety of procedures and
techniques, their design being an integral part of the overall construction
process (Figure 6.5). At one extreme, performance observation represents
little more than inspection by an engineer competent to notice subtle
departures from expectation, e.g. in texture of concrete, in slight
misalignment of segments, in incipient fracture in the roof of a rock tunnel,
each of which may presage some feature requiring modification to the
construction process. At another extreme, the performance observations
may be the operative part of Observational Design whereby the need for
premeditated supplementary work may be required. This procedure is
described in Chapter 2.
Where observation may lead to action to guard against deterioration or
damage, it is important to ensure that appropriate action is taken in a
timely manner. Figure 2.9 represents that part of a typical organisation
chart indicating the action needed to achieve this end. This is a feature
which merits much care in accepting the management structure plan for a
project. Even where there is nominally a single unit for procurement of
design and construction in a design-and-build project, there may remain
groupings related to identities of a company or company unit. These units
may well cut across the information-and-action linkages needed to respond
to a ‘trigger’ for appropriate response. A management chart may give
indications such as ‘interface at all levels’ between the units. There must in
addition be a specific linkage such that, whatever the occasion for
responsive and possibly urgent action, the communication passes directly
from the engineer who makes this assessment directly to the engineer
Figure 6.5 Observations of construction.
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involved in putting this into effect (on previously rehearsed lines), with the
event communicated to others who need to know, as opposed to a
communication passing up the hierarchical line of the appellant and down
the corresponding line of the activating agency. When considering the
practicality of an observation-based approach, allowance for the time
available for corrective action must include not only that required for taking
the practical steps in the tunnel but also for the communication, reaction and
issue of the appropriate instructions and the mobilisation of resources. The
assumptions must be reflected in the organisational arrangements made in
advance of such an event, combined with training to ensure that the
procedure is understood and implemented without delay.
Observation during construction may lead to the conclusion, by those
qualified so to rule, that the method of working may need modification to
permit such techniques to be adopted. There are many examples of such
circumstances, each pointing to the problems which arise when the
contract conditions are inappropriate for the circumstances, particularly
the degree of uncertainty of the ground. A few such examples merit
recording here.
 
1. Carsington. The method of construction for this water supply tunnel in
Derbyshire in limestone and shales of Carboniferous age had been
specified in excessive detail with the Contractor effectively relieved of
responsibility of certain of the most difficult tasks in treatment of the
ground ahead of the face in the mistaken belief by the Engineer that this
represented appropriate risk-sharing. In fact, the development of
effective methods of drainage and treatment required free access to the
face, prevented by the specified shields, road-headers and backup
equipment which needed therefore to be removed when serious problems
develped. In view of the construction of the Contract, a major crisis
resulted, leading to the replacement of the Engineer, in order to restore an
effective approach to the work. The inappropriateness here resulted
principally from inexperience in tunnelling of the consulting engineer
appointed to this project, a failing which must be shared with the
Employer in making this appointment without appreciation of the skills
and experience required for the task. CIRIA Report 79 includes a specific
‘health warning’ to this effect:
‘There are few civil engineering projects in which greater ultimate
responsibility weighs upon the Engineer than tunnelling. Those responsible
for underground construction projects must be fully experienced in the
practical aspects of recent tunnelling work.’
2. Unidentified. The Contract for an undersea outfall tunnel in strong
jointed sandstone contained a provisional item for steel arch support.
The Contractor persuaded the Engineer that, to avoid delay, an advance
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order needed to be placed for this support. Having authorised this
considerable expenditure, the Engineer subsequently agreed to these
arches being built into the tunnel which, initially, required no such
support. The tunnel was wet and the Contractor used the arches to
support sheets of corrugated iron to deflect the water. Salt water caused
rapid corrosion of the sheeting which formed an unsatisfactory umbrella,
provided no support to the rock and obstructed inspection to identify
potentially unstable rock blocks. Claims and counter-claims followed.
Essentially there was an absence of understanding by the Engineer of the
principles of tunnelling in such conditions and a determination by the
Contractor to exploit this innocence.
3. Unidentified. A project for a coastal offshore outfall was expected to be
situated in sedimentary rocks of Devonian age. Interpretation of a site
investigation had concluded, in the absence of adequate consideration
of geological structure and the significance of steeply dipping features
between boreholes, combined with the positional relationship between
boreholes and the tunnel (the alignment having been altered subsequent
to the site investigation), that high strength sandstones would not be
encountered by the tunnel. For the original intention of tunnelling by
drill-and-blast, this assumption had little significance. The substitution
to the use of a road-header should have led to a reassessment of risk of
this occurrence, which caused problems of unacceptably low
productivity and in consequence a very substantial claim which hinged
on the question of foreseeability. A less tolerant scheme of tunnelling
had been substituted for a highly tolerant scheme without appreciation
that geological risk (R) depends on the product of geological hazard
(H), the design of the project (D) and the design of the scheme of
construction (C):
R=H×D×C   
4. Sewer tunnel in Cairo. During the construction of sewer tunnels for the
Greater Cairo Waste Water Project, one length of tunnel being
advanced by slurry shield through water-bearing sand was found to be
rising and distorting during construction. A first suggestion was that
machine vibration might be causing local liquefaction of loosely packed
sand. The tunnel was rising about 75 mm at the crown, twice as much
at the invert, with the horizontal diameter increasing at axis level by
about 150 mm; it therefore became clear that the tunnel was floating
into the upper half of the cylinder of ground excavated by the TBM.
Early in the drive, problems had been experienced as a result of the
setting of grout penetrating from behind the shield into the tail seal
around the segmental lining. In consequence, a very weak bentonite-
cement grout was being used in the vicinity of the TBM. Calculation
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readily disclosed that its shear strength was inadequate to resist
flotation of the tunnel. The next problem was to determine why the
sand in this locality was not, in such circumstances, settling onto the
tunnel. After a suggestion that this might be explained by viscose from
textile mills in the locality contaminating ground-water, a problem in
shaft-sinking nearby provided the more likely explanation. Here tufa
was found to have formed in the sand layer, doubtless caused by flow
from the limestone Moharram Hills towards the Nile, providing
cohesion between the sand grains to a degree adequate to allow stable
arching over the tunnel. Use of a somewhat stiffer grout, subsequently
confirmed by calculation as providing adequate shear strength,
provided a simple solution to the problem. Might the site investigation
have been expected to disclose this particular problem? The hazard
only became a risk on account of specific and particular practices in
construction.
6.2 The initial phases
6.2.1 Bidding strategy
Whether or not construction is separated contractually from design of the
project, where competition between tenderers is primarily on price, a
bidding strategy needs to be prepared. Assessment of risk must be a central
component to such strategy, with geological risk the particular factor to
stress for tunnelling. The assessment of geological risk at the time of tender
may be approached in three elements:
 
(a) factual information of geological hazards available to tenderers which
may be supplemented by information separately in the possession of a
tenderer;
(b) interpretation of factual data with areas of major uncertainty identified
in relation to engineering consequences, attached, where possible, to
estimates of probability;
(c) consideration of the extent of the geological hazard imposed on the
tenderer by the terms of the Contract, giving rise to geological risk when
coupled with a preferred method of construction.
 
Bidding strategy will be dominated by factor (c) above. In this context, we
may consider three possible degrees of risk sharing:
 
1. risk sharing zero: full imposition of geological risk imposed on the
Contractor;
2. protection against extreme risk: a phrase in the Contract such as ‘unless
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unforeseeable by an experienced contractor’ or ‘he could not reasonably
have expected to be a significant probability’;
3. equitable risk sharing: elements of geological hazard of major
importance to a preferred scheme of construction and to its cost
identified with reimbursement based on stated Reference Conditions (see
Section 2.1.3).
 
For Case 1, in legal terms there is no limitation to the geological risk
accepted by the tenderer, however dependent on information provided on
behalf of the Owner. In consequence, there is no procedure for modification
to risk in relation to the hazard assessment derived from factors (a) and (b)
above. In principle, it would be oppressive if the Contractor were to be
expected to take responsibility for circumstances incompatible with data
provided, or with the interpretational limits made, by those working on
behalf of the Owner (frequently only made available post Tender when
preparing for litigation).
For Case 2, however reasonable such a formula for ‘unforeseeable
risk’ may sound, there may remain considerable problems in
interpretation, in the absence of an obligation on the Engineer (or
Owner) to reveal his understanding of foreseeability at the time of
Tender. The Owner should have been made aware at this time of the
nature of areas of unforeseeability in relation to significant geological
hazards which might eventuate, for which no express form of
reimbursement is included in the Contract (and it should be made
evident to the Contractor that this has occurred). Where such foresight
has not been shown, or even made impossible by the nature of the
relationship between Owner and Engineer, there are numerous
examples of a weak Engineer falling to the temptation of implying,
when circumstances are more unfavourable than he had hoped for, that
the Contractor has been unduly optimistic in his interpretation of the
data. For uncertain features which may have major effects on the
possible options for the scheme of work, the satisfactory procedure is to
provide a sum, in a manner transparent to Tenderers, for costs in
dealing with the feature to the extent that it occurs. This has a
considerable bearing upon the extent to which the Owner and Engineer
need to study the implications of the working options prior to inviting
tenders, an issue further developed in Section 7.1.
Where a contractor is concerned with bidding for a succession of several
comparable projects in familiar circumstances, it is reasonable, extrapo-
lating from experience, to select a provision for risk lower than the worst
case for an individual project. Tunnelling projects are only rarely of this
nature, however, each having its own degree of uncertainty and the
individual project often of a magnitude to make the underestimate of risk
burdensome.
200 Design of construction
There will be many features that will make evident to the tendering
contractors whether the Owner (including the Engineer if a separate entity)
has a professional attitude to the project and expects—and appropriately
rewards—a correspondingly professional attitude from the Contractor.
The Contract will then be based on Condition 3 with an explicit effort to
make available all data that may affect the undertaking, with keys to the
most vital data, also to have taken action to minimise uncertainties
external to the project. The Contractor, in return, must be prepared to
provide from time to time details of his proposals for undertaking the work
in sufficient detail to permit assessment against any particular interests of
the Owner which might be affected. There will then be a shared
understanding of the nature of the problem and how best it may be
circumvented.
A serious problem in tendering arises, as is illustrated by examples below,
where a particular hazard may cause a scheme of construction otherwise
preferred to become uneconomic. The dilemma is then whether to rely on
this method and accept the consequent risk or, from the outset, to select a
more ‘tolerant’ scheme. Under Condition 3 above, the Reference Conditions
will serve as a basis for the decision; the experienced Engineer, who has
drafted the Reference Conditions, will have assessed the overall risk and will
have judged that it is sufficiently small to justify acceptance by the Owner
(with the latter’s knowledge and understanding of probable benefit and
possible cost) of the potentially favourable but less tolerant scheme. Under
Condition 2, the tenderer may indicate the nature of the assessed risk,
provide a conforming tender based on the ‘tolerant’ scheme and an
alternative (where this is permitted) on the basis that this specific risk is lifted
from the Contractor. Under Condition 1, the tenderer is in a dilemma. Unless
he wishes to depend on the result of fighting the case in Arbitration or in the
Courts, he should provide in his tender for his most pessimistic assessment,
possibly indicating a formula for an alternative scheme with a ‘value
engineering’ cost saving by transferring part of the risk to the Owner,
recognising that this will have minimal prospect of success if tenders are to
be considered by those without a clear understanding of the uncertainties of
tunnelling (an almost certain inference if Condition 1 has been adopted). In
principle, a point emphasised in Chapters 5 and 7, Condition 1 is quite
unsuited for tunnelling except in wholly familiar and predictable
circumstances.
Where a tenderer accepts responsibility for design and construction, the
problem becomes more complicated since the project design is a factor in
relating risk to geological hazard; there should be opportunity, in
consequence, for geological exploration specifically to explore important
geological hazards prior to commitment to the preferred scheme of project
design. While the general formula for bidding strategy remains much as
described above, there will be additional factors in the risk calculations and
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additional elements of associated cost. These circumstances introduce
additional problems in risk sharing unless there is effective sharing of
complementary skills, perhaps integration, such as ‘partnering’, between the
several Parties to the Project (Chapter 7).
During negotiations on qualified tenders there are often strong pressures
for the tenderer to relinquish important qualifications. It is instructive for
those concerned in negotiation to have access to a set of ‘what-if’ estimates
indicating the approximate range of exposure to additional cost by
acceptance of a particular risk. This discipline can dampen unwarranted
enthusiasm on the brink of accepting intolerable risk as the price of winning
a tender.
Special expedients (Section 6.4) may play a vital part in the scheme of
construction in cost, in time—in the manner in which the tunnelling cycle
may be affected, and in assumptions made about their efficacy. Performance
claims by specialists need to be tested against actual achievement in
comparable circumstances, with allowances made for differences. False
optimism may be costly where, for instance, an elaborate scheme of ground
treatment needs to be grafted into a system of tunnelling which has not made
provision for such an eventuality from the outset.
The cynic can point to tunnelling contracts which have been set up on so
unsatisfactory a basis, including in some cases the excessive loading of
responsibility on the Contractor, that major renegotiation after a crisis has
brought much consequent relief to the sitting Contractor. Reliance should
not be placed on such a form of rescue.
6.2.2 The early phase of construction
It is a fact, an evident but inadequately appreciated fact, that many of the
greatest problems, including the germinating seeds of future problems, occur
in the early stages of the process of construction. These problems occur
before familiarity with the method has been established by a newly formed
team, before the effects of learning and training of any tunnelling project
have been adequately absorbed and where no rhythm has been established,
and yet at a time when there are great, often excessive, pressures for
progress, especially from financial interests, with an eye to ‘milestones’ as a
basis for payment, without understanding of the merits of a more measured
and deliberate plan of operation.
A tunnel may be approached from a shaft, entailing an initial site set-
up which will need to be modified before tunnelling begins. Whether the
shaft is drilled, raised or sunk in a more traditional manner, the initial
collaring and first stage of excavation need to be undertaken in such a
manner to avoid unacceptable settlement, uncontrolled abstraction of
water and any of the problems that may be associated with ground
contamination.
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One of the most potentially hazardous episodes in tunnelling in weak
ground is that of the initial break-out from the access shaft. Whether or not
the tunnel is to be constructed in shield or TBM, there will normally be
(except in instances in which some form of gland or seal is provided,
attached to the shaft wall to fit around the tunnel prior to the break-out) a
period of potential exposure to disturbed, possibly water-bearing, ground
which may flow at the face or around the perimeter of the shield. Where
reliance is placed on ground treatment to control this risk, by grouts, resins
or freezing, careful tests of its efficacy should be undertaken. Loss of ground
into the shaft during sinking operations may cause voids against the shaft
wall with possible effects on the stability of the shaft or the ground near the
shaft/tunnel junction. Moreover, destruction of the original soil structure
may result in a material difficult to treat (Section 8.2).
Unless a back-shunt has been constructed (and then the main problem is
transferred to the break-out for this tunnel), a shield or other plant at the
face will be deprived of its back-up by lack of space. Thus, for example, a
shielded pressure-balance type of machine may need to be advanced a
considerable distance before it is capable of being operated in this mode.
Again, it may be stressed that this critical phase occurs during initial
learning.
For the French section of the Channel Tunnel (Barthes et al. 1994), where
all tunnelling was operated from a massive shaft, 55 m diameter×65 m deep,
the problem of protecting back-shunts and the initial lengths of tunnel drives
were solved by constructing an approximately elliptical bentonite/cement
cut-off, 198 m×97 m in plan, toed into the Chalk Marl to envelope these
elements of the early works.
Where a tunnel is approached from the surface directly to an entrance
portal, the initial tunnelling will often be through ground decomposed by
weathering, possibly water-bearing and affected by superficial movement,
introducing problems atypical of the general features of the tunnel. Many
stability problems have been associated with this initial phase, now
frequently overcome by constructing some form of hood over the length
affected, by means, for example, of an umbrella of drilled, driven or
jetgrouted crown bars, the procedures described in greater detail in Chapter
5. A tunnelling shield or TBM, to be operated effectively, needs to be well
buried in the ground, although forms of blade-shield may be more suitable
for this initial phase. A more traditional expedient has been to construct the
portal in a pit excavated from the surface, possibly oversize to allow
subsequent traverse of a TBM or shield. Such a means is often adopted for
road tunnels where, for visual or pollution reasons, the finished portal
structure may then be extended well beyond the original surface of the
ground.
The disposal of spoil from the tunnel may be a matter of considerable
importance, meriting exploration by the Owner prior to inviting tenders.
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For hydro-electric projects, for example, the spoil may, with prior
planning, be used in the construction of an associated dam—elsewhere it
may be used for roads or for concrete aggregate. Conversely, the disposal
of the spoil may present a major problem in mountainous country or where
there are strict environmental restrictions on the location and topography
of spoil heaps.
The Channel Tunnel provides examples in positive and negative
directions. On the French side, there was no evident use for the Chalk Marl
spoil. In consequence, at the main working shaft the spoil was slurried and
pumped to disposal in a slurry pond behind a purpose-built dam on a hillside
at Fond Pignon (Barthes et al. 1994). On the British side, inadequate space
for the working site at the disused Shakespeare Colliery at the head of the
main inclined access shafts was remedied as the work proceeded by using the
spoil for reclamation as a series of cells, adjacent to the original seawall,
bounded by a sheet-piled concrete seawall and dividing cell walls (Pollard et
al. 1992). The phasing of the work required that in the early phases of
tunnelling much improvisation in working was necessary until advance of
the tunnels permitted an adequate area of reclamation.
London clay spoil from the Potters Bar Tunnels (Terris and Morgan 1961)
was deposited, from skips using ‘jubilee’ track with limited compaction, on a
large field, sloping towards the railway. Surface cracks indicated creeping
downslope movement. Sampling allowed estimates of strength of the
remoulded clay which indicated that the incipient failure would accelerate.
Time nevertheless permitted construction of a brick rubble ‘dam’ ahead of
the advancing toe of the spoil and hasty renegotiation of revised final
contours for the field. The spoil came to rest against the ‘dam’. Although
born of a reaction to a surprise, the result was probably a more economic
solution than the alternative of a high general compaction of all the placed
spoil.
6.3 Choice of method
The most fundamental and irreversible (or reversible at great cost) feature
of tunnel construction concerns the choice of method, from which flows all
aspects of planning of the operation, of plant and logistics, and to which
the whole concept of the project is closely linked. The choice of method
may be dictated by the degree of certainty to which potential geological
problems may be identified and located. This feature emphasises the need
for planning of the studies which precede construction constantly to keep
the construction processes in mind, as stressed throughout Chapter 4.
Furthermore this interdependence adds weight to the deliberate step-by-
step approach through the planning and design of the project (Chapters 2,
3, 4 and 5) to guide the studies. Benefits derived from innovation in method
or from the need to reduce uncertainty in an unfamiliar locality may well
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justify the use of test galleries or experimental tunnels prior to decisions on
the scheme of working, for which an allowance of time must suffice to
permit the results to contribute to the optimal solution, recognising the
period needed for observation and for possible modification of tunnelling
techniques, as for the Keilder Tunnel (Ward 1978 and Coats et al. 1982),
the Orange-Fish Tunnel (Kidd 1976) and the Victoria Line tunnels (Dunton
et al. 1965). A more general account of the benefits is given by Lane
(1975).
There are obvious, and not so obvious, factors associating the specific
project with the means for its construction. The obvious factors include:
 
1. the nature of the ground, including scope for surprises;
2. lengths of continuous tunnel of a particular size, taking account of any
requirement for relative timing of sections of the work;
3. extent of interconnection between tunnels;
4. useful tunnelled space in relation to practicable tunnel profiles;
5. value of time.
Other project-specific factors which may be significant are:
6. requisite spacing between tunnels;
7. local experience and maintenance facilities;
8. accessibility of project;
9. likelihood of late variations in requirements;
10. environmental concerns.
 
For overall project economy, there needs to be a clear mutual understanding,
arising from discussion, of the significance of factors such as 1–10 above.
Only then can the optimal construction strategy be devised. The possible
significance of each of these factors is described below.
 
1. Nature of the ground. An elementary subdivision of the types of ground
in relation to the scheme of tunnelling is described in Section 5.1, where
the most important characteristics are expressed as a series of factors,
such as intact strength and extent of jointing. These factors are
incorporated selectively in the several schemes of Rock Mass
Classification (RMC, Chapter 4). Different factors assume different
degrees of importance in relation to different aspects of construction. For
example, the common schemes of rock mass classification are relevant
only to the needs for ground support, for which for example the Q system
provides a rough initial notion of the support needs for strong, fairly
tightly jointed rock, where say the Competence Factor Rc, [unconfined
compressive strength of the rock]/[weight of overburden]>4. Evidently
the rate of deterioration of exposed ground, a factor excluded from
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RMC, is important where rock bolts are expected to support the ground
for an extended period. For shield and TBM tunnels, there may be
problems of uneven loading on a shield prior to transfer of load to a
solidly grouted formal lining.
Another factor of great importance concerns the variability of the
ground, which may need to be considered more coherently than
allowed by RMC. Thus, for example, when, as commonly occurs in
weak sedimentary rocks, strata represent depositional layers or
cyclothems, the coarser grained rocks (possibly sandstones) may be
stronger and more permeable to water than the interleaved fine-grained
layers (mudrocks or siltstones). These combined characteristics will
tend to lead to problems of roof support and breakdown of the
structure of the mudrocks of a nature and seriousness which might not
have occurred with all of one type of rock or the other, unless expressly
considered by the designer in shaping the tunnel profile (Sharp et al.
1984, Wallis 1998b).
The practicability and efficiency of all tunnelling processes depend
on the reliability of assumptions made about the ground characteristics,
which are adopted to form the several ‘ground models’ (Appendix 5F).
Any attempt to over-simplify these characteristics in numerical form of
RMC may serve to conceal the specific features which, in combination,
present the critical features for design of the tunnelling process. The
‘ground model’ needs to express the known and the conjectured
features of the ground, distinguishing between the two types, and how
these features are inter-related. Variability must not at this stage be
obscured by presenting mean properties of the ground. It is of the
greatest importance that the design of construction should be based on
the widest available knowledge of the ground. Elsewhere (Chapter 8),
the practice, inspired by lawyers, of concealing from a Contractor
factual reports on the ground and interpretative reports of site
investigations, has been roundly criticised. Availability of information
should be regarded quite separately from questions of responsibility for
the information. There have been instances of assumptions made in
error in early phases of interpretation which have coloured, without
being questioned, the views of those who have followed and affected
information passed to a contractor. In the absence of access to the
development of such assumptions, a serious contractual dispute may
arise.
Where geological features of special significance for tunnelling are
likely to be preferentially orientated (see Chapter 4 for illustrations) these
need to be taken into account. There are here two types of issue:
 
(a) Jointing may well be illustrated on a stereoplot (Figure 4.2) and
hence indicate likely conjunctions of planes of weakness in
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relation to the line of a tunnel. If such data have been obtained
from a series of vertical boreholes, allowance should be made for
directional probability of intersection of an individual joint (which
may include lost core being related to the presence of sub-vertical
joints).
(b) When the feature in question is at intervals appreciably greater than
the diameter of the borehole, the chance of intersection becomes
small and hence may represent a hidden risk (see also Chapter 4
concerning deep weathered joints).
Where sharp geological change occurs within a length of tunnel,
optimisation of the scheme of construction needs to pay attention to
the particular features of the transition. If this occurs on an interface
at low angle to the tunnel line, there may be appreciable lengths of
mixed face presenting problems specific to the adopted means of
tunnelling, e.g. the combination of hard and soft rock in the face of a
TBM, throwing the machine off line while thrust pads sink into
yielding ground.
2. Lengths of continuous tunnel. The classical example is that of a series of
running tunnels for a Metro which traverse stations. What is the best
order of construction? It is desirable to build flexibility into the
programme by allowing either operation, i.e. of specific part of station
and tunnel, to precede the other. There is often the need to assess the
benefits of simplifying the tunnelling against the specific operational
needs which will normally permit some tolerance in layout.  During the
construction of the Channel Tunnel, the Crossover Tunnel under the sea
from the British side in the Lower (Cenomanian) Chalk (Figure 6.6) was
designed to be required to be advanced to a near complete stage before
the TBMs for the running tunnels could be slid through for the
completion of their drives, requiring the construction of a cavern of
external dimensions 164 m long×21 m wide×15.4 m high. An alternative
scheme, more flexible in relation to timing between the two aspects of
construction, was considered and rejected as being more complex in
organisation; it would have been less susceptible to the effects of
geological uncertainty, a feature of some importance when excessive rate
of local convergence was attributed to development of high water
pressure some 4 m above the tunnel (John and Allen 1996), trapped
above a relatively impermeable layer and causing the opening of a
bedding plane. Figure 6.7 illustrates the French crossover tunnel in Chalk
of approximately the same age, formed by an arch of multiple drifts
around the previously constructed running tunnels (Leblais and Leblond
1996).
3. Extent of interconnection. Two issues arise here. Firstly, how do the
interconnections aid the scheme of construction? Secondly, since the
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junctions between tunnels may provide particular difficulties in
construction, to what extent may their siting and their geometry
contribute to facilitating such problems. Section 6.1 discusses the
principles of tolerance and adaptability in such respects. Interconnections
are often for reasons of safety in operation and hence their siting may
offer no great flexibility but, where possible, positions of particular
ground problems should be avoided. The Storebaelt Tunnels in Denmark
provide examples of the greater problems in constructing interconnecting
tunnels, deprived of protection by TBM, by contrast with the principal
 Figure 6.6 Phases in construction of UK undersea crossover-cavern (after
Fugeman et al. 1992).
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tunnels (Biggart and Sternath 1996). A tunnel designed to be watertight
presents further problems to be solved at interconnections in
safeguarding the integrity of an impermeable membrane at such points.
4. Useful tunnelled space. There is often the need for a certain profile
for use, e.g. related to the structure gauge for a railway tunnel, with a
need for an additional area of space of uncertain position or shape
(within limits). Different means of tunnelling present differing, but
always limited, options as to the internal profile of the structural
element of the tunnel. This is another example of optimisation
depending on the interplay between operational needs and
constructional desiderata. A drill-and-blast tunnel or an Informal
Support tunnel may readily make provision for local enlargements.
For a TBM or shield-driven tunnel, the problems are greater,
particularly where a segmental lining is employed in water-bearing
ground. The preferable solution will be either to increase the
diameter of the tunnel or to construct cells transverse to the tunnel.
So far as the load-bearing shell of the tunnel is concerned, as
discussed in Appendix 5E, it is important to ensure a continuous
thrust-line around the shell and to remember that the compressive
Figure 6.7 Phases in construction of French undersea crossover-cavern (after
Barthes et al. 1994).
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stress applied to the ground will be approximately inversely
proportional to the local radius of the ‘thrust-path’, hence highly
concentrated at any sudden change in direction around the arch.
5. Value of time. For construction, there will be an optimal rate of working.
Timing of a project should normally attempt to understand and respect
this feature, making special provision where causes of uncertainty may
justify a contingency allowance. There may be good reason for an
accelerated rate of construction but this may require higher
contingencies for the possibility of delays, since the exposure to the risk
of delay will be increased and the designed slack in programme reduced.
6. Spacing between tunnels. Planning of a project may depend critically on
an assumed spacing between parallel tunnels or tunnels crossing at low
angle and minimal spacing. The spacing assumed prior to detailed
consideration of the scheme of construction, if not capable of
adjustment, may eliminate what would otherwise be the most economic
means of construction.
7. Local experience. Systems of tunnelling do not necessarily export readily
from country to country, for many reasons of culture, familiarity,
resources, traditional ways of working, provisions for maintenance, not
forgetting problems of importing special equipment and skills which
those concerned with a country’s import policy, remote from the project,
may consider could be provided from within the country. Potential
problems of importing the necessary resources of all natures should be
carefully researched by those responsible for commissioning the project.
Adequate provision should be made for training in techniques previously
unfamiliar to the national or local work force.
8. Accessibility of project. Particularly where there may be dependence on
special expedients, requiring rapid mobilisation or the risk of
compensation of long periods of waiting time, accessibility and
interaction between different operations may be an important issue
affecting practicability and economics.
9. Possibility of variation. The different means of tunnelling have totally
different characteristics in relation to response to change. Possibilities
for change need therefore to be considered carefully, including those
which may be prompted by a Party external to the project, e.g. an
Authority concerned with aspects of health or safety, to avoid late
variations or reconstruction. If such variation is foreseen as possible,
what is the magnitude of the risk and on whom will the liability fall?
10. Environmental concerns. A far-sighted Owner will have undertaken
preliminary investigations with Authorities whose jurisdiction may
impinge upon the project, for environmental or other reasons. The
Owner will also have consulted the community to establish
understanding for the nature of the proposed project. The objective
must be to reduce to a reasonable level, for agreement in detail as the
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project proceeds in relation to the specific proposals for construction,
the uncertainty affecting conditions of noise and pollution to be
respected.
 
Limits on vibration are based on the combination of particle velocity and
frequency at the affected point, related to the risk of annoyance or causing
structural damage (Broch and Nilsen 1990). Where caused by blasting, the
maximum particle velocity is roughly proportional to Q1/2/R where Q is the
weight of the charge (detonating simultaneously) and R the distance from
the detonation. Site specific factors, including the nature of the ground will
affect the transmission of noise and vibration, with small trial charges
usually employed for calibration and to establish means for compliance with
the national or other standards. Hillier and Bowers (1997) describe
vibrations caused by mechanical tunnelling plant, establishing personal
sensitivities to vibration (greater vertically than horizontally). For Metro
tunnels, there may well be concern for limiting transmitted vibrations during
operation, where the solution may include elastomeric track suspension
(Jobling and Lyons 1976).
6.4 Special expedients
Traditional means for tunnelling through bad, i.e. weak and water-bearing,
ground entailed the use of low pressure compressed air or of ground
freezing. LP compressed air has now been largely replaced by other
expedients to stabilise the ground, although up to a pressure of 1 bar (100
kPa or about 10 m of water) there should be no effects on the health of
those passed medically fit to work in compressed air; locking in and out are
then fairly rapid processes. Compressed air may not only help to stabilise
ground exposed at the face but also to reduce water inflow and, by
reducing pressure differential between the ground in situ and the interior of
the tunnel, the value of Ns (Section 5.3), to reduce ground settlement.
While compressed air has usually been used for segmentally lined tunnels,
on occasion it may with advantage be used with an ‘informal’ form of
initial tunnel support, e.g. with rock bolts and sprayed concrete, the
compressed air contributing to the natural arching in the ground around
the tunnel (Appendix 5D).
The installation of air-locks may be possible within a tunnel, prior to the
face reaching the ground for which the air is required, in which case, except
for large tunnels, an enlargement will be required for the air-locks and
adjacent sidings or laybys. More often the tunnel air-locks have themselves
to be built under compressed air, entailing the use of vertical shaft air-locks
with the consequential restriction on throughput of material, plant and
people. An obvious consideration of the siting of air-locks is that the entire
length of tunnel to be subjected to internal pressure of compressed air must
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have adequate ground cover or surcharge to ensure stability. For this
condition, Ns<1 (Jones 1998).
Marchini (1990) provides a wide-ranging introduction to the special
expedients available to the tunnel engineer (See also Cambefort 1977).
Special expedients of ground treatment by injection may be difficult to
undertake for the initial length of a tunnel since there needs to be sufficient
protection by rock (or possibly concrete) wall of the excavated zone in order
to collar the drill-holes, taking account of the pressures to be developed
during the treatment processes and the extent of the ground to be subjected
to raised pressures.
The objectives for any use of special expedients need first to be thoroughly
understood. Is the objective to improve the general strength of the ground, or
of discontinuities in the ground by a process of consolidation, or is it
primarily to exclude water? If the object is to exclude water, for what reasons
and to what standards of residual inflow under what conditions of exposure
of the rock? Often the concern is with water causing weakening and possibly
flow of highly fractured or weathered rock or of fine soils into the tunnel.
Where the water is travelling through a contiguous aquifer, the most effective
means may be by combining the interception and drainage of water entering
the aquifer with grouting, rather than by any attempt to tackle more directly
the finer soils forming a potentially unstable aquiclude which will be more
difficult either to drain or to grout.
During construction of the Clyde Tunnel, a sheet-piled box for the North
Portal and Ventilation Building was designed to be sealed into glacial drift
(boulder clay). An observation of air bubbles rising through the water in the
partially drowned box implied that the seal had not been fully achieved.
Investigations revealed that, while initial boreholes had proved the clay at
two diagonal corners, a previously unsuspected glacial stream had cut
through the clay on the other diagonal. After unsuccessful attempts directly
to drain the silt layer overlying the drift, which might otherwise have flowed
into the box as excavation proceeded, it was found that pumping from the
permeable sandstone underlying the drift was effective in generally lowering
the water-table in the silts. The construction of the portal proceeded without
further incident.
Another incident of the Clyde Tunnel involved the driving of the tunnel
under compressed air through a gravel esker reaching close to the ground
surface (Morgan et al. 1965). It was appreciated that the pressure of
compressed air could be transmitted to the top of the esker and in
consequence lift the ground and cause a ‘blow’. The solution adopted was to
form a box from the surface of grouted bentonite/cement walls as the sides
and lid of the box in the gravel, and to use compressed air at a low pressure
supplemented by pumping from tubewells in the invert of the pilot tunnel.
An air release valve was also fitted to control maximum air pressure towards
the top of the esker.
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Inflow into a tunnel may be objectionable per se in its effect on plant, on
working conditions generally, on problems of disposal of the water or on
weakening of exposed strata. Inflow may be objectionable on account of
external consequences, as described in Chapter 5, for example on affecting
local water supply or on settlement of buildings or structures. It is important
to be able to place concrete linings so that the setting concrete is protected
from direct contact with inflowing water. For many years, techniques have
been adopted using continuous plastic sheeting attached to the rock around
the arch of the tunnel, with piped drains in shallow trenches along each side
of the tunnel invert; on completion of lining, inflow is stopped by plugging
and grouting the side drains (Figure 6.8).
Drainage of an advancing tunnel by means of a sub-drain was a
familiar technique of the nineteenth century (Simms 1944) but the use of
well-points, possibly with recharge wells to avoid consequential damage,
is a more widely used expedient at the present day for lowering the water-
table in the vicinity of a tunnel. The most remarkable recent example of
this technique was ‘Project Moses’ for the Storebaelt Tunnel which lowered
the water-table in the Glacial tills under the sea by pumping from fissured
Figure 6.8 Concrete lining in wet rock.
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limestone beneath (Biggart and Sternath 1996). The lack of adequate
recharge wells resulted in considerable damage to elm piles (whose life
depends on remaining saturated) supporting buildings in Amsterdam during
the construction of the first line of the Metro.
A grouting scheme for granular soils or for rock needs to be designed for
the specific circumstances and objectives, with a high degree of dependence
on the size of aperture (for soils) or fissure (for rock) through which the
grout is required to penetrate. The effectiveness of a suspension grout
based on cement is related to the ratio of fissure width to size of cement
particles. Thus, a grouting system based on Ordinary Portland Cement
may be able to achieve an effective permeability of k=10-7 m/s but 5×10-6 m/
s is more generally achievable (see Appendix 5G for further explanation).
Grouts based on more finely ground cement, such as Microfine Cement,
may perhaps achieve k=5×10-8 m/s. For greater penetration one turns to
chemical grouts (Harding 1946, Glossop 1968). Lichtsteiner (1997)
surveys a range of cement and synthetic resin grouts. The traditional
silicate grouts have typically low strength and relatively low life and hence
have been widely used for shaft sinking through permeable sediments near
to the ground surface. Acrymalide grouts are claimed to be able to achieve
flow rates as low as equivalent to k=10-9 m/s but these grouts are toxic as
the experience at Hallandsäs has emphasised. The Hallandsäs road tunnel
in South Sweden, advanced by drill-and-blast, used acrylamide resin grout
to prevent water inflow from depleting groundwater. Evidently, some form
of syneresis occurred, allowing the toxic resin to reach the surface,
resulting in the death of several cows (Tunnels Tunnelling Int., November
1997 p. 8 and May 1998 pp. 22–4, Anon, 1998). Acrylic grouts are
claimed to achieve similar results to acrylamide grouts but with somewhat
lower toxicity.
Where grouting in rock is related to a specific localised feature of limited
extent, the scheme is designed expressly for this purpose. More generally, a
scheme of grouting for a tunnel in fissured rock will usually entail a
succession of aureoles of grout-holes drilled at an acute angle to the tunnel in
order to treat a series of overlapping cones of rock ahead of the advancing
face. Where the degree of opening of water-bearing fissures varies, a thick
grout may first be used to fill the wider fissures prior to using a more
expensive viscous grout for the finer fissures. Coarse grouts may be used
under high pressure to cause deliberate claquage, i.e. the temporary opening
of fissures, but such an effect does not extend to a distance of many grout-
hole diameters. Grouting is often undertaken through tubes-à-manchette to
enable the grout to be delivered to a preferred zone. The processes of
consolidation and compensation grouting are described in Section 5.3.
Ground freezing, usually to exclude water, has often been considered as
an expedient of last resort on account of cost and time. Freezing, first used in
shaft sinking (Chapter 1) was undertaken by the circulation of brine through
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U-shaped tubes in bore-holes, set in an annulus around the shaft. For
tunnelling, liquid nitrogen may be used as the freezing medium, achieving a
faster freeze and hence possible to use where there is some slight movement
of ground-water (Chapeau and Dupuy 1976). The freeze pipes are coaxial,
the liquid nitrogen delivered through the central tube with sufficient
clearance at its lower end to avoid obstruction by the formation of ice. The
external tube is partially insulated in order that freezing is confined to the
zone to be treated. Freezing is generally undertaken from the surface but the
process may also be operated from a tunnel, provided it is of a size to house
the plant required for the operation. Then, the freeze pipes may be
established by overlapping aureoles, as at the Milchbuck Tunnel in Zurich
(Bebi and Mettier 1979; Jones 1996) or, to deal with a more confined zone of
unstable ground, from the surface, as for the Three Valleys Tunnel (see also
Section 8.2). Where freezing is used for a fine silt, ice lenses may form with
deleterious consequences to the tunnel on thawing. Freezing will tend to
break down the structure of clay, whose strength will be correspondingly
reduced. The consequences of such phenomena need to be studied in relation
to the stability of a tunnel through frozen ground (Altounyan and Farmer
1981). Considerable data have been published at international conferences





If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be
content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.
Advancement of Learning, Francis Bacon.
7.1 Introduction
It is remarkable that, with so great a recent emphasis on management, with
much purveyance of courses, books and seminars, so little wisdom appears
to emerge on the essence of the successful management of large complex
engineering projects. Major tunnels clearly figure in this category, occupying
a special place on account of the dominance of the construction options and
the constant vigilance demanded in respect of geological uncertainty. The
principal defect of so many tracts on management is that the subject is
discussed as administration, the manipulation of the tools of management,
understanding the bureaucratic machine, in preference to management as
the art of blending and synthesis across the diverse contributions to the
successful project. There is a great deal of jargon relating to project
management. This language needs to be understood, in order to penetrate
the surrounding mystique, but not to be used. Management-speak is no
substitute for good leadership and clear thinking.
Management as administration supposes that the engineering is
controlled by directives and undertaken in individual cells, each cell
concerned with a particular aspect which is defined and recorded.
Administration endeavours to police each aspect to prevent change which
might otherwise interfere with other aspects of the project. Administration is
remote, avoids technical debate, being incompetent, on account of
inadequate technical understanding and an inappropriate structure, to
engage in interactive leadership, reacting ineffectually to the consequences of
change without active engagement in their anticipation.
Management as administration is practised by some of the best known
management consultants, who rely upon a formal set of procedures to ensure
rigorous compliance with each aspect of a project to avoid interference with
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any other aspect. Superficially, the consequence appears to be that of
successful management, but achieved at great cost in denying the
opportunity for change as advantageous options come to light as a project
develops. In this way, the effective operation of the process of design is
denied (see Chapter 2).
This widespread set of errors in project management springs essentially
from a legalistic approach to project management which derives from the
thesis that interests of participants are only guarded by precise definitions of
each transaction or undertaking treated separately from any other. In
essence, this approach endeavours to impose certainty in an inherently
uncertain environment. In the terms of games theory, a zero-sum game is
imposed, whereby the gains of one party can only occur at the expense of
another. On the contrary, as described in Section 7.2, the essence of the
successful project is the recognition that the parties must share to some
degree the benefits of a successful project implicit in the process of
optimisation, rather than reliance on scoring only by diminishing the
benefits of other parties of the project, to the detriment of the project overall.
Successful project management hinges upon the application of the
professional element of engineering. While engineering is a market-led
occupation, the professional mark of an engineer’s training should ensure
that the interests of his (or her) Client, (i.e. the rewarder of his contribution)
and of the public interest (the ‘stakeholders’, the social and environmental
consequences) should predominate over the reliance on short-term market
values of so many politicians and accountants. Such an attitude should also
preclude totally the advancement of the interests of the engineer at the
expense of his Client.
As the environment of underground construction has become
increasingly exposed to commercial pressures so has it become increasingly
difficult to retain professional standards—but not impossible. Excessive
commercial pressures, failing to appreciate the merits of a gestalt or
holistic approach (i.e. the perception of the project as a whole) are bound
to achieve sub-optimal results. In the distant past, there was a presumption
that the engineer concerned with the conceptual design of the project (in
many countries, the Consulting Engineer) had virtually a monopoly of
professional virtue. This never was the case and a present boost to
professionalism results from the present sheer complexity of engineering,
so that professional engineers are now fairly evenly spread across the more
enlightened Owners, Engineers, Contractors and Specialists in plant and
special processes. Many need, however, to relearn the demands upon a
professional to perform effectively. The professional understands that his
own expertise and know-how need, to be effective, to inter-relate with
those corresponding features of others with whom he works. This, as
indicated by Section 2.1, is an essential element of design and, in
consequence, of the effective manager.
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This chapter is concerned with establishing the criteria for good
practice. There is much to learn from multitudinous examples of bad
practice but these are best explored against their consequential effects and
typical examples are therefore examined predominantly in Chapter 8. Not
all—but most—project disasters derive essentially from management
deficiencies, often of structural rather than personal nature. Too often,
immediately evident and practical causes are discussed without
appreciation, possibly even with deliberate obscuration, of the way in
which the management philosophy or structure has encouraged or even
established the deficiencies in practice, the project ‘climate’ (Pugsley 1966).
Comparable to the way in which, as described by Pugsley, features of a
project contribute to a ‘climate’ for physical failure, so also is there a less
tangible ‘social climate’ of relationships, competencies and responsibilities
that contribute to the broader features for success of a project, dependent,
as is a tunnel, on a degree of inherent uncertainty. The wider concern is
therefore with contract practices which give poor value for money, deny
development of engineering responsibility and fail to exploit the potential
capabilities for success.
7.2 Project procurement
The first step in the assembly of the component parts for the execution of
a successful major project is to establish the means of procurement, i.e.
the assembly of the contributory elements. It should be evident—but too
often set to one side in favour of established procedures without merit for
an underground project or for any project with a scope for change or
uncertainty—that the purpose should be that of harnessing most
effectively the special skills of those upon whom success must depend. A
vital element is that such parties should be engaged in a professional
manner, so that the success of the project dominates the shared purpose,
with this success reflected in the contribution to the profitability of each
participant.
For the Øresund Link between Copenhagen and Malmo, a deliberate
attempt has been made (Reed 1999) by the Owner, Øresundskonsortiet
(ØSK), to demonstrate the functions of an exemplary Employer (or
‘Enlightened Purchaser’ in the terminology of the UK Treasury), with
procurement rightly seen as the first step, an essential basis for supporting
the subsequent phases of a potentially successful project, of a size and
complexity comparable to that of the Channel Tunnel.
Apart from the rigour with which the prequalification of tenderers and
the award of Contracts was undertaken, to a preconceived plan for objective
assessment of resources, competence and the degree of conformity to the
standards of requirements, other particular features merit mention:
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• While each of the four main contracts was conceived as design-and-build
to give each Contractor greatest freedom in the method of working, an
Illustrative Design was prepared as part of the Tender documents.
• Uncertainties in provisions to be made for extreme conditions of sea and
weather (e.g. the extent of delay as a consequence of sea ice) and in the
properties of the ground to be considered by tenderers were confined by
means of ‘Reference Conditions’ (Section 2.1.3).
• An important feature of tender assessment concerned the proposals for
fulfilling the Contractor’s acceptance of responsibilities for the quality of
the work.
 
The Illustrative Design not only provided the Owner with a basis for
establishing overall feasibility, with preliminary estimates of time and cost,
but it also permitted negotiation with the several Danish and Swedish
Authorities responsible for planning, navigation and the environment prior
to the work beginning, with much benefit in identifying and resolving
issues that might otherwise have delayed or modified the work.
Requirements were based largely on performance criteria, with the
Illustrative Design provided for guidance and indication of standards of
acceptability.
In order to establish overall credibility for technical project competence,
the Owner absorbed elements from consultants, Rambøll, Scandiaconsult,
Halcrow and TEC. In order to emphasise the intention to deal objectively
with contractual issues that might arise during the course of the work, a
Dispute Review Board of independent engineers was appointed for each
main contract, kept informed on the progress of the work as the first external
agency for appeal. Much thought was also given to the delicate problem of
managing interfaces between Contracts, exploiting the opportunities for
mutual benefit in cooperation, eased by bonus payable in achieving the
overall project target and objectives. The conclusions of Reed in relation to
this project merit repetition as indicators of the functions of a far-sighted
Owner:
 
• ØSK acted as a very efficient buffer between the politicians and the
engineers, and between the environmentalists and the engineers. This
enabled the engineers to concentrate on what they are good at.
• ØSK had clear objectives for what they wanted to achieve, and how it
should be achieved. This made it simpler to prepare the contract
documents.
• ØSK recognised the strengths of the consultants and contractors who
worked with them, and tried to ensure that those who were best able to
handle a particular aspect did so.
• ØSK were always prepared to listen and consider suggestions put to
them. There were no closed minds.
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• ØSK realised that if one of their contractors had a problem, ØSK had a
problem. This attitude had a significant effect on the content and the tone
of the documents.
 
There are too many recent examples of faulty systems of project
procurement to merit invidious selection. Identifying characteristics of the
doomed project—doomed that is to suffer unplanned over-runs in time and
cost usually accompanied by satisfaction for the legal vultures—may be
summarised as entailing several of these features:
 
• risk imposed on Contractor in preference to adequate risk analysis and
control;
• uncertainty of composition of project and performance criteria;
• absence of assurance of feasibility;
• absence of prior agreement with regulatory and other authorities;
• site investigation inadequately related to construction and not treated as
a project resource available to participants;
• evidence of intention to rely upon commercial relationships enforced by
law in preference to professional relationships built on mutual trust.
 
It is also to be noted that international financing agencies and Development
Banks are not free from some of the above defects in the conditions that they
impose.
The Øresund Link project provides an example for the future for a
contractual base which appears to achieve the objectives of ‘partnering’
without losing the competitive edge and without dependence on a
cumbersome preliminary procedure. It is not alone but too many of the other
recent examples of enlightened management have arisen as a result of a
major incident emphasising the deficiencies of those contractual conditions
initially adopted.
7.3 The ‘zero-sum’ fallacy
A zero-sum game is one in which gains are only made by one party at the
expense of losses by other(s). For example, if one team wins the Calcutta
Cup, the other loses. The essence of game theory is to establish the optimal
strategies between perceptive participants that will allow outcomes
favourable to each.
This notion derives from game theory which was the creation of John
von Neumann (1903–57), the renowned Hungarian mathematician who
migrated to the United States in 1930, the theory first appearing in print in
1944 (Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). The significance of game theory
is that the best ploy for an individual in any transaction depends on the
actions of others, i.e. that the action of one depends on the perception of
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others as to their best interest. The application of game theory has exposed
that, for a wide range of applications [e.g. in the biological domain, see
Ridley (1996)], the optimal results are obtained through a degree of
cooperation, as opposed to each attempting to take the path of maximum
apparent self-interest.
In the context of tunnelling contracts, game theory provides
theoretical support to the practical benefits of flexibility and cooperation
as opposed to domination and rigidity imposed by the author of the
contract. The nature of uncertainty is a key element, with benefit of
provisions for resolution made to the advantage of all concerned. The
overall gain over a zero-sum approach (e.g. the Channel Tunnel) may be
highly significant.
The most dominant philosophical basis of bad management is the notion
of the zero-sum game, a defect which springs from the dominance of
lawyers, and those who have become dominated, by a process of diffusion,
by the legalistic outlook on construction procedures. The only direct
experience of most lawyers with construction is confined to negotiation of
liabilities for restitution when something has gone wrong and blame is to be
attributed retrospectively. A loss has been incurred and somebody needs to
be held liable and to compensate another party. This is a situation in which
the zero-sum concept is applicable, where gains equate to losses (provided
for the present that the legal costs are excluded); it is then too late to mitigate
the cause of the problem. It is from this process of sweeping up the pieces
that the lawyers acquire the zero-sum vision. From such a viewpoint it may
seem a natural step to establish progressively tighter contractual
relationships for succeeding projects so that potential liabilities to a
protected party become minimised. As the consequences continue to be
unsuccessful—other than for those who profit from increased consequential
litigation—further tightening is imposed so that the project is literally
strangled at birth. These notions of sharply separated responsibilities should
be confined to simple readily defined transactions not subject to
uncertainties of any importance beyond the control of the contracting party,
e.g. the purchase of a fully specified pair of socks.
Where the project managers are not competent to engage in ‘conducting’
the project, they fall readily into the zero-sum mode of operation in the
company of those who lack understanding of engineering principles and
have turned to ‘management’ in compensation, who follow the trail, without
comprehension of the cost of the consequences. Once the disease takes hold,
often from an uncomprehending and project-innocent board of management
of a prospective Owner, it is highly contagious, leading to a bureaucratic
project control structure, superficially efficient since all costly changes and
rectifications can be blamed on somebody else.
In the construction industry the market depends upon the Owner or
Client who determines not only the nature of the product but the terms
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under which it is to be provided. Whether they are destined to get what
they need, expressed in terms of performance and value for money,
depends on the skill with which their requirements are translated into
appropriate terms for the provision, through an appropriate procurement
process and subsequent management. Too often, with a predominantly
legal and financial background, the Owners have no understanding of the
criteria for success or for avoiding the obstructions to success, imposing
over-rigid terms and allocation of risk in the face of uncertainties which
are in part governed by their own transactional and adversarial
behaviour. Where a project is founded on a combative base there is no
scope for innovation so that risks occur in the absence of protective
mechanisms.
An immediate consequence is that of project fragmentation. Each
element that should contribute to the holistic approach to the project is
commissioned, usually on the basis of least cost, without consideration of
the likely evolution of other elements, as has been outlined in Chapter 2.
Within the Owner’s office the only measure of efficiency relates to the
delivery of each commissioned fragment to the specified date and
content, but not to quality or to the contribution to the project as a whole
(the holistic concept). In this environment, contracts tend to be prepared
to standard models, each professional contributor to the process is
designated a ‘contractor’ to emphasise the constricted nature of the
‘deliverables’. The management jargon is fulfilled, each successive piece
is inserted in the paperwork and the ultimate cost mounts insidiously
without accusatory evidence. The zero-sum mentality prevails and no
competence exists within the client’s structure to compare the overall
value for money for such a ‘crazy-pavement’ form of project against a
truly optimised project.
Moreover, a form of Gresham’s Law develops, with the inferior driving
out the superior, where professionals are engaged in this manner. Those with
least capability for insight of the potential problems will not foresee the
complexities of the commission to be undertaken professionally, i.e. beyond
the commercial limits, and their involvement will be favoured on lowest cost,
often sharing with the Owner—who knows no better—the ignorance that he
is thereby short-changed. A valuable capability of the professional is to
advise on the terms of reference appropriate to enabling the Owner to
receive the results to be expected from a well conceived procurement
process, which may be of great value and relevance to the project. When the
professional is treated on a commercial basis, this procedure is eliminated.
The right or vital answers cannot be expected from the wrong questions.
Management jargon overwhelms; leadership is lacking.
Currently, there is a dividing of the ways. While many organisations
become yet more entrenched in the practice of project fragmentation, the
enlightened few perceive that release from the history of poor project
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performance springs from a totally different course. This entails acceptance
of the logic of design (as defined in Chapter 2), managing the project to
permit greatest benefit from the combined skills from those who contribute,
the art of ‘management by design’, even though few—yet—use the
terminology of this book!
7.4 The functions of project management
The essence of successful project management derives from management of
the design process (Section 2.1). This entails the organisation and control of
the resources appropriate to the project, establishing a coordinated and
methodical convergence towards the definition and attainment of the project
targets, rooting out risk and rooting for beneficial innovation, by synthesis
of the contributions to be expected from the parties in the design process.
Supporting measures include the consideration of the formal processes for
decision-taking, for change, for assembling resources and for their
reimbursement, for reporting on the project and for overall control of
quality.
Good project management should flow from appropriate project
planning, discussed in Chapter 3. The planning process will have attempted
to achieve the optimal balance between costs of construction of the project,
expressed in terms of value for money, and its operational performance. New
information or development may require this equation to be periodically re-
examined, always mindful of the high costs of any attempt at modifying
what has already been built or placed on order.
The principles of Quality Assurance (QA) have a part to play in
establishing procedures for quality control and in ensuring that these
procedures are fulfilled. The main limitation of QA is that it is concerned
with foreseen quality issues whereas tunnelling essentially provides
occasions for unforeseen features and for characteristics which do not lend
themselves to the simple yes/no options of QA. Moreover QA, with its own
viral form of Parkinson’s Law, tends to expand into areas far better left for
engineering judgment and, uneconomically, into procedures and ‘house
style’ unrelated to quality and safety, attended as they then will be by
rigorous rules for controlling change and ensuring compliance. As a
consequence, much time and energy is diverted to negotiating escape routes
from non-compliances with QA, where simple and valid engineering
solutions have to be ignored because they do not fit requirements to follow
procedures of apparent Byzantine complexity lacking technical justification.
In applying principles of QA, emphasis should always be given to
exercising the powers of observation on the look-out for precisely those
features which are not included in the QA procedures. Otherwise QA tends
to provide excuses for failings in vigilance, and QA is no substitute for
understanding in depth the nature of the engineering uncertainties and the
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features which may give advance warning of trouble. A QA engineer may be
appointed to ensure compliance with QA and, if so, the project management
needs to establish the role within the overall objectives for the success of the
project, including assurance as to the availability of records in such a form as
to be of value in identifying and resolving potential problems.
Quality assurance has in certain instances been confined to what are
defined as ‘permanent works’, i.e. excluding a Contractor’s Temporary
Works. In tunnelling, this is a very artificial division. Whatever may be the
precise arrangements for working arrangements, which may well be related
to the Industrial Regulations of the country concerned, QA must include all
aspects vital to the permanent works. For the tunnel elements of the Øresund
Link (Hentschel 1997), for example, the bulkheads at each end of the
element were supported against temporary horizontal reinforced concrete
edge beams attached to the base of the roof and to the top of the floor of the
element. As temporary works, these steps escaped QA which was being
relied upon to ensure performance of the Contractor’s procedures for
ensuring compliance of workmanship with design. As a consequence, a
bulkhead failed during sinking, fortunately without loss of life or gross
damage. This might have been a far more serious mishap. Every finished
tunnel emerges as a result of metamorphosis through several stages of
construction. The success of each is vital to the project. It makes no sense if
QA is inattentive to these vital intermediate phases for the formalistic reason
that they do not constitute the ‘permanent work’.
A practice has developed for replacing independent inspection of the
construction works by ‘self-certification’ to the effect that certain features
specified by QA have been undertaken. The expectation has evidently been
that such a practice confers comparable security. It only achieves this
purpose when self-certification is seen as part of a professional undertaking
and not as one performed against conflicting commercial pressures,
concerned with the formalities of QA and no more. During the course of a
project, features of quality specified from the outset may benefit from being
revisited, as it becomes clearer as to which features are vital, which cosmetic
in nature. Tunnelling, particularly those of its features to be hidden by
subsequent construction (often the most vital elements), entails operations
which require experience and judgement to establish whether they have been
undertaken in such a manner as to fulfil the expectations of the designer.
Those features, most essential and possibly arcane, need the resource of a
knowledgeable engineer capable of taking a detached and responsible view,
who needs to be aware as to which is vital to fulfil the intentions of the
designer. Where there are departures from these intentions, the inspecting
engineer needs to have power to order immediate action, over-riding
apparent conflict from commercial pressures.
Emphasis is repeated throughout this book (see particularly Chapter 2)
on the ‘orchestration’ of the tunnelling project with the manager seen as
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the ‘conductor’, ensuring the integration of the principal participants. A
project does not start from a tabula rasa but draws upon much experience,
direct and indirect, from similar or at least comparable projects, as
illustrated by the helix of Figure 7.1. Success in management largely
depends on the ability, directly or by proxy, to draw upon, distill and blend
such experience, learning the lessons of failure as well as success. Features
of uncertainty are identified in this process (Section 2.1) providing the
basis for risk analysis and control as the project is defined, designed,
constructed and operated. A skill, expected particularly to be displayed by
the project manager, is that of transmutation of experience, recognising
that circumstances between projects—or even between parts of projects—
are different, sometimes subtly different. For example, where a particular
incident has occurred in a tunnel, it is necessary to understand the
contributory factors, how these combined and the lessons, in particular
and for wider application, to be learned.
The development of the successful project may be visualised as a
convergent helix, illustrating the interactive nature of the process and the
constant communications between participants in the design process
towards the optimal goal.  
Figure 7.1 Tunnelling: the iterative nature of learning.
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The dominant questions for a tunnel—as for any other project—are too
readily obscured by detail but must remain exposed to view and to critical
development:
Why? —the purpose of the project and how success is to be measured.
What? —the nature of the project to fulfil the purpose.
How? —the means and the method of construction.
These questions need to dominate the construction planning process. They
cannot be approached sequentially—to be more correct they frequently are
and those guilty reap the consequences—as explained by Chapter 3. As the
construction process and the means of construction, particularly special
plant, become more complex and specialised, so does ‘How?’ occupy an
increasingly important role in project planning. ‘How?’ in tunnelling is a
dominant feature, controlling not only the economics of choice of scheme
but possibly the more fundamental issue of feasibility. What, for example, is
the greatest practical depth at which a particular form of watertight tunnel
may be built in water-bearing ground?
An art of balance concerns the gradual imposition of restraints on the
options for ‘What?’ and ‘How?’. The elimination of one option will require a
certain amount of information in order to establish the superiority of
another, within the uncertainties of knowledge, superiority in terms of
expected life cost, suitability in operation, time of construction, control of
risk. Where comparisons are made between options, it may be possible to
accelerate the process (Figure 3.4) by eliminating common features of
uncertainty, in a manner comparable to that described in Section 3.1.3 for
focusing upon optimal planning scenarios, never forgetting in so doing that
risk of a particular scheme depends on specific susceptibilities of the scheme
to a particular set of uncertainties. Indeed, the uncertainties may group
themselves differently in their combined impact on a particular scheme, by
comparison with another (Figure 2.4). The greater the number of options
retained at any stage of a project, the greater the costs in assembling the data
necessary for the next sequential phase of refinement. One essential feature
for success is the open sharing of all information relevant to the design
process, the feature designated as ‘transparency’. As a practical measure,
common computer programs should be used between the Parties for
recording progress and as design packages for producing drawings, thereby
helping to avoid conflict between the requirements of different participants
and of relating permanent works to temporary works. It is a paradox that
where, on the contrary, in disregard for good practice, attempts have been
made to throw risk disproportionately onto a single party, the withholding of
any information germane to the assessment of such risk may in litigation and
at great cost thwart the attempt to do so. In consequence the Owner loses all:
the possibility of a successful project; the self-inflicted costs of litigation.
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The equation between time and money needs to be carefully studied
for a project. For the Client as operator, the timing of investment needs to
balance the cadence of construction costs (unless these are to be
accompanied by financing proposals), with revenue, actual or notional,
derived from the expected degree of usage after commissioning. To a
certain degree, the cost of construction can be estimated in relation to the
rate of working for a given size of project, taking account of costs of
mobilisation and demobilisation, special plant needs, learning curves and
so forth. Tunnelling is subject to particular constraints as a result of the
linear nature of the operation with limited access. The number of faces
may not be readily varied for an underwater or urban tunnel although
this may be an option on occasion. The frequency of working-shafts for
many of the ancient tunnels described in Chapter 1 was governed by a
conscious, and project-specific, objective for optimal balance of time and
cost.
Throughout, the objective must be to modify previous planning so as to
take best advantage of new information or interpretation of data old and
new. This process requires fullest cooperation of all concerned, encouraged
by a shared interest in the stated criteria for judging the success of the
project. A newly encountered problem in construction, for example, may
best be countered by a revision in layout or project design.
7.5 Principles of project management
The management community contains obscurantist elements, typified by
those management consultants who find the need for constant invention of
this year’s modish neologism or acronym which, on analysis, reveals little
more than the simplistic approach of its agent. The object appears largely to
envelop the art in a mystique to encourage the belief that guidance is
essential from the true believers, the acronymic guru. There are however a
number of principles for success which may be stated briefly:
 
1. Overall competence of the team, appropriately assembled under good
leadership as the project develops. The possible need for a ‘surrogate
operator’ to inject operational competence where this is lacking in the
Client has been discussed in Chapter 3.
2. Methodical approach to project definition, which starts from the
identification of the ‘business case’, i.e. the statement of the objectives
and assumptions which justify proceeding with the development.
3. Appropriate resources, which need to be available to take the project
through its preliminary stages without hiatus. Of course, the precise
needs for financing, and the optimal means, develop synergistically with
the definition of the project.
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4. A shared interest in success between all those contributing to the overall
design process. Means to achieve the objectives will be project-specific
and are discussed further in Section 7.7.
5. Following from the above, there must be continuity in responsibility as
the project develops. For a road tunnel, for example, Figure 7.2
summarises the technical input requirements as the project develops. The
‘centroid’ of major input changes as the project passes through different
phases but the guiding philosophy must be sustained. For example, it
may be necessary to reconsider an earlier decision for which purpose the
context and influencing factors of this decision must be accessible and
revisited.
 
The shared interest in success, already emphasised in Section 7.3, requires
particular emphasis. The author has heard more than one management
consultant discuss project success in terms of his company’s profit, regardless
of the abandonment of the project in question.
Following from these principles, synthesis must be assured of the
activities of the several contributions, with interactive iterative progression
with time. Risk analysis and control will be central to all decisions, an
operation which requires constant communication and interaction
between participants.
A fundamental conclusion which follows from application of such
principles is that relationships between the parties in the form of contracts
and agreements must conform to the requirements for project optimisation
and not be imposed in cavalier manner in conformity with an Owner’s
standard, imposed, as too often occurs, regardless of the nature of the
project. Furthermore, what appears frequently to be overlooked is that,
where project risk is imposed upon the contractor, project direction is
necessarily transferred in association. What then follows is the ludicrous—
were it not also highly risk-prone—masquerade of nominal (hands-off)
project direction by the Owner and advisors (in fact, largely administration
of payment) while the real project management rests on the shoulders of the
Contractor.
7.6 Project management in practice
As stressed throughout this book, management needs to be deeply
embedded in the design process. There is no place for ‘hands-off’
management which only obstructs the essential interactive elements of
design. A special skill is that of the anticipation of approaching problems,
as opposed to the far more expensive practice of reacting on their arrival.
Where there is common interest in the overall success of the project, there
is a likelihood that reports on progress and on minor incidents, that may






























objective, and not protective and over-confident. Where the interests of
the participants do not coincide, e.g. as the result of the arbitrary or
wilfully inappropriate allocation of costs and risks, the first interest will
be to establish liability and reporting will tend to be partisan. One such
example occurs when conditions are a little more unfavourable than an
optimistic interpretation of the initial geological data. Contractors have
been known, in such circumstances, deliberately to exaggerate
difficulties of construction to establish a case of ‘unforeseeable
conditions’ where none exists, at the expense of maintaining progress.
At a time when the greatest degree of cooperation is demanded to
forestall what may develop to a disaster, the lawyers will advise: ‘Do
nothing. Sign nothing. Speak to nobody. Sit absolutely still’. This is the
nature of a ‘brittle’ contract which, by the way it was constituted, made
no provision for the flexibility of approach necessary to find solutions
to new problems. Often the Owner, who has willed such a situation in
ignorance of its consequences, is the principal sufferer. The Contract
contained no built-in machinery for resolution of problems which
required cooperation. The trench warfare—covered trench warfare
perhaps—which ensues is a totally unproductive invasion of the
valuable time of skilled engineers.
The term ‘holistic’ is possibly overworked but it is a vital attribute to
avoiding the misallocation of risk. An holistic approach implies that all
contributory factors will be addressed towards a solution. Throughout the
evolving project an holistic approach will help to find opportunities for new
solutions to perceived problems which could not evolve from a partisan or
piecemeal approach. Even during the preliminary stage of a project there
may be a need for rapid decisions involving several interests. For example, a
site investigation reveals information unexpected to a degree to require
revision of the ground model (Appendix 5F) and to consequent rethinking of
project strategy. In this way, problems are solved in such a manner as to
reduce the sum of the combined exposures of the Parties, to mutual benefit in
avoiding the ‘zero-sum’ constraint.
During construction, the needs for rapid decisions are obvious. In general,
the nature of possible problems should have been considered and noted,
together with the nature of the path to be followed to ensure prompt
deliberate counter-action, recognising the several aspects that need to be
satisfied in solving the problem. An important benefit of the observational
approach (Section 2.6) is that a systematic procedural system is already in
place when required (Figure 2.9). Where a particular form of hazard is
perceived, a well-defined contingency plan will need to have been evolved in
order to contain the risk to within acceptable levels, to be brought into effect
without delay in mobilising resources. This was, for example, the situation
during construction of the Cargo Tunnel at Heathrow Airport, described in
Section 5.2.3.
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The observational approach may play a prominent part in the apprehension
of features that may lead to a risk. There is evidence of confusion as to the
scope of the Observational Method which, in the nomenclature of this book, is
known as ‘Observational Design’ (OD). Observation may be undertaken
solely for the sake of obtaining information on performance or on behaviour
of the ground or tunnel. When observation entails monitoring (Figure 6.5), i.e.
the ascertaining of performance with a possible view to consequent action, this
constitutes OD, whether the need for such action may be seen as exceptional
(Case 1) or whether the design has explicitly accepted the occasional or more
frequent need for supplementary work (Case 2), on a basis such as that
discussed in Section 2.6. It is simply a matter that the probability of the need
for supplementary work under Case 2 is greater, possibly orders of magnitude
greater, than for Case 1. Case 1 expects confirmation of the adequacy of the
initial provision but needs nevertheless to include contingency planning for the
unexpected, but possible, departure from expectation.
7.7 The team and the contract
Recent evolution of contract practices for tunnelling has been generally
disappointing. In the United Kingdom, to take one example, by 1978 there
was a particularly promising background and tradition. The minimum
criteria for success were understood as: enlistment of competence, holistic
design, continuity in direction—all were features of the tradition of the
contract between Employer and Contractor directed by the Engineer, whose
considerable powers correlated with duties.
Under the Institution of Civil Engineers Conditions of Contract (ICE
Conditions) up to the 6th Edition, the Engineer is the independent
administrator of the Contract. This also applies to the international
counterpart, FIDIC (Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs Conseils)
Conditions up to the 4th Edition. The functions of the Engineer also include
services as Agent to the Employer as planner and designer of the Works,
possibly in addition as general advisor. The Engineer needs at all times to be
clear as to which function is appropriate to each act of participation. The
wise Employer appreciated that the confidence of the Contractor in the
objectivity of a respected Engineer as Contract administrator much reduced
the need for hidden provisions in pricing for uncertainty. Provided the
Contract was constructed on equitable lines, the Engineer would recognise
an unforeseeable event, as qualified by the Contract, with the responsibility
of considering all aspects, including possible modification to the design of
the Works (by the Engineer as Employer’s agent) to achieve the most
satisfactory solution. The Engineer was also responsive to suggestions from
the Contractor to modifications to the scheme of work which had no
detriment to the project. The system worked well for readily definable
contracts, when:
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1. the Engineer was fully competent to undertake the range of tasks
entrusted to him;
2. the independence of the Engineer was respected, without unreasonable
constraint (such as a requirement for the Employer’s prior agreement to
any ruling by the Engineer);
3. the Employer did not make a ‘reflex’ recourse to his lawyer when a cause
for variation had been unforeseen by the Engineer as well as the
Contractor.
 
In fact, much of the criticism of the system originated from lawyers who
grudged the extent of the powers of the Engineer. Essentially the system
depended on the Engineer acting proficiently and loyally (as Agent) in the
interests of the Employer and as a professional of independence and integrity
as Contract administrator, a feature of a profession at odds with the more
evident self-interest of commerce. The Engineer, under the system, was the
‘Conductor’ as described in Section 2.1 who could thereby bring the virtues
of operating the design process to the project.
When operated by a knowledgeable Employer (as to the objectives), an
experienced Engineer and a Contractor appointed on merit, the system
worked well for the time and was not, as later critics imply who never saw
the system operating effectively, a confrontational system. Confrontation
only developed when expansion of work attracted inexperienced Engineers,
appointed in competition predominantly on cost, whose powers were
fettered with regard to the degree of independence from the Client
(Employer), with invasion of the relationship of trust between Employer and
Engineer by the intervention of the lawyer. The enlightened Engineer had
previously accepted large responsibility for the broad area of design, with
opportunity to ensure that the terms of appointment from the Employer
adequately expressed project objectives, supplemented by constant
discussion during project definition to refine requirements against likely
costs, and prepared to modify project design in response to unexpected
circumstances.
With the increasing importance in tunnelling of the means and methods
of construction (process design), procedures were occasionally modified to
include specialist advice from contractors or specialist suppliers as the
project developed, where the Engineer recognised, as a result of new
developments, the desirability of resort to know-how beyond in-house
experience. Nevertheless, the system began to creak for large complex
projects where greater unification of effort was desirable between the
‘players’ and where greater flexibility was required to determine the
scheme of work, including possible acceleration, best to suit the challenges
of uncertainty in the interest of the project in order to respond to the
unforeseen. Fundamentally, concerns for operation of complex projects
assumed greater importance so there was increasing need for the Owner, as
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future operator, to take an active part in the development of definition of
the project—a process often continuing through construction to
commissioning.
The engineering profession remained largely complacent as the
system deteriorated, possibly distracted by the high work load at the
time. It may even be suggested that, in the short term, the incompetent
within the profession, whose failings contributed to the later criticisms
of the system, were profiting from the system’s defects. This was the
occasion for the lawyers, aided by other ancillaries, to pounce. The
positive move should have been towards a fundamental rethinking of
the project scene, drawing upon the professional integrity of the
engineers and others involved in all aspects of construction. Instead, it
appeared modish to encourage a drift towards increasingly partisan and
complex contract documents (the disease was particularly rampant in
the English-speaking world—one large project in Canada had such a
complex set of contract documents that only one man, a lawyer, was
said to have read them all) with increasingly defensive postures of the
Employer reflected in the attitudes of the Contractor, forced to compete
at sub-economic rates for a pessimistic outcome, while the Engineer was
compressed into a subservient role with overall duties fragmented and
diminished. The relationships became fragmented and confined to
commercial bases. The result, as has been widely recognised but too
rarely correctly diagnosed, is that projects, lacking the necessary
cooperation across the component parts, are well below optimal
achievement. (The 30% suggested economy proposed by the Latham
Report (Latham 1994) is readily achievable in tunnelling, by
comparison with the out-turn of recent ‘fragmented’ projects by the
adoption of good practice, i.e. management by design, the title of this
book.) The consequent level of litigation, a direct result of the
deliberately confrontational contracts imposed by the influence of the
lawyers, should immediately recede. In 1978 a constructional lawyer in
Britain was a rare breed. A result of the restoration of good practice is
that there is not a lawyer in sight in discussions between the Parties, the
Parties having common interests in contributing to objectives as
opposed to contractual opposition. In 1978, as described in Chapter 2,
CIRIA published Tunnelling—Improved Contract Practices (CIRIA
1978) which built consideration of risk-sharing and the means of
reducing uncertainties between contracting parties onto traditional
contracting practices, directly opposed to the trend of retreat into
defensive postures.
The organisation of a tunnelling project may be visualised as a series of
systems which interlock or which may be wholly contained one within
another. The system represents the design process in action. The contractual
relationships need to be so arranged as to be compatible with the operation
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of each desirable system or sub-system, advancing and not impeding the
process of project optimisation. The consequences of such an approach lead
to a choice of forms of relationship expressed in formal terms suitable for the
circumstances. As described below, the particular project may, for example,
be best served by a form of ‘partnering’ at one extreme or by a Lump Sum
Contract at the other, with several intermediate choices.
A general requirement of good practice is that all information known to
the Employer or Engineer, with a bearing on the responsibilities placed on a
Contractor, should be made readily available. This requirement will include
all relevant geological and geotechnical data as described in Chapter 3. Two
particular features require further clarification and emphasis:
 
1. Interpretation of data against a wider background and against
experience of comparable projects may be vital to the informed use of
the raw data in assessing problems of construction. Often such work of
interpretation has been undertaken in depth and over a considerable
time. A Contractor should not be expected to have repeated such work
within a brief competitive tendering period. There may well be a formal
disclaimer by the Owner concerning liability for such interpretation.
Where the interpretation leaves open features of appreciable impact on
the system and cost of tunnelling, use should be made of the principle of
stating ‘Reference Conditions’ (CIRIA 1978, para 4.7).
2. In the public interest, all information derived from ground investigation
should be accessible for those planning new underground works or
modifications to existing works. Judgment is needed, where the existence
of such data is known or suspected, by the engineer responsible for a new
project, as to whether access should be requested to the data.
 
A first consideration in project organisation concerns the nature of the
operation. A tunnel seen as a conveyor of stated capacity between
points A and B may be designed without further recourse to its
performance specification beyond efficient functioning over a stated
period of years. Underground construction for more complex purposes,
e.g. gas storage or transport tunnels, will require constant iterations
between operational desiderata and constructional options, with the
understanding that the economic objective is to minimise the total of
the capitalised costs of construction and of operation. In the latter
instance, the operator will play a key part in the design management
and in the discussions that will follow the identification of any
unforeseen feature or new opportunity.
Figure 7.3 illustrates an organisational system for tunnelling for a
specific purpose of linking A and B through ground familiar to tunnellers
which experience has shown to be without geological surprises, a feature
to be checked for the specific project. Features of functional planning are
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translated, by a knowledgeable engineer, in conjunction with appropriate
studies, into the project design of a familiar nature. This may then, for the
construction phase, constitute the input for the system of construction and
monitoring, since the proposed construction methods do not impinge on
the project design requirements. For a very simple instance, with no
expectation of external variation, a Lump Sum Contract may be
considered. More generally, the familiar circumstances may be favourable
for an element of innovation offering benefits, requiring an element of
interaction between project design and construction design. Here the
Figure 7.3 Lump sum contract, with value engineering option.
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preference may be for a Lump Sum with an alternative which offers shared
benefit to Contractor and Employer for savings for the alternative
measured below the Lump Sum value. This is a form of Target Contract
which does not permit increase beyond the Target, a specific form of the
more general expression: ‘Value Engineering’. Where used in the USA, a
valid criticism is that the Lump Sum Contract has often been based on
highly conservative schemes which readily lend themselves to savings,
occasioning greater ultimate cost to the Client than would arise from a
better engineered project in the first instance. This has often stemmed from
the separation between the design and the construction phase in North
America which has resulted in many designers having limited experience of
construction (and constructors of design). This traditional separation in
the USA coupled with the dominance of the construction lawyer represent
features which have held back innovation. The project planning and
associated studies have to be conceived as adequate for any option that
may reasonably be proposed or there will not be a valid basis on which to
assess the merits of the alternative. There is otherwise considerable risk of
problems arising from lack of continuity between the conceptual thinking
and its development by the contractor.
Target Contracts (Figure 7.4), as encouraged for example by the
Institution of Chemical Engineers (1992) for Process Plants, are held by
many to reduce the antagonistic attitudes believed to be inherent to the form
of contract based on Measured Works. Target Contracts are said to
encourage a common interest between the parties to the Contract in reducing
cost. Provided the project costs remain within the target figure, the benefits
of efficiency are indeed shared. The problem, particularly in tunnelling,
arises from the unexpected when the target value is exceeded and when it is
then in the Contractor’s interest to renegotiate the Target Value in order to
provide a new base line for the calculation of fee and thus to recover loss of
profit which would otherwise occur. As illustrated (Figure 7.5), this feature
may have far greater incidence on the total cost of a project than would
alternative arrangements for variation of a measured contract, following the
pattern of ICE Conditions or FIDIC Conditions, as described above.
Variation for unforeseeable conditions of the ground may in either instance
require Reference Conditions (see above) to provide a base-line for
negotiation.
A real problem arises where, as often accompanies a Target Contract,
the Contractor has latitude for the choice of the means of construction, a
choice which may have influenced appreciably the exposure to risk
(Section 2.1). Certain Employers, or their advisers, deliberately choose
generous Target Values with the expectation that this should be readily
achieved by an efficient contractor, to eliminate the eventuality of overrun
but, if so, the claimed benefits of a Target Contract are materially
diminished and the Employer enjoys spurious, self-congratulatory credit
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for the apparent virtue of controlling project cost. In the absence of valid
bench-marking, the generosity of a specific Target Contract cannot be
estimated. This is a circumstance in which the Engineer’s estimate, based on
good practice in the circumstances of the project, with stated provisions for
uncertainty, can provide a valid basis for comparison. The more effective
control is to set a realistic target and to undertake good quality engineering
examination of a Contractor’s proposals and method statement in order to
establish that foreseeable geological surprises are unlikely to introduce
problems of a nature to support variation of the Target Value.
The Author can instance major projects of his own experience, e.g. the
Clyde Tunnel (Morgan et al. 1965), Potters Bar Tunnels (Terris and
Morgan 1961), Heathrow Cargo Tunnel (Muir Wood and Gibb 1971) and
others, including for example the Orange-Fish Tunnel, where a remeasured
Figure 7.4 Target contract.
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contract administered by an independent Engineer has provided a project
meeting the requirements of the Owner, without dispute and achieved within
time and budget. The first of these projects encountered a number of
different forms of geological hazard, the problems requiring design of
specific tailor-made solutions as each was more specifically defined as the
work advanced. The second and third projects were innovative in basic
design and required the degree of coordination between design and
construction compatible with such an arrangement of Owner, Engineer and
Contractor. Where the Engineer sees high benefit for the project from
innovation with acceptable concomitant risk, combined with fully meeting
the specified operational requirements, as for the Heathrow Cargo Tunnel,
such a system is particularly appropriate. The Author insisted for this project
that ICE Conditions should be used in order to provide powers of the
Engineer adequate to establish the essential coordination between design and
construction (as opposed to a Government model CCC Works 1 preferred by
the Owner). The innovative design, saving at least 50% of the project cost to
Figure 7.5 Effect of revision of target cost.
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the Owner, could not have been accepted for a Lump Sum or Target
Contract, and certainly not for a project in which the several contributions
were fragmented and contracted each at least cost. The notion of project
interacting with process is fundamental.
Where the ground is uncertain, while efforts may be made to ensure that
the direct expenditure on special expedients (Section 6.4) is neutral to the
Contractor’s profit, the overall balance is difficult to achieve since the
consequential easing of the Contractor’s task, e.g. by reducing inflow of
water below an acceptable amount, will probably not figure in such a
calculation. This, once again, is a situation in which a remeasured contract
may be the fairest course, in the interest of both the Owner and the
Contractor.
In 1993, the Institution of Civil Engineers (1993) issued a new basis for
construction contracts, the New Engineering Contract (NEC), followed in
1994 by a second edition with a minor amendment titled The NEC
Engineering and Construction Contract. These documents contain many
innovative features of potential benefit. The commissioning of major
projects in Britain at that time was being undertaken without adequate
contribution by engineers with a grounding in the criteria for project success.
The documents represent considerable departures from traditional practice
and should have been accompanied by a comprehensive guide to the Owners
as how to apply the spirit of the scheme to the best advantage of a particular
type of project. It needs to be recalled that project fragmentation—with each
element, of planning, of design, of site investigation and its supervision, of
construction obtained in a competitive manner—was the prevailing
commercially-led scheme for project procurement in Britain. Certain
features of the NEC, including the sub-division of the traditional functions of
the Engineer into designer (a function indicated as complete by the time of
tender), Supervisor and Project Manager, appeared to encourage the practice
of fragmentation.
The NEC provides five different bases for payment to a Contractor:
A—Priced contract with activity schedule;
B—Priced contract with Bill of Quantities;
C and D—Target Contract (with payment as A or B above);
E—Lump Sum Contract.
An objective is stated that the ‘NEC is intended to provide an up-to-date
method for employer, designer, contractors and project managers to work
collaboratively and to achieve their own objectives for their work more
consistently….’ intended to lead towards much reduced risk of cost and time
over-runs. Changed requirements are recognised through ‘compensation
events’.
The treatment of ground conditions, so vital for tunnelling, however
falls short of good practice. For tunnelling works, a few simple
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‘boundary conditions’ are suggested as confining the Contractor’s
exposure for uncertainty about the ground. There is no indication of
appreciation of the subtlety of such criteria in relation to methods of
working, i.e. the relative tolerance or adaptability of the system
(Section 6.3). Nor is there clarity concerning the provision of data. The
guidance note with the NEC documents advises (p. 27) that only factual
information should be provided to tenderers—with the hint that some
Employers may go rather further, while p. 59 advises the provision of
interpretation of factual data by a specialist. A major issue of potential
uncertainty then derives from the geological risk imposed on the
Contractor. Clause 60.1 limits the Contractor’s liability to ‘physical
conditions which…. he could not reasonably have expected to be a
significant probability’. If the information is inconsistent, the
Contractor is assumed to rely upon the less adverse (in the 1994
version, the more favourable). This is unhelpful for the Contractor left
to choose between an ‘intolerant’ system potentially more economic
than a more ‘tolerant’ system, for which a more cooperative approach
between the Parties is to be preferred.
The NEC, with fairly minor variations, in respect of such issues, is capable
of acceptance for tunnelling provided it is set into a broader framework
which will establish:
 
• full coordination across all preliminary activities of planning, design and
supporting studies, including site investigation, directed by the Employer
with the Engineer or by the Engineer on behalf of the Employer;
• development of a practical scheme (or alternative schemes) for
construction pre-tender in order to establish adequacy of provisions and
constraints of the Contract;
• provision for design continuity between pre-Contract and the
construction phase, in order to encourage innovation, reduce risk arising
from uncertainty and to develop professional relationships between the
Parties;
• full continuity of risk analysis and control throughout;
• a system for full integration of operational objectives with construction,
with continued guidance to the Contractor and appropriate levels of
detailed provision of method statements in return.
 
Providing such a basis is clear from the outset, such a scheme may be devised
to be compatible with payment on activity schedules of Scheme A of the
NEC. Provision for beneficial modifications need to be made so that interest
is at all times focused on the requirements for the Project as the over-riding
concern of all involved. The essence entails the broadest analysis of the way
in which contributions from all directions may find optimal solutions to
problems encountered during construction.
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A common occurrence for tunnelling is where the general nature of the
ground, and its variability, may be predicted reasonably well, but only
roughly the extent to which the ground may be ‘zoned’ and the precise
position of each zone not at all. In these circumstances, type design for tunnel
support may be provided for each zone and serve as the basis for payment.
So far as practicable, an objective basis is provided for the zoning, which
may be found to require some degree of revision in the light of experience as
construction proceeds.
The Øresund Link discussed in Section 7.2 provides a good example of
project management based on a variant of FIDIC Type Contract
administered by the Owner, dependent on considerable contribution from
Consulting Engineers, with payment based on achievement of ‘milestones’
supplemented by Variation Orders on the basis of changed conditions. The
principle of risk sharing is accepted, including a set of Reference Conditions,
with continuity across project and construction design, also in the
management of the interfaces between principal Contractors which would
be impossible in a situation of confrontation. Management is by engineers
with lawyers confined to the proper functions of lawyers.
As the different aspects of the project interact more comprehensively,
so does the case become stronger for a form of partnering between those
contributors responsible for the elements concerned. Schemes of PFI
(Private Finance Initiative) usually involving DBO (Design, Build and
Operate) provide opportunity for unified engineering throughout the
project. The potential for ‘internal partnering’ in a DBO context
remains underdeveloped. Engineers, previously confined to particular
roles in a confrontational setting, tend to remain on the defensive
within their own perceived area’s of responsibility, while excessive
powers of management remain in the hands of those who do not
perceive the merits of interaction and are in consequence blind to the
benefits of operating the design process. People who have traditionally
accepted responsibility for a confined aspect of a project appear to feel
insecure when they are expected to share responsibilities alongside the
consequent benefits of managing a continuity across the several inter-
related functions. As a result, the worst features of traditional posturing
may be encountered, standards further depressed by the overall control
having a commercial rather than professional motivation, to the
detriment of the project. It is essential that education, training and
operation of project ‘transparency’, i.e. the sharing of motivational
objectives, should contribute towards eliminating such divisive
attitudes, in combination with rewards related to success of the project
overall.  Partnering offers benefits in providing scope for full
optimisation, which is not properly exploited if the elements of design
and construction are kept at arms length from each other and from the
operation of the completed project.
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Another feature of the DBO project concerns the remarkable number of
consultants employed on behalf of different agencies to undertake essentially
QA type duties for each separately. Apart from the proliferation of bodies
making for a complex bureaucracy, the enemy of good engineering, the result
may not achieve the objectives. The purpose of each is to ‘sign off’ the
discharge of a particular function. The absence of integration of functions
may lead to unforeseen gaps in the provision. For instance, the overall
standard of safety of a road tunnel in a fire depends on the traffic, the control
system, the layout, fire-fighting and fire-escape provisions. Assurance of
adequate standards requires all such features to be considered as a whole,
not each in isolation from the others.
Partnering is a term which was originally coined in the petroleum,
processing and power generation industries in the United States. The
Construction Industry Institution (CII) Task Force on Partnering provided a
definition in 1987: ‘Partnering is a long-term commitment between two or
more organisations for achieving specific business objectives by maximising
the effectiveness of each participant’s resources. The relationship is based on
trust, dedication to common goals, and an understanding of each other’s
individual expectations and values. Expected benefits include improved
efficiency and cost effectiveness, increased opportunities for innovation and
continuous improvement of quality products and services.’
While partnering remains predominantly a practice between large
international clients and their principal contractors engaged in serial
projects, the potential scope is now recognised as considerably wider, where
the processes of construction may have particular influence on the life costs
of the project and where operational expectations dominate the criteria of
design. Cooperation between participants will in consequence promise, and
achieve, results superior to traditional, or to more recent adversarial,
practices. The contract is rewritten in these circumstances as a statement of
objectives and as providing a basis for reward related to success of the
project overall, treating the participants as professionals, eliminating the
dominance of the legal profession and providing in consequence escape from
the ‘zero-sum’ game (Section 7.2), while recognising the community of
objective in overcoming the consequences of unforeseen circumstances.
For the time being, partnering for major underground projects will
doubtless be confined to those Clients who do not depend excessively on
finance by commercial banks or dominance by accountancy, with its
concomitant distortions of risk allocation, legalistic relationships and
management separated from engineering. A few more experiences like the
escalation of costs of the Channel Tunnel (+72%), of the Jubilee Line
Extension and the Heathrow Express Rail Link may yet influence the
financial world to follow the more enlightened examples born from the ashes
of disaster and from other quarters. Chapter 8 explores the circumstances
and the explanation of such outcomes.
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More generally, major tunnel projects administered by an Engineer,
charged to manage the design process, incorporating the best elements of
risk-sharing and of applying foresight to the heading off of incipient
problems, will continue to be seen as a superior solution to that of the
expensive macho project management that remains in favour from the
unenlightened circles of finance. It is also probable that a small Dispute
Resolution Board (Section 8.5.2) of experienced (practical not academic)
engineers (not lawyers), kept well informed of the development of the project
throughout the construction phase, will be seen as a reserved reminder of the
over-riding virtue of objectivity of professionalism.
Chapter 8
 
Hazards, Disputes and their
Resolution
They’re funny things, Accidents. You never have them until you are
having them.
The House at Pooh Corner, A.A.Milne.
8.1 Introduction
Defects in design, in materials, in specification of materials and
workmanship, in standards of workmanship or in any combination of these
features—and it is most frequently that mutual incompatibility or
misunderstanding lies at the root of a problem—demand rigorous control.
The costs of rebuilding or in finding alternative solutions in tunnelling are
likely to be high, particularly on account of the linear process of construction
and constraints on access to working faces. There is no better safeguard than
a continuity in direction of the project by an engineer perceptive to the
nature of potential hazards and how they may be anticipated. This, however
frequently disregarded, is no new concept. Muir Wood (1975b) states:
The processes of planning, design, construction and maintenance of
tunnels are (or should be) closely inter-related. In certain countries,
current practices tend towards artificial barriers and discontinuities
between certain of these aspects, particularly that of time separation
between design and construction; it is not surprising there to find a
high frequency of avoidable hazards and frustrated contracts.
 
Where this lack of continuity exists, or where reliance is placed on oversight
by a central administrator in the place of participation by an experienced
engineer, readily avoidable and expensive failures to meet objectives will
continue to occur at an unacceptable frequency. The lawyers will continue to
seek scapegoats without concern or understanding of the fact that a
fundamental cause has been an absence of attention to the principles of
design (Chapter 2).
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There is a present tendency in the United Kingdom to regard Construction
Design Management (CDM), described in Section 2.4, as in some way
compensating for the absence of informed engineering continuity of
management. This is to misunderstand the function of CDM. CDM,
particularly where it is undertaken through competitive tendering, may be
reduced to a review of stated proposals for methods of working, and in
provision of a safety plan by the ‘Planning Supervisor’. The review may have
good intentions but these may take little regard of the manner in which
decisions are taken and the response to slight but important departures from
routine operations or from stated expectations about the ground. The
Planning Supervisor does not provide continuity in supervision—in fact,
some never visit the working site. CDM plays no part in ensuring that the
objectives of the project, as designed and built, will be achieved. If, for
example, a supposedly watertight tunnel leaks, this will only concern CDM
if the leakage is life-threatening.
As explained in Chapter 2, hazards may be responsible for physical
deficiencies in construction leading to:
 
• tunnel collapses or distortions;
• flooding;
• fire or explosion;
• injuries or accidents arising from working practices.
 
External effects include damage to people, the environment, property or
services, having one or more contributory causes:
 
• consequences of tunnel collapse or flooding;
• ground movement causing direct damage (Section 5.3);
• variations to watertable;
• effects of compressed air or chemical agents travelling through the
ground.
 
Non-physical risks concern the failure of the project to meet the objectives of
the Parties concerned.
After the event, the immediate circumstances leading to defects are
usually capable of being established, often as the result of some degree of
specific investigation. If the existence of a particular hazard had been
considered earlier, the conclusion will be that the effect could and should
have been avoided. It is here that a risk strategy, described in Section 2.1,
would have provided a powerful tool in guiding procedures and saving loss
that may have been incurred in life, money or time.
There is no attempt here to provide a taxonomy of defects in tunnelling
(see, for example, Muir Wood 1975b; Pelizza and Grasso 1998) but rather to
consider a few case histories as indicators of the features that may make a
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project accident-prone and of the positive features that may guide future
tunnel project management.
It is frequently supposed that tunnels are subjected to their most
demanding conditions during the period of construction. While this is
generally true, there remain aspects of longer-term structural security which
may only become evident during the passage of time, or in relation to specific
features of operation or maintenance. Examples are included in Section 8.4
below.
The important issue overall is once again to emphasise the attitude of
mind of all those concerned in directing the operation of construction, who
should, in the words of Sir Harold Harding, be ‘always prepared to be
surprised but not astonished’. The same author also advises (Harding,
1981): ‘The moral is that there is no simple answer to tunnelling, but that it
is a matter of infinite variety undreamed of by the layman and the
administrator.’ The essential attribute of the tunnelling engineer, whether or
not formal Observational Techniques are adopted (Section 2.6), is that of
informed observation which is often the key to forestalling risks.
Defects in tunnelling are too often explained by their most immediate or
proximate causes, e.g. the immediate reason for a serious rock-fall. It is
instructive to pursue the fundamental causes, which may relate to unclear
allocation of responsibility, to lack of communication or to absence of
appreciation of the importance of providing specific information to those
concerned. A number of minor problems in tunnelling, resolved during the
course of construction, but carrying pointers as to how to avoid similar
recurrences, are described elsewhere in this book adjacent to discussion of
the practices concerned.
8.2 Hazards in construction
Many of the hazards in construction arise from:
 
• lack of relevant information about the ground;
• failure to express features of geology in aspects or terms significant or
comprehensible for engineering;
• misunderstanding of the information available or of its import,
occasionally aided by the inadvertent concealment of relevant
information from those concerned with designing or managing the
scheme of construction.
 
The safety of the scheme of construction depends on the validity of the
ground model (Appendix 5F). Thus the purpose of the ground model
should be not only to provide the basis of a generally satisfactory scheme of
construction but also to indicate the nature of potential hazards for which
special precautions may be needed. In a rock tunnel, for example, the
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variability of the rock may point to the local presence of loose rock needing
to be identified in advance so that local measures may be taken to avoid
risk of rock falls. In the more serious circumstances where a fall might
trigger progressive failure along a tunnel, there may be the need for
periodical local lengths of greater robustness of support, each associated
with a formal break to limit spread of collapse. This type of failure
becomes more prevalent as the Sprayed Concrete Lined (SCL) tunnel has
its use extended to a wider range of types of ground, since a buckling or
internal bending failure is most likely to occur with a thin lining of variable
geometry, where a high radius of curvature may coincide with poor
workmanship and high uneven external ground load to provide the initial
failure mechanism (but see Chapter 9 for another example). Emphasis
needs constantly to be given to understanding the mechanisms of potential
collapse rather than placing reliance on rules of a doctrinal nature, which
may be related to a particular form of construction or to a numerical
ground quality designation, but which provide little or no guidance on
variability or the nature of associated local risks of collapse.
Where probing ahead of the face is undertaken for a rock tunnel, any
looseness of rock that may be encountered will be associated with open
jointing and hence, below the water-table, with increase of inflow of water.
Probing should have specific objectives, with an understanding of the
features being sought and for any appropriate precautions. For example, if
localised zones of water under high pressure are to be located, collaring of
the probe hole will be necessary, equipped with gate valves to staunch inflow.
Where running ground may be encountered, the needs for control and for
consequential effects of uncontrolled inflow should have been anticipated. In
strong rock, where TBMs are used, probe holes should be located outside the
area of excavation to avoid obstruction of cutters by abandoned drill rods or
bits.
Where reliance is placed on ground treatment to provide stable ground,
tests should be conducted to ensure that the objectives have been achieved
before opening up the ground. A case described by Muir Wood (1975b) is
that of a shaft to be sunk by underpinning through a depth of gravel above
clay into which the shaft was to be sealed. The gravel was treated by
silicate injection. The bottom subsequently ‘blew’ and the shaft flooded,
requiring an enveloping sheet-piled box for its recovery. The cause of the
problem was later identified as a layer of sand at the base of the gravels too
fine to be penetrated by the injection. A trial hole could have located the
problem and allowed a safe method of working to be devised. If the
problem had been suspected from the outset, by detailed investigation, an
alternative form of construction could have been adopted initially, for
example by sinking the shaft as an open caisson, with water pumped out
only after achieving adequate penetration by the cutting edge below the
aquifer.
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Several instances of problems have occurred in breaking out from a shaft
at the beginning of a tunnel drive. The general problem, experienced in
several different varieties, arises from instability of ground associated with
its disturbance during shaft sinking, coupled with inadequacies of support in
the eye through which the tunnel is to be constructed through all stages of
the work. One such example was experienced in Mexico City (Muir Wood
1975b) in highly thixotropic clay, sensitive in consequence to disturbance.
Elementary design faults in tunnel arch support include the failure of foot-
blocks on account of the limited strength of the ground and of neglect of
weakening caused by uncoordinated local excavation, e.g. a drainage
channel. Where arches are to be supported as the bench to a top heading is
removed, leg extensions must be in place and loaded prior to undermining
the local section of bench support. The lateral stability of steel arches always
needs to be considered in relation to the degree of blocking against the
ground. Where an arch has straight legs, neither the rock nor the arch in this
vicinity benefit from arching and need analysis of the possibility of ground
instability and of distortion of the arch.
Small inflows of water may, in particularly sensitive circumstances, have
consequences disproportionate to the quantities concerned. Examples of this
nature have occurred in Switzerland, as described in Section 5.3 affecting an
arch dam, and in Oslo as a result of a small degree of under-drainage of
sensitive clay by tunnelling in the underlying rock, necessitating strict control
of leakage to within 5 litres/minute/100 metres length of tunnel (Jøsang
1980). Underdrainage of normally consolidated sediments in Hong Kong as
a result of rock tunnelling (Munro 1997) is also described in Section 5.3.
When problems threaten, the prospect of a simple rational solution may
depend critically on the contractual terms and relationships between the
Parties. Thus, where the expectations of all Parties appeared to be for a dry
tunnel, in fact it was so wet, with exposure of plant to salt water, that major
modifications would be needed to the TBMs in use to adapt to the
conditions. Moreover, construction time would then grossly exceed the
specified period. All geological risk had been placed with the Contractor
who saw no prospect of renegotiation on the grounds of unforeseen
conditions. With so much at issue, with no prospect of agreement, the cost,
diversion of effort and delay as a result of litigation will result in far greater
overall cost to all Parties, including the Employer, than would have resulted
from a more equitable allocation of risk in the first place.
There is a common phrase—‘technical before contractual’—which
implies that solution to the engineering problem, in a tunnel or elsewhere,
will normally not wait for debate on the minutiae of liability. Such an
approach assumes, however, an equitable basis for subsequent compensation
and a cooperative relationship between those concerned in assessment.
There may be no such basis, as in the circumstance of excessive risk being
imposed on the Contractor and where information provided by the
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Employer may have been misleading or incomplete. Almost as bad is the
situation where the Engineer, in today’s litigious climate, is conscious that a
ruling in the favour of the Contractor may lead to the Engineer being
pursued in the court by the Employer, his Client, for an aspect of alleged
negligence which may have contributed to the problem. Once again, this
usually arises on account of an Engineer accepting responsibilities for
tunnelling beyond his grasp.
A hydro-electric project on a Pacific island was designed to be
constructed in hard volcanic rocks overlain by sediments with known
presence of basalt dykes and sills. Unexpected problems were encountered
in raising an inclined shaft, attributed by an Austrian professor serving on
a Consultants Board to excessive horizontal stresses. The shaft was being
raised by a diesel-driven shaft raiser. On investigation, it became evident
that destruction of ventilation trunking as a consequence of rock falls in
the shaft created so unpleasant an atmosphere that no serious geological
examination had been undertaken of the shaft. A more intrepid
engineering geologist rode on the roof of the Alimak shaft-raiser obtaining
video film which revealed that the geological structure had been essentially
misinterpreted. In fact, the shaft was virtually following a steeply inclined
basaltic flow transverse to the expected direction of such an intrusion,
associated with weathering and heavy fracture. This unsuspected feature
was the cause of much avoidable cost. The obvious solution, suggested by
the Contractor, prior to knowledge of the cause of the problem, would
have been to substitute a vertical shaft—and here it may be worth
commenting that inclined shafts introduce a number of complications in
construction sensitive to uncertain geological factors. This proposal had
been rejected by the Engineer, on the grounds that the change would
inevitably entail increased costs, on account of head losses, in operation. In
fact, this issue could readily have been compensated by local increase in
tunnel and shaft areas, with much saving in construction costs and time.
This is an example of addressing the wrong problem and failing to perceive
the right solution, both features obvious in hindsight, the latter also in
foresight.
On 21 October 1994 a major collapse of station tunnels under
construction within Heathrow Airport for the Heathrow Express Rail Link,
using SCL techniques, caused considerable surface subsidence and damage,
but fortunately no personal injury. The incident is described in Chapter 9.
Only subsequent to this collapse was a management plan introduced which
attended to the needs for continuity and coordination throughout the
processes of design and construction. The Jubilee Line Extension, under
construction at the time and using similar tunnelling techniques, made
comparable changes in project management without which it is possible that
comparable experiences could have occurred, in circumstances more
susceptible to risking life.
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While compressed air tunnelling has declined in recent years in response
to medical concerns, examples of ‘blows’ continue to occur, where the air
finds a path of escape to the surface (Muir Wood 1975b). The Clyde Tunnel
(Morgan et al. 1965) was constructed in compressed air, the crown of the
tunnel passing beneath a timber jetty used over many years as a ferry berth
(Figure 8.1). As-built drawings by its nineteenth century contractor indicated
the lengths of driven timber piles. The Author made the excusable error of
supposing that the contractor would not have underestimated the length of
pile (on which payment would have been based), but this in fact was the case.
The tunnel passed in consequence too close to the shoe of the pile. Constant
buffeting over the years by berthing ferries had tended to loosen the piles
which provided a preferential path for escape of compressed air, the path
enlarged by the mechanism of upward flow of air. The resulting loss of
ground into the tunnel was contained without injury, the cavity filled,
ground treatment undertaken and tunnelling resumed. The containment of
compressed air depends on the degree of homogeneity and continuity of the
ground; any disturbance to this pattern needs to be treated with suspicion
and investigated. The compressed air should be prevented from
accumulating at any level at a pressure equal or greater than the overburden.
Where compressed air is to be used, the stratigraphical sequence should be
studied in order to consider the possibility of the air leaking from the tunnel
being trapped beneath a relatively impermeable layer. It is more surprising to
find examples of compressed air failures whose primary cause has been that
of air pressure inside the tunnel exceeding that of the overburden.  
Figure 8.1 Clyde Tunnel blow in West Tunnel on 22 October 1960.
250 Hazards, disputes and their resolution
Another feature associated with compressed air arises where the air is
driven through organic or chemically reducing soils causing deoxygenation,
from a face under compressed air to another in free air or in compressed air
at a lower pressure. A more bizarre example of a comparable phenomenon
was that of the driving of the first RER Metro line in Paris from Etoile
towards the Pont de Neuilly. A shield was used with compressed air confined
to a compartment in the face of the shield. High temperatures called for
investigation which disclosed that pyrites nodules in the ground were being
oxidised by escaping air, leading to production of sulphuric acid, in its turn
causing accelerated corrosion of the plating of the shield (Kerisel 1969).
Other comparable incidents have been reported elsewhere in natural and
contaminated ground.
Many of the chemical resins used as special expedients for ground
treatment of fine soils or for sealing fissures of low aperture in rock are
highly toxic and require to be handled with appropriate care. Such
precautions are widely understood and the less readily controlled problem
occurs when they migrate to another cavity or to the surface as described in
Section 6.4.
Many incidents of greater or lesser significance have resulted from a
tunnel encountering open boreholes, wells and geological features filled with
water or loose water-bearing soil. Where past ownership of land is involved,
it may be possible by consulting old maps and documents to determine the
likely location of wells. There should be available records of recent
boreholes. For the Channel Tunnel, while boreholes sunk for the tunnel itself
were deliberately offset from the tunnel line (but this was periodically
changed) and had generally been conscientiously back-filled with a
bentonite-cement mixture to avoid risk of flooding the tunnel, the positions
of other boreholes sunk for hydrocarbon prospection had, so far as was
known, been left open and constituted an unknown hazard to the Tunnel.
Fortunately these were situated predominantly on the French side of the
Channel, where the TBMs were designed to operate in closed or open-face
mode. None was encountered during tunnelling. This is a hazard which may
merit consideration elsewhere in circumstances where exploration for other
purposes, lacking a discipline of effective back-filling of boreholes, may have
preceded a tunnel project.
So-called ‘anomalies’ encountered in London clay of Eocene age have
been attributed by different authors to different origins. The upper part of
each feature has the form of a non-circular funnel or basin with major and
minor axes variable around mean values of 50–100 m. Below, a more
irregular shape has been found, partially steep-sided, which may penetrate
the base of the clay, where underlying strata indicate some degree of
resulting uplift. An account by Hutchinson (1991) records 31 examples,
referring to drift-filled hollows in the surface of the London clay between
90 m and 470 m across and up to 30 m deep as scour hollows near the
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confluence of tributaries to a main river course at the time of their
formation. Hutchinson also concludes that, where the anomalies have
penetrated the London clay, these features are usually found near the
tapering edge of the clay (<35 m thickness) and where artesian water
would have been freeflowing, the lower strata thrust upwards as a result of
excess of hydraulic pressure from beneath. Hutchinson provides a
taxonomy of five different forms of anomaly associated with the London
clay, the formation of the processes mostly associated with cold climatic
periods or inter-glacial periods. A 6.1 km long, 2.5 m diameter tunnel
between Wraysbury and Iver in the Thames Valley encountered one such
anomaly in December 1983 at a depth of about 30 m. After consideration
of alternatives, ground treatment through a pattern of boreholes from the
surface, of the unstable mixture of sand, silt and clay was attempted,
combining claquage grouting using bentonite-cement with permeation
grouting with a silicate grout with ester hardener. This was unsuccessful,
indicated by failure of the silicate grout to penetrate some of the water-
bearing ground and by partial absence of setting of the grout. In
consequence, freezing by liquid nitrogen was undertaken through a series
of vertical holes on a grid of 1 m×1.2 m, based on a ‘rolling freeze’, freezing
proceeding with the advance of the tunnel. Periodical local problems were
caused by irregular inclination of some of the freeze holes.
The confined space within a tunnel is itself a contributory hazard. Where
the completed size of a small-diameter (say <3 m) tunnel is specified,
consideration should be given to the overall benefit of some increase for
safety, efficiency and economy, particularly for a TBM tunnel, possibly
requiring provisions for special expedients and for ground support. There
should for example be space for a continuous dry walkway for man access to
the face, alongside any rail track. Accidents have resulted, for example, from
a locomotive striking a bottle of propane gas stored too close to the track in
a confined tunnel. The provisions for flow of ingress of water should be
related to tunnel gradient. Where a TBM is used, regard must also be given
to the safety of reasonable access for those who may be required to
undertake maintenance or ground exploration ahead of the face of the
machine. Care needs to be taken in the routeing of tunnel services during
construction. Otherwise a single incident of, for example, a derailed skip,
may cut off power supplies with serious consequences. The design of
mechanical plant should not entail risk of injury or damage as a result of a
power failure, e.g. by the sudden drop of a load. These are examples of issues
to be considered, alongside Codes of Practice and statutory health and safety
regulations for work in tunnels to be undertaken to exemplary standards and
probably overall economy.
A number of other examples of tunnelling defects are described elsewhere
in this book. The nature of possible emergencies needs constantly to be
reviewed and the procedures rehearsed. For example, smoke associated with
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a fire is a major hazard to life and an obstruction to efficient fire-fighting as
a consequence of poor visibility.
Fire precautions in tunnels during construction need to take account of
specific features contributing to the hazard such as HT electrical circuits and
flammable hydraulic fluids (Tait and Høj 1996). The resort to intrinsically
safe electrical equipment and non-flammable fluids imposes high costs,
greater requirements for space and needs strong reason for justification,
against the alternative of rigorous fire safety measures. The effects of fire on
the permanent structure is described in Section 8.4. Working in compressed
air adds to the risk of fire in two respects: first by the increased availability of
oxygen; second, by any incipient smouldering, of timber support for
example, to be kindled by the draught of escaping air.
8.3 Methane
The danger of methane in tunnelling calls for special mention. As methane is
an odourless, invisible gas, circumstances leading to explosion may develop
without preliminary warning where steps have not been taken to identify the
potential conditions for methane to be found. Furthermore, the solubility of
methane in water may allow invasion of methane into a space apparently
isolated from gas entry from the ground. This gas may then come out of
solution. Methane may have a direct biological source from the breakdown
of organic matter or it may be of geological, i.e. palaeobiological, origin.
Methane causes an explosive mixture in air at concentrations (by weight)
between the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) of ~5% and Upper Explosive
Limit (UEL) of ~15%.
The methane explosion at Abbeystead in 1984 (Health and Safety
Executive 1985) illustrates a number of features of methane risk, providing a
cautionary tale for more generalised application. The tunnel (Figure 8.2), for
conveyance of water from the River Lune to the River Wyre in North-West
England passes through mudstone, siltstone and sandstone rocks of
Namurian (Lower Carboniferous) age. The possible inference of the
presence of hydrocarbons in the vicinity of the tunnel as a consequence of a
‘commercially confidential’ borehole at Whitmoor (7 km away from the
tunnel) had not been considered at the time of planning the project. As a
result, only routine detection of methane had been undertaken during
construction, using portable instruments unlikely to detect the presence of
methane in a well-ventilated tunnel, but the question remains arguable as to
whether some aspect of construction, involving for example the local
lowering of a perched water-table, might have been a trigger to start seepage
of methane, in which case the tunnel would have been virtually free of
methane during early stages of construction. Environmental considerations
led to the air vent from the tunnel ventilation valves being kept below ground
surface, discharging into the wet-room of the valve house (Figure 8.3).
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An explosion in May 1984 in the valve house, near to the point of discharge
into the River Wyre at Abbeystead (Orr et al. 1991), at the time of an
organised visit by the public, caused loss of life and major structural damage.
Investigation disclosed an operating practice, when no pumping had occurred
over extended periods, of cracking open a wash-out valve to avoid
development of stagnant water in a cul-de-sac portion of the tunnel. There was
a certain amount of nett income of ground-water to the tunnel but when the
outflow through the wash-out valve exceeded the inflow, this action had the
effect of lowering the water level in the upper part of the tunnel system,
forming an air void in consequence. When pumping resumed, the air expelled
Figure 8.2 Lune-Wyre transfer scheme.
Figure 8.3 Schematic arrangement of outfall works at Abbeystead (after Health
and Safety Executive 1985).
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from this void into the wet-room contained a high concentration of methane
which, on this occasion, created an explosive mixture.
A detailed study was made of the methane transmission paths, leading to
these general conclusions illustrated diagrammatically by Figure 8.4:
 
1. The methane is derived from source rocks at considerable depth.
2. The methane migrates upwards, along joints in the rock, driven by a ‘gas-
lift pump’ mechanism (reducing pressure causing the methane
concentration to exceed the equilibrium saturation level in the water and
to come out of solution, thus reducing the overall density of the
combined water and gas and hence the mechanism for the upward lift) to
a trap beneath a mudrock anticline in the vicinity of the tunnel.
3. Methane enters the tunnel partially as a gas (~50%?), partially in
solution, at a mean rate of about 8 kg/day, the rate varying inversely with
barometric pressure and with other factors only partially understood.
The total rate of inflow of methane was based on analysis of gas flow and
water flow over an extended period but the proportion entering in
solution is inferred from direct measurement when the tunnel was
dewatered.
Figure 8.4 Abbeystead: postulated mechanism of methane flow.
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An account of the investigation following the explosion is described by Orr
et al. (1991), partly based on geophysical prospection, partly on evidence
from the approximately exponential rate of reduction in methane entry into
the tunnel immediately following dewatering, from an initial maximum in
excess of 150 kg/day.
Since the factors controlling absorption and release of methane between
water and air are not readily accessible to tunnelling engineers, a brief
account is set out below. Except in perfectly still water, where molecular
diffusion would control, the flux rate F (i.e. rate of transfer of methane per
unit area of the water surface into or out of solution) is controlled by
turbulent diffusion and, for a gas such as methane which does not ionise in




where: Kw=Ku, where K is a constant and u=(τ/ρ)1/2 is shear velocity,
cw=concentration of gas dissolved in water, ca=concentration of gas in air,
H=Henry’s constant, τ=shear stress, and ρ=density of water.
At NTP, for 1 bar pressure of methane, i.e. 100% in air, for equilibrium
cw=27.4 mg/litre, with the value of cw increasing as temperature reduces and
as pressure increases. For flow in a tunnel, t is calculated from friction at the
tunnel wall for rate of the flow of water. For a particular rate of flow
therefore, where the concentration of methane in air is small enough to be
neglected, Fρ cw. The flux rate F will increase with increasing rate of flow,
where other factors remain constant.
Water diffusing from a water surface may give rise to a methane level in
air of 5%, the LEL for a concentration in the water of 5/100×27.4 mg/litre,
i.e. ~1.37 mg/litre (adjusted to prevailing temperature and pressure). During
intermission of several weeks between periods of transfer, the body of
stagnant water in the Lune-Wyre pipeline and tunnel absorbed considerable
quantities of methane, much of which came out of solution as the water
cascaded over a weir in the wet-room of the valve-house at Abbeystead.
Therefore, even with redesign of the air venting arrangements, the wet-room
has, as an additional precaution, been opened up to the air.
As a footnote to Abbeystead, it is instructive to summarise the legal
aspect. A charge of negligence was tried in the court, with considerable
technical evidence on the factors which contributed, without prior
appreciation of risk by the Parties concerned, to the explosion. The trial
judge, who indicated a wide measure of understanding the technical issues,
nevertheless found Employer, Engineer and Contractor all guilty of
negligence. Under English law, compensation to those affected depended
on proof of negligence. What was a little surprising was that the
Contractor should have been found to have failed to test for methane to an
acceptable standard; tunnelling practice at that time would not have
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required such testing to be undertaken unless there were reason to suspect
the presence of methane and, as stated above, the chance of detection in a
well-ventilated tunnel by a standard instrument would be remote. The
Court of Appeal dismissed the charge against the Contractor and
considered that the Employer was entitled to rely upon care in design and
supervision of the project by the Engineer. Two judges of the Court of
Appeal found the Engineer guilty of negligence but Lord Justice Bingham
dissented by reference to the test of professional negligence, based on such
precedents as the statement by the judge in the often cited case of Bolam v
Friern Hospital Management Committee of 1957 which contains this
phrase:
 
‘A man need not possess the highest expert skill at the risk of being
found negligent. It is well established law that it is sufficient if he
exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising
that particular art’.
 
For an engineer, comparison is to be made with the ‘ordinary competent
man’ (or woman) of the class to which the particular engineer claims to
belong. The question needs therefore to be asked in relation to alleged
negligence as to the special skills and the standard of performance of such
skills on which appointment to the project would be based in order to
establish this ‘class’.
It is probable that many tunnels with methane entry rates comparable to
those of Abbeystead are recorded as having been free of methane. The
portable instruments that have customarily been used to check for methane
during tunnel construction have a sensitivity that permits concentrations of
no less than about 10% of the LEL to be recorded, i.e. 0.5%. Such a
concentration would only be recorded in a well-ventilated tunnel with a
massive inflow or in a particularly stagnant area of the tunnel. There is then
no explicit assurance that, during periodical stoppages or in the event of
power failure, local dangerous concentrations of methane will not occur. A
surer means of safeguard, where potential danger from methane cannot be
dismissed, is by precise measurements of methane concentration in the air
discharged by the tunnel construction ventilation system; knowledge of the
rate of flow will then allow rate of methane inflow to be calculated. As the
tunnel advances, such measurements should be repeated if the risk of
migration from a methane source cannot be disregarded. This situation
occurred during the construction of an outfall tunnel in Sydney in permo-
triassic rocks overlying coal measures. When precise measurements were
made, in a tunnel hitherto believed to be free of methane, a rate of entry of
methane at a rate similar to that of Abbeystead was established. Provided the
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potential risks are understood, control of minor inflow of methane should
follow coal mining practice by reliance on assured dilution. The remarkable
explosion in the diversion tunnel at Furnas, Brazil (Lyra and MacGregor
1967) was caused by methane derived from rotting vegetation, a more
readily controlled source, once the potential hazard was identified.
During the construction of Brunel’s Thames Tunnel (Muir Wood 1994a)
considerable quantities of methane and of hydrogen sulphide entered the
tunnel with sewage-contaminated ground-water. The methane caused
periodical flares from the tunnel face, but the widespread use of candles to
light the works possibly contributed, by igniting the gas at the point of entry,
to the absence of the local gas concentrations coming within the explosive
limits (~5–15%).
Where tunnels traverse, or are close to, landfill sites, the potential risk of
methane needs to be anticipated. A cut-and-cover tunnel (as for the
Heathrow Express, Chapter 9) may be provided with an appropriate
protection by a thick clay cover with external venting and drainage or, where
greater potential danger threatens, by a more elaborate system incorporating
polymeric sheeting.
Where any inflow of water occurs, through the tunnel lining or through a
portal, the possibility of methane-bearing water must be foreseen, either
requiring continuous dilution, control at source or, where internal
ventilation is adequate, design of gullies or interceptors to ensure that their
local ventilation is sufficient to ensure no danger from methane
accumulating above the water surface as it comes out of solution.
Comparable precautions are needed in tunnels in which there may, in
operation, be spillages of inflammable or toxic liquids, including the
provision of periodical U-traps to contain spread of flame.
8.4 Defects during operation
Certain of the hazards described in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 may only become
apparent after the elapse of time such that the tunnel is already in service.
The consequences will be correspondingly more serious. There are also
many examples of natural deterioration with time, at a rate in excess of
that expected, on account of undetected factors such as particularly
aggressive ground-water. Such latent problems, involving as they do major
direct and indirect costs, should be foreseen as possibilities and
systematically eliminated as the result of specific investigation at the time
of initial planning or taken into account in estimating the life costs of a
particular option for a project. Many problems have been experienced of
corrosion of reinforced concrete tunnel linings by saline water, a problem
touched upon in Chapter 5.
A number of brick and masonry railway tunnels were constructed in the
nineteenth century in stiff clay or marl which did not appear to the engineers
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of the time to require invert arches. The passage of time, accompanying
reduced confining stress aided by repeated cycles of stress reversal from rail
traffic, has weakened the clay beneath the tracks and in consequence
impaired the stability of the footings of the arch. Remedial work may entail
the provision of a new invert in short lengths accompanied by temporary
propping between the footings. The Bopeep Tunnel (Campion 1967)
provides an example of a tunnel collapse when such remedial work was not
undertaken in time, leading to a parallel-sided block failure extending to the
ground surface.
Where electrification or other form of upgrading has required the
lowering of railway track, resistance against inward movement of the
footings of an arch tunnel constructed without invert is reduced and collapse
may occur. An instance of this nature affected a short, shallow brick tunnel
in Glasgow, where water services had been built into the tunnel arch below
the carriageway of a road crossing the railway. Here the process of collapse
was accelerated by fracture of the water-main. Legal argument, of little real
concern to the public, then ensued for some months between the two public
bodies concerned as to which was responsible. This was likely to be
inconclusive since the two events, tunnel movement and pipe fracture, were
mutually provocative in a progressive manner, incipient movement
coincident with increasing leakage.
An instance in Australia revealed, only at the time of proposed
electrification, when clearances became vital, distortion of a brick tunnel in
Geelong. Examination of the history of construction of the original tunnel in
1875 revealed that the distorted sections coincided with the positions of
intermediate working shafts. Almost certainly, squatting of the tunnel had
occurred as a result of inadequate compaction of backfilling in the working
spaces formed at the foot of each shaft, with associated dropping of the
crown of the tunnel and settlement of fill in the shaft. In all probability this
had occurred over many years, being only noticeable as the result of an
accurate survey.
Egger (1996) describes typical problems of swelling gypsum affecting
tunnelling in Stuttgart. Intact anhydrite (CaSO4) at depth shows little
tendency for swelling but towards the surface of the ground or where for
other reason the anhydrite is fractured, access of water permits hydration
to gypsum (CaSO4.2H2O) with associated swelling. Swelling potential of
gypsum has been measured between 1 and 4 MPa, which if unresisted may
result in an increase of volume of about 60%. The most common form of
swelling damage by gypsum has caused invert heave. Where the threat
exists, countermeasures have been either to seal off the possible access by
water (usually found to be a difficult operation) or, more positively, to
construct a massive invert capable of resisting swelling. Gysel (1977)
undertook an early analysis of the approach to tunnel design in such
circumstances.
Hazards, disputes and their resolution 259
A failure of a single-track rail tunnel dating from 1827 occurred beneath
the University of Kent at Canterbury in 1974. The tunnel had a cross
section of about 4 m×6 m with the major axis vertical. It is interesting that
M.I.Brunel commented to his son, I.K.Brunel (Harding 1981) in 1836 on a
tunnel of identical profile, with vertical walls between semi-circular arch
and invert: ‘They have not, I conceive, given sufficient arching to the
sides…’ The shape was doubtless prompted from simplicity in centring by
comparison with a preferable ellipse. At the area of failure over a length of
about 30 m, the tunnel was in London clay and passed beneath the
Cornwallis Building of the University. The line had been closed to traffic in
1952 and from 1964 the ends of the tunnel closed by bulkheads. There had
been evidence from inspections since 1952 of bulging of the sidewalls but
the precise mechanism of incipient failure was not identified. While the
tunnel remained ventilated, evaporation from the surface of the brickwork
would have enhanced the strength of the brickwork and would have
applied a suction to the clay around the tunnel, thereby increasing its
effective strength. The clay immediately around the tunnel was found to
have its moisture content increased by about 10% and a wedge-type failure
is surmised as the initiating mechanism (Vaughan et al. 1983). Increasing
inward bulging of the brickwork would cause increasingly concentrated
loading on weakened brickwork. At first, in 1974, two breaches were
observed in the lining, which later joined together and caused subsidence of
a vertical-sided block of clay.
A spectacular fire occurred on 18 November 1996 in the Channel
Tunnel, (Brux 1997) notwithstanding the elaborate safety precautions
built into the operation of this link. A lorry (HGV) loaded with expanded
polystyrene was ignited outside the tunnel, possibly by a flaming missile
thrown by a striker. The policy for dealing with a fire detected on a train
was for the transit of the tunnel to be completed and the fire extinguished
outside the tunnel. On this occasion, the fire affected a warning circuit
operated by a limit-switch relating to the vehicle-loading mechanism. If
this were out of its correct stowage position, it could foul the loading
gauge appropriate to the tunnel. The train stopped in consequence and
the temperature of the fire rapidly caused local melting of the soft metal
fixing the power cable to its support. The power cable dropped and the
resulting short-circuit cut off power. The train crew and HGV drivers
escaped to the service tunnel provided for such eventuality, some affected
by smoke since instructions for using the ventilation system to ease
escape were slow to take effect. A major contributory cause of this
incident was that, initially, the intention had been for the HGV wagons to
be enclosed and for any fire to be extinguished by the automatic release
of Halon gas. During wagon design, increasing complexity introduced
weight and restrictive interpretation of maximum axle-loading caused
the canopy of the wagon to be omitted thereby eliminating such a
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possibility for fire control; the overall risk does not appear to have been
fundamentally reconsidered at this late point in construction of the
project. Smoke from the vehicle had been seen by a security guard before
the train entered the tunnel but there was no procedure for immediate
notification of the train control centre. As a consequence of this incident,
several operational changes were made, including provisions more
readily to tackle such a fire within the tunnel.
A feature of this fire was that within the tunnel the temperature rose to
1000°C or more and caused spalling of the reinforced concrete lining over a
length of about 500 m and for part of this length back to the rear
reinforcement in the 400 mm thick segments. Spalling was principally
attributed to high pressures from trapped moisture in a dense concrete.
Fortunately this incident occurred where no immediate risk of irruption by
sea (which could have helped to extinguish the blaze?) or ground was
threatened. Repair made use of sprayed concrete. An internal layer of
foamed concrete has been recommended as a protection against such
damage to a vulnerable tunnel elsewhere.
8.5 Disputes
Disputes are expensive and time-consuming. A tunnel project will entail
some degree of uncertainty. The first elementary step, often ignored,
particularly where project responsibilities are fragmented, is to identify the
causes for uncertainty and to establish that procurement and contractual
arrangements take these adequately into account (Chapter 7).
8.5.1 Causes of disputes
The commonest causes for disputes in tunnelling occur where the project has
changed, or has appeared to change, in such a way that the rates or terms for
undertaking the work are alleged as being no longer applicable. The
Contract may or may not make provision for a stated degree of variation.
For tunnelling contracts, the most likely single cause for dispute arises from
claims for unforeseeable conditions of the ground, affecting the costs of
construction and possibly of consequential remedial work. Uncertainty as to
the base from which any important change is to be measured is a significant
cause for dispute, for immeasurable argument and for rich pickings for the
lawyers. The use of Reference Conditions (CIRIA 1978), described in
Section 2.6, is a valuable control, used with discretion and adequately
related to the features affecting the choice of a specific scheme of
construction. It is interesting to find that this same concept has been
reinvented in the United States 19 years later under the title Geotechnical
Baseline Report (ASCE 1997). Where geological interpretation has failed to
appreciate the sensitivity of a particular means of construction, a problem
may arise when the Contractor elects to adopt such a means. Similar
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problems may arise where the particular circumstances associated with
ground-water have not been understood, or not been revealed by site
investigation information available at the time of Tender.
Problems relating to the ground are exacerbated where all geological risk
is thrust onto the Contractor. Either exposure by the Contractor to excessive
financial risk may result or the cost of the project to the Owner will be very
high, or usually both. Since there is then no available evidence as to the base
line of expectations, no opportunity for handling unexpected risk by
contributions from revisions to planning or redesign of the works, no
assurance of compatibility with the selected scheme of construction,
uncertainty is multiplied and all Parties suffer. It deserves emphasis that, by
imposing all responsibility on the Contractor, the possibility of changes to
the project, to help in solving an unexpected problem, will entail a Variation
which may undermine the basis of the Contract. If the Contract contains any
feature that has deliberately or inadvertently misled the Contractor into
supposing a lesser risk, or where relevant information known to the
Employer or Engineer has not been made available to the tenderers, the
grounds for dispute are established. It is also highly improbable that an
adequate hazard assessment will have been undertaken in the circumstances
of the Contractor bearing all geological risk. These are all features of poor
and expensive project management.
Where the Contract is administered by an Engineer who has been
responsible for the planning and design of the project, with the associated
studies, he will, on the approach of an incipient problem, be in a position to
explore how revisions to layout or concepts of design might assist towards a
solution at least cost to the Employer and making best use of the resources of
the Contractor. Where the Engineer (or the Supervisor under the New
Engineering Contract) has had partial or negligible concern with developing
the project, he will be unable readily to propose such a contribution and may
not have the powers to do so. An Engineer appointed to a fragmented
project, moreover, is likely to find that he, having been appointed under
some such title as ‘Design Contractor’, not enjoying a professional
relationship with the Owner, may be the subject of litigation from his own
Client, a further barrier to finding a coordinated solution whose antecedent
causes lie in the very fragmentation.
A particular category of problems may arise for a Target Contract
(Section 7.6). The Target Value should be established on the basis of
assumed and agreed Reference Conditions which may then be used for the
basis of establishing change. For a simple case, where the basis of estimate
is related explicitly to a stated distribution of recognisable objective
characteristics of the ground, there should be no problem in revising the
value of the Target. If the assumed Reference Conditions are not explicit
there may be a problem. A problem also arises for design-and-build
projects where it may be suggested that the increase in cost is at least
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partially caused by the adoption of a scheme of construction intolerant to
change in the conditions of the ground. This type of problem may be
averted by the undertaking of a hazard assessment prior to acceptance of
the scheme of construction.
Where the Contract is controlled by an Engineer, a mechanism is in place
to settle problems expeditiously. A serious condition arises when the
Engineer fails to behave in an ethically neutral manner. In a notorious case,
which did not proceed to arbitration, the Engineer, not foreseeing possible
geological hazard, had undertaken to his Client to complete a tunnelling
project within a stated budget. When such a hazard intervened, a claim for
compensation by the Contractor was rejected.
Problems may arise from the Contract Documents themselves, of which
examples are:
 
1. Incompatibility between different sections of the documents without
clear indication of precedence.
2. Inappropriate documentation, caused by inadequate knowledge of
tunnelling in the preparation of the documents. A drainage authority,
familiar with work near the ground surface, specified forms of grouting
of rock at depth applicable to a shallow tunnel in soft ground.
3. Inappropriate assumptions of responsibility by the Engineer for an aspect
of construction which is then unsuccessful. There are occasions where the
continuity in control between design and construction is essential for an
innovative scheme of tunnelling, where it is correct for the experienced
Engineer to establish the essential ingredients of the scheme of
construction. There are other occasions where inexperience has caused
the problems. For the Carsington water supply scheme, where water-
bearing shaley mudrocks presented difficult tunnelling conditions, the
Engineer assumed responsibility for a vital step in construction, namely
the means of assuring a stable tunnel face, without a clear idea as to how
this was to be achieved. Specified shields and road-headers obstructed the
working faces of each tunnel preventing access to undertake the support
and drainage measures which were the appropriate means for control.
4. Vagueness or misleadingly absolute requirements in specification. What
does it mean when a tunnel is required to be watertight? Engineers may
know what they mean but lawyers may take the requirement literally.
CIRIA (1979), for example, provides a set of specific standards of
dryness.
5. Impossibility of performance. It may be impossible, without special
expedients which are excluded, to comply with stated limits of ground
movement. Achievement of the completion period would require a form
of construction that would fail to satisfy some other provision of the
Contract.
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The Channel Tunnel was a hybrid of curious contractual parentage. While
the Conditions of Contract between Eurotunnel (Employer) and Trans-
Manche-Link (Contractor) were based on FIDIC, variations to this
document served to confuse the situation. For example, there was
considerable play upon the concept of ‘optimisation’, generally understood
in such a context as establishing the best balance between capital cost and
operating cost. The term offers almost infinite scope for interpretation where
one Party bears the greater part of the capital costs, the other Party the costs
of operation and maintenance, with the absence of provisions for
‘transparency’ in either respect. The Engineer, essential for the balance of a
FIDIC type contract, was transmuted into the somewhat emasculated form
of mâitre d’oeuvre, with powers of advice but not of decision, which body
was then largely, and unilaterally, absorbed into Eurotunnel. Tunnelling was
the subject of a Target Contract, scarcely appropriate when not even the
tunnel diameter was known at the time of Tender. Fixed equipment,
including Terminal Buildings and equipment throughout, was nominally a
Lump Sum, but subject to a great amount of variation as the project
developed. Rolling stock was included as a series of Provisional Sums. The
Anglo-French Safety Commission, only appointed a year after work had
begun, was responsible for setting operational standards, which changed as
the project developed. It is remarkable that this project, the subject of so
much attention by Governments and by such bodies as the British Major
Projects Association, should have demonstrated so many egregious and
elementary errors in its contractual constitution. It provides a cautionary tale
on an unaffordable scale. The main lesson is that a project of this nature
requires a deliberate period for project definition and for examination of the
several causes for uncertainty before work is commissioned. No overall loss
in time would have resulted for the Channel Tunnel with such an approach.
The engineers who contributed so much to the project deserved better from
the financial direction of the Project.
8.5.2 Resolution of disputes
Disputes arising from tunnelling projects are liable to be costly, protracted
and to absorb much nugatory time and effort of engineers and others better
occupied in a productive capacity. The first objective must therefore be to
prevent disputes from arising or, where this appears unlikely to be
practicable, to provide a short simple system for their resolution.
If we look back to 1978, say, the British contractual system depended on
a Contract between Employer and Contractor administered by an
independent Engineer who, apart from designing the project, controlled
and ruled on questions raised by Contractor (or occasionally the
Employer) arising from the terms and conditions of the Contract, for
tunnelling often associated with questions of foreseeability of the
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characteristics of the ground. The best Engineers studied carefully the
information available about the ground in order to assist the Contractor in
selecting a compatible system of working and to prepare for dealing with
aspects of uncertainty which might affect the costs of the preferred scheme
of construction. There have always been opportunities to make provisions
in the Contract for dealing with important uncertainties, codified, for
example, in the use of Reference Conditions (CIRIA 1978) from which to
be able to measure departures, to reduce argument over what was
reasonably foreseeable. During this period, it was also the prerogative of
the Engineer to have access to the basis used by the Contractor in
constructing his unit rates so that the same formulae could be used for
pricing additional work. It seems that this condition has recently been
rediscovered by lawyers under the term ‘escrow’. Chapter 7 has discussed
the choice of form of procurement appropriate for tunnelling, including the
possible modifications to the New Engineering Contract to enable benefit
to be derived by tunnelling from its undoubted improvements upon
predecessors.
The essence of the operation of this ‘traditional’ system was the
independence of the Engineer. Problems arose when the Engineer,
possibly influenced by concern over the source of fees (or salary for an
Engineer internal to a Client Authority) or by the possibility that extra
costs claimed by the Contractor might be related to deficiencies in design,
acted in a defensive manner. Another problem arose where certain large
Authorities reduced the powers of the Engineer below those stated in the
Contract and thus destroyed the intended equilibrium of the ICE and
FIDIC Contracts—a source of special grievance where the Engineer failed
to make this explicit to the Contractor. The system depended on mutual
trust between the Engineer and his Client. This became sadly eroded
when the Client, instead of turning to the Engineer for advice as to how
to overcome a problem, would first involve a lawyer, effectively
preventing a resolution of the issue at a professional level. The alternative
was bound to be expensive and suboptimal. The effects are more
profound. All good engineering, introducing innovation to the benefit of
the project and its Owner, must entail periodical mistakes, usually
insignificant in relation to the project overall. If however each such
instance is to provoke intervention of the law, the Engineer and the entire
project will tend to be conservative in intention and expensive in out-
turn. The consequence has been increased cost, reduced innovation,
increased confrontation. This adversary situation has for many years
attracted comment in the USA and more recent steps for improvement.
As a consequence, it is noticeable that, in the USA, there is a greater
chasm between ‘design’ and ‘construction’ than in Europe or Japan,
leading to greater conservatism and legal intervention. Most innovation
in tunnelling has either come from overseas or from plant manufacturers.
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The ICE or FIDIC Contract in 1978 included arrangements for
Arbitration, in the event that the decision of the Engineer was unacceptable
to the Employer or Contractor. The Arbitrator was likely to be an engineer of
considerable experience in the type of work, either active or recently retired,
capable of judging a situation through the eyes of those entering into such a
Contract in the circumstances of the Project concerned.
At around this time changes were already occurring, at first with the
Arbitration system. Presentation of the case for each Party was no longer
through the responsible engineers but through the intermediary of barristers.
As a consequence, the Arbitrator, who had previously relied on external
Counsel for advice on legal issues, required a greater degree of legal training
and was increasingly drawn from a list of professional Arbitrators remote
from the practice of engineering, even if some were engineers manqués. The
consequences have been greatly protracted and litigious proceedings
engaged increasingly with legal issues of marginal bearing of the particular
claim and frequently well beyond the limits of thoughts of those who entered
into the Contract, lacking the virtues of speed, low cost and a form of rough
justice appropriate to the circumstances of civil engineering, particularly of
underground, projects. The costs of the process have in consequence
frequently been well in excess of the sum at issue and with decreasing benefit
of arbitration as opposed to a civil action at law. A statistic for 1997
indicates that only one-sixth of the costs of Arbitration for construction
disputes in Britain of £750 m, returned to one or other of the Parties to the
proceedings. Much of this cost relates to tunnelling and the figures exclude
much direct and indirect costs relating to the time of skilled engineers
distracted to such a preoccupation.
While the presence of the independent Engineer as administrator of the
Contract remains appropriate for projects capable of definition and control
within a framework which does not interact unduly with the operating
policies of the Employer or with other contracts administered by others,
other arrangements discussed in Chapter 7 provide satisfactory alternative
systems for the circumstances described. In these arrangements, the
Employer takes an active part, even the leading part, in the project
administration, through engineers competent to introduce solutions to
problems that have significance beyond the Contract, with the overall quest
for optimisation uppermost, that is to say optimisation of construction
combined with operation. As described in Chapter 7, a flexible approach to
the Contract relationships remains essential, in view of inherent uncertainty.
Variations of a nature foreseen from the outset can then be introduced to the
overall benefit of the project and to achieving the operating desiderata.
Ultimately, where ‘partnering’ occurs (Section 7.6) all such discussions and
variations take place within a single team with common incentives for
achieving the objectives of the Client’s ‘business case’. There are many
intermediate arrangements, whereby profit derived from a project is related
266 Hazards, disputes and their resolution
to the success achieved overall. An essential element is that of transparency
in all aspects concerning the technical features of the project, provision for
interchange on aspects that might be improved and generally the
encouragement of professional competence to complement the commercial
capability of each participant.
Where there is no independent Engineer (e.g. where the Project has
been designed by a team headed by the Employer), or where the powers
of the Engineer are curtailed, expediency and economy require the
presence of a first point of appeal, able to give a rapid technical decision
on matters requiring resolution. There is much evidence to support the
benefit of the provision in the Contract for the participation of a Dispute
Resolution Board (DRB), or a body of such a function under a similar
title. This Board usually comprises three or more engineers of
considerable practical project experience (from the author’s experience,
academics do not make effective DRB members) whose fields of activity
are somewhat complementary and relate to work of nature similar to that
of the Project. The Board retains a familiarity with the project, by being
provided with all contract documents, by periodical visits and meetings
with the principal engineers concerned with the project. The DRB is
available in consequence to respond rapidly to matters of dispute referred
to it by one or other Party. The greatest success of such a Board,
dependent on the degree of consideration for equity in the Contract,
particularly the provision for risk-sharing, occurs where the mere
presence of the DRB encourages the Parties to internal resolution of
potential disputes, aware that the DRB will reach conclusions that
depend expressly on technical appraisal of the points at issue and not on
enlargement of the case into areas of legal intricacy beyond the intentions
of the Parties to the Contract. This approach satisfactorily inhibits the
legal advisors to the Parties from their incorrigible hankering for forensic
complexity.
While the DRB members should be capable of understanding the
engineering principles and have a general familiarity with site practices they
do not necessarily require to contain between them expertise in every aspect
of a possible reference, relying principally upon their ability to understand
statements by engineers working within such areas who appear on behalf of
the Parties, or in exceptional cases on independent authorities to whom the
DRB should have the power to turn. From experience of the system, so long
as the proceedings are conducted by engineers, such a need is rare.
Where disputes may develop as a result of differing interpretations
between the Parties of features of the Contract, it is highly desirable that
reference be made to the DRB before any considerable sum of
expenditure has been incurred within the area of contention. Otherwise,
liabilities without adequate control may be incurred by one Party,
encouraged by legal or other advice that the bill may be passed for
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settlement by the other Party. The cost has been incurred and there is then
no solution other than apportionment of this additional cost, a ‘zero-
sum’ situation (Section 7.2). Moreover, if left to fester, issues accrete and
resolution of the original problem becomes increasingly difficult to
determine equitably.
While the precise rules of operation of the DRB will depend on the nature
of the project, the general pattern may be summarised thus:
 
1. Members of the DRB should be independent from (or declare to the
satisfaction of the Parties) any current relationship with either Party.
2. Membership of the DRB and appointment of Chairman will be agreed
between the Parties at the time of appointment of the Contractor.
3. Members of the DRB shall have experience in the type of work of the
Project.
4. There should be agreed arrangements for the provision of documents,
organisation of periodical meetings and visits to the Works, to
familiarise the DRB with the progress of the work and with any incipient
problem. It is important to develop a mutual understanding and
confidence between the Parties and the DRB.
5. The Parties should make the greatest efforts to settle differences of view,
and to define precisely the area which defies resolution, prior to the
presentation of a dispute to the DRB.
6. Formal rules will be established for the notification of a Dispute to the
DRB, in writing and presentation at a hearing, including responsibility
for logistics.
7. The DRB should determine, for agreement with the Parties, the rules of
operation in the event of a Dispute including a stated period of, say, 10–
14 days after the hearing for the DRB to issue their recommendations to
the Parties, with provision for a longer period, by agreement with the
Parties, possibly with supplementary hearings, in the event of a complex
Dispute.
8. The DRB should strive towards a unanimous decision; where this is
impossible, a dissenting view would be provided identifying the specific
area of disagreement.
9. There will be a stated period of, say, 10–14 days, for acceptance of the
recommendations of the DRB by the Parties, after which the
recommendation will be binding on the Parties.
10. It is important that the operation of the DRB and the mechanism for
acceptance of its decisions and recommendations should be explicit in
the Contract (to avoid complications with insurers and others).
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has developed and been used in the
USA since the early 1980s to overcome the mounting costs of litigation and
to provide more relevant means for settling disputes. See for example
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Thomas et al. (1992). ADR takes several forms, which may include DRB,
but including also arrangements which introduce a single mediator into
discussions between the Parties or a private hearing before a judge. However,
ADR generally maintains the expensive and inappropriate feature of a
distinct legal flavour. In Britain there is a requirement that a contract shall
make explicit provision for dispute resolution.
The merit of DRB in an appropriate risk-sharing form of contract as
described above is that it is a practical remedy acceptable to the Parties, but
not having meticulous concern with points of law which, while having
possible bearing on the Contract from a lawyer’s viewpoint, were not
influential to the attitudes and behaviour of the Parties. If the DRB is put into
a legal setting, its operation is inhibited and the process tends to develop the
current failings of Arbitration by complication and diversion into legal
byways, of interest to neither Party. Not only will the DRB then become
more expensive and long-drawn in its operation, by virtue of its infection by
high legal fees and costs, but all aspects will be affected by the legal
intermediaries, aided no doubt by another trans-Atlantic import, the ‘claims
engineer’ who comes between the engineers who work on the project and the
DRB. The DRB should be seen as a constructive part of a project team with
interest in promoting the overall success of the Project in the interest of the
Parties to it.
The Channel Tunnel and the Øresund Link, comparable projects based on
totally different philosophies of project management, each included
provisions for Dispute Resolution.
The dispute arrangements for the Channel Tunnel, established within the
legalistic trappings preferred by the dominant banking interests, were
dominated by lawyers. Generally remote from the engineers putting their
best abilities towards the construction of a demanding complex project,
confrontation was the keynote of the references to the Dispute Panel. The
Contractor was responsible for the greater part of design of the project,
subject to an elaborate system of approval by the Employer. The Dispute
Panel was appointed by Eurotunnel (Employer) and Trans-Manche-Link
(TML, the Contractor) and was seen as the first stage to Arbitration which,
itself, was conducted by lawyers appointed through the International
Chamber of Commerce. In such circumstances, issues were only brought to
the Panel when large sums of money had already been committed. Any
solution was therefore of a ‘zero-sum’ nature—disregarding the not
inconsiderable costs of the large teams assembled for each dispute. This was
an unsatisfactory arrangement but at least the Dispute Panel helped to avert
the costs, greater possibly by an order of magnitude, that would have been
entailed in full-blown Arbitration of each issue.
The Øresund Link, based on a form of contract developed by engineers
and including provisions for the sharing of risk, depends for its
construction on four main Contracts: the bridge (7.8 km); the immersed
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tunnel (3.5 km); dredging and reclamation, including the construction of
an artificial island 4 km long, where tunnel and bridge meet through
transitions of road and rail. The permanent works were designed by the
Owner and his consultants with provisions for variation by the
Contractors. Each Contract has a Dispute Review Board whose terms of
reference correspond generally to items 1–10 earlier. The Dispute Boards
maintain close links with the project, through periodical meetings and
visits, principally serving as a reminder of the immediate availability of an
objective view on any point that eludes the participants. All discussions are
between engineers prompted by common interests, assured by the
Contracts, for completion to time and budget of the Project as a whole, as
well as the individual Contracts.
This comparison of dispute resolution arrangements represents one
difference among many between major projects, dominated by financial
interests, who rely on defensive postures protected by what they believe to be
fortified positions, and those established by engineers who understand the
essential element of cooperation across all those aspects of design which
should contribute to a well conceived project. Differences in control of time
and cost of these two projects should provide the best evidence of the
preferred approach. At the present time, whereas the Channel Tunnel was
about 72% over budget and about two years late, the Øresund Link at the
time of writing appears to be generally within budget and on time. Bankers
should understand that a major underground project has negligible value
(growing mushrooms?) prior to completion and operating. Instead of
insisting on premature timed ‘milestones’ for payment, conditional on their
achievement, which give no protection to finance and may—and do—
provoke an over-hasty start, a project, if to be designed by the Contractor,
should begin with a period of 18–24 months of deliberate preparation. This
could have saved the Channel Tunnel a large proportion of the over-run in
cost.
To repeat once again, the essence of the formula for success throughout
a tunnelling project depends on the appreciation of the professional
demands made upon the participants. Where requirements may be
specified with a high degree of certainty, the technical competence of each
may be exploited without provision for change in the undertaking. It is the
inherent uncertainty in tunnelling which demands the high degree of
professionalism, the ability to see beyond the solving of individual
technical problems by the pooling of special skills for the benefit of the
project overall, the realisation of the Owner’s business plan, and a
profitable and rewarding experience for all concerned. The lawyer’s
approach is contrary to this objective, erecting a shell of protective clauses
around each participant and leaving each to solve problems in isolation—
at the expense of one or more of the other parties. This does not make for
good engineering.
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Generally, there is a wide degree of available knowledge and experience of
how to undertake large underground projects successfully, but there are
continuing examples of wilful failure to learn the necessary and sufficient
features by those who commission new projects. A main objective of this
book is to help to discriminate between good and bad practices in all aspects
from the initial concept through to the avoidance of disputes and the
resolution of those which are unavoidable.
Chapter 9
 
Coda: the Heathrow Tunnel
collapse
 
‘…the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.’
‘The dog did nothing in the night-time.’
‘That was the curious incident.’
Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, A.Conan Doyle.
9.1 The context of the project
As this book was about to go to press, the legal action arising from the tunnel
collapse at Heathrow Airport in 1994 came to court. In consequence, it is
now possible, as a personal view, to recount the circumstances, to identify
the contributory factors and to point to lessons to be learned for the future.
These lessons are instructive and bear much relevance to the principal
themes of other chapters. Following the collapse in October 1994, Britain’s
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) established an investigating team
overseen by a Supervisory Board to which the Author was appointed as an
external member (Health and Safety Executive 1996). The Author also
subsequently served as Expert Witness to the HSE in the indictment
proceedings brought against Contractor and Specialist Consultant under the
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
The practicability of using systems of tunnelling in London clay based on
Informal Support (Chapter 5) had been discussed, generally favourably, for
several years. On 17 February 1994, a debate on the subject was organised
by the British Tunnelling Society. The Author seconded the motion but
insisted that the fragmented system of project management currently in
favour by London Underground and the British Airports Authority for the
tunnelling projects in London needed to be radically changed. The
organisational features for success were then reiterated in September 1994
(Muir Wood 1994b), thus:
‘Good tunnelling practice demands continuity and interaction of
planning, investigation, conceptual design, detailed design and
construction. Each is dependent to a degree on the others. A site
272 Coda: the Heathrow Tunnel collapse
investigation, for example, needs to be directed to obtaining
information of particular relevance to a specific form of tunnelling;
where unexpected features are revealed, the tunnelling strategy may
need to be reconsidered and the site investigation appropriately varied.
Conceptual design and construction are particularly interdependent
since the former may depend upon quite specific features of the latter
for success, with the need to ensure that these are rigorously
implemented.
Present trends in commissioning tunnelling tend to ignore a
condition for good tunnelling: the overall management of the design
process. The many engineering activities of a project are subdivided
and performed sequentially or separately, with only limited
coordination. This ensures that interaction cannot occur and that the
specific needs cannot be addressed in the early phases.
The single motive appears to be to ensure fixed costs of each
fragmented activity, an objective far removed from obtaining good
value for money. The costs may well be fixed—up to a point—but the
price for so doing will be high and good tunnelling practice suffers in
consequence. The goal of economic tunnelling, which benefits all
involved, is effectively prevented.
Moreover there are greatly increased risks of disputes and litigation
because of the attempt to unload all responsibilities into construction.
This procedure is as good for the legal profession as it is disastrous for
good engineering.
Tunnelling methods based on the observational method (ISOM) [i.e.
Informal Support based on the Observational Method] are particularly
incapable of optimisation where the overall project is fragmented.’
 
The absence of consideration for the criteria of a system of contract
management suitable for tunnelling and dependence on the New
Engineering Contract (NEC) (Institution of Civil Engineers 1993) not
previously applied to tunnelling, paid inadequate regard to the need for
special considerations and provisions to make it suitable for the purpose. In
particular, the NEC, reissued in 1995 as the NEC Engineering and
Construction Contract (Institution of Civil Engineers 1995), subdivides the
traditional function in Britain of the Engineer (Chapter 7) into those of
designer, Project Manager and Supervisor coupled with the statement that
the functions of the designer are limited ‘to develop the design to the point
where tenders for construction are to be invited’. The NEC advises that the
roles of designer, Project Manager and Supervisor may be combined ‘where
the objectives of the Employer are served by so doing’ but there is no
guidance as to the circumstances for such combination. As discussed in
relation to the Øresund Link Project in Section 7.1, where responsibility for
quality is placed upon the Contractor in a competitive contract, a rigorous
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assessment is needed to ensure that full provision is made to undertake this
role comprehensively and conscientiously, under terms which will be
understood by the tenderers. Informal Support is essentially a design-led
activity. With the break between pre-Tender design and post-Tender design
for these tunnels at Heathrow, there was therefore need to ensure a full
understanding of the responsibilities thus accepted by the Contractor and the
adequacy of the means to undertake these functions. The evidence that
emerged during the hearing indicated that no adequate heed was given to the
precautionary measures needed when working in circumstances so
unfamiliar to those concerned. It deserves note that such actions would have
been required by the 1994 CDM regulations.
Heathrow Express provides a high-speed rail service between London and
Heathrow Airport, by means of a spur from the main railway line from
Paddington, London to Bristol (Figure 9.1). The spur goes underground in a
cut-and-cover tunnel through a landfill site, with precautions against
methane entry which included a surround of recompacted clay spoil from the
tunnelling, provisions for interception of infiltration, a ventilated filter and
capping. The remainder of the running tunnels is constructed predominantly
with expanded precast linings, while the Station tunnels at the Central
Terminal Area (CTA) and at Terminal 4 make use of Informal Support
(NATM) for the Platform and Concourse Tunnels.
Mott MacDonald (MM) were responsible for layout planning and
supervision of site investigation. Contracts included responsibility for
detailed design and for the option of Informal Support. The Contract was
awarded to Balfour Beatty (BB) who appointed Geoconsult (GC) as their
specialist NATM consultant. A project management structure was
established by BAA, under the name of HEX, including staff seconded
from Taylor Woodrow Management Contracting Ltd (TWM) as Project
Manager and MM as Lead Designer. This was known as the ‘Seamless
Team’ for project management but it was divorced from the management
of construction, all details of which were entrusted to BB with retention by
HEX only of powers of periodical ‘audit’. MM were responsible for the
design of permanent works and as checkers of ground settlement.
Separately, MM were appointed by BB to advise on control of settlement
by compensation grouting. There were in consequence virtually two
separate ‘managements’ with, between them, only a tenuous link.
Potentially—and as events proved in reality—this was hazardous for a
novel system of tunnelling in London clay, a system fundamentally
dependent on control by design through observation and monitoring,
under an unfamiliar form of contract.
In view of the technical novelty, a trial tunnel to the same geometry as the
future Platform and Concourse Tunnels had been constructed on the line of a
running tunnel at Heathrow, demonstrating three possible forms of
construction (Bowers et al. 1996):
Figure 9.1 Layout of Heathrow Express project.
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• Type (i) the use of two side headings with central enlargement.
• Type (ii) the use of a single side heading with enlargement.
• Type (iii) crown heading and bench, with a temporary scroll of shotcrete
lining at the base of the crown sidewall (‘pretzel’ to Austrian engineers, a
feature of tunnels without invert in Germany in the early twentieth
century).
 
Each type was constructed for a length of about 30 m. Cover to the tunnel
was about 16m, as opposed to 20 m at CTA. Measurements were taken of
lining deflections (convergence), of ground ‘stress’, of piezometric pressures
and ground movements. Immediate surface settlement of about 25 mm was
measured for Type (ii), somewhat more for Type (i) and, affected by delayed
installation of invert, about 35 mm for Type (iii).
9.2 The project unfolds
BB and GC elected to adopt Type (ii) (see above) for the construction of the
Station tunnels at CTA. Work was undertaken by breaking out from the Fuel
Depot Shaft previously sunk for access. Initially, in May 1994, work
concentrated on the central Concourse Tunnel (Figure 9.2) with the intention
of advancing at a rate of 4.2 m per week. For a number of reasons, including
material supply for the sprayed concrete (dry process), progress averaging
only about 1.5 m per week fell behind programme. BB decided in
consequence to start construction of the Down Line Platform Tunnel in
September 1994, followed soon thereafter by the Up line Platform Tunnel.
As a part of their undertaking BB were liable for making good damage that
might be caused by failure to respect settlement limits for structures above
the tunnels. These structures included (Figure 9.2) Camborne House and the
Piccadilly Line of London Underground.
There is no evidence of a comprehensive risk analysis having been
undertaken, addressed specifically to the allocation of responsibilities. This
is particularly surprising for three associated reasons:
 
1. This was a novel tunnelling technique for use in London clay.
2. Success of the method depended upon a systematic relationship between
design and construction, the former needing to address all pertinent
factors, the latter needing rigorously to conform to the conditions
imposed by the former.
3. As explained above, this was a Contract under the terms of the New
Engineering Contract allocating powers and duties in an unfamiliar
manner between Employer and Contractor, coupled with the
responsibility of self-certification by the Contractor as quality control, in
the place of independent inspection or assurance of conformity to design.
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It is apparent that these issues contributed to the ‘climate of risk’ (Pugsley
1966) in which the works were being constructed without provision for the
counter-measures demanded by such circumstances.
For an unexplained reason, GC had predicted a maximum settlement of
only 9 mm as the first tunnel, the Concourse Tunnel, passed beneath
Camborne House (Figure 9.2), although comparison with the Trial Tunnel
(Atzl and Mayr 1994), would have suggested a figure of around 25 mm—as
was in fact predicted by others—in the event, possibly somewhat greater on
account of the slower rate of progress of the Concourse Tunnel. Although a
shaft was available for use for compensation grouting, mobilisation in
advance of tunnelling had not been made for Camborne House. In August
1994, when the Concourse Tunnel was already beyond Camborne House,
compensation grouting—or more correctly grout jacking since it was
required to lift the ground and the two-storey building—was undertaken in
mid-August to reduce settlement, which had already exceeded the figure of
25 mm. This grouting had the effect of depressing the crown of the tunnel by
a maximum of 60 mm or more, leading to approximately circumferential
cracks around Chainage 60 (measured in metres from axis of the Fuel Depot
Shaft). Evidence from optical targets, attached to the periphery of the tunnel
(but none was in place between Ch. 54 and 72—for chainages, see Figure
9.2) for convergence measurement, showed a general depression of the
tunnel over a length of at least 72 m. Evidence from the optical targets, as
Figure 9.2 Tunnelling at Central Terminal Area (extent of excavation by 20
October 1994).
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explained in Section 9.3, points to a closure across the tunnel invert.
Investigation, which required removal of clay ‘running’, the clay spoil
replaced over the finished invert to a depth of about 1 m to provide a running
surface for plant access, indicated that the invert joint had failed, with one
side riding over the other. The damaged section was repaired over a length of
about 20 m but the repair did not extend to the first constructed length of
tunnel from about Ch. 15 to Ch. 54, despite evidence at this time from
partial arrays of optical targets at Ch. 30 and 41 of anomalous distortion of
the tunnel through this length. In mid-September work started on the lengths
of Down Line and Up Line Platform Tunnels, alongside the Concourse
Tunnels, spaced for the most part at centres of about 16 m and 21 m from the
Concourse Tunnel (Figure 9.3).
Records of movements of the tunnels, obtained from survey by
precise theodolite equipped for electronic distance measurement, were
usually recorded and plotted daily. Figure 9.4 indicates a vector plot,
simplified to show movements of target points (Ch. 41) at monthly
intervals. When survey errors are smoothed out, the daily plots at Ch.
30. and Ch. 41 indicate generally continuing distortions at a slightly
accelerating rate until the last week of September, when the rate notably
increased and the rate of increase continuously accelerated at a period when
the Platform Tunnels were approaching Ch. 30. Some concern was expressed
by the HEX team but no action was taken. Belatedly, on 18 October,
Figure 9.3 Cross-section of tunnels at Central Terminal Area on 20 October 1994.
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GC admitted to their own concern about the nature of the movements
and called for investigation, which started on 19 October. By 20 October,
the clay running had been removed from above the central part of the
invert over a length of about 20 m, disclosing defects of the joint similar
Figure 9.4 Central Terminal Area, Heathrow. Example of partial availability of data
for convergence vector plot.
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in nature to those already encountered elsewhere in August, described
above. Widespread but apparently uncoordinated concrete patching at
the invert joint was undertaken. This patching continued to fail until
around 02.30 on 20 October 1994, when horizontal cracking of the
adjacent sidewall of the Down Line Platform Tunnel, followed by
spalling concrete, indicated incipient failure. At around 00.45 on 21
October the tunnels were abandoned and collapse of a length of the
Concourse Tunnel from the point of break-out, also the adjacent length
of the Down Line Platform Tunnel, occurred around 01.15. During the
following two days, further collapses occurred affecting the Up Line
Platform Tunnel and an additional length of the Concourse Tunnel in the
vicinity of Ch. 54 (affecting part of the length repaired in August 1994).
The surface contours post-collapse are affected by surface structures, in
particular a slab supported on bored piles over the tunnels extending
from the working shaft to approximately Ch. 25. After investigation and
grouting of voids in the area affected by the collapses, the project was
subsequently completed by sinking a 60 m diameter shaft to envelope
much of the collapsed tunnels. The Health and Safety Executive Report
on the collapse, ‘The Collapse of NATM Tunnels at Heathrow Airport
October 1994’ is due to be published in 2000.
As a consequence of this chain of events, and the presence of these
structures, the pattern of surface subsidence was fairly complicated. There
was a general settlement of about 2 metres covering a wide area, with well
defined cones of depression, in excess of 3 metres total depth:
 
(i) above Ch. 20 of the Down Line Platform Tunnel with a secondary lobe
extending to Ch. 30 of the Concourse Tunnel.
(ii) above Ch. 20 of the Up Line Platform Tunnel.
(iii) the deepest and steepest cone at Ch. 60 of the Concourse Tunnel, at the
E corner of Camborne House.
 
The phenomenon of (iii) above was associated with the movements
subsequent to the initial collapse. It appears that the crown of the length of
tunnel between Ch. 40 and Ch. 54 settled by up to one metre, while beyond
Ch. 54 a length of about 10 metres of tunnel collapsed totally. As a
consequence, a considerable ingress of clay, gravel and water flowed along
the tunnel towards Ch. 80. It seems probable that the lining of the length of
tunnel with defective invert folded around itself, causing circumferential
cracking at Ch. 54, with the adjacent length of tunnel deformed, but
temporarily intact. There would for this reason have been concentrated
loading on this length adjacent to Ch. 54 where the discontinuity would
provoke rupture, probably initially near the springing of the arch, with
progressive failure along this length of tunnel, affected by the previous
damage caused by grout-jacking.
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9.3 Technical explanation of the collapse
There remains scope for conjecture as to the degree of contribution made by
several factors to the collapse. The main purpose of this Chapter is to
describe in general terms how and why the collapse occurred and to point to
lessons to be learned from this experience. Records of tunnel displacements
(e.g. Figure 9.4) provide adequate evidence, notwithstanding sparse data on
account of missing targets, of a predominately circumferential component of
movement at Ch. 30 and Ch. 41 towards the invert. Mature shotcrete may
be assumed to deform linearly elastically, with a modulus of, say, 7-15×103
MPa, depending on quality, up to a working compressive stress of about
two-thirds ultimate unconfined compressive strength of around 25 MPa.
Thereafter, an increasing degree of creep occurs until, at failure, strain may
amount to, say, 0.6–1%. Thus if a lining were subjected to compressive hoop
stress approaching failure, strain might amount to 1%, i.e. 40 mm
convergence for a radius of 4 m. Other than movement affecting the invert
there was no evidence of radial convergence of such a magnitude. The design
indicated stress levels of 6–8 MPa to be expected.
At Ch. 30, arrays of stress cells were included, circumferentially between
shotcrete lining and ground, also radially within the lining. There are well-
known theoretical and practical problems in the use of such cells since their
function assumes that they fully represent the stress-strain properties in three
dimensions of the concrete they displace. Circumferential cells between
ground and structure are difficult to emplace and present particular
problems where high shear stress occurs at the interface. Radial cells are
buried in shotcrete which itself needs to be carefully applied to avoid
‘shadowing’ and yet must be representative of the neighbouring shotcrete.
There is furthermore the problem of drying shrinkage of the inner surface of
the shotcrete which tends to induce bending stress across the thickness of the
lining. No results of the circumferential cells have been published. The radial
cells show reasonably coherent results with hoop stress usually no more than
2 MPa and with the stress at a position near to target 0035 (i.e.
corresponding to the position of 0045 at Ch. 41 on Figure 9.4) falling away
to zero from the last week of September 1994. Since the movement of the
lining is towards the invert, we might reasonably expect compressive load in
the lining to reduce in this direction on account of shear stress between lining
and ground.
The amount of foreshortening of the invert could be obtained by summing
the circumferential contributions of movements (respectively counter-
clockwise and clockwise) of targets such as 0045 and 0048 on Figure 9.4. At
Ch. 30 and Ch. 41, on account of late attachment of targets and of failure
promptly to replace damaged targets, there are missing data which prevent
direct calculation of aggregate movement at any date. Nevertheless, making
use of such data which exist, we may establish strain across the invert, the
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distance between points 0045 and 0048 being about 8 m, from the date of
starting readings (which is usually several days after placing the concrete and
hence omitting prior movement of young concrete since completion of the
ring by 9 July 1994) as Table 9.1, which excludes the accelerating movement
during the last few days. For a compressive stress of 2 MPa and assuming a
low value of E for the shotcrete of 5×103 MPa for such a level of stress, the




This simple calculation establishes that the invert was incompetent over
virtually the full period for which measurements were being taken. If the full
arrays had been in position, the defect would have been all the more obvious.
While trigger values for convergence may be readily estimated as described
below, the cause for any persistent indication of circumferential movement
of the tunnel shell, once the full ring at any point was completed, should have
been investigated.
Although lattice arches had been included around the full periphery of
Types (i) and (iii) of the trial tunnel, the redesign for CTA omitted these
arches for the invert, the arches for the crown being supported on a bench,
the ‘elephant’s foot’. As a consequence there was no template for the
construction of the invert nor any simple positive means for establishing true
alignment between the two sides of the invert joint, which was specified to be
made while the temporary intermediate wall remained in place. It is certain
that errors in construction in the vicinity of this joint represented the main
defects in construction of such nature as:
 
• first (side heading) section of invert cast too flat and too high;
• deficient shotcrete thickness, stated on occasions as less than 50 mm;
• step at junction at foot of side-wall (possibly accentuated by ground
movement prior to completing the ring);
• no continuity in reinforcement at junction at foot of temporary side-wall;
• rebound allowed to accumulate, especially near junction.
Table 9.1 Strain across invert of Concourse Tunnel at Ch. 41
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The failure appears generally to have entailed the first section of invert, that
placed as part of the side heading, riding up and forming a step over the
section placed to complete the enlargement. A failure of this nature, once
started, would tend to be progressive, as developing distortion would lead to
transfer of hoop load along the tunnel, and for further stepping and
concentration of load across any section of the invert remaining intact.
Simple calculations indicate the order of acceptable convergence of a
(near) circular tunnel, without overstress of the shotcrete: (1) Compressive
hoop stress—a limiting strain of 0.1%, for example, would entail 4 mm
radial convergence for a 4 m radius tunnel; (2) Bending stress—for a thin
elliptical ring of semi-diameters a and b, the radius of curvature at the minor
and major axis will be:
Thrusts may then be combined with bending moments, for the known
provision of reinforcement, to establish the ‘trigger values’ for the radial
convergence and elliptical distortion to give warning of high stress of the
shotcrete, which may be presented for each point as a ‘box’ (or of one ‘box’
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within another to provide ‘amber’ and ‘red’ triggers), in view of the degree of
their interdependence.
If, as appears to have been the case for the CTA Concourse Tunnel, the
tunnel was wrapping around itself at the invert, it is possible to use an
approach similar to that outlined above to determine at what stage cracking
and bending failure would be liable to occur. If a reduction∆C occurs in the
circumference, C, with a uniform reduction in radius from r to (r-∆Cr/C), i.e.
to (r-∆C/2π), then:  
indicating a reduction in the tunnel perimeter of about 4%. Such a
simple calculation explains why collapse of the Concourse Tunnel
occurred only after a massive contraction in the periphery of the tunnel
by the failure at the invert. The mandoria shape of the heading of the
adjacent Down Line Platform Tunnel would be susceptible to failure
initially in bending by the release of lateral support combined with
increased vertical loading which would have been a result of the
reduction in perimeter of the Concourse Tunnel and the associated
ground movements downwards and towards this tunnel. The first
visible signs of failure of the Platform Tunnel heading would be
horizontal cracking, followed by slabbing of the shotcrete—having
potential weakness at the interface between layers—and crippling of the
steel mesh reinforcement, all features of sketches made by engineers
during the incipient period of failure. Collapse of the Down Line Tunnel
would then cause failure of the Concourse Tunnel, leading to loss of
support of the Up Line Platform Tunnel, which was separated by a
greater distance between tunnels (Figure 9.3). Subsequent extension of
collapse of the Concourse Tunnel appears to have involved much of the
length of tunnel through ground weakened by the degree of shear
distortion associated with the compensation grouting of August 1994,
and including that section which was repaired in August.
9.4 Failures of management
Having explained, in admittedly over-simplified terms until a
comprehensive numerical analysis establishes the timescale for the several
contributions to the failure and the phenomena associated with the
collapse, it is then necessary, for lessons of value for the future, to
understand the circumstances in which these contributory features were
permitted to occur.
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Firstly, the system of project management was inept for the nature of the
work, without strong direction to ensure that the Contractor fully
understood the special and unfamiliar responsibilities placed to his charge
and assurance that resources and systems were fully adequate in all respects
to carry these out. The criteria for success were evidently not understood by
BB and the resources committed by GC were quite inadequate to undertake
a role of design, monitoring and interpretation of instrumented records of
consequences of construction. The duty of ensuring that construction
complied with design was a function of GC. Quality control remained with
BB without apparent appreciation of the rigorous practices that this should
have involved in ensuring compliance with design. There was a procedure of
‘Corrective Action Requests’ which needed to be ‘signed off’ by GC, but
subject to a process whereby such notices would not be seen until an elapse
of days, by which time any defect in the invert for example would be covered
up and any remedial work would have caused major disruption to progress.
(After the events of August 1994, the practices were improved which may
account for the failure stopping short of the traverse beneath the Piccadilly
Line, Figure 9.2.)
GC was represented at site by a single engineer experienced in NATM,
who had also to cover similar work at Terminal 4 and, for a period,
junction lengths at Skepiston Lane, Sipsons Farm and Custom House
shafts (Figure 9.1). BB employed three, later four, so-called NATM
engineers whose principal function was the installation and reading of
instruments (but not of the vital optical targets on the lining for measuring
‘convergence’ which was undertaken by BB surveyors). They had no
specific responsibility for the quality of construction work although they
commented upon it from time to time. The arrays of optical targets were
not adequately maintained but there is no evidence of any insistence upon
ensuring that all targets were in place or replaced following damage,
although the widely circulated records must have indicated the extent of
deficiencies. All those familiar with this type of work emphasise that these
indicators of ‘convergence’ provide the most important and reliable source
of monitoring data.
The general picture is that of failure of BB to recognise their vital role in
a design-led system of construction. GC should have committed resources
adequate for their responsibilities; they should also have concentrated
upon the most vital priority, that of monitoring tunnel movements against
established ‘trigger values’ which required explanation or investigation.
The specific feature of excessive circumferential movements of tunnel
optical targets should have given rise to a requirement for immediate
investigation which would have resulted in identification of the faulty
workmanship. It is particularly remarkable that the tunnel invert for the
initial length of the Concourse Tunnel up to about Ch. 54 was not
investigated following the failure associated with grout-jacking in August
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1994 described earlier since this was the length of tunnel at the beginning
of the learning curve.
The question needs to be asked as to why, if the evidence for incipient
collapse was so obvious, none of the engineers on the project, to whom the
records were circulated at intervals, asked searching questions requiring
explanations of the anomalous behaviour of the tunnel (the tentative
questions that were asked were given bland reassuring replies). This
feature is indeed difficult to explain but at least a partial explanation is
found in the air of esoteric mystery that pervades NATM, encouraged by
many of its promoters. Those who assume that there indeed exists an
occult art, beyond the rules for good engineering, may put unjustifiable
faith in the ‘experts’ with the undesirable effect that scepticism is set aside
and even the most obvious questions not asked. A more normal practice
among engineers, of explaining what they are doing and why, would have
avoided development of such a degree of unwarranted confidence. It must
now be apparent that all that was required from GC in monitoring
construction was to exercise straight-forward application of sound
engineering principles.
9.5 Summary of factors contributing to failure
Summarised below are a number of factors seen as contributing to the
collapse of the Heathrow tunnels. These features appear sufficient to explain
the nature and timing of the collapse without the need to conjure up a deus
ex machina. What is remarkable is that if any one of the issues set out below
had been addressed competently, in all probability the collapse would not
have occurred. Although no lives were lost, this was an expensive accident.
The cost of the collapse is stated (New Civil Engineer 18 February 1999 p. 4)
as £35M to BB, £35M to BAA, £100M to BAA and BB insurers, £50M for
airport disruption, £200M for the associated stoppage of working on
NATM construction for the Jubilee Line Extension, apart from court fines of
£1.2M to BB and £0.5M to GC plus costs (appeal by GC was subsequently
dismissed). The original tender value was around £60M. Other
consequential costs are excluded from these figures.
9.5.1 The project management
The underlying cause for the incident is undoubtedly to be found in the
adoption of an unfamiliar system of project management based on the New
Engineering Contract (NEC) (Institution of Civil Engineers 1993), without
thought for the special measures necessary to ensure that the responsibilities
placed on the Contractor were fully specified, recognised and implemented.
The New Engineering Contract is essentially a framework document, with
different options for the contractual base, which requires to be accompanied
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by a procurement strategy taking account of the special features of the
project.
9.5.2 Relationship between design and construction
On the one hand, adoption of the method of construction was
predicated on special knowledge on design and monitoring to be
brought by GC; on the other hand, pressures towards least cost
confined GC to resources inadequate to provide even minimal control
of the work, and lacking the powers of control appropriate for a design-
led system of construction. It should have been evident from the outset
that GC were unable, on account of limits on their powers and
resources, to undertake the role on which success depended. With the
function of self-certification imposed on BB, it was essential, at the time
of tender, to ensure a fully adequate system of design control of this
work since additional requirements imposed subsequently would lead
to increased costs to the Employer.
The NEC contains no advice on the exceptions to the statement of a break
in the design process at the time of inviting tenders (Section 7.7). Where it is
expedient to procure a project through design-and-build, there is bound to
be a hiatus at this stage. Where, as for tunnelling, it is essential to overcome
this problem, it is the job of the drafter of the Contract terms to make
provision, in one of several possible means, to overcome this problem,
possibly by a form of ‘partnering’, prior to negotiation on terms, and in any
circumstances ensuring that the design concepts and assumptions are fully
understood and taken into account by the Contractor. Quality assurance for
many forms of tunnelling will need to address the specific needs for a tunnel
to be ‘right first time’ and to preclude vital defects from being overlooked.
Here once again (and see Chapter 7) it is necessary to ensure that QA
procedures are not confined to a narrow definition of permanent works, in
recognition that phases of construction procedures may be vital to the
temporary—or even longer term—security of the works. Broader criteria for
good practice are described elsewhere in this book.
9.5.3 Acceptance standards of construction
The contract placed on BB the responsibility that construction complied with
design. Only after completion of a considerable length of tunnelling was
there counter-action following appreciation that the system of Corrective
Action Requests (CARs) and System Defect Notices (SDNs) was not
ensuring full compliance with the requirements of design. This did not
however lead to investigation of the extent of hidden defects of the section
already built which would have allowed a planned correction programme in
a timely manner.
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9.5.4 Compensation grouting
As described in Section 9.3, compensation grouting under Camborne
House was in reality grout-jacking, requiring pressures in excess of
preexisting vertical ground stress. The ratio of horizontal to vertical stress
(K0) in the London clay at Heathrow at the depth of the tunnels is probably
not greatly in excess of unity (assumed by different authors for purposes of
analysis as between 1.15 and 1.5). The prior construction of the tunnel
would have been associated with ground movements towards the tunnel
which would have further reduced local horizontal stress, probably also
affected by the failure of the tunnel invert prior to this time. In
consequence, the excess pressure at the grouting point could well have
exceeded the in situ horizontal ground stress, which would cause grout to
follow joints or paths of weakness at inclined or even sub-vertical angles.
This could then have added to the loading on the crippled tunnel,
contributing to the already noted tunnel distortion. Evidence for such
inclined grout paths was disclosed by the excavation subsequent to the
collapse.
9.5.5 Monitoring
There is no evidence that there was any reaction by GC to the consistent
records of circumferential movement of the tunnel lining coupled with
depression of the crown. There was no acceptable explanation for this
phenomenon other than a weakness of the invert. The fact that such
weakness had been exposed over the length of invert investigated in August
1994 makes this lack of reaction all the more extraordinary. Since GC did
not indicate to others any hint of the magnitudes of acceptable deflections
or movement of the lining, there was no quantitative ‘trigger’ to spur calls
for action from others. The poor maintenance of the arrays of optical
targets would have made it appear that there was no serious cause for such
monitoring to be undertaken beyond the provision of data, which data
were provided in figures and diagrams devoid of comment. Nevertheless,
the data caused BAA to question the integrity of the tunnel, an
apprehension dismissed summarily by BB. Here, again, the over-
dependence on an engineer with claims for exclusive skill, is exposed as a
hazard. The acceptance of the evidence of incipient failure did not require
egregious skill.
It has been suggested that acceleration of recorded closure of the tunnel
invert during the last fortnight prior to the collapse might have been fully
attributable to the advance and temporary stoppage of the adjacent Platform
Tunnels. This suggestion does not bear examination since Ch. 41 is well
beyond any affective zone of influence of the partially excavated length of
the Platform Tunnels, so long as they remained intact, prior to the collapse.
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9.5.6 Failure to investigate
In many forms of contract, there is a requirement on the Contractor to
investigate any suspected defect, for which the Contractor is reimbursed if
no such defect is found. There was no similar imposition on BB so that, in the
event of a rebuttal by BB of an expression of concern by HEX, a major
‘compensation event’ (in the terms of the NEC) would have arisen. The
operation of audit by HEX was inadequate to establish the extent to which
the process of ‘self-certification’ was failing.
9.6 Events post collapse
After the causes for collapse had been investigated, work was resumed with
major changes in procedure (Powell et al. 1997). MM responsibilities for
design were extended to include Informal Support work, the basis of the
Contract with BB became a Target Contract, and steps were taken towards
‘partnering’ in the resolution of problems—all generally features of a late
blossoming of enlightenment.
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planning 70–96; desk study 75;limits of
deviation 49; multi-purpose 87;
scenarios 77; serial 78, 87–8;sieving
process 53
private finance 240;BOT (Build,
Operate, Transfer) 81, 83;DBO
(Design, Build and Operate) 240–1;
PFI (Private Finance Initiative) 82,
83; tolls, credit transfer 98
procurement 217–19; in planning 89;
tendering 94
profession 35; essential feature 216;
performance audit 52; standards
256; in team 39
project management 215–42; continuity
in design 243;of early tunnels 34–5;
faults 218; fragmentation 221, 232,
238; functions of 222; integrated
75;in practice 227–30; principles
226–7; problems 35, 60; surrogate
operator 226








Reference Conditions 45–6, 200, 233,
235, 260, 264; NEC 238;for
Øresund Link 240
Rennie, J. 13
risk 39, 41, 59, 93;ALARP (as low as
reasonably practical) principle 42;
analysis 42; climate of 92, 276;
control 42–3; event tree 86;factors
of 197; geological 44; hazard 41, 42;
mitigation 44; opportunity 41;
sharing 198–201, 232; strategy 244,
275; in tunnelling 42
roadheaders 31, 51; as option 146;
tolerance 47
rock bolts and dowels 19, 20, 26, 28;
resin-bonded glass fibre 148;see also
support
rock characteristics competence 131,
134, 204; continuum 131;
cyclothems 205; jointed 132, 134;
weak 61, 132, 136 205
rock drills compressed air 15;drilling
carriage (jumbo) 15; hydraulic 31;
jumpers 15; rotary-impact 15; steam
15
Rock Mass Classification (RMC) 26;
limitations 61, 182, 204;multi-
dimensional approach 61–2, 182





segmental lining 15, 21, 51, 143;cast-
iron 16, 17, 19; Donseg 21–2, 155;
expanded 18–9, 21–2, 24–5, 154;
gaskets 157, 160; jacked 21, 24,
155; joints 21, 24, 155; junctions
24; Lee-McCall bars 24; as option
145; reinforced concrete 19, 25,
155, 157; shear keys 23;spheroidal
graphite iron 24; steel 24; tapered
21, 159; with TBM 30
seismic hazards 43
self-certification 275




275;compensating 28, 108, 165,
276;subsidence damage 84
shaft break-out 202, 247; freezing 32
shield 15; types 16–19; trailing bars
151
site investigation 46, 58, 101–6;how
much? 111–14;Interpretative Report
205; in planning 80; reporting 114
Sommeiller, G. 15
special expedients 210–14; initial length
202; see also compressed air;
freezing; ground treatment; pumping
Indexes 307
spoil disposal 202–3
Sprayed concrete (shotcrete): 20, 26,
28–9, 51, 143; for early support
148; fibre reinforced 29,
153;robotics 29, 153; shadowing
29, 280
SCL (sprayed concrete linings) 29, 149,
160, 271–288; defects 277–9;
junctions 160
squeezing rock 25, 28, 141, 117, 149
stability ratio (simple overload factor)
140–2
stand-up time 137–8
steel support 18, 28; arches 19, 26,
143, 151–2; packing 26, 151;
inclined arches 148; lattice arches
29, 153; yielding arches 26, 28, 152
stereoplots 115–16
support 62, 134; anchors 26; block
stability 134–6; polings 16; spiles
15, 28; supplementary 67–9;see also
SCL, segmental linings, steel
support, timbered support




swelling ground 145, 258
systems 37, adaptability 189, 190;in






timbered support 13–14, 18, 35
tombs and temples 10
trial tunnels 29, 55, 204, 273
tunnelling canal 13–14; cut-and-cover
9; defects 257–60; headings 28;
junctions 160; method 202–10; pilot
17; pressure 21, 166–7; road 17,
85–6; for sapping 12; subaqueous 9;
tunnels: Abbotscliff 18; Ahmed Hamdi
96; Albanus, Lake 12; Antwerp 17;
Arlberg 28; Athens 12; Bath 95;
Biber 13; Blackwall 17; Bopeep 258;
Bologna-Florence 153; Bridgewater
13; Cairo 197; Canyon 118;
Carsington 262; CERN 96;City and
South London 17; Clyde 34, 96,
211, 236, 249; Col di Tenda 13;
Cumae 12; East Boston 18;
Euphrates 9; Fréjus (Mont Cenis)
15, Fucinus, Lake 12; Furnas 257;
Geelong 258; Hallandsäs 213;
Harecastle 13; Hong Kong Bank
164; Hudson River 17, 33;Jubilee
Line Extension 42, 241, 248; Kariba
113; Keilder 137, 204; Kelvin 113;
Lee Valley-Hampton 21;Lodano-
Losagno 26; London drainage 18;
London Underground 19; Malpas
13; Mersey rail 18; Milchbuck 214;
New Cross 16; Orange-Fish 140,
204, 236; Paris Metro 250;Potters
Bar 23–4, 203, 236; Puteoli 12;
Rotherhithe 17; St Gotthard Base
103; Samos 12; Sangatte 18;Severn
cable 107; Shakespeare 18; Siloam
10; Simplon 25; Singaport MRT
165; Snowy Mountains 26;Southern
Box 95; Storebaelt 34, 160, 207,
212; Tauern 28, Thames (East
London) 15, 16, 17, 96, 179, 257,
260; Tower Hill 16; Tronquoy 14;
Victoria Line 24, 55, 154, 204;
Wraysbury-Iver 113, 214, 251;see
also Abbeystead; Channel;
Heathrow Cargo; Heathrow Express
Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) 30, 35,
149–51; Batignolles 18; Beaumont
18, 30; bentonite (slurry) 16, 30;
bimodal 192; Brunton 18;closed face
30; Crampton 18; English 18; EPBM
30; as option 146; Price 18; range
191–2; Whitaker 18
 




da Vinci, L. 13
Vitruvius 12
 
whole life cost 54
